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Leading to Crisis: Decision-Making in Ireland’s Celtic Tiger 
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Abstract 
The meteoric rise and catastrophic fall of Ireland’s economy between 1997 and 2010 is a 
compelling story.  The so-called Celtic Tiger disappeared and Ireland turned to international 
partners for financial assistance. This research seeks to understand the causes of the economic 
crash in Ireland, and - more specifically - to better understand one of the regularly cited 
causes: poor economic decision-making.  
The puzzle for this research is to reveal which factors influenced policy-makers in Ireland 
and how those factors impacted decision-making. This includes better understanding the 
presence and impact of irrationality in policy-making. The research seeks to determine (i) 
whether evidence of active, impactful irrationality among key decision-makers in the period 
before Ireland’s crash is detectable using a quantitative method, and linked to this (ii) what 
role did interests, institutions, and ideology play in poor decision-making. 
The research proposes that leaders in Ireland fell victim to higher relative levels of a 
particular form of decision-making bias, behavioural convergence, and that this can be tested 
using the leadership traits conceptual complexity and in-group bias as a proxy, employing the 
Leadership Trait Analysis technique. Contrary to the hypothesis, the research finds that Irish 
leaders in the run up to the crisis had higher rather than lower scores for conceptual 
complexity, and lower rather than higher in-group-bias, relative to other leaders. The thesis 
finds that personality trait scores vary considerably over time, that the position that the leader 
holds, and that the decision-making context can have a significant impact on leaders’ trait 
scores. Further, the nature of the content analysed (ad libbed versus pre-prepared text) can 
also have a significant impact on scores. 
Next, process tracing a decision case-study finds evidence of interests, institutions, and 
ideology impacting on decision-outcomes. However, it is the combination of ideological and 
institutional factors that have the clearest negative impact. The research brings these 
learnings together to help inform better decision-making, and indicates scope for further 
research arising from this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
 
  
1 
 
Chapter 1: The Economic Crisis in Ireland 
1.1 Introduction 
The meteoric rise and catastrophic fall of Ireland’s economy between 1997 and 2010 is a 
compelling story. Since the Irish State was founded in 1922 its economy suffered some highs 
but many more lows. From the stabilising policies of the 1920s, to the economic nationalism 
of the 1930s and 1940s, the stagnation and emigration in the 1950s, the outward looking 
revival of the 1960s, through the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, Ireland had spent 
seventy years seeking out a sustainable economic model that would foster growth and 
employment, and reverse decades of population loss to emigration.  
 By the end of the 1990s it was thought that Ireland had arrived at such a model as the 
‘Celtic Tiger’ emerged. In 1996 there were 250,000 more people living in Ireland than in 
1986, 216,000 more people at work, and the Irish economy moved from being “among the 
poorest in Europe”, to being dubbed “the region’s star” (The Economist, May 15th 1997).   
The Celtic Tiger moniker was earned by virtue of an economy growing at East Asian rather 
than West European rates. Ireland’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 10 per cent in 
1995 and by 7 per cent in 1996.  
 From the beginning of the next decade things began to change. Ireland’s 
competitiveness decreased sharply as labour costs rose in real and absolute terms, public 
expenditure growth exceeded economic growth (including public sector pay and numbers), 
current account surpluses became deficits, household debt climbed, bank lending increased 
strongly, Ireland’s share of international trade fell, and - perhaps most critically - the tax base 
became unstable (Regling and Watson, 2010: 26). Yet, in 2007 Ireland’s economy appeared 
in relatively rude health. Economic growth was running at 5 per cent. The unemployment rate 
was 4.5 per cent. Employment was growing by over 70,000 jobs per year. Gross current 
spending was to increase by 11.5 per cent, and gross capital spending by 13 per cent. 
Ireland’s gross debt to GDP ratio was under 25 per cent, one of the lowest in Europe.  
 Within two years, Ireland had entered what has been described as a crisis of five 
overlapping elements: a banking crisis, a public finance crisis, an economic crisis, a social 
crisis, and a reputational crisis (NESC, 2009). Strong economic growth had turned into a 7 
per cent contraction. In four budgets between July 2008 and December 2009, government 
spending was cut by €9 billion. Another year later and Ireland was, in the words of the 
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government, facing an economic crisis without parallel in its recent history. GDP had fallen 
by nearly 15 per cent from its height in 2007. Over 320,000 jobs had been lost since 
employment peaked in 2007. The gross debt to GDP ratio was 80 per cent. In 2010 Ireland 
turned to international partners for financial assistance. That assistance included financial 
support from the European Union (EU), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and bilateral 
loans from the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark, and was on the on the basis of 
specified conditions.  
 It is decision-making by Ireland’s leaders over the period from the end of the 
sustainable growth to the onset of the crash that is of interest to this research. More 
specifically, the research seeks to explain why policy-makers acted the way they did, and 
better explain the disastrous decisions they took in the decade before the crisis.   
1.2 The Puzzle: Why Decision-Makers Acted as They Did 
The purpose of the thesis is to seek to understand the causes of the economic crash in Ireland, 
and, more specifically, to better understand one of the regularly cited causes: poor economic 
decision-making. The poor economic policy pursued in Ireland emerged despite advice which 
if acted upon may have mitigated the subsequent crisis (e.g. action to address declining 
national competitiveness). The over-heated property market occurred in a time of 
unprecedented economic expansion, encouraged by pro-cyclical fiscal policies, individuals’ 
investment errors, banking and regulatory errors, and poor political decisions. The thesis 
seeks to explain those decisions.  
 The scale of the Irish economic disaster makes it an important and interesting case for 
official investigations and academic studies, and many have been undertaken since the crash. 
Official investigations include those by the Honohan (2010), Wright (2010), Regling and 
Watson 2010), Nyberg (2011), and by the Houses of the Oireachtas (2016). Other relevant 
works include those by Allen (2009), Kinsella and Leddin (2010), Kirby (2010), Whelan 
(2010), Drudy and Collins (2011), McCabe (2011), and Woods and O’Connell (2012). 
Analysis of the wider crisis can be found in Buti (2009) and Esposito (2014).  It is now 
accepted that Ireland’s policy-makers did received advice from international organisations 
that if heeded would probably have helped bolster the economy against the global crisis 
which emerged in 2007, but also that this advice was not delivered forcefully and 
unequivocally enough (O’Leary, 2010; Wright, 2010; Nyberg, 2011; Houses of the 
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Oireachtas, 2016). Domestically, warnings on Ireland’s deteriorating national 
competitiveness were also sounded (see Appendix A).   
 The puzzle for this research is to reveal the factors influencing policy-makers in 
Ireland and how those factors impacted the decision-making process, to in turn explain the 
failure of government to respond to policy advice. In short, what caused these bad decisions? 
Based on analysis to date, the causes of poor policy-making in Ireland are so well-known and 
(now) so obvious as to warrant little further exposition: key decision-makers believed that the 
basis for growth was robust, that market regulation and supervision was satisfactory, financial 
institutions were sound, and that the boom would continue and/or there would be a soft-
landing. These decision-makers were caught-up in, and benefiting from, a cheap credit-
fuelled property and construction bubble to such an extent that any suggestion of significant 
policy change, which in hindsight may have head-off or mitigated the crash by protecting 
competitiveness, was ignored (e.g. moderating public expenditure, stabilising the taxation 
base, cooling the property market). This disastrous consensus was in turn the result of a naïve 
belief in the efficiency of financial markets, supported by irrational forces (Nyberg, 2011). 
Nyberg acknowledged the powerful, negative influence of the paradigm of efficient financial 
markets i.e. the assumption that developments in financial markets, almost by definition, 
could not be seriously flawed from a systemic point of view, and that regulation of the 
financial markets would reduce innovation and efficiency without improving stability. But his 
investigation identified another overarching, causal issue: 
“It is the belief of the Commission that stronger, irrational forces were also present. 
The widespread consensus as well as the confidence, until the very last moment in 
late 2008, that everything would end relatively well points to the existence of a 
national speculative mania in Ireland during the Period, centred on the sale and 
acquisition of property. Warning signs were ignored as continuing economic stability 
was confidently assumed. Traditional values and practices were seen as less relevant 
in the new financial order. When the mania ended, participants had difficulty in 
accepting blame for their own part in it since everything had seemed so normal and 
acceptable at the time” – Nyberg, 2011: 94 
Whereas the role of the markets in the crisis and the failure of financial market regulation 
specifically, are well understood as a result of the aforementioned research, the concept of 
irrational forces and when and how they impacted economic decision-making in Ireland is 
less well developed. Nyberg identified two specific irrational forces, groupthink and herding, 
and Lunn (2013) developed this approach further, concluding that one likely contributor to 
the non-progression of ostensibly sound economic policy was the impact of a number of 
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empirically-established behavioural biases held by decision-makers, of which groupthink and 
herding were just two examples. Behavioural biases (Nyberg’s irrational forces) are 
systematic errors in judgements and choices which are influenced by emotions. A 
behavioural economics approach focussing on the impact of behavioural biases, including 
groupthink has been a feature of analysis of Ireland’s economic crash. As one witness told the 
official Inquiry: 
“The various players, including politicians, builders, bankers and regulators, 
displayed 'behaviour exhibiting bandwagon effects both between institutions 
(herding) and within them (groupthink”) - Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry 
into the Banking Crisis Vol. 1, Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 54 
The witness, a journalist and author on Ireland’s crash agreed with Nyberg’s conclusion that 
various institutions in the run-up to the Irish crisis fell victim to irrational forces, exhibited 
groupthink and herding, hindrance of critical thinking and overall risk assessment, 
widespread consensus, and confidence until the very last moment in late 2008 that everything 
would end relatively well (Nyberg, 2011: 7, 48, 49, 94 and 95).  
 The almost unanimous acceptance of what proved to be disastrous views within 
public policy and discourse was, according to Nyberg and others, at the heart of what went 
wrong in Ireland. There was a stubborn confidence in a persistent era of economic stability, 
and asset-wealth growth. Given the scale of the crisis and its implications for an entire 
economy and society, it is natural to seek to get to the heart of what went wrong in Ireland, 
not just for the sake of the Irish but to inform policy approaches in other economies. The 
2011 investigation was based on an in-depth examination of the role of the banks and 
auditors in Ireland’s crash as you would expect. Interestingly from a political science point of 
view, Nyberg also examined the role of public institutions including Regulators and 
Government Departments. The investigation’s contention that “groupthink could easily exist 
in public institutions, with a publicly mandated and thus strongly empowered leader 
gradually eliminating independent critical analysis among staff” Nyberg, 2011: 9) is 
important; it was not only banks, stock traders, investors, or property developers/purchasers 
alone who were victims of groupthink. 
The use of the words irrational forces is, of course, both interesting and central to this 
research.  Recent studies of Ireland’s economic crisis highlight the presence and impact of 
behavioural factors.  
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“Regling and Watson refer to ‘euphoric conditions’, a ‘national blind-spot’ and 
behaviour ‘embedded in collective psychology’. The now Governor of the Central 
Bank, Patrick Honohan, describes ‘mass psychology’; a ‘construction frenzy’ and 
‘hysterical’ financial markets. Whelan blames ‘over-optimism’, especially in relation 
to the continuation of Ireland’s abnormally high economic growth. In addition to 
invoking herding and groupthink, Nyberg refers to national ‘mania’; FitzGerald even 
calls it ‘madness’” – Lunn, 2013: 565. 
These references to behavioural biases in analysis of the crisis in Ireland, albeit often in what 
he calls a ‘folk-psychology’ manner, prompted Lunn (2013) to apply a behavioural 
economics approach and assess whether known biases in decision-making were instrumental 
in the development and severity of the crisis. Lunn sought evidence that key decision-makers, 
including politicians, were influenced by specific behavioural bias phenomena and which 
have been identified previously via experiments and field studies.  
 In short, Lunn picks up where Nyberg finished and expanded upon the idea of 
irrational forces. He suggests policy-makers in Ireland may have ignored policy advice that 
now seems indisputable, because they, for example, predicted future outcomes based on the 
past (extrapolation bias), placed greater weight on existing beliefs (confirmation bias), 
predicted outcomes too positively and overestimated the accuracy of those predictions 
(overconfidence bias), were adverse to uncertainty (ambiguity aversion), conformed to 
majority views (behavioural convergence), were drawn toward immediate rewards (time 
inconsistency), or gave inordinate weight to losses or gains (loss/gain asymmetry) (Lunn, 
2013: 566). These biases, and an emphasis on irrationality as an explanation for Ireland’s 
crisis, have been a feature of many studies of the crash. In fact the broad approach to 
governance in the years preceding the crash has been described as “the politics of hubris”, 
where Ireland was a “hotbed of consensus politics”, and external warnings to government 
were summarily dismissed (Murphy, 2016: 103-128). Whelan (2010) reviews Ireland’s 
economic performance of the preceding two decades, from the early days of the so-called 
Celtic Tiger, through to the housing boom, and the crash, and then attempts to draw some 
lessons. Whelan refers to the apparent consensus among economists that economic growth 
was likely to continue at a healthy pace, adding:  
“It was hardly surprising that Fianna Fáil was re-elected to government in 2007 on the 
basis of an election manifesto whose underlying assumption was that growth over the 
following five years would average 4.5 per cent per year. Rather than challenge these 
assumptions, the opposition political parties largely agreed with this assessment. This 
over-optimism was, I believe, the fundamental source of a range of different policy 
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mistakes which left Ireland badly placed for coping with the economic slowdown to 
come” – Whelan, 20 : 238 
In this one synopsis alone one can detect extrapolation and overconfidence biases which 
feature on Lunn’s list of established behavioural decision-making biases. Whelan says that 
the over-optimism (as opposed to overconfidence bias) about economic growth that prevailed 
during the period leading up to 2007 was responsible for a number of serious policy errors.  
In his 2014 study, Mercille points to impact of irrationality in an examination of Irish 
mainstream media coverage of Ireland’s housing bubble that burst in 2007. Mercille states 
that because the boom was advantageous to key sectors of the Irish corporate and political 
establishment (e.g. builders and developers, banks, the government and property firms), it 
was never seriously challenged, despite it being “possible to identify bubbles with a 
reasonable degree of confidence before they burst” (Mercille, 2014: 286 and 287). The work 
goes on to show that media performance in Ireland fits the description Nyberg gave to 
finance industry where there was a large amount of herd behaviour and groupthink (i.e. 
behavioural convergence bias) “pointing to an uncritical acceptance and following of the 
dominant trends and decisions that sustained the boom and led to the bust” (Mercille, 2014: 
287). 
 Getting more specific of the role of leaders in the lead up to Ireland’s economic 
collapse, Brennan and Conroy (2013) analyse the CEO letters to shareholders of a bank over 
ten years for evidence of CEO personality traits, including narcissism (a contributor to 
hubris), hubris, overconfidence and CEO-attribution. This followed newspaper speculation 
that the banking crisis of 2008 was partly caused by CEO hubris. In addition, following 
predictions that hubris increases the longer individuals occupy positions of power, the authors 
examine whether hubristic characteristics intensify over time. 
Not unlike this research, Brennan and Conroy analyse whether there is evidence of 
bias (hubris) by means of content analysis to gain insights into the personality of the person 
making the utterances, using proxies for the bias; in this case the content is bank CEO letters 
to shareholders. This is based on the authors’ belief that content analysis has the potential to 
reveal how the mind-sets of the individuals being studied function, citing Craig and 
Amernic’s (2011) suggestion that analysis of corporate communication has the potential to 
reveal linguistic traces of personality. Using discourse analysis, they study destructive 
narcissism as revealed in the CEO letters of Enron, Starbucks and General Motors. Craig and 
Amernic analyse CEOs’ public language, which mediates the interactions of their companies 
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and organisational audiences for those corporate disclosures (Brennan and Conroy, 2013: 
180). As discussed later, this research is based on the argument that that analysis of 
communication by political leaders in parliament also has the potential to reveal traces of 
personality. Revealing these traits is important for Brennan and Conroy as, again in a similar 
vein to this research, their work is based on the assumption that “cognitive biases can have a 
potentially detrimental effect on corporate performance if the executives exhibiting such 
behaviours are left unchecked” (Brennan and Conroy, 2013: 188). Their content analysis of 
CEO utterances does point to hubris syndrome in the character of the CEO, concluding that 
“these symptoms might act as a warning to boards of directors in relation to the character 
traits they look for when recruiting CEOs” (Brennan and Conroy, 2013: 190). 
Another study of decision-makers in the lead up to Ireland’s economic woes has been 
undertaken by Dowling and Lucey (2014). By taking a behavioural economics approach to 
their analysis of the role of Boards of Directors in Irish banks’ risk management, and 
exploring the likely presence of behavioural biases among senior executives, they find the 
Irish context provides a pertinent case study of what can happen when hubris and associated 
behavioural biases take control of a bank’s risk management strategy (Dowling and Lucey, 
2014: 1). Similar to this research, Dowling and Lucey ask why catastrophic events came to 
pass, how did established external processes not prevent or slow down activity that 
precipitated disaster. They explore the role of Bank Boards in their control and oversight 
function of risk and particularly highlight some of the behavioural perspectives. Their starting 
point is the view that “[e]xisting studies of risk governance by Board of Directors generally 
ignore this role of behavioural characteristics of directors, both individually and as a group, 
despite significant recent evidence that these behavioural characteristics can play an 
important part in determining firm risk attitudes and carrying out of the risk oversight 
function.” (Dowling and Lucey, 2014: 3 and 4).  
This research has a similar starting point, but rather than examining Boards of 
Directors, focusses on political decision-makers in government.  Interestingly, the authors 
also employ Lunn’s categories of established biases (2013), and claim that at “a national or 
aggregate level in Ireland all these biases were demonstrably present” (Dowling and Lucey, 
2014: 7). This claim is based on (i) a general consensus in the national elections of 2002 and 
2007 that the economic circumstances would continue to be benign, (ii) demonstrations that 
macroeconomic forecasts for Ireland were consistently overoptimistic, (iii) central bank and 
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stability reports showing no major concern with the housing bubble, and (iv) lack of 
willingness to challenge the consensus and change economic course. The paper focuses on 
the banking system and finds evidence of pervasive bias in the fact that the short-term 
liquidity issues of the banks in 2008 dominated the long-term questions on solvency, and that 
“banks and policy makers continued to pour money into manifestly insolvent banks and 
banks likewise poured money into insolvent borrowers rather than take the embedded losses” 
(Dowling and Lucey, 2014: 7 and 8).  
While Dowling and Lucey’s analysis presents evidence of how biases played out 
among decision-makers within the banks, they do not broaden out this out to an examination 
of decision-makers in government, which is the purpose of this research.  Rather they argue 
that senior decision-makers in Irish banks were subject to considerable behavioural biases 
affecting their approach to risk taking, which along with Brennan and Conroy’s work, and 
Mercille’s examination of the media, is an important element in our overall understanding of 
decision-making in the years preceding Ireland’s economic crash.  
 Notwithstanding all of these contributions, a number of gaps remain.  First, evidence 
of the presence of behavioural biases specifically among key political decision-makers in 
Ireland is absent. The studies on Ireland referenced above do deal with biases directly but do 
not assess the political leaders involved. International studies have assessed political leaders 
but not through the prism of behavioural bias (van Esch, 2015). Testing for the presence of 
impactful irrationality among decision-makers in government is at the heart of this research. 
It is analysis of this kind which can best inform processes to reduce the likelihood of 
disastrous decision-making occurring again.    
Second, Lunn’s analysis notes that the circumstances of Irish decision-makers during 
the crisis closely parallel contexts that are known empirically to produce these biases. This 
research unlike any previous analyses seeks evidence of irrationality among political 
decision-makers using material from the time the decisions were being taken. This will allow 
a more precise examination of any claim that Ireland’s decision-makers fell victim to 
irrational forces at the moment a poor decision was being made.  
Third, evidence that biases were more prevalent in Ireland versus elsewhere is also 
absent, would be novel and is worthy of empirical analysis. In attempting to explain why did 
the crisis happen in Ireland, Lunn’s answers include the suggestion that behavioural biases 
may have been fomented by the length and extent of the so-called Celtic Tiger, which was 
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extraordinary by international standards meaning that biases hypothesised were likely to be 
magnified by the extraordinary scale of Ireland’s boom (Lunn, 2013: 584). Thus, some 
method of assessing the strength of irrationality in Ireland relative to levels amongst decision-
makers in other economies would be most useful in developing the explanatory power of 
behavioural biases with regard to the causes of Ireland’s crisis. 
 Finally, irrationality is part of the human condition, ever-present and predictable 
(Ariely, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). Yet previous analysis suggests it was particularly impactful 
in the years immediately preceding the crash, compared to other periods of time. This raises a 
number of questions. Why was irrationality more prevalent and impactful at this time? Was it 
activated by other factors? Were such activating factors the root cause of the problem, rather 
than irrationality?   McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2013) posit that interests, institutions, 
and ideology ‘lurk behind’ poor policy decisions. For example, interests influence decision-
makers by mobilising constituencies, via direct expenditure on electoral campaigns, and by 
the production and provision of information. In addition, institutional arrangements can have 
a significant bearing on information flows, and levels of expertise. Finally, ideology can 
justify erroneous action or inaction, despite events and information suggesting a particular 
course of action (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2013: 15, 72, 73, and 112-114). This 
research investigates the role played by these three factors in activating irrationality and/or 
the extent to which they in and of themselves explain poor decision-making.    
 To paraphrase Vennessen, although it can be argued that the phenomena of interest 
here (irrationality, behavioural bias, groupthink, interests, institutions, and ideology)  are 
obviously impactful, and can be deemed so by common-sense intuition, the implications of 
previous studies, or deductive reasoning, this research is based on a belief that if and how 
they impact decision-makers is an empirical question, and only painstaking empirical 
investigation can uncover them fully (Vennessen 2008: 233).   Thus, notwithstanding the 
extensive analysis to date, two important questions about the genesis of Ireland’s economic 
crisis remain: 
1. Is evidence of active, impactful irrationality among key decision-makers in the period 
before Ireland’s crash detectable using a quantitative method? 
2. What role did interests, institutions, and ideology play in poor decision-making? 
The first question is borne out of the need to test assertions made about the role played by 
irrationality in the economic crisis, and an optimism that perhaps policy-makers need not wait 
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to employ painful hindsight to confirm the presence of levels of irrationality which damage 
economic policy-making.  The second question is posed with the broader objective of 
informing responses to counteract any negative link detected between can interests, 
institutions, and ideology, and suboptimal policy decisions more generally.  
1.3 Thesis Structure  
In Part I, Chapter 2 sets out how the learnings from behavioural economics can enhance our 
understanding of how an economic crisis such as the one experienced in Ireland arises. Using 
a framework that more accurately reflects how decisions are really made, reveals new 
considerations for those seeking to understand how decision outcomes are arrived at. Far 
from being fully rational and utility-maximising, decision-makers are impacted by emotions, 
are limited by bounded rationality, and are subject to empirically established biases (irrational 
forces). One of these biases in particular, behavioural convergence bias (groupthink / 
herding), is believed to have played an important and negative role in many debacles, 
including Ireland’s crash. This leads to a hypothesis that leaders in Ireland fell victim to 
higher relative levels of this form of decision-making bias, and that this hypothesis can be 
tested using the leadership traits conceptual complexity and in-group bias as a proxy for 
behavioural convergence bias. The purpose of Chapter 3 is to set out the theoretical approach 
to the case study, specifically to explain how interests, institutions, and ideology impact on 
decision-making, and how they interact to influence irrational or rational decision-making.  
 Part II of the thesis investigates if we can establish whether there is evidence of active 
irrationality in the period before Ireland’s crash using the quantitative method Leadership 
Trait Analysis (LTA). Opening Part II, Chapter 4 sets out the research design employed to 
assess the levels of conceptual complexity and in-group bias of leaders, and to do so at a 
distance. The objective is to test the hypothesis that decision-makers in Ireland in the years 
preceding the economic crash had lower relative levels of conceptual complexity compared to 
decision-makers in comparable economies, and higher levels of in-group bias. The Chapter 
presents a research design to detect the presence of impactful decision-making biases ‘in real 
time’ as opposed to in painful hindsight, to inform crisis prevention and mitigation strategies. 
Employing the LTA technique, the research design provides a comparative content analysis 
of political leaders in Ireland and those in a group of western democracies in the years 
leading up to the most recent global economic crisis. Chapter 5 reports the results of the 
application of the content analysis research design to the utterances by eight Irish leaders in 
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parliament. The results do not provide evidence to support the hypothesis that Irish leaders in 
the run up to the crisis had lower scores for conceptual complexity and higher levels of in-
group bias, relative to the mean of a norming group of other Western leaders. This prompts 
the question as to whether these leaders were not in fact victim to irrational forces, or whether 
the LTA method is not suitable for detecting these forces. The Chapter closes with a 
preliminary investigation of this issue.  
In light of the findings reported, Chapter 6 starts by offering a review of the LTA 
technique and the ongoing discussions concerning its validity and reliability. In an effort to 
contribute answers to some of the remaining questions in this matter, the Chapter proceeds 
with conducting an empirical analysis of all seven LTA leadership traits of British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown and Irish Taoiseach (prime minister) Brian Cowen. Finally, on the 
basis of this and previous methodological analyses of the LTA, the Chapter draws 
conclusions and offers some guidance on more appropriate use of the method. 
In moving from Part II to III, the thesis moves from the general to the specific and 
from a quantitative to a qualitative approach. In Part III, a ‘most-likely’ case is used to 
investigate the role interests, institutions, and ideology play in shaping decision outcomes.  
The research moves to a specific case of economic decision-making and the qualitative 
process tracing of a case-study of one such decision; the decision of the State in 2005 not to 
intervene to prohibit or limit the availability of 100 per cent loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages.  
This ‘most-likely’ case is selected to investigate the role of certain factors (interests, 
institutions, and ideology) in shaping a decision outcome.  
Chapter 7 describes the research design to determine if and how the three factors 
impact on decision-making. This includes setting out the process tracing approach employed, 
the approach to case-selection, summarising why the selected case is suitable, and setting out 
the case study analysis framework that will be applied. The Chapter proposes a new 
framework for decision-making analysis which links the three factors of interests to the 
outcome of the decision. 
 The decision-making case study is set in and shaped by a particular decision-making 
environment. Chapter 8 identifies the main actors in the case (State/Government, Regulator, 
and banks), describes how they interact with each other, each with their own roles and 
objectives, and within a loose hierarchical structure. Chapter 9 then recounts the relevant 
events in Ireland leading up to the decision by the Government in November 2005 not to 
intervene to prohibit or limit the widespread availability of 100 per cent LTV mortgages. 
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These are the events to which the research design described in Chapter 7 is applied to reveal 
the extent to which interests, institutions, and ideology impacted on that decision, and to 
provide evidence of irrational decision-making.  
 Chapter 10 then reports the outcome of the application of the process tracing research 
design to the detailed case study. This augments the quantitative content analysis research 
into government decision-making in the run up to Ireland’s recent economic crisis reported in 
Part II of this thesis. The final Chapter provides a discussion of the findings of the research as 
a whole and expands on how the learnings can help explain why decision-makers acted the 
way they did in the years leading up to the crisis. It also examines the prospects of developing 
a real-time method of detecting active irrationality among decision-makers with a view to 
improving crisis-prevention or mitigation strategies. The Chapter will also discuss how the 
learnings from behavioural economics, and what we have learned about how interests, 
institutions, and ideology impact decisions, can improve policy-making more generally (e.g. 
use of heuristics), and how the proposed framework of decision-making can improve 
outcomes.          
1.4 Summary of Findings  
The literature posited that leaders in Ireland fell victim to higher relative levels of 
irrationality, and particular forms of decision-making biases - behavioural convergence -, and 
that this can be tested using the leadership traits conceptual complexity and in-group bias as a 
proxy using the LTA technique. Contrary to the hypothesis, Irish leaders in the run up to the 
crisis had higher rather than lower scores for conceptual complexity, and exhibited lower 
rather than higher in-group bias relative to other leaders. This finding prompted the question 
as to whether the analysed decision-makers were not victims to irrational forces, or whether 
the method employed is not suitable for detecting these forces.  
 Several previous studies had explored the validity of LTA and this thesis added 
analysis to reveal whether the trait scores vary over time, and whether trait scores vary over 
time due to a change in the position that the leader holds (role), or the specific decision-
making context the leader finds themselves in (state), or the nature of the content analysed to 
assess trait scores (source). The thesis finds that trait scores vary considerably over time, that 
role and state can have a significant impact on trait scores, and that the nature of the source 
(ad libbed versus prepared content) can also have a significant impact on scores. In addition, 
as the comparator reference group was based on a variety of sources, the research found that 
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these groups may actually not be suited to assess leaders’ scores in certain circumstances. 
Therefore, it is likely that the failure to uncover evidence of irrationality amongst Irish 
leaders before the crash is a consequence of the method employed. Every practical step 
possible was taken to eliminate alternative explanations for the failure to uncover evidence 
(role, state, and source) but these could not be ruled out. However, making the suggested 
amendments to the research design may make it possible for evidence of active, impactful 
irrationality among key decision-makers in the period before Ireland’s crash to be detected 
using this quantitative method. This answers the first key question posed in this research.  
 Next, the role of interests, institutions, and ideology play in poor decision-making was 
investigated. A framework of decision-making analysis was proposed which linked the three 
factors of interests (interests, institutions, and ideology) to decision outcomes. This model is 
applied using a process tracing technique to a bad-decision case study, and the decision on 
100 per cent LTV mortgages in 2005 provides evidence that the three factors all influenced 
the decision outcome. However, it was the combination of ideological and institutional 
factors that had the greatest negative impact. The dominant market ideology of the time, 
combined with the relative institutional standing of decision-makers, contributed to the poor 
decision outcome. That free market ideology raised the threshold to be met before 
intervention by the State was seriously considered, and coupled with the relatively low 
standing of the primary proponent of such intervention, meant a sub-optimal outcome was 
reached.   Further, the process tracing evidence suggests that irrationality cannot be described 
as the primary cause of the poor outcome. The detailed information considered and discussed 
by decision-makers in the case, over a period of months, argues against impactful behavioural 
convergence or groupthink. Though many of the symptoms of such irrationality were present 
(selective bias in processing information at hand, poor information search, incomplete survey 
of alternatives) within institutional actors, between them there was detailed information 
exchange and deliberation.  
The final Chapter brings all of these learnings together to help inform better policy-
making and decision-making, and indicates scope for further research arising from this thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Decision-Making and Irrationality 
2.1 The Behavioural Economics Approach 
When decisions - and decisions on economic matters more specifically - go wrong, the 
factors shaping a leader’s choice come under scrutiny. Nyberg (2010) zoned in on the beliefs 
of individual decision-makers who were in a position to take national policy steps to shape 
Ireland’s economic fortunes. Nyberg concludes that irrational forces were one of the reasons 
those decision-makers in Ireland made poor choices (Nyberg, 2011: 94).  Much of decision-
making theory, indeed neo-classical economics as a field of study, is based on the notion of 
rational actors taking rational decisions to deliver the perceived optimal outcome for them 
(‘expected utility’; see Bernoulli, 1738/1954). The behavioural economics approach arises 
from an examination the application of the ‘rational actor / expected utility’ theory in the real 
world and finds it to be an inadequate descriptive model.  As Rick and Lowenstein put it: 
“Fortunately, many economists would view the [rational actor model] as outdated. 
This is largely attributable to the advent of “behavioral economics,” a subdiscipline of 
economics that incorporates more psychologically realistic assumptions to increase 
the explanatory and predictive power of economic theory. The field first achieved 
prominence in the 1980s and has been gaining influence since then. And much of the 
thrust of behavioral economics has involved, or at least could be construed as 
involving, an enhanced understanding of emotions” - Rick and Lowenstein, 2008: 139 
That is not to say that traditional or neo-classical economics is unaware of, or ignores the 
limits to rational human behaviour or the role of emotions in decision-making. It is a question 
of the weight given to the impact or influence of bounded rationality on decisions, despite 
being a theme which features in economic and political thought across centuries. For 
example, though most remembered for his work The Wealth of Nations published in 1776, 
Adam Smith’s first book The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) proposed a theory that 
seems closer to behavioural economics than classical economics, where behaviour is the 
outcome of the struggle between what Smith termed the ‘passions’ and the ‘impartial 
spectator’; in short “Adam Smith’s world is not inhabited by dispassionate rational purely 
self-interested agents, but rather by multidimensional and realistic human beings” (Ashraf, 
Camerer, and Loewenstein, 2005: 131, 145). In 1848, John Stuart Mill warned of irrational 
behaviour in politics and his belief that individuals “lose some of their capacity for well-
informed, thorough reasoning upon entering the political sphere” (Schnellenbach and 
Schubert, 2014: 3). Right through to Keynes in the 1930s, who wrote of ephemeral factors 
influencing markets, the impact of irrationality and human limitations were a feature of 
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economics. In the 1940s Schumpeter wrote that an individual expends “less disciplined effort 
on mastering a political problem than he expends on a game of bridge ... Thus, the typical 
citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political 
field” (Schumpeter, 1942: 261-62; Schnellenbach and Schubert, 2014: 4) In this respect, 
Schumpeter foreshadowed Daniel Kahneman’s work on attention and effort (2011). It was 
the work of Paul Samuelson from the late 1940s on that marked the rise to dominance by the 
rational actor model in economic thinking. The behavioural economics approach proposes an 
alternative account of decision-making, viewing Samuelson’s neo-classical economics to be a 
useful normative model, but a poor descriptive one. The behavioural approach is based on the 
bounded rationality of the actor as they are subject to the irrational forces of behavioural 
biases. This term was first used by Herbert Simon in 1957.  
“The alternative approach employed in these papers is based on what I shall call the 
principle of bounded rationality: The capacity of the human mind for formulating and 
solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems 
whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world — or 
even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality” - Simon, 1957: 198 
Put simply, human emotions limit our ability to make purely rational decisions. In Judgement 
Under Uncertainty (1974), Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979) and 
Choices, Values and Frames (1984), Kahneman and Tversky demonstrate the presence, 
impact and – most importantly - the predictability of irrational forces or decision-making 
biases. The consequence is poor decision-making in almost every area of life, from our 
failure to save or provide an adequate retirement pension (present bias), to our inclination to 
only heed advice which accords with our own (confirmation bias), to our tendency to put a 
higher value on our possessions than we would be willing to pay for them (endowment 
effect). A purely rational, actor would save more, provide for an adequate pension, would 
assess all advice equally on its merits, and would see no additional intrinsic value in the fact 
that an item is currently theirs.  
Kahneman and Tversky examined these phenomena and what determines peoples’ 
beliefs, and how, in circumstances of uncertainty, they rely on a limited number of heuristic 
principles (mental ‘short cuts’ or ‘rules of thumb’) to assess probability of outcomes, 
reducing complex tasks to simpler judgemental operations. When people are asked to assess 
the frequency of a class or the probability of an event, they do so by the ease with which 
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind. Reliance on these heuristics causes 
cognitive or behavioural biases in laymen and experts, and is not attributable to motivational 
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effects such as wishful thinking, or the expectation of payoff or penalty. Kahneman and 
Tversky analysed decision-making in risky scenarios, demonstrating how their prospect 
theory (as opposed to utility theory) accounts for observed attitudes toward risk. Central to 
this are the biases of loss/risk aversion and loss/gain asymmetry where losses loom larger 
than gains and people experiences of losing an amount of a good appear to be greater than the 
pleasure associated with gaining the same amount. These theories are further extended in 
their later studies which demonstrated how decisions “can be described or framed in multiple 
ways that give rise to different preferences, contrary to the invariance criterion of rational 
choice” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984: 341). In summary:  
 Heuristics (mental short-cuts): Such as the availability heuristic where a decision-
maker estimates probability based on the ease of which an instance comes to mind. 
For example, the length and extent of an economic bubble may make it more difficult 
for decision-makers (government, regulators, investors, borrowers/lenders etc.) to 
conceive of a crisis scenario.  
 Loss/gain asymmetry (losses loom larger than gains): Where a decision-maker 
places more weight on a loss than on a gain of equivalent size. For example, during 
the emergence of an economic bubble, decision-makers may pursue increasingly risky 
financial practices to stave off, recoup, or delay losses.    
 Framing effects (seemingly inconsequential variation in the presentation of choice 
impacts on preferences): For example, periods of rapid economic growth in a bubble 
provide benchmarks for data-comparison which impact on a decision-maker’s 
expectations and perceptions of ‘normality’, risk and opportunity.    
The attachment of significant weight to irrational forces in economic decision-making 
presents a challenge to the dominant utilitarian, rational choice perspective on economic 
behaviour, whereby an economic actor balances the costs against benefits of a choice and 
pursues the action to maximize advantage. Whereas the rational choice/utilitarian approach 
ignores the motivation for choice, the behavioural approach is very much concerned with 
why and how the actor estimates the cost and benefits, and the cognitive process that 
precedes the choice. The emergence of the behavioural approach has also contributed to 
challenges to economic syllabi and teaching in higher education particularly in the aftermath 
of the crash in 2008 (for example see the report of Post-Crash Economics Society at 
Manchester University, 2014). In regard to political decision-making, Simon was strident: 
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“the principle of rationality, unless accompanied by extensive empirical research to identify 
the correct auxiliary assumptions, has little power to make valid predictions about political 
phenomena” (Simon, 1985: 293). 
 The behavioural approach has been of increasing influence since the 1980s, 
particularly in the areas of behavioural finance (Barberis and Thaler, 2003) and so-called 
nudging approaches to policy (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), with the list of empirically 
established behavioural biases growing over time (see Table below). The concept of 
irrationality and the impact of behavioural biases have been considered outside of the often 
abstract, though revealing scenarios of Kahneman and Tversky’s ground-breaking analyses.  
Bias Definition 
Extrapolation bias 
(Projection bias, Overinference) 
When predicting future outcomes based on the past, placing 
more weight on the most recent events 
Confirmation bias 
(Myside bias) 
The inclination to place greater weight on and to actively 
seek information consistent with prior beliefs 
Overconfidence bias 
(Over-optimism bias, 
miscalibration) 
A tendency to predict outcomes too positively and to 
overestimate the accuracy of predictions 
Ambiguity aversion 
(Aversion to Knightian uncertainty, 
Illusion of explanatory depth) 
Greater willingness to take risks in contexts where people 
feel able to quantify the risk, or where people feel relatively 
competent in assessing the risk. 
Behavioural convergence 
(Bandwagon effects, Herding, 
Information cascades, Conformity, 
Groupthink) 
The tendency to copy similar decisions made by others, or 
conform to majority views 
Time inconsistency 
(Present bias, 
hyperbolic discounting) 
Systematic changes in individual preferences over time, 
whereby more immediate rewards become 
disproportionately attractive 
Loss/gain asymmetry 
(Loss aversion, endowment effect) 
Giving greater weight to losses than to equivalent gains, 
including willingness to take risks to avoid or recover 
losses 
 
Table 2.1: Examples of established decision-making biases (from Lunn, 2013) 
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1. The Dutch Tulip Bulb Bubble 1636 
2. The South Sea Bubble 1720 
3. The Mississippi Bubble 1720 
4. The late 1920s stock price bubble 1927–1929 
5. The surge in bank loans to Mexico and other developing countries in the 1970s 
6. The bubble in real estate and stocks in Japan 1985–1989 
7. The 1985–1989 bubble in real estate and stocks in Finland, Norway and Sweden 
8. The bubble in real estate and stocks in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and several other 
Asian countries 1992–1997 
9. The surge in foreign investment in Mexico 1990–1993 
10. The bubble in over-the-counter stocks in the United States 1995–2000 
These concepts have generated popular best-seller publications such as Ariely’s Predictably 
Irrational (2008) and The Upside of Irrationality (2010), which focus on how bounded 
rationality impacts everyday decision-making for individuals. Notwithstanding the focus of 
this research on the decision-making of a small number of political leaders, understanding 
how the irrational decision-making of individuals aggregates up to irrational markets is 
important. The lessons from Kahneman and Tversky’s approach, and the concept of bounded 
rationality has led to a better understanding of market behaviour especially in explaining the 
emergence of market bubbles i.e. instances where expectations contribute to asset prices 
departing strongly and unsustainably from historical levels (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 
2013: 14).  The notion of individual irrationality aggregated to irrational markets has been 
used to explain assets bubbles going back as far as the “tulipmania” of 17th century 
Amsterdam which saw the reported prices of several breeds of tulip bulbs rise to above the 
value of a furnished luxury house (Thompson, 2006: 100). Irrationality has become linked to 
market bubbles to such an extent that Shiller (2005) recounts how the mere use of the words 
‘irrational exuberance’ by former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan in a 
televised speech in 1996 precipitated sharp declines in stock markets across the globe 
(Shiller, 2005: 1).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: The “big ten financial bubbles” (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005: 9) 
Regarding political decision-making, the behavioural economics approach has been applied 
most notably in the sphere of international relations. Herbert Simon, for one, linked the 
argument that ‘leaders matter’ to the fact that they do not necessarily act rationally (Hermann, 
2010). Writing in 1985 on human nature in politics and the link between psychology and 
political science, Simon notes that the limitations of knowledge and computing power of 
decision-makers may make them incapable of making objectively optimal choices. To deduce 
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the boundedly rational choice in a situation, we must know the decision-maker’s goals, the 
information and conceptualisation he or she has of the situation, and their abilities to draw 
inferences from the information they possesses (Simon, 1985: 294). Simon’s experimental 
studies of political decision-making indicated that rationality is bounded by how the people 
involved process information, what they want, the ways in which they represent the problem, 
their experiences, and their beliefs:  
“In effect, decision-makers do not have unlimited time, resources, and information to 
make choices that maximize their movement toward their goals. They satisfice, 
settling for the first acceptable option rather than pushing for ever more information 
and a more optimal choice. People are, at best, rational in terms of what they are 
aware of, but they can be aware of only tiny, disjointed facets of reality” - Hermann, 
2010: 2. 
Successive studies indicate that a leader’s personal characteristics may have significant 
effects on political decision-making (Hermann, 1980a; Kaarbo and Hermann, 1998; Dyson, 
2006; Schafer and Walker, 2006; Hermann and Dayton, 2009; Keller and Foster, 2012). 
Hermann recalls the contention of Snyder et al. that it is policy-makers who perceive and 
interpret events, and whose preferences become aggregated in the decision-making process 
that shape what governments and institutions do (Hermann, 2010: 1). Furthermore, when the 
people in governments change, a difference in perspective often occurs in parallel. Resonant 
with this research, analysis shows that there is a contraction of authority to those most 
accountable for policy in crisis situations (Hermann and Kegley, 1995; Boin et al., 2005). 
Preston (2001) and Beer, Healy, and Bourne (2004) illustrate that experience also appears to 
count as an important influence on how policy-makers interpret events, while policy-makers 
feel more comfortable and confident dealing with domains in which they have some expertise 
(Stewart and Stasser, 1995).  Kowert (1996) takes issue with the assumption that personality 
theory has little to offer, an assumption which can lead political psychologists to direct their 
attention elsewhere.  
“Personality theory does allow for generalizable propositions based on variations in 
personality types. Such a statement may seem patently obvious to many 
psychologists, but it is not sufficiently appreciated with a few notable exceptions 
among political scientists” - Kowert, 1996: 422 
The knowledge that leaders’ personalities matter, that rationality is bounded and that 
decision-making is impacted by a leaders’ conceptualisation and processing of information is 
central to this research. Of interest here is how the approach has enhanced the study of 
political decision-making. The rational actor theory of international relations has been 
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challenged since the early 1970s with the publication of Allison’s Essence of Decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971). The influence of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
analysis on political science is notable, and by elevating the presence and of impact of 
heuristics, loss aversion and framing effects on decision-making, behavioural economics has 
prompted more sophisticated understanding of how policy-actors behave. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1981) demonstrated how seemingly inconsequential changes in presentation 
(framing) of choice problems caused significant shifts in the preference of the decision-
maker. In developing the punctuated equilibrium model of policy-change (see Chapter 7 
also), Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have illustrated the importance of framing effects on 
political decision-making.    
 Perhaps most famous account of the impact of bounded rationality and the 
behavioural approach in the sphere of international relations is Irving Janis’ exploration of 
the decision-making process in the run up to the 1961 Bay of Pigs incident. In his ground-
breaking 1972 work, Janis revealed “a mode of thinking that people engage in when 
concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive in-group that it tends to override 
realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action” (Janis, 1982: 9) – in other words 
groupthink. A systematic treatment the phenomenon can be found in the second edition of 
Janis's book (1982), which “extends and above all systematizes the earlier formulation” (t‘ 
Hart, 1991: 256).  Groupthink is the tendency of individuals when in groups to adopt the 
viewpoint of that group rather than to form an intellectually independent assessment, and is 
similar to herding, the more general tendency to follow other decision-makers. As Lunn 
states “herding and groupthink belong to a category of phenomena collectively termed 
‘behavioural convergence” (Lunn, 2013: 564, 567). This classification will be important later. 
Returning to the Bay of Pigs scenario, the Kennedy administration converged on one course 
of action, which proved disastrous. Janis termed the Bay of Pigs the “perfect failure” and in 
his second edition produced evidence of groupthink in additional international relations 
settings (wars in North Korea and Vietnam, and the attack on Pearl Harbour, and a case study 
of the Watergate controversy). In addition to these “cases studies of major fiascoes resulting 
from poor decisions” he provided two counter-point cases (Cuban Missile Crisis, the 
Marshall Plan), as examples of “well worked out decisions made by similar groups” (Janis, 
1982: viii). 
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The groupthink concept has been employed to help explain fiascoes beyond politics and 
economics, such as the Challenger space shuttle disaster (Esser and Lindoerfer, 1989) and, 
more recently, the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster (Reb, Iinuma, and Joshi, 2012). 
Groupthink has also become synonymous with other debacles such as the collapse of Swiss 
Air in 2001. However it is important to note that despite the widespread use of Janis’ 
groupthink concept within and outside academic research it is not without its critics. 
Criticisms include the absence of a robust theoretical framework or precise causal sequence 
(rather it provides a set of antecedent conditions or symptoms), the difficulty capturing 
meanings of conditions (e.g. trust, anxiety), the challenge of assessment in real-life scenarios, 
the risk of hindsight bias from focussing on fiascoes, and the absence of a spectrum of case-
studies groupthink decision outcomes (from success to disaster, and in between). See Park 
(2000) for empirical tests, and Baptist (2015) for a summary of criticisms.  
2.2 Behavioural Convergence, Conceptual Complexity and In-group Bias 
The preceding sections have set out the theoretical underpinnings for the contention that 
leaders and their decisions matter, that the learnings from behavioural economics can 
improve our understanding of how decisions are made and the impact of bounded rationality, 
and that these learnings have been applied to international cases. At this point, attention starts 
to turn to if and how groupthink can be measured in a useful way. Before dealing with the 
‘how’ in Chapter 4, the remainder of this Chapter will deal with the ‘if’. 
Tetlock looked back at the diverse theoretical approaches taken from the early 1970s 
to “the problem of how psychological factors influence political decision-making” (Tetlock, 
1979: 1314). From the study of unresolved psychological conflicts (Glad, 1973), the need for 
achievement and power (Winter, 1973), to the impact of cognitive consistency (Jervis, 1976), 
there has been an acceptance that political personal traits and predispositions can be 
measured. However, Tetlock noted that relatively few of the approaches to assessing 
personality traits considered exactly how interaction among policy-makers can influence 
decision-making. The one exception was Janis’ groupthink approach, which argued that 
intense social pressures toward uniformity and in-group loyalty within decision-making 
groups can build to the point where they seriously interfere with both cognitive efficiency and 
judgement (Tetlock, 1979: 1316). This linkage between the group situation, social pressure, 
and an impact on cognitive information processing and judgment is an important element of 
the groupthink concept.  This is because detecting and measuring behavioural biases in 
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general is not a straightforward task, and the usual methods are unsuitable for the purposes of 
this research.  
 Typically, behavioural bias is detected in economic laboratory settings where groups 
of subjects are asked to make decisions in controlled and variable conditions to reveal the 
choices made and offer an explanation for these. Most of the biases listed in Table 2.1 were 
initially identified in economic laboratory experiments observing individuals in deliberately 
contrived, decision-making scenarios. For example, the earlier section referred to one of the 
criticisms of the groupthink concept being the challenge of assessing such behavioural 
conformity in real-life scenarios. This is apart from the theoretical and hindsight challenges. 
The now famous experiments conducted by Solomon Asch (1951) to test for 
conformity behaviour involved a group of college students, some of whom are instructed to 
deceive others during an experiment in visual judgment, comparing the lengths of lines on 
cards. A more modern version of this assessment technique used functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neural basis of conformity, again in the face of 
erroneous information (Berns, 2005). While these are extreme examples, they do illustrate 
some of the challenges of assessing the presence or impact of decision-making biases. This is 
particularly true for this research as many of the actors of interest (decision-makers) can be 
well-known figures (nationally and internationally) who held positions of significant 
authority and esteem, and are thus unlikely to participate in typical experiments to assess 
conformity and behavioural convergence bias (e.g. card games with actors; fMRI 
examination). Further, typical experimental approaches are overt, where a covert approach is 
preferred, and are usually conducted ‘after-the-fact’, when assessment at the time of parallel 
consequential decisions are being taken is preferred here. To assemble psychological 
assessments for individuals who cannot be accessed directly, we require effective and 
efficient techniques, and because key decision-makers are often inaccessible to researchers, 
specific content analysis schemes have been developed (Young and Schafer, 1998: 86). This 
issue of how to assess at a distance will be explored in Chapter 4.  For now the issue is what 
would be measured, were a suitable technique be available, given the difficulties set out 
above. 
Preceding the rise of behavioural economics, a tradition in psychology of 
experimental studies to reveal, measure and categorise individual differences in cognitive 
tasks and information processing began in the 1950s (see Kozhevnikov, 2007 and Suedfeld, 
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2010 for summary). The rise of authoritarianism during and after World War II increased 
academic interest in ‘how’ as opposed to ‘what’ people think, in pursuit of explanations for 
such overtly rigid views. As Suedfeld notes:  
“‘Ways of thinking’ have long been considered as stable personality characteristics, 
although not always labelled that clearly. Intelligence, for example, is to a large extent 
a matter of thinking style, and it has hallmarks of many personality traits: it is quite 
stable across time and situations, affects behavior in a variety of ways, and has a 
strong innate component. The classic concept of authoritarianism, although based on 
the psychoanalytic theory of child development, clearly has cognitive implications. 
The thinking of people high in authoritarianism is characterized by rigidly held ideas, 
black-or-white evaluations, and a reluctance to consider alternative beliefs as 
legitimate. Other personality systems, some more and some less clear in their 
cognitive foundations, include dogmatism, field independence, personal constructs, 
explanatory style, need for cognition, and need for closure” – Suedfeld, 2010: 1670 
As discussed earlier, Simon (1985) found that if we take into account the limitations of 
knowledge and computing power of decision-makers then we may find them incapable of 
making objectively optimal choices, and much will depend on the information available and 
conceptualisation of the decision-maker, along with their ability to draw inferences from the 
information they possess. Suedfeld states that in the course of the cognitive revolution in 
psychology during the 1960s, theory focused on ‘complexity’, “generally thought of as a 
combination of flexibility, high levels of information search, and tolerance for ambiguity, 
uncertainty, and lack of closure” (Suedfeld, 2010: 1670). As a result, the construct conceptual 
complexity emerged (Schroder, Driver, and Streufert, 1966). Tetlock’s finding that the group 
situation and social pressure associated with groupthink had a direct impact on cognitive 
information processing and judgment is important here. Conceptual complexity is a construct 
proposed by Schroder et al. in 1966 to explain and measure how individuals behave and make 
decisions in various situations. Central to this approach is the assumption that it is not only 
what information is available to individuals when making decisions that is important, but how 
that available information is processed by the individual. For example, how does the 
individual perceive the different dimensions of the information and its alternatives, and the 
connections and trade-offs between them. Conceptual complexity is this “degree of 
differentiation which an individual shows in describing or discussing other people, places, 
policies, ideas, or things. The more conceptually complex individual can see varying reasons 
for a particular position, is willing to entertain the possibility that there is ambiguity in the 
environment, and is flexible in reacting to objects or ideas" (Hermann in Schafer, 2000: 521).  
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Young and Schafer (1998) outlined and assessed the “methodological arsenal” available to 
researchers attempting to assess decision-makers at a distance: operational code, cognitive 
mapping, image theory, and finally, trait analysis, which is the preferred approach for this 
research. Young and Schafer assessed each of these on the basis of the associated underlining 
theory, how the method makes inferences, and correspondence with observed behaviour. In 
summary, trait analysis to assess conceptual complexity and in-group bias is the preferred 
assessment method in this research because, as Young and Schafer note,  it was developed to 
explain success in complex decision environments and it is a trait that differentiates among 
people as well as a variable that reflects changes in a person’s situation, e.g. from stressful to 
less stressful.  Given that the interest here is in the presence and effect of behavioural 
convergence bias, groupthink and herding, conceptual complexity trait analysis is particularly 
useful in that the more conceptually complex person will “see the world in more nuanced 
terms and...not react to any situation without gathering and processing contextual 
information” (Young and Schafer, 1998: 84). The opposite is true for a decision-maker 
displaying lower conceptual complexity at a point in time.  Speaking of the findings of 
conceptual complexity studies in the sphere of international affairs, Young and Schafer state: 
“[C]onceptually complex leaders wanted to check with politically powerful others, to 
seek further information about the information at hand, and to consider a range of 
alternatives before taking action” - Young and Schafer 1998: 85 
The corollary resonates with the findings of Nyberg in a national policy setting, and whether 
leaders in Ireland before the crash did not want to check with others, or seek additional 
information about information on the economy, and did not adequately consider the range of 
alternatives, options and contingencies before making decisions. Thus, the conceptual 
complexity construct is akin to the impact of groupthink in that it is related to the 
characteristic of the decision environment and considers the ability of an individual to 
process information (i.e. the information processing complexity exhibited by the individual) 
as a trait that can vary, and is impactful on decision-making. Unlike groupthink however, 
conceptual complexity can be more readily assessed. This makes conceptual complexity a 
valuable construct when attempting to assess the presence and impact of groupthink or 
behavioural convergence bias.   
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Low Conceptual Complexity Symptoms of Groupthink 
 Low desire to seek multiple sources of 
information concerning issues and policy 
options  
 Less readily able to change views on an 
issue in light of new evidence 
 Unable to see varying reasons for a 
particular position  
 Not willing to entertain the possibility 
that there is ambiguity in the environment  
 Incomplete survey of alternatives and 
objectives 
 Failure to examine risks of preferred 
choice 
 Failure to reappraise initially rejected 
alternatives 
 Poor information search 
 Selective bias in processing information 
at hand 
 Failure to work out contingency plans 
 
Table 2.3: Conceptual Complexity and Groupthink (Based on Hermann 1999, Dyson 
2004, and Janis, 1982)  
It is important to note that there are two components to the complexity construct. Conceptual 
Complexity (CC), used in this research, is a stable trait while Integrative Complexity (IC) is 
the state component which changes over time. See Suedfeld (2010) for more detail. 
Implications of the use of trait analysis in general, and the trait/state debate are discussed at 
length in Chapter 6.  In addition to the theoretical linkages, conceptual complexity as a proxy 
for behavioural convergence bias offers and important practical advantage in that it allows 
psychological assessment of individuals who cannot be subjected to typical experimental 
techniques. Measurement of conceptual complexity moved from paragraph scoring using a 1-
7 scale (Suedfeld and Rank, 1976), to guided interviews using a 25-point scale (Streufert and 
Nogami, 1989), to remote and automated techniques (Hermann, 1999).     
Irrational 
Force → 
Decision-
making Bias → 
Behavioural 
Convergence → 
Groupthink 
→ 
Conceptual 
Complexity / In-group 
Bias 
 
Table 2.4: Linkage between irrational forces, biases and traits 
Ultimately, having a sense of a political leaders’ level of conceptual complexity is only useful 
if helps explains the outcomes of decisions taken in that psychological context. To this end 
Schafer states: 
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“Conceptual complexity has proven to have explanatory power for some state 
behaviors. Most notably, Hermann has demonstrated that lower conceptual 
complexity scores by leaders tend to correlate with more conflictual state behavior. In 
addition, low complexity correlates with higher risk propensities by the state, less 
reliance on diplomacy, and quicker commitments of state resources to a conflict. 
Others have argued that conceptual complexity correlates with the process of 
decision-making: More complex leaders will establish better and more open 
information processing during decision-making” - Schafer, 2000: 522 
Again applying the opposite, that less complex leaders will establish suboptimal and less 
open information processing during decision-making, suggests a strong premise for 
conceptual complexity as a proxy for the symptoms of groupthink:  incomplete analysis of 
alternatives and objectives, poor information search, failure to examine risks of preferred 
choice, failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives, selective bias in processing 
information at hand, and a failure to work out contingency plans.  
 Finally a second leadership trait, in-group bias, has been developed to assess the 
degree to which a leader feels connected to their political, economic, social, cultural group, 
and how protective they are of their own in-group (Hermann, 1999). Decision-makers who 
display strong in-group bias are prone to only perceive the positive aspects of their group and 
to downplay weaknesses, and this can reasonably be assumed to be associated with 
behavioural convergence, groupthink and herding.    
2.3 Hypothesis 
Having established that theoretical link between groupthink, behavioural convergence, and 
leadership traits (conceptual complexity and in-group bias), it is now possible to describe 
how this helps address a central question: why did leaders in Ireland take the decisions they 
did, and to what extent was irrationality a contributing factor?  
Many examinations of Ireland’s crash suggest that policy-makers in Ireland made 
poor choices, and that irrational forces were one, important cause. Based on the behavioural 
economics literature, it is clear that bounded rationality and behavioural biases offer a more 
accurate explanation for poor decisions by leaders in the years preceding Ireland’s crash, and 
that behavioural convergence bias manifested as groupthink and herding behaviour in 
particular, was present and impactful. It has also been argued above that in the face of the 
challenges of detecting bias in general and groupthink in particular, in a way useful to this 
research, the trait ‘conceptual complexity’ can proxy for behavioural convergence bias for 
assessment purposes. This assessment can be augmented by also looking at the extent to 
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which a leader demonstrates in-group bias. Armed with a research design which illustrates 
the potential for content analysis to reveal levels of complexity and in-group bias (Chapter 4):  
The hypothesis is that decision-makers in Ireland will have:  
 H1: lower relative levels of conceptual complexity compared to decision-
makers in comparable economies, in the years preceding the economic crash, 
and 
 H2: higher relative levels of in-group bias compared to decision-makers in 
comparable economies, in the years preceding the economic crash. 
The first of the two key questions for this research is whether evidence of active, impactful 
irrationality among key decision-makers in the period before Ireland’s crash can be detected. 
The literature provides a firm basis for expecting such irrationality to be present, and for 
expecting the conceptual complexity and in-group bias traits to provide signals of this. 
Further, the literature prompts an expectation that these signals will be stronger when 
analysing leaders in Ireland, compared to results for other economies. In terms of fiscal cost, 
output losses, and increase in debt, Ireland’s crash was the costliest crisis in advanced 
economies since the Great Depression (Laeven and Valencia, 2012: 20). Official and 
academic investigations of the cause of the crisis point to irrational consensus, hubris and 
groupthink. Part II of this thesis will provide a quantitative test of this, and the subsequent 
Chapters will examine the role of interests, institutions, and ideology in poor decision-
making. 
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Chapter 3: Decision-Making, Ideology, Interests, and Institutions  
3.1 The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideology  
It is axiomatic that interests, institutions and beliefs matter in in shaping political decisions 
and outcomes. The sizeable empirical literature (see de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014 for an 
excellent summary) shows that interest group lobbying is pervasive, that the number or 
interest groups is positively correlated with macroeconomic activity, that politicians targeted 
by interests tend to be powerful allied agenda setters, that “who you know” matters, and that 
issue expertise may also matter to targeting.  Tsebelis (1995) notes that while there is general 
agreement that political institutions matter, the consensus breaks down when it comes to the 
outcomes of specific institutional structures. Institutional structures impact on the likelihood 
of a certain regime types (e.g. democratic, authoritarian) arising in the first instance, or on the 
clarity of choice for the electorate, or on the distribution of political power (Tsebelis, 1995: 
289-290). Even within authoritarian regimes institutions may matter, and there are strong 
arguments to support the view that party system structure, electoral rules, and the type of 
executive system have important consequences (Gandhi, 2008).  The impacts of interests and 
institutions are linked to the presence, or otherwise, of a pervasive ideology.   
As Feldman and Johnston (2014) note, the default operationalisation of ideology in 
scholarly research is as a continuum, ranging from socially liberal to socially conservative, or 
from the economic left to the economic right. Given the focus of this research on economic 
policy, the concept of ideology used here refers to the latter, with the left referring to an 
abstract belief in State action, intervention in the economy/markets and higher levels of 
government spending and taxation, and the right referring to a contrasting abstract belief in a 
laissez-faire policy approach, non-intervention by the State in economic affairs, and lower 
levels of government expenditure and taxation. The two important aspects of ideology are, 
first, that it is an action-related set of ideas, and second, that it leads to action which 
disregards circumstances. Ideology as a force which can lead to suboptimal policy decision 
outcomes, such as policy bubbles, emerges because these “abstract beliefs…constrain 
specific policy preferences” (Feldman and Johnston, 2014: 339). Importantly for decision-
making, ideologies are the framework for how people interpret (new) data. An ideologically-
driven policy actor may, for reasons of that ideology – including reference to poorly 
interpreted data – take action that proves detrimental to the wider group, or fail to take action 
which proves beneficial to that group.  
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Given the complexity of, and pace of change in, modern policy-making environments in 
which political decision-makers and interests sit, it is not surprising that long-established 
academic perspectives of decision-making and  public administration (e.g. the bureaucratic-
model; the top-down authority perspective) have been described as stale and apparently 
irrelevant to those they claim to study (Rhodes et. al, 2011: 1). To reinvigorate the field, new 
approaches to analysis of decision-making in the public service have emerged and these point 
to the influence of interests, institutions, and ideology, to varying degrees. 
Kingdon’s multiple streams framework (1984) considered decision-making with an 
emphasis on why some issues are processed by the governmental system, while others are 
not. The activity of interests is one explanation as agenda setting may involve the transfer of 
issues from a non-governmental agenda to a formal, governmental agenda (Kingdon, 2014: 
16, 45-70). Alternatively, decision-making maybe impacted by a change in ideological 
balances on foot of an election.  Finally, institutional factors such as the role of officials in 
the executive branch of government have been shown to be important for agenda setting 
(Kingdon, 2014: 30).       
While accepting that the decision-making environment is both complex in terms of 
the multiplicity and non-linearity of actions, and is capable of learning from previous 
decisions and adapting behaviour, complex adaptive systems (CAS) theory also notes the 
influence of the factors important to this research. For example, reform of public 
administration in the last thirty years has resulted in a plethora of actors and interests with 
heterogeneous motives interacting in policy and decision-making, leading to highly variable 
results and a limited ability to hold any one organisation to account (Rhodes, 2013: 332). In 
terms of the rules of the game and Ireland’s public policy decision-making environment, CAS 
theory also recognises how rules emerge from the interaction of those interests or “system 
stakeholders” (Meek and Rhodes, 2014: 25). 
In explaining their punctuated equilibrium model of policy-making, Baumgartner and 
Jones (2009) give central importance to the role of institutions which, when in place for 
extended periods, structure participation and give the illusion of equilibrium. They link 
institutions and interests closely noting that this equilibrium helps create policy-monopolies 
and a political and economic system which appears to provide continuing benefits to the same 
group of interests.  
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“Institutional rules inevitably have policy consequences, which is why seemingly 
arcane decisions… so often become the subject of intense debate. Changing the 
procedures of decision-making often has unintended consequences however; policy-
makers are therefore generally conservative in altering them” – Baumgartner and 
Jones, 2009: 14     
This final point is exemplified in the Irish context in the design of regulatory institutional 
structures (see Chapter 8). Overall, for Baumgartner and Jones the policy-making 
environment can be explained with reference to the impact of institutions (‘venues”) and 
interests (‘policy communities’), in parallel with irrationality (framing). Chapter 2 outlined 
how framing, along with the use of heuristics and the prevalence of loss/gain asymmetry, can 
impact on preferences and decisions. In the punctuated equilibrium model, the urgency and 
mobilisation that precedes a sudden policy-shift is linked by Baumgartner and Jones to 
bounded rationality and framing effects. In these cases, information which was previously 
available may be redefined or reinterpreted and thus contribute to policy-change.        
Analysis of Ireland’s public policy system specifically, has noted the impact of 
interests, institutions and beliefs/ideology on decision-outcomes (Murphy, 2010 and 2016). In 
terms of interests, Rhodes and Boyle (2012) refer to the importance of the elite perceptions in 
shaping public service activity and reform. With the declining influence of the church in 
Ireland, a new group of business elites with access to the highest levels of government 
emerged, joining the construction industry which had long been a feature of Irish governance. 
Finally, the institutionalisation of interests in the social partnership process gave significant 
power to labour interests (Rhodes and Boyle, 2012: 42). 
 In terms of policy failures, analysis over decades has highlighted the impact of 
interests, institutions and beliefs/ideology in shaping policy outcomes. In his examination of 
decision-making in democratic politics, Jones refers to how governments respond to interests 
noting that “the actual range of policies is far narrower than the variability of preferences or 
interests in society” (Jones, 1994: 20). Jones states that the pervasive nature of satisfying 
interests is evident from, for example, studies of legislative representation where the policy 
decisions of leaders are compared to the preference or attitudes of interests on issues of the 
day. In parallel, institutions play a crucial role. In an effort to address the mismatch between 
policy complexity and limited evaluative resources, “institutions may be designed to achieve 
but one aim, and when they confront the contradictory demands that are part and parcel of 
governance, they may fail” (Jones, 1994: 20). In another analysis, Nutt includes interests – in 
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the form of unmanaged social and political forces – as one of the seven “traps” which lead to 
decision failure:  
“Successful implementation calls for the understanding and careful management of 
peoples’ interests. If these interests can be uncovered and understood, the social and 
political forces that the interests stir up are usually manageable” – Nutt, 2002: 87 
Turning to the role of the three selected factors on bubbles and crashes, Grossman’s analysis 
of nine policy “disasters”, including the most recent economic crisis, finds that the related 
policy mistakes “had one thing in common: they were based on ideology rather than sound 
economic analysis” (Grossman, 2013: xvii). In his analysis, this results in decision-makers 
clinging to one “key idea” as their only guide to economic policy. Grossman, in one example, 
points to the ideologically-driven, (self-)interest driven tax-reduction policy pursued in the 
US in 2001 as signalling the start of the business cycle expansion that led to the global crash 
in 2007/08. This was followed by a fiscal stimulus provided via a doubling in military 
spending to $595 billion, supporting ideologically-driven military action in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Grossman, 2013: 141-142).  
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2013) present the most succinct framework, arguing 
that it is the impact of interests, institutions, and ideology specifically, that sees successive 
governments facilitate dangerous policy and market bubbles.  First, the role of interests in 
policy-making and bubbles goes beyond the ‘few bad apples’ theory which politicians must 
stick to in public, and into “legally and ethically dubious behaviour in generating…crises” 
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2013: 72, 73). Interest groups influence decision-makers by 
mobilising constituencies, direct expenditure on electoral campaigns, and the production and 
provision of information. For elected decision-makers, constituent mobilisation is a constant 
consideration, and whether out of their interests or out of self-interest in being re-elected, a 
policy-maker may make poor decisions.  
 For political leaders, voter preference is key and in the US, for example, workers in 
the financial sector, compared to a general population of survey respondents, are more likely 
to vote, are more likely to try to influence other voters, are more likely to attend an electoral 
campaign event, and more likely to work on an electoral campaign (University of Michigan, 
2004). While it is arguably a more important consideration in the US, there is little doubt that 
the campaign funding boosts interest group influence among policy-makers (McCarty, Poole, 
and Rosenthal, 2013: 81).  
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Perhaps of greater concern is the point regarding information and lobbying, and the impact on 
the decision-making process. Similar to the impact of institutional policy-delegation (see 
below), “most of the time [decision-makers] depend on outside lobbyists and interest groups 
for information about the consequences of policy choices” (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 
2013: 85). This information asymmetry is exploited by interest groups, who have little 
incentive to suggest or support policies which can contribute to the medium-term benefit of 
the economy or society, but rather focus on their short-term advantage.  
 In Ireland, one of the most prominent, and ultimately damaging, examples of linkages 
between decision-making and sectoral interests was the move to so-called “relationship 
banking”. The Nyberg Commission noted the reliance on relationship banking for growth by 
Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society. These financial institutions 
provided loans to a limited number of entrepreneurs operating in the riskier parts of the 
property market, found it difficult to decline a loan to any of its top customers, and allowed 
loans that were not supported by strong or sufficient cash flows or collateral to be frequently 
reinforced by personal guarantees, which were either unsupported by assets free of debt, or 
supported by equity in other property (Nyberg, 2011: ii and 32). The banks were dependent 
on a small number of interests, the Central Bank was dependent on those same banks for 
information, regulators were dependent on information from the Central Bank, and 
government decision-makers were dependent on information from the regulators. In addition, 
“the pattern of tax cuts left revenues increasingly fragile [and] dependent on taxes driven by 
the property sector” (Nyberg, 2011: 5), leaving government budgetary policy dependent to a 
large extent on a small number of interests.   
Second, the problems arising from the impact of interests (and ideology) are 
compounded by decision-makers having to “create policies within institutions that are 
resistant to policy change” (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2013: 90-116).  Obviously, 
sound policy-making in general and bubble-avoidance in particular, requires policy change 
and institutions that facilitate such change. In the case of the US, the suggested institutional 
arrangements which hinder rather than facilitate positive decision-making and policy 
outcomes include fragmented political power, frequency of national elections, small, single-
member electoral districts, and parliamentary procedures.  In addition, McCarty, Poole, and 
Rosenthal point to the impact of levels institutional knowledge on decision-making. It is a 
truism that the greater the extent to which a leader, government and parliament lacks 
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information or expertise on critical issues, the greater the probability of poor decision 
outcomes. Institutional arrangements can have a significant bearing on information flows, 
and levels of expertise. For example, where the nuts and bolts of policy are delegated to 
regulators, it is harder for governments to distinguish between bad policies and poor 
implementation (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2013: 112-114).   
 In Ireland, both the institutional set-up (the Social Partnership model) and the 
information/expertise deficit arising from institutional and regulatory arrangements (the 
relationship between the Financial Regulator, Central Bank of Ireland, and the Department of 
Finance) all contributed to Ireland’s crisis. The Irish government’s budgetary process was 
“completely overwhelmed” by the Social Partnership model (Wright, 2010: 5), while “key 
facts which should have been of central interest to supervisors (e.g., on bank governance) 
were not available to policy-makers in a timely manner at the point where the crisis began to 
unroll” (Regling and Watson, 2010: 40).  
 Third and finally, for McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal’s framework, the final seven 
words of the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of ideology are particularly telling; 
ideology is defined as a “systematic scheme of ideas, usually relating to politics or society, or 
to the conduct of a class or group and regarded as justifying actions, especially one that is 
held implicitly or adopted as a whole and maintained regardless of the course of events” 
(2013: 15; emphasis added). In other words, despite events and information suggesting a 
particular course of action, one which may be optimal, ideology can justify alternative, 
erroneous action or inaction.  Ideology can be viewed as one of many heuristics through 
which irrational human beings try to make sense of the world, and it has been argued that this 
appears to be more prevalent among relatively well-informed elites, who are trying to make 
sense of more information: “To blame a regulator’s ideology for a regulatory mistake is 
merely to emphasize that regulators, like entrepreneurs, depend on theories to guide their 
actions. Ideologies provide them” (Friedman, 2009: 157). Further, the ideological identity 
and brand of the group or party of which a decision-maker is a member may be so strong that 
taking a decision which runs contrary to that ideology may be politically harmful to that 
decision-maker.  
 For McCarty and colleagues, ideology is synonymous with irrationality but under the 
model employed here, they are variables independent of each other either or both of which 
can impact on the decision-outcome (dependent) variable.  Ideology, as defined earlier, is a 
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systematic scheme of ideas regarded as justifying actions that is held implicitly or adopted as 
a whole, and maintained regardless of the course of events. This is in contrast to irrationality, 
which is not something one voluntarily holds or adopts, but rather is a consequence of our 
human make-up. Being human makes us, to use Ariely’s famous phrase, predictably 
irrational but it does not make us ideological.   
 For McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, ideology played a central role in the political 
bubble which surrounded the recent crash in the US; it is “a basic set of beliefs about how the 
world works and about what is right or wrong” (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2013: 38). 
For example, if the onset of the financial crisis prompted a government to move towards 
increased regulation, the legislature would immediately amend appropriate laws and 
structures. Ideology, however, limits the force of this channel of action. The abstract example 
they provide to explain the impact of ideology on economic policy is remarkably relevant to 
the actual events in Ireland in the decade preceding the crash there: 
“In certain contexts, pragmatists and ideologues alike might agree that lowering tax 
rates is a good idea. But a pragmatist would want assurances that lowering tax rates is 
a good idea…The pragmatist would also understand that context matters. Lowering 
taxes when taxes are high is quite different form lowering taxes when taxes are 
low…Conversely, an ideologue may want to lower taxes because she believes that 
lowering taxes is inherently a good thing to do….The fifth tax cut is just as valuable 
as the first four” -  McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2013: 39        
Tax reductions are a telling example of how ideology can contribute to a policy bubble. The 
changing structure of the tax system in Ireland from the 1990’s to 2007 presents an 
instructive example of dynamic policy-making, where a policy-shift on taxation originally 
occurred to influence economic behaviour and outcomes, grew in response to positive 
feedback through the 2000s and burst in 2007, some four years after its instrumental value, 
and four years after, moved from being a strength to being a weakness.  
 As the later section illustrates, an underlying issue in the period up to Ireland’s crash 
in 2008 was the development of an imbalance in the fiscal policy strategy: “the Government 
made policy decisions which directly contributed to erosion of the tax base” (Report of the 
Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Vol. 1, Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 
162). Between 1994 and 2007, the share of income tax as a proportion of total tax revenues 
fell from 39 per cent to below 30 per cent. These tax reductions were driven in part by an 
ideological shift in policy, manifest in the electoral success of the Progressive Democrats and 
their participation in successive coalition governments.  The tax cuts were made possible by 
35 
 
gains in other, transient/transactional sources of revenue (Stamp Duty, CGT and VAT). Over 
this period the Government’s finances and consequently, their entire macroeconomic tax and 
expenditure model became increasingly dependent on, and vulnerable to, maintaining 
stability in the construction and property sectors, leaving itself open to increased vested 
interest activity.  
 The official investigations into the crash also flagged up the role interests, institutions, 
and ideology in Ireland’s case. One investigation highlighted the impact of interests and 
institutions in its conclusion that effective policy in the potential bubble was lacking as a 
consequence of the “deference and diffidence” displayed by policy-makers (Honohan, 2010: 
12). Another pointed to the impact of firmly held ideological beliefs when it found that the 
crisis emerged from a naïve belief in “paradigm of efficient financial markets” amongst 
decision-makers (Nyberg, 2011: 94 and 95). It would not be correct, of course, to claim that 
interests, institutions, and ideology were the only contributory factors in Ireland’s (or perhaps 
any) political and economic babble. Casey (2010) places an emphasis on the cultural context 
in which decisions are made, concluding that this was important in precipitating what he 
terms “Ireland’s malaise”.                          
3.2 Economic and Political Bubbles: An Example from Ireland’s Tax Policy  
In 2016, the official parliamentary inquiry into the crash noted the significant powers 
conferred on political leaders by the Constitution, to make far-reaching decisions without any 
prior engagement with the Oireachtas and that prior to the crash, Government made policy 
decisions not always accepting the advice given to them (Report of the Joint Committee of 
Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Vol. 1, Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 13). Poor economic 
policy emerged despite advice which if acted upon may have mitigated the subsequent crisis 
(e.g. action to address declining national competitiveness). Ireland’s bubble and over-heated 
property market occurred in a time of unprecedented economic expansion, encouraged by 
pro-cyclical fiscal policies, individuals’ investment errors, banking and regulatory errors, and 
poor political decisions. That bubble was both economic and political.  
The familiar boom-bust cycles occur when “business cycles – the periodic, normally 
moderate swings in economic activity – become exaggerated, leading to excessive economic 
expansion followed by a dramatic collapse” (Grossman, 2013: xix). An economic bubble is a 
generic term for the unsustainable increases in asset prices in the “mania phase” of this 
economic cycle (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005: 12) and there are many notable examples in 
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history (see Table 2.2). A political bubble is the range of policy decisions that promote and 
exacerbate bubbles in economic markets and precipitate economic crises such as Ireland’s in 
2007/08. Both economic and political bubbles have a pro-cyclical character. A political 
bubble is “a real and/or perceived policy overreaction that is reinforced by positive feedback 
over an extended period of time” (Maor, 2014: 469). Economic and political bubbles are 
linked, have “marked similarities” and coincide for three reasons: both are fuelled by the 
greed of interests, both are strongly influenced by the rules of the game, and both rely on 
specific sets of beliefs (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2013: 14-17).  
 Ireland’s taxation regime from 1987 to the crash twenty years later provides an 
example of the link between policy and economic bubbles. The key reasons behind the 
emergence of Ireland as the so-called Celtic Tiger have been the subject of much study 
(Nolan, O’Connell and Whelan 2000; Barry 2003). Accession to the European Union (EU) in 
1973 or even earlier events, such as the end to protectionist economic policies in the 1950s, 
can be cited in such analysis as marking a turning point. But, as Barry notes, “Ireland did not 
deviate much from around 60 per cent of the level of national income per head in the UK (the 
country’s single most important trading partner) between 1913 and 1985” (Barry, 2003: 1).  
 In the decade up to 1987 the Irish government’s broad macroeconomic policy 
approach gave primacy to the “one-sector small open economy” perspective which held that 
all sectors of the economy produced goods and services that Ireland could export in unlimited 
quantities at given world prices (Honohan, 1988). The consequence was the belief by 
government that balancing the budget could as easily be achieved by raising the taxes paid by 
individuals as by the more politically-difficult method of cutting spending, that any necessary 
financial adjustment could be achieved without negatively impacting on unemployment, that 
public sector job losses could be avoided, and that the impact of taxation on wages and the 
cost of doing business was not of great importance (Barry, 2003: 7).  As a result levels of 
taxation rose sharply to service the government debt resulting from unchecked spending. To 
illustrate the heavy burden on individuals, Walsh notes that by the late 1980s a worker in a 
company that was paying less than 10 per cent tax on its profits was herself paying tax 
(including social security) at a 75 per cent rate, along with very high rates of VAT and excise 
duties (Walsh, 2010: 670). Public debt hit crippling levels (133 per cent of GDP in the early 
1980s) and by 1985 personal income tax made up 31 percent of tax revenue, up from 18 per 
cent in 1965 and 25 per cent in 1975 (O’Connell and Rottman, 1992: 227). This policy 
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approach failed. By 1987 the unemployment rate soared to 17 per cent even though 
emigration exceeded 40,000 people.  
 A number of events aligned in 1987 which signal that period as a turning point in 
Ireland’s economic fortunes. These include the impact of improved flows of foreign direct 
investment in preparation for the Single European market, the devaluation of the currency in 
1986 making exports cheaper and imports more expensive, positive working-age 
demographics, the supply of relatively low cost labour, a boost of exports to the UK as a 
result of a shift in economic approach there (lower taxes, higher consumption), the onset of 
the more corporatist approach to policy making with social partners, the impact of 
deregulation in the aviation sector on visitor numbers, and the prospect of significant 
transfers via structural funds from the EU (valued at as much as 3 per cent of GDP per 
annum).  
Another important event was the adoption of a new fiscal strategy of cuts to both 
spending and taxation, in 1987, a strategy pursued by a minority government with the support 
of the main political opposition and in the context of the aforementioned social partnership 
model. Spending cuts hit State capital investment, public service pay and numbers, and 
current expenditure by State bodies, all of which provided the resources for changes in 
taxation. Economic theory links changes in taxation to growth through their influence on the 
decisions of economic agents. Taxation – in theory - changes economic decisions and can 
thereby affect economic growth through its impact on disposable incomes, public 
consumption of goods and services, and the demand for (and hence supply of) infrastructure, 
all of which impacts positively on the demand for labour and boosts government revenues. 
Moderating labour costs via reduced income taxes places downward pressure the cost of 
doing business which makes goods and services more competitive for export, and Ireland 
more desirable as a location for mobile investment. In addition, allowing workers to keep 
more of what they earn boosts productivity, with high personal income taxes empirically 
shown to be more detrimental to growth than consumption, environment and property taxes 
(OECD, 2009; Prammer, 2011).  As Whelan puts it, at a time of deep crisis, Ireland was in 
fact “primed for growth” with its workers were becoming increasingly productive, yet the 
population as whole was significantly under-employed (Whelan, 2013: 3). In a bid to exploit 
this, a new approach was set in train.  
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The government’s Programme for National Recovery, published in 1987, said that Ireland 
would “rapidly reach the stage where two-thirds of taxpayers pay tax only at the standard 
rate”, placing the strategy firmly in the context of economic growth, stating that after four 
years of high taxation, high unemployment and high emigration, Ireland needed better 
management of the economy and the burden of taxation must be reduced.   In the first year of 
this new fiscal strategy fresh measures saw 93,000 taxpayers who would otherwise be liable 
at the 48 per cent rate pay tax at 35 per cent. In addition, 55,000 taxpayers who would 
otherwise be on the top rate of 58 per cent would now have a marginal rate of 48 per cent. 
Sixteen thousand taxpayers were taken out of the tax net altogether, while a further 5,000 
became entitled to marginal relief. Taken together, the approach meant that nearly 63 per cent 
of taxpayers would be paying tax at the standard rate in the first income tax year following 
the adoption of the new fiscal strategy. The taxation policy bubble of interest thus formed in 
Ireland 1987 to positively influence economic behaviour and outcomes in the face of the dire 
economic circumstances outlined above. The government saw economic growth as a 
precondition for employment growth and an improvement in living standards in Ireland.  
The impact of the new fiscal strategy adopted in 1987, with tax changes at its core, 
generated great cause for optimism and confidence, and the supply of this policy increased in 
response to positive feedback through the 1990s. Gross National Product rose from €24 
billion in 1986 to almost €34 billion in 1991, personal consumption of goods and services 
increased from €17 billion to €23 billion over the same period, and the interest on national 
debt finally levelled off in 1990 after soaring over the previous fifteen years
1
. By 1989 the 
deficit had dropped below 3 per cent of GDP, never to breach this level again until 2008, and 
the debt ratio had fallen below 100 per cent (O’Leary, 2010, 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Author’s calculations based on data from the Central Statistics Office. 
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Figure 3.1: GDP Growth Rates, Ireland and EU, 1979 – 1999 (Walsh, 2010: 661) 
Walsh correctly views 1989 as significant for Ireland with, as illustrated above, the country 
clearly outperforming the rest of Europe from this point on (Walsh, 2010: 660). The positive 
feedback emerged not only from the economic data but from the polling booths also.  Fianna 
Fáil, the incumbent minority government which adopted the new fiscal strategy in 1987, was 
re-elected to government as part of a coalition in 1989, and in all was returned as the largest 
party in government from 1987 to 2011 bar a short period from 1995 to 1997. The bubble-
inflating feedback from the electorate was unsurprising given that the fiscal strategy and 
policy supply it produced allowed successive Fianna Fáil-led governments to institute income 
tax cuts accounting for about one-third of the rise in real take-home pay between 1987 and 
2003 (Barry, 2003: 13).   
 In 1989, the new government continued with its approach to tax policy in pursuit of 
growth committing to reduce the standard rate of income tax to 25 per cent by 1993 and 
move towards a single higher rate of tax. In 1993, the next government made a priority of 
removing the low paid, especially families out of the tax net altogether, to broaden the 
standard tax band so that only relatively high earners pay the higher rate of tax, and to further 
reduce rates, especially the standard rate.   
 In their analysis of the crisis on behalf of the Irish Government, Regling and Watson 
found that despite the consequences being clear in the second half of the 1990s, policy 
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instruments such as fiscal and income policies were not used to offset the well-known 
expansionary effects of European Monetary Union membership on the macroeconomic 
environment, and in fact, tax policies “fuelled the fire” (Regling and Watson, 2010: 24). In its 
programme for the years following an election in 1997, the government stated that it 
recognised the need to reduce the burden of personal taxation in order to reward effort and 
give people an incentive to take up work, committing to reduce the basic rate of income tax to 
20 per cent and the higher rate to 42 per cent over the next five years. If economic 
circumstances permit, the objective was to reduce the higher rate to 40 per cent by 2002. 
Basic allowances were to be increased, and rise by at least the rate of inflation at each 
Budget.  
 The perceived gains from this supply of a low personal taxation policy continued 
through the 1990s and into the 2000s. As O’Connor notes (citing Kirby and O’Connell and 
Russell), “Ireland became a blueprint economic miracle held up to other countries as a model 
to emulate. This was based on the rapid level of economic development achieved since the 
mid-1990s. Ireland’s average GDP growth from 1990 to 2004 was a stunning 6.37 per cent 
per annum. In 2003, Ireland’s GDP per capita stood at 133 per cent of the EU25 average. 
There was also a staggering increase in employment. From 1993 to 2004, employment levels 
jumped from approximately 1.18 to 1.84 million, an increase of over 650,000 at work in 
slightly over ten years” (O’Connor, 13: 2010). 
Upon election in 2002, the new government pointed to the dramatic reductions in 
taxation in the preceding years, yet committed to sustaining economic growth and 
maintaining full employment by inter alia keeping down personal and business taxes in order 
to strengthen and maintain the competitive position of the Irish economy in the period leading 
up to 2007.  Their stated priorities with regard to personal taxation were to achieve a position 
where all those on the national minimum wage were removed from the tax net, and to ensure 
that 80 per cent of all earners paid tax only at the standard rate. In addition, if the economic 
resources permitted, the government would use the potential of the tax credit system to 
effectively target changes and to pursue further improvements in the income tax regime.  
 Average economic growth in Ireland exceeded 6 per cent between 1987 and 2007, the 
numbers at work almost doubled from 1.1 million in 1987 to 2.1 million in 2007, and the 
unemployment rate plummeted from 17 per cent to 4.5 per cent over the same period 
(Commission on Taxation: 2009, 71). The nature of employment growth also signalled 
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something of a simultaneous societal shift with non-agricultural employment jumping from 
33 per cent of workers in 1993, 41 per cent in 2000, and 46 per cent by 2007 (Honohan, 
2010: 21). It is true that establishing cause and effect vis-à-vis the government’s programme 
of tax reduction and economic growth is challenging, and the subsequent boom cannot be 
described as having been caused by tax cuts alone. However, there is a coincidence on the 
timing of an adoption of this new fiscal strategy and an inflection point in economic progress.  
 Ireland was demonstrating all of the attributes to modernity, convergence and 
affluence and the positive feedback created the ideal conditions in which a policy bubble can 
grow. The initial optimism and confidence spawned by the new fiscal policy from 1987 
turned into something more dangerous in the new millennium. As Maor notes, “for a policy 
bubble to grow, over-optimism and overconfidence should propel the process of positive 
feedback. Overconfidence and optimism of policy-makers may trickle down from policy-
makers to the general public (or vice versa), whose appetite for risk and high expectations 
may lead to a gradual inflation of the bubble” (Maor, 2014: 476).  
 The notion of the policy bubble implies a tipping point where policy moves from 
being accurately valued and supplied at appropriate levels, to being over valued and over-
supplied, leading to overreaction. O’Leary (2010: 4) speaks of “two phases of the long Irish 
boom... roughly divided by the millennium year”. Identifying the precise year of the tipping 
point in the case of Ireland’s taxation policy is perhaps futile and certainly challenging. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to estimate at what stage tax changes ceased to yield sustainable 
gains to the Irish economy and started to present a risk to the public finances. A proposed 
estimate here is that tipping point to have arrived just prior to, or in, 2003. The centrality of 
this policy bubble and overreaction in terms of tax policies to the later crisis in Ireland is 
clear from one of the official reports: 
“Much of the reason for the revenue collapse lies in the systematic shift over the 
previous two decades away from stable and reliable sources such as personal income 
tax, VAT and excises towards cyclically sensitive taxes. Revenue became 
increasingly dependent on corporation tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax (in that 
order); the contribution of these taxes to total tax revenues rose steadily from about 8 
per cent in 1987 to 30 per cent in 2006 before falling to 27 per cent in 2007 and just 
20 per cent in 2008. The steady growth in revenue from the above ―fair weather 
taxes during the two decades from 1988 – with only two brief hesitations in 1993 and 
2001-02 – created a false sense of security as to their sustainability and induced policy 
makers to take advantage by narrowing the base of the personal income tax and 
lowering rates. The latter did help buy wage restraint but left the budget seriously 
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exposed to a downturn. Had the tax structure been less cyclically sensitive, the fall in 
revenue in 2008 would have been much lower” - Honohan, 2010: 29 
While today the size and broad distribution of the tax burden across tax types in Ireland is not 
greatly out of step with other EU countries (O’Connor, 2013: 538), this was not the case in 
the early 2000s.  As the policy overreaction took hold and continued to be over-supplied in 
response to the positive feedback, historical tax revenue data shows the trend of increased 
reliance on taxes on capital with a reduced reliance on taxes on income and spending 
(Commission on Taxation, 2009: 74). The data points to 2003 as the time, the tipping point, 
whereby the contribution of income tax to overall revenues became too low relative to other 
components such that continuing to supply the policy placed the economy in jeopardy, as 
opposed to bolstering or propelling growth.  From 1999 to 2002, Ireland reduced the total tax 
burden across the board from 32 per cent to 28 per cent of GDP, though in a context of 
expanding GDP.  
 It is worth highlighting a point O’Leary makes about this period in Ireland: “there is a 
widespread perception that the period from 2000 to 2007 was one during which taxes were 
greatly reduced in Ireland. Actually, this is not the case. It is true that some taxes were 
reduced, but the overall tax burden remained unchanged. What defines the period rather 
better is the big shifts that occurred in the composition of tax revenue and the extent to which 
the income tax base shrank” (O’Leary, 2010, 5, original emphasis). By 2001, the new fiscal 
strategy had been in place for fourteen years and budget of that year implemented a package 
of tax cuts equivalent to 1.4 per cent of GDP. This was followed by two budgets in which 
taxes were raised: by the equivalent of 0.5 per cent of GDP and 0.7 per cent of GDP 
respectively. 
 Nevertheless, by 2003 the proportion of the Irish State’s tax revenue coming from 
personal income tax (expressed as a percentage of GDP) fell to 7.7 per cent. It had been 9.4 
per cent in 2000.  By 2003, as Honohan puts it, the reliance on taxes that could only generate 
sufficient revenue in a boom, had made public finances highly vulnerable to a downturn. 
(Honohan, 2010: 20).   
The taxation of individuals fell steadily from 1998 to 2002, from over 12 per cent of 
GDP to 7.4 per cent, at a time when GDP was rising rapidly.  Although it rises slightly, 
taxation of individuals was at 8 per cent when the crisis broke and only rose sharply in 
response to the crash.    This was the result of a process that began in 1987 and by the mid 
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1990s really took hold. The top personal income tax rate in Ireland went from 48 per cent in 
1995, to 46 per cent in 1998, to 44 per cent in 2000, to 42 per cent in 2001, and to 41 per cent 
in 2007. As O’Leary finds “just as there was a more or less secular increase in the share of 
capital taxes and stamp duties in total revenue from the mid-1990s, so there was a secular 
decline in the share of income tax in the total. It fell by about 10 percentage points over this 
period” (O’Leary, 2010: 6).   
 Yet, in 2005 the government introduced another tax-cutting package which reduced 
taxes by the equivalent of 0.4 per cent of GDP, another in 2006 which did likewise, and yet 
another in 2007, cutting taxes by a net 0.6 per cent of GDP in the year preceding the boom. 
Whereas across the EU in 2007 over 45 per cent of tax on average came from taxing labour, 
in Ireland it was 34 per cent (Commission on Taxation, 2009: 75).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Tax Base Erosion in Ireland: Source as a Percentage of GDP, 1991 - 2013
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As Regling and Watson describe, the government repeatedly offered income tax cuts, 
inflating the policy overreaction bubble, which seemed sensible at the time as revenue was 
booming. The problem was that “over time, this approach narrowed the tax base and made it 
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 Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Volume 1,  Houses of the Oireachtas, January 
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more fragile because the “booming” part of tax revenue turned out to be a transitional 
phenomenon” (Regling and Watson, 2010: 27).  This approach was possible because between 
2002 and 2006 the total tax ratio increased every year, reaching 32 per cent in 2006, driven 
by the flood of VAT receipts, capital gains tax and stamp duties associated with property 
market transactions. The consequence was a difficulty to assessing the underlying, structural 
situation of the budget and the fiscal stance because the cyclical taxes grew rapidly in the run-
up to the crisis, and increasing the vulnerability to a recession, because the cyclical taxes 
reversed rapidly in the downturn.  Overall, between 2000 and 2007 the proportion of income 
earners legitimately not paying any income tax increased from 28 per cent to 40 per cent 
(O’Leary, 2010: 6).  
 The Irish government’s pursuit of a new fiscal strategy policy was in a context of 
advice to the contrary at the time the policy was enacted. Two studies in particular summarise 
the relevant international reports on the Irish economy (Wright, 2010), and assess the external 
surveillance of Irish fiscal policy during the boom years (O’Leary, 2010). These analyses 
include examples which show that the Ireland’s fiscal policy was in a context of warnings at 
the time this tax strategy policy was pursued. It is important that there is evidence that the 
overreaction was wrongly adopted in the presence of external prompts to deviate or desist. 
That said, the Wright report into the crisis in Ireland itself concluded - similar to O’Leary - 
that these occasional warnings from international commentators took a benign attitude 
towards the risks that were building up, and there was general view was that there were no 
serious implications for the Exchequer or the economy generally.  
 The inflated bubble of taxation policy supply burst at the end of 2007, some four 
years after its instrumental value, and four years after it moved from being strength to being a 
weakness. Although 2007 was a record year for tax receipts the economic environment 
changed rapidly and Ireland quickly fell into recession. It is not surprising that the State’s tax 
receipts fell by more than a quarter over the years 2008 and 2009, greatly exceeding the 14 
per cent contraction of nominal GDP between 2007 and 2009.  The consequences of this 
particular policy bubble are clear from the conclusions of the Irish government’s 
commissioned study of the crisis: 
“The main reason for the sharp increase in the fiscal deficit in 2008-09 was the 
collapse in tax revenue. This was possible because the structure of tax revenue had 
changed dramatically from the 1990s to 2006-07. The composition of tax revenue had 
shifted gradually from stable sources of taxation, like personal income tax and 
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VAT/excise taxes, to cyclical taxes, such as corporation tax, stamp duty and capital 
gains tax. The share of these cyclical taxes reached 30 percent of tax revenue in 2006; 
in the late 1980s it had amounted to only 8 per cent” - Regling and Watson, 2010: 26  
The remarkably high sensitivity of tax receipts to economic activity was a result of the policy 
overreaction in the preceding four years. Armed with the power of hindsight, an investigation 
into the lead up to the crisis pointed out that fiscal policy needs to build in sufficient 
allowance for temporary revenues, that the tax base should not be eroded, that independent 
institutional sources for economic and fiscal projections would be useful, and finally that it 
would be worth exploring the use fiscal rules, such as a medium-term expenditure ceiling 
(Regling and Watson, 2010: 43).  
 In July 2011, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council was established as an independent 
statutory body tasked with providing an independent assessment of official budgetary 
forecasts and proposed fiscal policy objectives. This was part of the wider Fiscal 
Responsibility Act passed by the government which includes a structural balance rule and a 
debt rule. Finally, Ireland passed the EU Fiscal Treaty referendum in July 2012. All of these 
can be considered measures to prevent, if not outlaw, oversupply or overreaction on this 
policy front in the future, in response to the painful recent past which saw a government 
collapse, rocketing personal and sovereign debt, a rapid unemployment and emigration crisis, 
and loss of economic sovereignty via a request for international financial assistance.   
 What is clear is that the decision to adopt a new fiscal strategy in 1987, which 
changed structure of the tax system in Ireland through the boom, is a telling example of 
dynamic policy making, where a bubble forms, grows in response to positive feedback, and 
bursts years after it moved from being strength to being a weakness.  This policy overreaction 
in pursuit of short-run benefits ultimately delivered massive societal costs despite warnings to 
the contrary. The reasons for this likely go beyond bounded rationality and consensus, and 
include interests, institutions, and ideology as important drivers of this harmful policy and 
economic bubble. Overall, this research employs the framework presented by McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal, and argues that these three factors impact on the decision outcome 
though they are not mutually exclusive, or even competing. Rather, together they explain key 
decisions in Irish policy-making. 
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3.3 Theoretical Framework of Decision-Making 
While interests, institutions, and ideology may or may not be impacting on any particular 
decision-making process, bounded rationality is ever-present in human decision-making (see 
Chapter 2), yet humans do not always make irrational decisions. Irrationality can vary, 
depending on the extent to which it is activated. Part II of the thesis investigates whether 
there is evidence of particularly active irrationality in the period before Ireland’s crash using 
a quantitative method of Leadership Trait Analysis.  Part III uses a most-likely case to verify 
if and how interests, institutions, and ideology play a role shaping a decision outcome, and 
also to seek evidence of irrationality in decision-making.  
 One perhaps unintended consequence of Nyberg’s analysis of Ireland’s crisis is that, 
by identifying the causes to be a combination of a naïve belief in efficient markets and 
irrational forces, he downplayed rational decisions that nonetheless had poor outcomes. Not 
all rational decisions are good or irrational ones bad.  Schumpeter (1939) noted the example 
of ‘hog cycles’, whereby a producer of a good may respond rationally to a shortage of a 
product and consequent high prices by investing in increasing output. However, the time-lag 
in arrival of the good on the market (e.g. production of crops, animals) sees other producers 
respond similarly and a surplus supply arises which could ruin the first producer’s business. 
Alternatively, Klein (1999) uses the example of ‘firefighter’s intuition’, whereby a firefighter 
makes a good decision to leave a burning building prior to a collapse, absent any obvious 
rationale. It is entirely possible that poor decisions were taken by Irish policy-makers out of 
rational self-interest, such as the interest in short-term electoral success.     Added to this, 
bounded rationality is ever-present, yet rational decisions are taken regularly suggesting that 
Nyberg’s harmful irrational forces are sometimes more active than others. Chapter 2 outlined 
some of the lessons from behavioural economics and how it challenges the rational actor / 
utility maximising assumptions of neo-classical economics. Central to this debate are 
decision-makers’ preferences, and assumptions about their knowing what they want, doing 
what they want, and why they want what they do. Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan (2011: 
10) summarise how the results of behavioural economics prompt deviation from the standard 
assumptions about preferences in rational-choice economics. 
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Imperfect optimisation: The classical model assumes that individuals are capable maximizers 
of their own utility- that is they know what they want and what will make them happy and 
that their choices and preferences are consistent. Behavioural economics, however, finds that 
individuals are imperfect in their ability to maximise their own welfare and that their choices 
are often inconsistent- that is that individuals have more difficulty knowing what they want 
than the standard model assumes. 
Bounded self-control: Even when individuals accurately perceive their own interests, they can 
have difficulty realising their intentions. The classical model allows for no such difficulty, 
and it assumes time consistency in preferences. Behavioural economics recognises forces 
such as temptation and procrastination as real and meaningful phenomena- that is that 
individuals have more difficulty doing what they want than the standard model assumes. 
Non-standard preferences: Finally, the standard model also makes some weak assumptions 
about the shape of individual preferences. Behavioural economics finds two important cases 
in which those assumptions appear in accurate first preferences appear inaccurate: first, 
preferences appear to be set over changes in status rather than over end states. Second, the 
assumption of pure self-interest is often a bad assumption, in that individuals routinely hold 
preferences that are other-regarding- that is, that what people want is different from what we 
usually assume.      
 
Figure 3.3:  Behavioural Economics and Assumptions about Preferences, from 
Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan, 2011 
As Jones argues, decision-makers value or weight preferences depending on the context in 
which they are evoked (Jones, 1994: 6) and attempting to identify whether a suboptimal 
decision was arrived at as a result of rational or irrational forces is less than straightforward.  
It is possible that a policy-maker might make a perfectly rational or totally irrational 
suboptimal decision. For example, they may make a rational decision to support ultimately-
damaging tax policies because it is so closely linked ideologically to their political party that 
not doing so could harm their electoral prospects. This would be a rational response to 
powerful incentives.  Or the same policy-maker may on another occasion make an irrational 
decision to support ultimately-damaging tax policies as (irrational) confirmation bias leads 
them to place greater weight on the benefits of the policy, than on the downsides. That is 
irrational decision-making. Knowing that interests, institutions, and ideology play a role in 
generating and sustaining economic and political bubbles, and that rational and irrational 
decision outcomes can be arrived at, prompts the framework proposed here.  
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Figure 3.4: Proposed Framework of Decision-Making 
The above is a framework (rather than explanatory theory) with which to analyse the role and 
interaction of the three factors on a decision outcome, which may be rational or irrational, or 
optimal or sub-optimal.  For example, the policy-maker chooses an option because it is the 
preferred option of a powerful external interest group. The group may be in a position to 
mobilise an important constituency (of voters), direct expenditure on electoral campaigns, or 
produce and provide information important to the policy-maker. In this case, it is rational for 
the political decision-maker to support those interests’ views.  This can also be aligned to the 
self-interest of a politician to be re-elected. Ireland has seen examples of planning decisions 
being influenced by the interests of property developers (Final Report of the Tribunal of 
Inquiry into Certain Planning Matters and Payments, 2012). Slow progress on reform of 
sheltered sectors of the Irish economy, such as the legal services, are also linked to the power 
of external interests, while the decision in 2003 to decentralise certain government 
department functions is also considered to have been taken to serve constituency interests.  
 The policy-maker may also rationally choose an option because of the external 
institutional framework which may be resistant to alternatives, or in which power and 
knowledge is distributed in such a way as to militate against alternative options.  Authority 
and access to information can be distributed across government; in Departments, Agencies, 
and Regulators. A policy-maker in a government Department may be overly or totally reliant 
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on information from a Regulator and may thus make a poor but rational decision. This was a 
key feature of the Irish crisis where the Financial Regulator relied on information provided by 
the banks, there was poor information sharing and definition of responsibilities between the 
Financial Regulator and the Central Bank, and poor information sharing and definition of 
responsibilities between both of these and the Department of Finance (Honohan, 2010). In 
such a scenario it is plausible that a policy-maker could make a poor, but rational, decision in 
response to powerful incentives arising from the institutional framework.  
 Alternatively, a policy-maker may select an option as a consequence of a rigid 
ideological belief held by them, their party, or which dominates political thinking. An elected 
decision-maker who is a member of a party with a strong ideological brand (e.g. Tea Party 
Republicans in the US) whether conservative/right or socialist/left might rationally choose an 
option because to do otherwise would be politically damaging to them or their party. A 
decision which runs contrary to stated ideological position (e.g. a tax increase by a 
representative on the economic right or a spending cut by a representative on the economic 
left) can be used against the decision-maker by those within and without their own grouping. 
In Ireland, ideology has been highlighted as a contributing factor in shaping income tax 
policy from to 2003 on, after which the contribution of income tax to overall revenues 
became too low relative to other components such that continuing reduce tax placed the 
economy in jeopardy, as opposed to bolstering or propelling growth.     
 A policy-maker may also arrive at an irrational decision because the relevant 
information and messaging is controlled by others with a strong interest in the outcome, 
which in turn activates irrationality.  In pre-crisis Ireland regular property market assessments 
by the two biggest banks, reports published by two large Dublin stockbrokers, research by the 
independent (but State-funded) Economic and Social Research Institute, and annual reports 
published by the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland reveals evidence 
of extrapolation bias and that expectations of continued house price increases were not 
confined to households (Lunn, 2013). Lunn also notes that the persistence of beliefs about the 
prospect of a soft-landing for the property market and the financial soundness of the banks is 
a theme of the official report into the performance of the Central Bank and the Regulator 
which points to confirmation bias and “highlights lack of scepticism and selective reading of 
evidence” (Lunn, 2013: 576). (At a broader level, ratings agencies have also been criticised 
for their naïve reliance on historical patterns; see Friedman, 2009: 134) 
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In addition, the irrational choice preferred by the decision-maker may come about as a 
consequence of the institutional framework in which they work. Nyberg found that a “silo” 
organisational structure strengthened the effect of lack of critical discussion, groupthink”, and 
modest or absent serious consideration of alternatives among Irish public authorities (Nyberg, 
2011: iv). Further, poor decision outcomes are more likely where key institutions have certain 
characteristics e.g. where financial institutions and supervisors tend to act in a herding 
manner, groupthink and conformism is present within these institutions, and the media and 
the political system take a supportive rather than a challenging role (Nyberg, 2011: 9). It is 
reasonable to expect that an institutional scenario where the Regulator is dependent on the 
banks for information, the Central Bank is dependent on the Regulator, and the Department 
of Finance is dependent on the Central Bank and the Regulator for information, increases the 
likelihood of groupthink or herding. 
 Lastly, a decision-maker may choose an irrational option because the rigid ideological 
belief they hold precludes consideration of important information. The ideological 
polarisation of politics makes policy-making resistant to the incorporation of new information 
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2013: 90). Where it would be rational to seek out new 
information to inform a decision, ideologues may only seek or process information which 
confirms or is unambiguously supportive of their ideology. This may extend to only including 
those with a similar ideology to their own in decisions. In Ireland’s case, this ideological 
barrier to rational decision-making manifested itself in an assumption that developments in 
the financial markets could not be seriously flawed, that regulation of the financial markets 
would reduce innovation and efficiency without improving stability, and that less and lighter 
regulation was therefore better (Nyberg, 2011: 94). Nyberg concludes that the widespread 
ideological belief in the efficiency of markets makes the international nature of the financial 
crisis, as well as the general unpreparedness of Irish banks and authorities, easier to 
understand: “To the extent that this paradigm, in its naïve version, had become widely trusted 
among Irish financial professionals in private and public institutions, such an assumption may 
have been made both across institutions and within institutions (strengthened through 
groupthink)”. 
 It is important to note that the forces of interests, institutions, and ideology at play are 
decision-specific. The process outlined here does not expect these three factors to be fixed, as 
the interests, institutions, and ideology impacting on a decision on, say, environmental 
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regulation can be expected to be very different to those at play in a decision on financial 
regulation. Finally, these three elements can be expected to interact with each other. For 
example, political institutions may put certain decision-makers at the heart of the political 
system. By putting elected politicians - who all share the same electoral incentives - in 
control, it makes it more likely that their short-term electoral self-interest may lead to sub-
optimal decisions. Further, the cabinet system may put the same types of people in a 
collective decision-making role, usually with the same ideologies which could encourage 
sub-optimal decisions. Similarly, the ideological position of a policy-maker may influence 
whose interests are heard in the decision process (for example proponents of State 
intervention versus market players). 
 Overall, the quantitative content analysis research in Part II attempts to reveal the 
presence of irrationality amongst decision-makers by seeking evidence of behavioural biases, 
using the leadership traits conceptual complexity and in-group bias as a proxy. To probe the 
issue further, the second element of the research employs qualitative case study analysis to 
reveal the influence of the three explanatory forces amongst decision-makers, namely 
ideology, institutions and interests, and reveal the rational or irrational nature of the decision-
process. The starting point for the entire research was Nyberg finding that public policy in 
Ireland seems to have almost unanimously accepted and encouraged views and practices that 
later proved disastrous, and that irrational forces were a key contributor or facilitator of this 
disastrous decision-making by government. (Nyberg, 2011: 94-97). So, up to this point 
irrationality has been the variable of interest. The hypothesis for the case study research is 
that there are three factors which alone or together may impact information processing, and 
contribute to the creation and sustaining of policy bubbles. The decisions may be rational or 
irrational, but the information processing element is key.  
 The impact of ideology, institutions and interests on information processing, and 
hence on decision outcomes, is the link between Parts II and III of this thesis. These three 
factors impact on information flow and on those decision-makers processing that information. 
It is these decision-makers that are assessed (in terms of leadership traits) in Part II of this 
research. How the interests, institutions, and ideology shape the flow of information is 
examined in detail in Part III. The resulting decision may be irrational in terms of the extent 
to which it was impacted by established decision-making biases (see Table 2.1). The analysis 
of utterances in Part II, and the process tracing in Part III are informed by a subjective 
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assessment, in hindsight, that certain decisions were poor. As stated in section 1.1, the 
objective of this research to better understand poor decisions made by policy-makers in pre-
crisis Ireland, with an emphasis on factors contributing to poor or irrational decisions. This is, 
in part, to inform processes or systems which could mitigate the impact of such factors. 
 The case study approach is being pursued to supplement the quantitative content 
analysis technique used in this research and because case studies are “generally strong 
precisely where statistical methods and formal models are weak” (George and Bennett, 2005: 
19). The case study will help us further understand why economic advice offered between 
1997 and 2007 did not translate into policy action that would have mitigated the likelihood or 
severity of the economic crisis in Ireland from 2008, and to what extent and how each of the 
three factors contributed to this. The case study is targeted to help reveal irrationality, as well 
as the other factors that can help explain poor decision-making. 
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Chapter 4: A Research Design to Assess Irrationality  
4.1 Assessing Behavioural Biases At a Distance   
It is clear that irrational forces (behavioural convergence bias, groupthink, herding) are at the 
heart of ex post explanations as to why the crisis in Ireland unfolded in the way it did. One 
question this prompts is whether it is possible to reveal these irrational forces as they were 
happening so that action is conceivable which could mitigate, if not avert, future crises. 
Typically, behavioural bias is detected in economic laboratory settings where groups of 
subjects are asked to make decisions in controlled and variable conditions to reveal the 
choices made and offer an explanation for these (see discussion in Chapter 2). Many if not all 
of the biases thought to have been impactful in Ireland’s crisis were initially identified in 
economic laboratory experiments, but evidence of the presence and impact of decision-
making bias would be more persuasive if gathered in an environment more like the one of 
decision-makers before the crash. The laboratory/experimental approach is unsuitable for the 
nationally and internationally known decision-makers of interest here. To perform 
psychological assessment of such individuals, effective and efficient at a distance techniques 
are necessary. Because key decision-makers are often inaccessible to researchers (they may 
in fact be deceased), specific content analysis schemes have been developed (Young and 
Schafer, 1998: 86).  These at a distance techniques allow researchers to perform assessments 
and derive measurements using material that is available without gaining direct access to the 
decision-makers of interest, and are based on the central premise that: 
“...what people say and how they say things can tell us much about what they think 
and who they are. For instance, we all know the adage that an optimist refers to the 
glass as half full, while a pessimist calls the same glass half empty. By specifying that 
specific traits or beliefs are associated with the usage of particular words, phrases or 
speech patterns, and then looking for these patterns in a subject’s verbal material, we 
can assess many different psychological traits and characteristics. For 
instance...someone who uses more black-and-white terms such as absolutely, 
definitely and always as opposed to more gray terms such as possibly, maybe and 
perhaps is presumed to be lower in conceptual complexity” - Schafer and Crichlow 
2010: 47   
This premise has been shown to hold true for complexity and bias traits, which this research 
employs as a proxy for the behavioural convergence bias behind the groupthink which is 
thought to have contributed to Ireland’s crisis. For example, Tetlock performed content 
analysis on archival records of public statements of decision-makers in five American foreign 
policy crises. All the material (once topically restricted) was coded using two content analysis 
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techniques which showed that public statements of leaders could reveal groupthink as posited 
earlier by Janis (Tetlock, 1979). Tetlock noted that the material upon which Janis relied in 
developing his groupthink theory (observer accounts of private conversations and participant 
memoirs) “were susceptible to serious retrospective distortion” (Tetlock, 1979: 1316). Of the 
two behavioural methods open to researchers to test Janis’ theory- laboratory simulation and 
content analysis of archival material – Tetlock chose the latter, employing an assessment of 
conceptual complexity as previous studies had shown it to be sensitive to shifts in the 
complexity of processing caused by situation, and because it can be applied to documents as 
letters, essays, speeches, and diplomatic communications. Using content analysis to assess 
the presence and effect of groupthink via conceptual complexity, Tetlock found that public 
statements of decision-makers in groupthink crises were characterised by significantly lower 
levels of complexity and evaluated political groups with which they identified, more 
positively (Tetlock, 1979: 1322). Tetlock used the state component of conceptual complexity 
(integrative complexity), but that Tetlock successfully detected groupthink/behavioural 
convergence (i) using the conceptual complexity construct and, (ii) employing a content 
analysis technique, supports the approach taken in this research.  Tetlock added a note of 
caution however, stating that the research evidence does not rule out alternative explanations, 
adding that “a decisive test...will probably elude us for a long time” (Tetlock, 1979: 1323).  
This note of caution and pessimism remains today. 
4.2 The Leadership Trait Analysis Technique 
Personality traits are part of the psychological make-up that informs the way individuals act 
and think. Researchers have distinguished a wide variety of different traits and have used 
several different methods to determine them (Winter et al. 1991; Judge et al. 2002; Suedfeld, 
2010). As it is highly unlikely that political leaders are willing to undergo more invasive 
psychological tests, these at a distance techniques have resorted to analysing speech-acts as a 
proxy for leaders’ personal dispositions (Schafer and Walker, 2000; Suedfeld, 2010). The 
conceptual complexity construct allows psychological assessment of leaders at a distance 
using such a content analysis approach. The Leadership Trait Analysis or LTA technique 
developed by Margaret Hermann is one of the most prominent techniques for studying 
personality traits of leaders and with this technique, seven different personality traits, 
including conceptual complexity and in-group bias, can be determined. 
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Leadership Trait Description 
Conceptual 
complexity 
The intricacy of the cognitive structure of a leader’s belief 
system. Cognitively complex individuals have a desire to 
seek multiple sources of information concerning issues and 
policy options, are able to see varying reasons for a 
particular position, and are willing to entertain the 
possibility that there is ambiguity in the environment  
In-group bias The degree to which a leader praises his own political, 
economic, social, cultural group and how patriotic and 
protective they are of their in-group 
Belief in one’s ability 
to control events 
The amount of control leaders feel they have over the 
situations they encounter 
Need for power or 
influence 
The  concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring 
one’s power of influence /  have an impact on other people 
Self-confidence The leaders’ sense of self-importance and sense of one’s 
self 
Task orientation The extent leaders are focussed on completing their task 
and solving problems or on building and nurturing human 
relationships by maintaining group spirit and morale 
Distrust of others The level of trust a leader has in other actors and whether 
they see them as trustworthy 
 
Table 4.1: Leadership Trait Analysis: Traits and Meanings 
This research employs the first two of these listed seven traits, conceptual complexity and in-
group bias. The LTA technique is grounded in the assumption that frequent use of certain 
words and phrases indicates the presence of certain personality traits. Hermann first set out 
the LTA content analysis approach in her 1999 paper, and it is summarised by Dyson as 
follows: 
“The scheme is a theoretically-driven content analysis of a leader’s verbal output. 
More specifically, an assumption is made that the more frequently leaders use certain 
words and phrases in their interview responses (and other verbal behavior) the more 
salient such content is to them.  
At issue is what percentage of the time when leaders could exhibit particular words 
and phrases they are, indeed, used. This procedure consists of an identification of 
opportunities within a leaders text for exhibiting verbal behavior associated with the 
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trait variables, recording whether this opportunity was taken and whether the words 
used are indicative of a positive or negative score on that trait based on the coding 
dictionary developed with the technique, and the summing of all such instances within 
the piece of text. Finally, a ratio trait score (0-100) for that leader is calculated” - 
Dyson, 2004: 50 
A high level of conceptual complexity is indicated by the more frequent appearance of words 
such as ‘possibly’, and ‘approximately’ in the content for an individual, while a lower level is 
indicated by such words as ‘certainly’ and ‘absolutely’ (Suedfeld, 2010: Conceptual 
complexity is scored based on the percentage of frequency of words related to either high 
complexity (i.e. approximately, possibility, trend) or low complexity (i.e. absolutely, 
certainly, irreversible) complexity. This assesses the capability of decision-makers to discern 
different dimensions of the environment when describing actors, places, ideas and situations. 
In-group bias is scored on the percentage of times a reference to the group is 
favourable, shows strength, or a need to maintain group identity.  Of interest is ascertaining 
when the decision-makers references his or her own group are the modifiers used favourable 
(i.e. great, progressive, successful, prosperous), do they suggest strength (i.e. powerful, 
capable, made great advances), or do they indicate the need to maintain group honour and 
identity (i.e. must maintain our own interpretation, decide our own policies). Decision-
makers high in in-group bias are prone to only perceive the good aspects of their group and to 
deny or rationalise away any weaknesses, which can reasonably be assumed to be associated 
with behavioural convergence bias.   
As noted in a previous Chapter, measurement of conceptual complexity moved from 
paragraph scoring using a 1-7 scale (Suedfeld and Rank, 1976), to guided interviews using a 
25-point scale (Streufert and Nogami, 1989).  In Smith (1991), Baker-Brown et al. provided a 
scoring manual for conceptual complexity which “can be used with any connected verbal 
discourse to which the researcher has access” (Baker-Brown et al., 1991: 403).  Winter 
describes it as a method that has been “applied to archival material and personal documents 
in many studies, offering both real-world confirmations of laboratory results and also 
psychological explanations of important social and political processes” (Winter, 1991: 119). 
However, one significant drawback of employing content analysis to assess conceptual 
complexity in the past was that:  
“[C]oding is difficult, in large part because it does not reply simple content counting 
rules of the sort that other content analytical approaches employ. 
Assessing...complexity requires the judgement of trained coders, who have to make 
subtle inferences about the intended meanings of authors. Coders often make difficult 
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judgements concerning whether differentiation or integration exists in particular 
statements.” - Baker-Brown et al., 1991: 402 
Thies (2009) summarises Margaret Hermann’s work on conceptual complexity as one of the 
main approaches to complexity assessment at a distance, with one of the “distinct advantages 
of Hermann’s approach is that it can be machine coded, thus increasing the reliability of the 
measure and allowing conceptual complexity to be studied in a greater number of actors over 
time” (Thies, 2009: 452). Addressing Baker-Brown’s concerns, a computer program, Profiler 
Plus, has been developed that will automatically code for all LTA traits. The software detects 
conceptual complexity and in-group bias through content analysis scoring, reporting 
frequency of words related to either high complexity (i.e. approximately, possibility, trend) or 
low complexity (i.e. absolutely, certainly, irreversible). Thies point is borne out by the 
number of political leaders whose conceptual complexity has been assessed and reported in 
recent years to help understand their decision-making and its outcomes. These include:   
 Ronald Regan and George Bush (Dille, 2000)  
 Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton (Dille and Schafer, 2000)  
 Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and George Bush (Preston, 
2001) 
 George Bush, Bill Clinton, Lyndon Johnson and Harry Truman (Mahdasian, 2002) 
 Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton (Post ed. 2003), Tony Blair (Dyson, 2006)  
 Thirteen UK Prime Ministers between 1945-2008 (Dyson, 2008) 
 Asian Central Bankers in the late 1990s (Thies, 2009) 
 Margaret Thatcher (Dyson, 2009) 
 Hermann van Rompuy (Van Assche, 2009)  
 Brian Cowen, Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and José Zapatero (van Esch, 2015) 
While the aforementioned works are based on the same theoretical underpinnings as this 
research, this work is novel in that it links personality trait to the presence and impact of 
behavioural biases. 
Regarding validity of LTA and its power to explain leaders’ behaviour, firstly, aside 
from the continuing use and perceived value of the method, it is important to note Hermann’s 
assessment of its accuracy in capturing the styles that leaders actually exhibit. Hermann 
(1999: 40) developed profiles on 21 leaders using the procedure proposed here and the 
subsequent ratings were compared with those “made by journalists and former government 
personnel who had had the opportunity to observe or interact with the particular leaders”. The 
correlations between the two sets of ratings averaged 0.84 across the set of leaders suggesting 
that the profiles derived from this at a distance technique provided researchers with similar 
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types of information on which to judge behaviour as had the other raters’ experiences with 
the actual figures (Hermann, 1999: 41).  
In his discussion on validity, Dyson (2008), states that in addition to face validity, 
finds that more detailed research on leaders “seeking to process trace the linkages between 
complexity and policy outcomes has also provided support” (Dyson, 2008: 14). He adds that 
more can be done, suggesting that case study analysis comparing leaders in similar situations 
but with differing levels of complexity “are perhaps the most direct tests of the behavioural 
hypotheses associated with information processing style”, and that approach forms part of 
this research.   
We have already seen Schafer’s account that personalities traits have been proven to 
have explanatory power for leader behaviours, but what of LTA, of which conceptual 
complexity and in-group bias, are but elements? While research has demonstrated that higher 
or lower trait scores by leaders tend to correlate with behaviours, how useful, for example, 
have the aforementioned assessments of leaders been in explaining their decisions?  
“The preceding studies are evidence of two critical concerns for the study of foreign 
policy analysis. First, we can identify specific personality traits for individual leaders 
and they are distinguishable from one another on the basis of those traits. Second, the 
traits analyzed by Leadership Trait Analysis have been found to correlate with the 
political behavior of the states or organizations those leaders represent. In short, 
leaders do matter and Leadership Trait Analysis can both explain past behavior and 
predict future outcomes based on the hypotheses associated with the method” -  
Mahdasian, 2002: 37 
The test employed here is the application of the LTA technique to provide a comparative 
content analysis of political leaders in Ireland and those in a group of western democracies in 
the years leading up to the most recent global economic crisis. The results will provide 
evidence to support (or not) the hypothesis that Irish leaders in the run up to the crisis had 
lower scores for conceptual complexity and higher for in-group bias, relative to the mean of a 
norming group of other Western leaders.  
The next Chapter offers a review of the LTA technique and the ongoing discussions 
concerning its validity and reliability. In an effort to contribute answers to some of the 
remaining questions in this matter, it proceeds with conducting an empirical analysis of all 
seven LTA leadership traits. On the basis of this and previous methodological analyses of the 
LTA, it draws conclusions and offers some guidance on more appropriate use of the method. 
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Ultimately, validity concerns arise when the hypothesis posed here is tested and the results 
analysed.    
4.3 Profiler Plus Software 
Content for Irish leaders will be analysed using automated software to generate scores for 
each individual decision-maker (0-1) for conceptual complexity and in-group bias to be 
compared to those for over 50 political leaders from around the world. A computer program, 
Profiler Plus, has been developed by Social Science Automation (see 
https://socialscience.net) that will automatically code for the traits of interest here. 
Assessments of Bill Clinton and Saddam Hussein (Hermann, 2003) and twelve British Prime 
Ministers (Dyson, 2008), and many other have been made using this combined LTA 
technique and this particular software. As Dyson notes, “recent advances in the power of 
desktop computers and software design have made possible the automation of this content 
analysis scheme” (Dyson, 2004: 45).  Dyson presents the argument that “new methodological 
techniques of computer assisted textual analysis can be applied to the available public domain 
source materials in order to generate reliable data on the individual characteristics” of 
decision-makers (Dyson, 2004: 48).   
One downside to using Profiler Plus is that it is commercially developed and much of 
the information about how it and the dictionaries work, is proprietary. A licence for academic 
use was applied for and granted for this research. What is known is that the LTA Profiler Plus 
coding scheme involves seeking specific content (words and phrases) that signify either the 
absence or presence of the seven LTA traits.  Where the identified content indicates that a 
trait is present, then a score of one is assigned to that content. Alternatively, the absence of 
the trait means that a score of zero is assigned to that content. The scores within the totality of 
the content are averaged to present a score from zero to one. The scores for an individual 
decision-maker (0-1) on the traits of interest, conceptual complexity and in-group bias, can be 
compared to those of other political leaders. As Hermann sets out, through such comparisons 
the researcher can determine whether the particular decision-maker is high or low on a trait.  
The developers of the combined LTA / Profiler Plus approach were contacted directly 
as part of this research to seek the greatest possible clarity about the process by which the 
software generates the scores, and the possibility of comparing sample phrases with LTA 
dictionaries. This was born out of a concern the system appears to be something of a ‘black-
box’, the internal workings of which are a hidden from the user, but in which much faith is 
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placed. It was put to the developers that, ideally, the software would display some examples 
of the researcher’s text which scored highly/lowly on certain traits, for example. The 
developers were asked if there were any studies that describe what exact process Profiler Plus 
embarks on once it begins. In reply, the developers stated that, they understood the perception 
of the software as a black-box, adding that “to some extent, that is true”.  
“The analysis is based on the theoretical framework of LTA. The specific dictionaries 
are not released since they are proprietary ~ otherwise others could remake the 
program. So unfortunately [we] cannot help you any further with this question, except 
note that the literature justifies the method (Hermann, Dyson). Generally speaking, 
those articles serve as the justification for the method” – Derksen, 2013: Personal 
communication 
Correspondence with the developers did yield some further information. Unfortunately a non-
compressed version of the coding schemes (dictionaries) for the version of the software used 
in this research was not obtainable; “although the schemes are technically recoverable, that is 
more effort than it's worth to us, barring a requirement for a funded project” (Young, 2013: 
Personal communication). It was possible to receive the names of the 53 leaders analysed for 
the ‘norming group’, to confirm that both speeches and interviews were used to generate 
scores, but not obtain the scores over time for these leaders (see section 4.5).    
In an article by Young and Hermann (2014), some more detail of how Profiler Plus 
works became available. Writing about version 7 (version 5.8.4 was used in this research), 
the authors state that the software is multi-pass, word-and-phrase counting system looking for 
words and phrases that match entries in one or more lists or dictionaries. If a word or phrase 
in the text matches a dictionary entry, it is coded, which means a category count is 
incremented and the system moves on. Information from one pass is carried over from one 
pass to another. Multiple-pass systems are able to ‘remember’ information from one pass by 
storing information associated with each word (Young and Hermann, 2014: 636). For 
example, tables 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate Profiler Plus analysis for the sentence ‘We debated who 
won the television debate’. 
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Figure 4.1: The initial state of “We debated who won the television debate” after 
loading into Profiler Plus (second “debate” not coded) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The state of “We debated who won the television debate” after part-of-
speech tagging (second “debate” tagged as a noun)  
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According to the article, the words ‘television debate’ can be problematic for systems 
attempting to code for complexity because, although debate between two alternatives may 
indicate complexity, the phrase ‘television debate’ does not. Profiler Plus as a multiple-pass 
system first tags each word with its part of speech (Table 4.1), and then counting as complex 
only those instances of ‘debate’ that are verbs (Table 4.2). The coding is accomplished using 
a rule that triggers when the word “debate” is found in the text, but it only counts the word as 
an indicator of complexity if the value… is “verb.” Notwithstanding this additional insight 
much about the operation of the technique and software is unknown, and this leads to some of 
the methodological issues explored in Chapter 6.    
4.4 Leaders of Interest, Period of Analysis and Retrieval of Leader’s Utterances 
This research is interested in if and how decision-makers in Ireland were influenced by their 
beliefs about the economy and its competitiveness in the decade before the crash. But who 
are the decision-makers of interest here? As set out by O’Malley and Martin (2010), the Irish 
Prime Minister, the Taoiseach, is considered to be one of the strongest of all heads of 
government, with one of the highest degrees of influence within their system of government, 
and potentially more powerful that any of their European counterparts, save the British Prime 
Minister. According to the Department of the Taoiseach’s website, “the Taoiseach is Ireland's 
Head of Government. He is Party Leader, Government Chairman and Chief Policy Maker” 
(www.taoiseach.gov.ie). Unsurprisingly then, the utterances of the Taoiseach will be subject 
to analysis in this research.  
Connolly and O’Halpin (2004) state that “there is a clear ranking in the perceived 
importance of Ministerial portfolios, with Finance generally accepted as the most important 
(after the Taoiseach, of course) because of its responsibility for economic management and 
for public expenditure” (Connolly and O’Halpin, 2004: 253). Again, the relevant public 
statements made by the holder of the position of Minister for Finance are of specific interest 
to this research.  Finally, although the title of the Ministry/Department has varied over the 
years, the issue of competitiveness has been a central concern of Ireland’s serving Minister 
for Enterprise. This is not surprising given the link between macroeconomic stability, 
national competiveness, firm performance and Ireland’s attractiveness as a location for 
foreign direct investment, all of which is the responsibility of that Minister. Therefore, 
statements made by the holder of the “enterprise” portfolio in government will also be 
examined in this study. (The institutional arrangements are expanded upon in Chapter 8). 
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OFFICE HOLDER TENURE 
Taoiseach John Bruton 1995 - 1997 
 Bertie Ahern 1997 - 2008 
Minister for Finance Rúairí Quinn 1995 - 1997 
 Charlie McCreevy 1997 - 2004 
 Brian Cowen 2004 - 2008 
Minister for Enterprise Richard Bruton 1995 - 1997 
 Mary Harney 1997 - 2004 
 Micheál Martin 2004 - 2008 
 
Table 4.2: Ireland’s Pre-Crisis Leaders to be Subject of Trait Analysis 
 
A starting-year of 1997 for the analysis would be appropriate for two reasons. First, a general 
election was held in June 1997, following which there was a change of government. Fianna 
Fáil and the Progressive Democrats formed a coalition with Bertie Ahern as Taoiseach. 
Ahern remained Taoiseach following subsequent general elections in 2002 and 2007, the end-
year chosen for this analysis and the final year before the crash in 2008. Therefore, 1997 is a 
starting point for the decade in the lead-up to the crisis with the constant of Fianna Fáil-led 
governments with Ahern as Taoiseach throughout. Second, the National Competitiveness 
Council (NCC) was established in 1997 to report on key competitiveness issues facing the 
Irish economy and offer recommendations on policy actions required to enhance Ireland’s 
competitive position. This provides a reference point from which the State and others, via the 
social partnership agreement of that year, can reasonably be seen to have been concerned 
with maintaining Ireland’s competitiveness in a context of very strong economic growth, 
employment growth, falling unemployment, low inflation, and government deficit/debt 
reduction. To add some sense of comparison, the utterances of the Taoiseach, Minister for 
Finance and Minister for Enterprise in the previous short-lived government (1995-1997) will 
also be analysed.   
 In assessing decision-makers at a distance the researcher must take a number of 
factors into consideration when settling on which content will be subject to scrutiny. Dyson 
(2008) summarises three key points, some of which have been touched upon in sections 
above as follows: 
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“The focus here is text analysis, which, in the form of content analysis of the 
speeches, interviews, and verbal communications of political leaders, is now an 
exciting avenue of research in political psychology. Text analysis offers potential 
solutions to several of the major problems that have traditionally beset psychological 
studies of political leaders.  
 
First, the ready availability of large volumes of text produced by leaders, and the 
increasing ease with which text can be accessed online, substantially mitigates the 
traditional problems of access as a barrier to generating useful empirical insight on 
elites. 
 
Second, the discipline necessary to construct content analysis schemes that achieve 
high levels of reliability has imposed a clarity of conceptualization that has not always 
been present in studies of the psychological characteristics of political leaders.  
 
Finally, the increasing extent to which these content analysis schemes have been 
automated, with analysis performed solely by computer, has drastically reduced the 
labor-intensive processes associated with manual content analysis, allowing for the 
processing of large samples of text and the grounding of studies in a solid base of 
empiricism” – Dyson, 2008: 8 
 
Hermann finds that in the course of completing profiles of the leadership styles of political 
leaders, “it has become evident that the analyst can develop an adequate assessment of 
leadership style based on 50 interview responses of one hundred words or more in length. 
Confidence in one’s profile, of course, increases the more interview responses the analyst can 
assess but any profile will suffer if it is determined on less than 50 responses” (Hermann, 
1999: 3). Taking all of this into account (and the validity of the LTA technique discussed 
above), for this research the universe of decision-makers’ responses to oral parliamentary 
questions (PQs), available through the official record on the Houses of the Oireachtas 
website, will be collected and analysed using the LTA technique discussed earlier.  Though 
responses to parliamentary questions contain some scripted elements, they also provide 
adlibbed content as supplementary questions are asked and answered. Renshon (2009) 
provides results which strongly indicate that public or the private data generate the same 
results using content analysis, and thus providing tentative confirmation of the validity of 
using public speeches.  
 In his 2008 study Dyson applies Hermann’s LTA technique to post-1945 British 
Prime Ministers, utilising responses to Parliamentary foreign policy questions in order to 
generate data on their individual characteristics, stating that these “data provide a basis for 
empirical study of the impact of the Prime Minister on decision-making” (Dyson, 2008: 21). 
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Dyson states that responses to questions in [parliament] are appropriate materials for the 
generation of trait scores because (i) they are from a single source, eliminating differential 
audience effects which might bias estimates, and (ii) they are relatively spontaneous, 
reducing the risk that they are entirely pre-prepared and thus more indicative of the trait 
orientation of an aide or speechwriter than the subject in whom we are interested (Dyson, 
2008: 52). 
The website of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Ireland’s parliament) provides an 
accessible online source for text, suitable to the scale of this research. Following Dyson 
(2008) and unlike studies prior to his, a sampling procedure for selecting texts was not used-  
this provides greater confidence in the reliability of the trait data, which rests on analysis of 
over three million words spoken by the relevant Irish leaders, and constitutes population, 
rather than sample data (Dyson, 2008: 52). One issue to be overcome is the precise retrieval 
of that content to make the analysis feasible within available resources.  
The Dáil records for January 28
th
 1998 are used here to illustrate the process which 
might was automated. One way to read what was said in the Dáil by, say, the Taoiseach on 
this day is to enter the search requirements using the online search function. This returns 23 
records and clicking on the first result allows you to read the written answer given by the 
Taoiseach to a question asked by a member of the Dáil regarding commemorative events 
(Figure 4.3). 
This approach returns written replies as well as oral replies to parliamentary 
questions’ (PQs). Crucially for the purposes of this research, it is replies to oral PQs rather 
than written PQs that are of interest. This is to maximize the likelihood that responses are 
those of the leaders, and not of a civil servant, aide, or advisor.  Helpfully, Dáil oral PQ 
exchanges are labelled “ceisteanna” (“questions” in Gaelic) within the search results, and 
thus can be selected via an additional search including this term. This additional search 
reduces the number of records returned from 23 to 3, and selecting, for example, the third 
result allows you to read the oral PQ answer given by the Taoiseach to an oral PQ asked by a 
member of the Dáil regarding basic income (Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.3: Returned Record using Manual Search Option 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Returned Record Using “Ceisteanna” Field with Manual Search Option 
68 
 
Because this is an oral PQ, the record contains the full exchange between the questioner and 
the respondent (Deputy Sargent and the Taoiseach respectively, in this case), and any others 
who interjected. Extracting the utterances by a particular person only from these oral PQ 
exchanges, over a decade or more, would be prohibitively resource-intensive. Having firstly 
searched and located the exchanges of interest on a particular day by a particular person, a 
researcher then has to: 
 Manually select the record 
 Copy and paste the entire exchange  
 Remove any text in the record that is not actually spoken (e.g. speaker’s name) 
 Remove the words not spoken during the exchange by persons other than the person 
of interest 
 Further tidy up the text (e.g. remove the embedded paragraph marker numbers).  
This multi-step process would have to be repeated for every day, for every speaker. As there 
are hundreds of Dáil sitting days of interest (December 15
th
 1994 – June 14th 2007), and eight 
persons of interest who will answer a number of oral PQs on any particular sitting day, this 
process would be labourious to the point of making the research impossible given the 
resources available.  
To overcome this problem, an automated process was designed, based on a number of 
factors. First, the daily Dáil record is not only held as readable text on the internet, it is 
recorded in Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) format. XML is a mark-up language that 
defines a set of rules for encoding documents in a format that is both human-readable and 
machine-readable.  So, returning to our January 28
th
 1998 example, the Dáil debates page 
reads as per Figure 4.5, whereas the XML format of this debate is also available and appears 
as per Figure 4.6.  
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Mr. Sargent:   asked the Taoiseach the steps, if any, his Department has taken to establish 
the task force promised under An Action Programme for the Millennium to investigate the 
introduction of a basic income scheme. [22736/97] 
The Taoiseach:   In An Action Programme for the Millennium the Government is 
committed to producing a Green Paper on the issue of basic income within two years. The 
social partners are also committed in Partnership 2000 to carrying out an independent 
appraisal of the concept and the full implications of introducing a basic income payment for 
all citizens, taking into account the work of the ESRI, CORI and the expert group on the 
integration of tax and social welfare. 
In line with these commitments a working group on basic income has been established under 
the auspices of my Department to examine how the issue should be dealt with. The working 
group, having reviewed the material available on basic income, has developed terms of 
reference for a study whose findings will assist the group in progressing its work. The study, 
to be undertaken by independent consultants, will commence shortly and it is envisaged it 
will be completed by the autumn. 
Mr. Sargent:   Fáilte romhat ar ais tar éis na Nollag. The commitment in the programme 
for Government to examine the concept of a guaranteed basic income is welcome. I stress the 
urgency of consideration of that matter. How many times has the task force met? Will the 
report which the Taoiseach said will be published in the autumn deal with the labour force 
implications as well as the fiscal implications of a basic income, two aspects of the remit of 
the task force? 
The Taoiseach:   The task force has met five times and has held a seminar and a number 
of open days... 
 
Figure 4.5: Standard Rendering of Online Dáil Record 
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<MainHeading Type="OA" LHead="Ceisteanna—Questions." RHead="- Basic Income"> 
  <Title>Ceisteanna—Questions. - Basic Income.</Title>  
- <Speaker pid="TrevorSargent" hpid="Mr. Sargent Mr. Sargent"> 
  <NameTxt>Mr. Sargent</NameTxt>  
  <P Just="Left">asked the Taoiseach the steps, if any, his Department has taken to establish the 
task force promised under An Action Programme for the Millennium to investigate the 
introduction of a basic income scheme. [22736/97]</P>  
</Speaker> 
- <Speaker pid="Bertie" hpid="The Taoiseach Bertie Ahern"> 
  <NameTxt>The Taoiseach:</NameTxt>  
  <P Just="Left">In An Action Programme for the Millennium the Government is committed to 
producing a Green Paper on the issue of basic income within two years. The social partners 
are also committed in Partnership 2000 to carrying out an independent appraisal of the 
concept and the full implications of introducing a basic income payment for all citizens, 
taking into account the work of the ESRI, CORI and the expert group on the integration of 
tax and social welfare.</P>  
  <P Just="Left">In line with these commitments a working group on basic income has been 
established under the auspices of my Department to examine how the issue should be dealt 
with. The working group, having reviewed the material available on basic income, has 
developed terms of reference for a study whose findings will assist the group in progressing 
its work. The study, to be undertaken by independent consultants, will commence shortly and 
it is envisaged it will be completed by the autumn.</P>  
  </Speaker> <Speaker pid="TrevorSargent" hpid="Mr. Sargent Mr. Sargent"> 
  <NameTxt>Mr. Sargent:</NameTxt>  
  <P Just="Left">Fáilte romhat ar ais tar éis na Nollag. The commitment in the programme for 
Government to examine the concept of a guaranteed basic income is welcome. I stress the 
urgency of consideration of that matter. How many times has the task force met? Will the 
report which the Taoiseach said will be published in the autumn deal with the labour force 
implications as well as the fiscal implications of a basic income, two aspects of the remit of 
the task force?</P>  
  </Speaker>  <Speaker pid="Bertie" hpid="The Taoiseach Bertie Ahern"> 
  <NameTxt>The Taoiseach:</NameTxt>  - <P Just="Left"> The task force has met five times and 
has held a seminar and a number of open days...  
 
Figure 4.6: XML Rendering of Online Dáil Record 
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Thus, the initial rationale for the expectation that this process could be automated was that the 
records of interest are freely available in machine-readable format. The record is machine-
readable because the text is tagged. Discussions with those responsible in the Oireachtas for 
these Dáil debates suggested that extracting the data of interest for this research (just the 
utterances by a particular person from oral PQ exchanges) was theoretically possible because 
the record is tagged in terms of the speaker and the type of exchange. So, taking the XML 
extract in Table 4.6 as an example, the exchange has the tag MainHeading Type="OA", 
indicating it is an oral PQ answer, and the Taoiseach’s utterances have the tag Speaker 
pid="Bertie".  
The second prompt for the expectation that an automated process could be developed 
was that a not altogether dissimilar approach was used in previous research (Elgie, Quinn, 
and Stapleton, 2006). As part of that research, the results of an internet search similar were 
processed through to a Java computer programme, which is particularly suited for the purpose 
of examining ‘strings’ of text, determining their content and acting on this information. In 
that case, the programme was modified until it could reproduce control results, and used to 
search through a file containing hundreds of results, count how many days each particular 
types of exchanges occurred and sort them into appropriate files, all in a matter of seconds. 
The programme employed by Elgie, Quinn, and Stapleton, served a different purpose to that 
of this research. While they used Java to interrogate, sort and count the universe of records 
returned from a search of Dáil debates, here the programme would either have to (i) 
interrogate a subset of records returned from a search of Dáil debates (i.e. ‘ceisteanna’), or 
(ii) interrogate a raw XML file. Following (i) or (ii) the programme would then have to 
retrieve the text spoken only by a certain individual. A commitment to some minimal support 
by the Oireachtas was secured and the next step was to engage the programming expertise 
required to either amend the programme used in the 2006 research or write a new programme 
capable of interrogating records returned from a search of Dáil debates or interrogating the 
raw XML data.  
To retrieve the required content, the School of Computing in Dublin City University 
(DCU) was engaged to provide computer programming assistance. Postgraduate students 
were encouraged to participate as a means of demonstrating their ICT and project 
management skills by developing a programme capable of interrogating Dáil records to 
retrieve contributions made by senior policy makers. Crucially the programme had to be 
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capable of retrieving the text spoken by the individual of interest. Once that was achieved, the 
output of the programme could be tested against a sample of manually extracted days and, 
finally, be subjected to LTA content analysis. A short piece of code was written in the Python 
scripting language which was capable of interrogating the raw XML files, retrieving the 
utterances spoken only by a specified individual, and output the results to a plain text file.  
To ensure that the automated method could reliably return content for analysis (i.e. 
text identical to that which would be retrieved manually from the Oireachtas website), a short 
comparison test was run. A sample day for each of the eight leaders of interest was chosen 
using no other criteria other than ensuring the leader answered oral PQs on the day. The 
relevant text was retrieved automatically and manually. The output of both techniques was 
saved into sixteen electronic documents (two files of text, one automatically retrieved, on 
manually retrieved, for each leader).  
The pairs of files for each leader were then compared using the ‘compare documents’ 
function in Microsoft Word. In the case of Bertie Ahern, the comparison of automatically and 
manually retrieved text for January 28
th
 1998 showed that the automated programme could 
retrieve identical text to the manual process, except that the word “Tánaiste” uttered by Bertie 
Ahern and recorded as such on the Oireachtas website, was returned as “T‡naiste” by the 
automated programme. As requested in the programme design, the automated retrieval had 
not returned the numerical marker “[13]” from the website version and thus was shown to be 
able to return clean text in this regard.  
A similar test was run for Brian Cowen for November 8
th
 2006, a day on which he 
answered Leader’s Questions as Minister for Finance. The only differences noted here 
between the automatically and manually retrieved text were that the automated retrieval did 
not retrieve the “€“ symbol, “Bus Átha Cliath” became “Bus tha Cliath”, “blasé” became 
“blas”, while “Dún Laoghaire” became “Dn Laoghaire”. Again, unwanted markers were 
missing from the material returned by the automated programme, as required. The same test 
was run for the other leaders of interest: Charlie McCreevy (sample from October 8
th
 1997), 
John Bruton (sample from February 6
th
 1996), Mary Harney (sample from May 8
th
 2003), 
Mícheál Martin (sample from February 7
th
 2006), Richard Bruton (sample from April 22
nd
 
1997), and Rúairí Quinn (sample from June 5
th
 1996). In all cases the automated method 
reliably retrieved text that was almost identical to the manual method where each daily record 
from the Oireachtas internet page was examined and text retrieved line by line, save for the 
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text errors above. The automated method also had the advantage of not returning the 
unwanted text markers.  
 The only other difference was that the automated process did not recognise or report 
non-English words. Examples include the Irish words Dáil, Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin, Pleanála, 
FÁS and Forfás, and phrases such as vis-à-vis, inter alia, communiqué, fait accompli, raison 
d'être and in loco.  The only problematic term identified in the test was where the note 
“Additional information not given on the floor of the House” was correctly not returned in 
one instance by the automated programme, but not in another instance. Overall, these text 
errors, the non-recognition of non-English terms or phrases such as the preceding is not a 
concern for this analysis as these words and terms are assumed to occur randomly and in 
relatively small numbers across the text. In any event the Irish words would not have been 
recognised or processed by the content analysis software package that will be applied to text.    
This automated approach yielded in excess of three million words spoken by eight 
Irish leaders for analysis. As shown in Table 4.3, the annual word counts vary from 6,800 for 
Mary Harney in 2004 to 325,000 for Bertie Ahern in 2006, all of which exceed the required 
word count for Hermann’s LTA technique.  
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Who  Year  Word Count  
John Bruton  1995/96  80,120 
John Bruton  1997 59,617 
Rúairí Quinn  1995/96  30,965 
Rúairí Quinn  1997 21,775 
Richard Bruton  95/96  23,210 
Richard Bruton  1997 12,864 
Bertie Ahern  1997 64,559 
Bertie Ahern  1998 172,430 
Bertie Ahern  1999 186,541 
Bertie Ahern  2000 185,412 
Bertie Ahern  2001 193,680 
Bertie Ahern  2002 169,897 
Bertie Ahern  2003 283,055 
Bertie Ahern  2004 259,754 
Bertie Ahern  2005 266,397 
Bertie Ahern  2006 325,175 
Bertie Ahern  2007 107,995 
Charlie McCreevy  1997 9,704 
Charlie McCreevy  1998 36,210 
Charlie McCreevy  1999 45,789 
Charlie McCreevy  2000 42,965 
Charlie McCreevy  2001 41,678 
Charlie McCreevy  2002 25,816 
Charlie McCreevy  2003 33,637 
Charlie McCreevy  2004 18,095 
Brian Cowen  2004 11,008 
Brian Cowen  2005 51,491 
Brian Cowen  2006 44,863 
Brian Cowen  2007 14,026 
Mary Harney  1997 12,086 
Mary Harney  1998 29,865 
Mary Harney  1999 31,629 
Mary Harney  2000 18,250 
Mary Harney  2001 17,800 
Mary Harney  2002 17,629 
Mary Harney  2003 27,664 
Mary Harney  2004 6,802 
Mícheál Martin  2004 12,074 
Mícheál Martin  2005 34,508 
Mícheál Martin  2006 30,328 
Mícheál Martin  2007 20,854 
 Total   3,078,217 
Table 4.3: Word counts analysed for Leaders 
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4.5 The Norming Group and Reporting Results 
The crux of this research is that, based on the literature, decision-makers in Ireland had lower 
relative levels of conceptual complexity and higher levels of in-group bias, and examining 
what they say will reveal that they trusted their intuition, were willing to go with the option 
which presented first, and deemed action preferable to information seeking.  One of the 
additional benefits of LTA is that once the leaders’ speech content has been analysed and 
individual scores calculated for each of the traits, it is possible to put the scores into 
perspective by determining how they compare with those of other leaders; “without doing 
such a comparison, there is little basis on which to judge if the particular leader’s traits are 
unusually high or low or about average” (Hermann, 1999: 32).   
 
Region 
 
Control 
over 
Events 
Need 
for 
Power 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
Self-
Confidence 
Task 
Orientation 
Distrust 
of 
Others 
In-
Group 
Bias 
 
World 
Leaders 
(N=284) 
 
Mn=.35 
SD=.05 
 
 
Mn=.26 
SD=.05 
 
Mn=.59 
SD=.06 
 
Mn=.36 
SD=.10 
 
Mn=.63 
SD=.07 
 
Mn=.13 
SD=.06 
 
Mn=.15 
SD=.05 
 
Western 
Europe 
(N=53) 
 
Mn=.33 
SD=.07 
 
 
Mn=.26 
SD=.05 
 
Mn=.57 
SD=.06 
 
Mn=.32 
SD=.13 
 
Mn=.64 
SD=.09 
 
Mn=.09 
SD=.06 
 
Mn=.17 
SD=.05 
 
Eastern 
Europe 
(N=78) 
 
Mn=.34 
Sd=.05 
 
 
Mn=.24 
SD=.05 
 
Mn=.59 
SD=.05 
 
Mn=.39 
SD=.10 
 
Mn=.68 
SD=.07 
 
Mn=.10 
SD=.05 
 
Mn=.14 
SD=.06 
 
Middle 
East & 
Northern 
Africa 
(N=46) 
 
Mn=.33 
Sd=.06 
 
 
Mn=.27 
SD=.06 
 
Mn=.56 
SD=.08 
 
Mn=.31 
SD=.13 
 
Mn=.58 
SD=.06 
 
Mn=.16 
SD=.07 
 
Mn=.15 
SD=.06 
 
Pacific 
Rim 
(N=79) 
 
Mn=.34 
Sd=.06 
 
 
Mn=.27 
SD=.06 
 
Mn=.59 
SD=.08 
 
Mn=.32 
SD=.12 
 
Mn=.62 
SD=.08 
 
Mn=.14 
SD=.08 
 
Mn=.16 
SD=.05 
 
Anglo-
America 
(N=15) 
 
Mn=.36 
SD=.04 
 
 
Mn=.24 
SD=.04 
 
Mn=.60 
SD=.05 
 
Mn=.45 
SD=.08 
 
Mn=.62 
SD=.06 
 
Mn=.12 
SD=.03 
 
Mn=.13 
SD=.03 
 
Latin 
America 
(N=13) 
 
Mn=.37 
SD=.03 
 
 
Mn=.25 
SD=.02 
 
Mn=.60 
SD=.05 
 
Mn=.34 
SD=.05 
 
Mn=.65 
SD=.06 
 
Mn=.19 
SD=.06 
 
Mn=.15 
SD=.03 
 
Table 4.4: Leadership Trait Analysis Scores (Means and Standard Deviations) 
76 
 
Trait scores (including conceptual complexity and in-group bias) for a heterogeneous group 
of political decision-makers from many different countries, called the “norming” group, are 
available for the period of interest and when put alongside the data gathered here for Ireland’s 
leaders will help reveal whether behavioural convergence was more prevalent there versus 
comparable economies. (The absence of wide variation of scores for the various LTA traits is 
notable, and this point will be investigated in Chapter 6.)   
Adami, Eddie Fenech Kohl, Helmut 
Ahern, Bertie Kok, Wim 
Alema, Massimo D' Leterme, Yves 
Amato, Giuliano Lipponen, Paavo 
Ásgrímsson, Halldór  Lopes, Pedro Santana 
Aznar (López), José María  Merkel, Angela 
Balkenende, Jan-Peter Oddsson, Davíð  
Barroso, José Manuel Durão Papadopoulos, Tassos 
Berlusconi, Silvio #1 Persson, Göran  
Berlusconi, Silvio #2 Prodi, Romano #1 
Blair, Tony Prodi, Romano #2 
Bondevik, Kjell Magne #1 Rasmussen, Fogh Anders 
Bondevik, Kjell Magne #2 Rasmussen, Lars Løkke  
Brown, Gordon Rasmussen, Poul Nyrup 
Cameron, David Reinfeldt, Fredrik 
Chirac, Jacques Sarkozy, Nicolas  
Christofias, Demetris Schüssel, Wolfgang 
Clerides, Glafcos Schröder, Gerhard 
Cowen, Brian Sigurðardóttir, Jóhanna  
Jäätteenmäki, Anneli Simitis, Kostas 
Gonzi, Lawrence Sócrates, José 
Gusenbauer, Alfred Stoltenberg, Jens #1 
Guterres, António  Stoltenberg, Jens #2 
Haarde, Geir Verhanen, Matti 
Juncker, Jean-Claude Verhofstadt, Guy 
Karamanlis, Kostas Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez  
Klima, Viktor  
 
Table 4.5: Leaders in ‘Western Europe’ Norming Group   
 
In this research, the norming group, means and standard deviations referenced are those for 
the group of 53 western leaders (see Table 4.5), given the focus on Ireland. On the advice of 
the developers of the method, data for Ireland’s leaders were included in the norming group 
(Derksen, 2013: Personal communication).  
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In a context where bandwagon effects, herding, information cascades, conformity, and (above 
all) groupthink were thought to have significantly contributed to Ireland’s crisis, varying 
levels of conceptual complexity and in-group bias among individuals will help reveal a 
particular disposition, willingness to entertain the possibility that there is ambiguity in the 
environment, and flexibility in reacting to alternative ideas. This is the basis of the hypothesis 
tested in the next Chapter.   
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Chapter 5: Evidence of Elevated Irrationality in Pre-Crisis Ireland  
5.1 Hypothesis Assessment and Results 
Investigations into the economic crisis in Ireland found that decision-makers made poor 
choices, and according to one official report irrational forces were one, important cause 
(Nyberg, 2011). A reading of behavioural economics literature reveals that bounded 
rationality and behavioural biases offer a more precise and useful explanation for the 
suboptimal decision-outcomes in the pre-crash in Ireland. Behavioural convergence bias 
manifested itself as groupthink and herding behaviour in particular. Previous sections of this 
thesis have argued that in the face of the challenges of assessing biases in general and 
groupthink and herding specifically, in a useful way, the conceptual complexity and in-group 
bias traits can reveal behavioural convergence bias. This content retrieval process set out 
earlier produced in over of three million words spoken by these eight leaders for analysis. For 
this research, norming group means and standard deviations (Table 4.4) for a group of 53 
Western leaders are used as follows: 
 Irish leaders in the run up to the crisis will have lower relative levels of conceptual 
complexity compared to decision-makers in comparable economies 
 Western leaders conceptual complexity trait score mean is 0.57; standard deviation is 
0.06; scale 0-1 
 
 Decision-makers in Ireland will have higher relative levels of in-group bias compared 
to decision-makers in comparable economies, in the years preceding the economic 
crash 
 Western leaders in-group bias trait score mean is 0.17; standard deviation is 0.05; 
scale 0-1 
 
 If a leader’s score is one standard deviation above/below the population mean or 
more, they are considered high/low for the trait 
 
Table 5.1: Hypothesis and Scores for Assessment 
If the hypothesis holds, the eight Irish leaders analysed will (i) have a score for conceptual 
complexity below 0.57, on a scale of 0 to 1, preferably 0.51 or lower, one standard deviation 
below the norming group mean, and (ii) have a score for in-group bias above 0.17, preferably 
0.22 or higher, one standard deviation above the comparator group mean.  
As reported in table 5.2, the results of analysis on all of the content for the eight 
leaders refute the hypothesis. Each and every leader had a level of conceptual complexity 
above the mean of 0.57 for comparable Western leaders. The lowest score was for Taoiseach 
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John Bruton at 0.65, which is more than one standard deviation higher than the norming 
group mean. Three leaders, Quinn, McCreevy, and Harney had scores of 0.71, well above the 
mean for Western Leaders. Regarding in-group bias, all Irish leaders analysed had a level of 
in-group bias which was lower than the mean of 0.17 for comparable decision-makers. The 
highest score was for Richard Bruton at 0.12, a result which was one-standard deviation 
below the benchmark mean. 
Irish Leader Word Count 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
  
In-group 
Bias 
John Bruton  139,737 0.65  0.10 
Rúairí Quinn  52,740 0.71  0.09 
Richard Bruton  36,074 0.69  0.12 
Bertie Ahern  2,214,895 0.66  0.10 
Charlie McCreevy  253,894 0.71  0.10 
Brian Cowen  121,388 0.68  0.11 
Mary Harney  161,725 0.71  0.09 
Mícheál Martin  97,764 0.69  0.11 
Norming Group Mean 
 
0.57  0.17 
Norming Group Standard Deviation  0.06   0.05 
Hypothesised score   <=0.51  >=0.22 
Table 5.2: Trait Analysis Results for Irish Leaders  
These results do not support the hypothesis. Irish leaders in the run up to the crisis had higher 
(rather than lower) trait scores for conceptual complexity relative to the mean of other 
Western leaders, and they had lower (rather than higher) scores for in-group bias.  These 
results challenge the literature on Ireland’s crisis. Firstly, they suggest that Irish decision-
makers, to a greater extent than leaders elsewhere, had the desire to seek multiple sources of 
information concerning issues and policy options, were readily able to change views on an 
issue in light of new evidence, were able to see varying reasons for a particular position, and 
were willing to entertain the possibility that there was ambiguity in the environment. 
Secondly, the results suggest that policy-makers in Ireland referenced their group favourably, 
showed the need to maintain group identity, perceived only the good aspects of their group, 
and denied any weaknesses, to a lesser extent than leaders in other comparable countries. 
This runs contrary to claims of irrational behavioural convergence and groupthink.    
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5.2 Preliminary Interrogation of Results 
It is important that the basis for any rejection of the hypothesis is clear: is it because Irish 
leaders were not in fact victim to irrational forces (groupthink) to a greater extent than 
anywhere else, or is the method not valid for detecting these forces. These issues are probed 
in the remainder of this Chapter using the content already retrieved for Irish leaders, and 
additional content retrieved from media reportage. A deeper methodological view employing 
additional content, and a conclusion on this question, is provided in Chapter 6.  
Before this, some insight can be gained employing the data already gathered. In the 
previous Chapter it was noted an adequate assessment of traits can be based on 50 interview 
responses of one hundred words or more in length. Confidence in the results, of course, 
should increase the more content used (Hermann, 1999: 3). Rather than the 5,000-word 
requirement for analysis suggested by Hermann, the results reported in table 5.2 above were 
generated using multiples of this for each of the Irish leaders; from 36,000 for Richard 
Bruton, to 2,200,000 for Bertie Ahern. The analysis also examined traits over long time 
periods: two years for Bruton, and eleven years for Ahern. This raises the potential that such 
large word counts and wide time-spans mask important variation in levels of conceptual 
complexity and in-group bias at particular points in time. If a leader was the victim of a 
consequential fall in conceptual complexity, or rise in in-group bias at the time an important 
decision was being taken, the research approach used here could not detect it.    
Thus it is important and interesting to see how a trait measured using LTA and 
Profiler Plus, behaves over time. To do so, the 2.2 million words of content retrieved from 
Ahern’s responses to oral PQs in Dáil Éireann were split into 436 blocks of text, with a mean 
word count of 5,080 words in each block. The blocks of content were extracted in strict 
sequence, where no regard was given to the date on which the content was uttered, though 
sentences were not left incomplete. The text was then analysed to determine the level of 
conceptual complexity evident in each block. Figure 5.1 shows that, despite some variation in 
scores and slight downward trend over time, in the main the trait value remains above the 
mean for the norming group. Figure 5.3 displays box plots, where the dark and grey boxes are 
the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile respectively and the line represents the median/50
th
 percentile. 
The results show that there is little significant variation across time. This suggests that the 
analysis of single blocks with large word-counts over longer time-periods is not responsible 
for any rejection of the hypothesis.  
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Figure 5.1: Ahern’s Conceptual Complexity, 1997 - 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Ahern’s Conceptual Complexity, 1997 – 2007 (grouped) 
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Alternatively, the results reported thus far may conceal the fact that trait scores are shifting 
within the aggregate depending on the topic being discussed. This would fit with 
Mahdasian’s finding that “[i]f a researcher is interested in how a leader will behave in 
economic negotiations with a trading partner, the average value of trait scores derived solely 
from economic topics will likely be a more appropriate measure of how the leader will 
behave than the average of their mean scores produced through analysis of responses on 
political and conflict/security topics” (Mahdasian, 2002: 137).  The next piece of analysis 
tests an assumption that Ahern’s scores for leadership traits (e.g. conceptual complexity) 
measured using the LTA technique will vary depending upon the topic he is talking about.  
This follows Mahdasian, and prima facia evidence that Ahern’s handling of economic 
matters varied from his approach to, say, Northern Ireland or European Affairs. Bertie 
Ahern’s record of success/failure on economic matters is at variance to his record on other 
matters, especially the Northern Ireland peace process. In Ahern’s autobiography he states 
that, reflecting on his broader legacy, the “most significant contribution” he made was in the 
peace process (Ahern, 2009: 349). One commentator states that while the realisations about 
the economy would destroy Ahern’s reputation, the “success of his Northern Ireland policy 
stands unblemished” (Whelan, 2011: 333). While another assessment notes that there is no 
question that the crisis in the Irish economy has prompted some revision of his legacy of 
presiding over the greatest boom in the history of the state, the general view of his handling 
of other issues (bar his personal finances) appears positive (Clifford and Coleman, 2009: 
375).  
All of Bertie Ahern’s utterances in the Dáil in response to oral parliamentary 
questions (PQs) were split out into five themes as per Table 5.3. The content was split into 
these themes by reading all 2.2 million words and determining which of the five topics the 
utterances related to. In the case of the economy, Europe, and Northern Ireland, identifying 
the topic was straightforward, though there was some inevitable overlap. For example, many 
of the Dáil discussions of Europe were in relation to economic matters (e.g. discussions at 
ECOFIN of EU-wide tax harmonisation or duty-free treatment of goods). 
Given that the overarching concern of this research is the economic crisis in Ireland, 
unless the content was specific to Ireland’s (as opposed to Europe’s) economy, the utterance 
were categorised as being about Europe.  Inevitably, some of the content did not relate to any 
of the main categories of interest and this was split into an “Other” category which included 
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discussions of non-EU international affairs and visits, the United Nations, elements of the 
national Programme(s) for Government not directly related to the economy etc., the 
functioning of the Department of the Taoiseach, the role of the Communications section and 
political advisors, the operation of National Economic and Social Council/Forum, freedom of 
information requests, the national archives, and the eCabinet system, for example.  Finally, 
given the critical role that standards in public office (SIPO) issues played in Bertie Ahern’s 
career, particularly his stepping down as Taoiseach, content on this topic is split out. 
Year / Topic Northern Ireland Economy Europe Standards Other TOTAL 
1997 22,411 10,055 8,302 2,101 21,690 64,559 
1998 54,184 32,084 35,722 0 46,701 168, 691 
1999 56,677 21,714 37,576 13,379 57,195 186,541 
2000 49,000 38,737 26,042 554 71,078 185,411 
2001 50,384 44,532 43,232 1,015 54,517 193,680 
2002 36,615 47,214 26,401 1,945 57,721 169,896 
2003 46,551 57,840 26,433 8,931 143,299 283, 054 
2004 44,338 44,820 25,112 2,485 142,976 259,731 
2005 43,447 48,064 16,886 8,470 149,524 266,391 
2006 52,022 56,469 18,862 12,795 185,026 325,174 
2007 8,908 16,260 5,825 1,806 75,196 107,995 
TOTAL 464,537 417,789 270,393 53,481 1,004,923 2,211,123 
 
Table 5.3: Content Word Count by Topic - Bertie Ahern 1997-2007 
Examining that content over time shows that (while in absolute terms steady) the proportion 
of content dealing with Northern Ireland declines over time, the proportion dealing with the 
economy is relatively stable, while the discussion of “Other” matters rises sharply from 2001. 
This is due to the inclusion of non-EU international affairs in this category, and the sharp 
increase in discussion of international events in the aftermath of the September 11
th
 attacks in 
the United States in 2001. 
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Topic / 
Trait 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
In-
Group 
Bias 
Control 
over 
Events 
Need 
for 
Power 
Self-
Confidence 
Task 
Orientation 
Distrust 
of 
Others 
Economy 0.68 0.10 0.36 0.25 0.35 0.85 0.06 
Europe 0.69 0.10 0.38 0.24 0.32 0.81 0.03 
Northern 
Ireland 
0.63 0.09 0.39 0.25 0.37 0.76 0.12 
Other 0.68 0.10 0.38 0.25 0.31 0.79 0.07 
Standards 0.66 0.10 0.36 0.20 0.33 0.77 0.05 
 
Norming 
Group 
 
0.57  
SD=.06 
 
0.17 
SD=.05 
 
0.33  
SD=.07 
 
 
0.26  
SD=.05 
 
0.32  
SD=.13 
 
0.64  
SD=.09 
 
0.09  
SD=.06 
 
Table 5.4: Trait Mean Scores by Topic - Bertie Ahern 1997-2007 
 
 
Economy  Europe  Northern Ireland  Norming Group  
1997 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.57 
1998 0.69 0.72 0.62 0.57 
1999 0.69 0.71 0.63 0.57 
2000 0.69 0.71 0.65 0.57 
2001 0.67 0.68 0.64 0.57 
2002 0.68 0.66 0.64 0.57 
2003 0.67 0.73 0.63 0.57 
2004 0.68 0.68 0.64 0.57 
2005 0.68 0.67 0.60 0.57 
2006 0.65 0.68 0.62 0.57 
2007 0.67 0.66 0.62 0.57 
Mean 
  
0.68 
 
0.69 
 
0.63 
 
0.57 
SD 0.06 
 
Table 5.5: Ahern’s Conceptual Complexity score by topic  
The results show that, based on his responses to oral PQs, there is some variation in the trait 
scores for Bertie Ahern depending on the topic he is discussing. In terms of conceptual 
complexity, the higher score when discussing economic matters goes against the assumption 
that it would be lower. The difference in conceptual complexity scores for ‘economy’ versus 
‘Northern Ireland’ was significant in 1998, 1999, and 2005 (difference was equal to or greater 
than one standard deviation). With a score of 0.68, Ahern’s level of conceptual complexity 
when discussing the economy was similar to that revealed when he was discussing European 
85 
 
Cowen’s Role  Conceptual Complexity 
Minister for Finance  0.68 
Taoiseach  0.65 
Norming Group Mean  0.68 
 
Minister for Transport  Conceptual Complexity 
Seamus Brennan   0.63 
Martin Cullen  0.67 
Norming Group Mean 0.68 
 
issues (0.69) and Other topics (0.68).  Interestingly, Ahern scored 0.63 for conceptual 
complexity when discussing Northern Ireland. This runs contrary to expectation that Ahern 
would display greater rather than lesser complexity in dealing with the peace process. 
Regardless of topic, Ahern’s scores for conceptual complexity were significantly higher than 
for the comparator group of Western leaders (0.57). Whether discussing the economy or 
Northern Ireland, Ahern’s levels of in-group bias remained well below the mean for Western 
leaders. Turning to trait stability over time, Ahern’s scores per trait per topic remained 
remarkably steady. The detection of different scores for the same trait depending on topic 
does support the use of the LTA approach. Ahern’s conceptual complexity scores stay above 
the norming group mean for all topics. Overall, the aggregation of topics in the original 
scores (Table 5.2) does not explain a rejection of the hypothesis.  
Another explanation for why the analysis did not reveal the hypothesised conceptual 
complexity and in-group bias scores, is that the role individuals hold in Ireland (compared to 
leaders in other Western democracies) is impacting the comparison in some way. To look at 
this more closely, firstly the PQ replies for one individual – Brian Cowen as Minister for 
Finance (2004 to 2007) and as Taoiseach (2008)   - were analysed.  The analysis compared 
120,000 and 180,000 of his words from each role respectively, and the additional content for 
Cowen’s time as Taoiseach was retrieved in an identical manner as the rest of the content. 
Secondly, the research compared complexity scores for a role held consecutively by two 
individuals. The late Seamus Brennan was Minister for Transport from 2002 to 2004 and he 
was succeeded in this portfolio by Martin Cullen, up to 2007.  
 
 
 
Table 5.6: Leader’s Conceptual Complexity Score, by Role 
 
 
 
Table 5.7: Role’s Conceptual Complexity Score, by Leader 
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Given that the content and context are as identical as can be reasonably found, Cowen’s trait 
scores as Minister and as Taoiseach should be identical, if role does not matter. On the other 
hand, given that the content, context and portfolio are the same and Brennan and Cullen are 
different individuals, the LTA analysis should detect and report different trait scores. As 
shown in Table 5.6, though Cowen’s scores should theoretically be identical, they are not. At 
the same time, the difference is small, probably insignificant, meaning one could argue that in 
Cowen’s case role did not have a significant effect on his complexity score, assessed in this 
way. Table 5.7 shows Brennan’s and Cullen’s scores to be different, as expected, but not 
significantly different. Again, Irish decision-makers in the run up to the crisis have trait score 
which differ from hypothesised levels, relative to leaders elsewhere. Given the inconclusive 
nature of this preliminary examination of the impact of role on trait scores, further more and 
more in-depth analysis of the impact of role (and state and source of content) is undertaken 
and reported in the next Chapter.   
 Despite some initial analysis, it appears that a rejection of the hypothesis that Irish 
leaders in the run up to the crisis would have different trait scores relative to the mean of 
other Western leaders cannot explained by (i) the large size of the word-counts of the blocks 
of content analysed, (ii) the aggregation of topics within that content or (iii), the role of the 
leader at the time of the analysis. Therefore and finally in this Chapter, analysis of additional 
content was undertaken to determine if expected trait signals can be revealed there using the 
LTA and Profiler Plus method.  
5.3 Seeking LTA Trait Signals in Media Reportage 
Given the difficulty in finding the hypothesised trait signals in the material from 
parliamentary debates, attention turned to identifying another source of material where 
evidence of irrationality or groupthink was likely to be present. The role of the media in 
supporting or contributing to the property bubble in Ireland has been flagged as an issue of 
concern and consequently the official Oireachtas Inquiry in 2015 heard evidence from 
academic commentators and media professionals under the theme of “the role of the media 
during the property boom” (Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis 
Vol. 1, Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 96). In its report the Committee recounted the 
testimony of one witness: 
“Print and broadcast media in Ireland played a difficult-to-measure but almost 
certainly significant role in the inflation of the property bubble and the legitimisation 
87 
 
of risky behaviour by the financial services sector in the lead up to the crisis of 2007 
and 2008” – Harry Browne, School of Media, Dublin Institute of Technology 
Evidence to the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Vol. 1, Houses of 
the Oireachtas, 2016: 96 
The Inquiry concluded that it is clear that property advertisers did attempt to put pressure on 
the media, with a previous editor of the Irish Times newspaper telling the Inquiry that “she 
was aware that many telephone calls were made to [the] Managing Director of the 
newspaper, by the property sector about coverage in not just the property supplement, but the 
main newspaper also. As Editor, she was aware of statements made by some in the property 
sector that the Irish Times would never get an advertisement again after the publication of an 
article … which predicted a drop in property prices” – (Joint Committee of Inquiry into the 
Banking Crisis Vol. 1, Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 97). Mercille’s analysis (2014) 
concluded that the media in Ireland ran stories which were “often dismissive of so-called 
‘doomsayers’ or remained vague and ambivalent about the existence of a bubble. Just like the 
Irish government, it is only once property prices had started falling that the media 
acknowledged that the market was on a downward trajectory” (Mercille, 2014: 297). 
Consequently, media reportage in the years preceding the crisis presents itself as likely 
location for the pursuit of a strong trait signal using the LTA technique.  
This element of the research analyses the content of the Irish Times newspaper. 
According to the Joint National Readership Survey, that newspaper had a typical daily 
readership of over 300,000 in 2000s. Content was retrieved from the paper via the Lexis 
Nexis system, using a query which returned all articles containing the words “Ireland” and 
“economy” in editions of the paper published on any Wednesday in the years 2000, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 (311 editions in total). Content was analysed for the year 2000 to 
provide a baseline from a year preceding the headiest days of the so-called Celtic Tiger, for 
2005, 2006 and 2007 to capture those heady days, and 2008 and 2009 to cover content during 
the immediate aftermath of the crash. 
Based on the literature the levels of the two traits most likely to proxy for groupthink - 
conceptual complexity and in-group-bias - can be expected to be significantly lower and 
higher respectively in the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, than they were in 2000, and the reverse 
in 2008 and 2009. In line with the many references to hubris in the literature on Ireland 
(Brennan and Conroy, 2013; Dowling and Lucey, 2014; Murphy, 2016), the levels of the self-
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confidence trait detectable in the content can also be expected to be higher in the years 2005, 
2006 and 2007, than they were in 2000, and may fall in 2008 and 2009.  
None of the results produced the expected significant difference in signals.  Regarding 
conceptual complexity (Figure 5.3), though all of the subsequent years were lower than the 
baseline score, none were significantly so. The 2008 and 2009 scores were lower than the 
baseline of 2000, and cannot be described as being dramatically higher post-crisis. The 
narrow range of the results (0.66 to 0.70) is similar to the results for Irish leaders’ utterances 
reported above. There was little or no variation in the levels of in-group bias detected (Figure 
5.4), though these was a spike in the level in 2006. In terms of self-confidence (Figure 5.5), a 
baseline of 0.38 was recorded for the year 2000. Contrary to expectation, the level of the self-
confidence trait detectable in the content was lower in the years 2005 and 2007, than in 2000. 
The level was three points higher in 2006 (a ten point jump on the previous year) which is 
notable. While the levels in 2008 and 2009 were below the 2000 baseline level, it cannot be 
said that they dropped significantly from previous years, bar 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Level of Conceptual Complexity detected in selected Irish Times editions 
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Figure 5.4: Level of In-group Bias detected in selected Irish Times editions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Level of Self-Confidence detected in selected Irish Times editions 
The results in this section do not resolve the question of the basis for any rejection of the 
hypothesis for Ireland’s decision-makers.  The pervasive view is that institutions, including 
the media, and individuals were gripped by a variety of behavioural biases which contributed 
to their making disastrous choices which negatively impacted on their economic well-being. 
The related, expected signals did not materialise, meaning that if the Irish media (in this case 
90 
 
represented by the Irish Times) were seized of groupthink and over-confidence, it is not 
revealed in the pattern one could reasonably expect. This could be for a number of reasons: 
the LTA technique is not useful for detecting bias, or is not useful when analysing articles 
from the printed press. Finally, it may be that the media did hold and reflect these biases in 
their reportage, but that this simply was not evident from the articles chosen for this analysis.  
5.4 Conclusion  
Contrary to the hypothesis, Irish leaders in the run up to the crisis had higher rather than 
lower scores for conceptual complexity, and lower rather than higher scores for in-group bias 
- relative to other leaders. The hypothesis could be rejected because irrationality in the form 
of groupthink was not an important factor in decision-making, or because the methodology 
was invalid. Breaking down the content into smaller blocks of analysis did not provide a 
definitive answer, though it did reveal sizeable trait score variation suggesting that the timing 
of any particular decision of interest should be considered carefully.  Examination of ‘leader 
by topic’ suggests the technique does allow detection of some variation depending on the 
issue being discussed by the decision-maker, and examination of ‘leader by role’ suggests 
that portfolio may matter. The use of alternative content for LTA analysis, media reportage, 
did not resolve the issue. The expected trait signals based on the literature, again, was not 
revealed.  
Overall, evidence to support Nyberg’s claims of impactful irrational groupthink and 
herding were not unearthed using this particular technique. While the automation of the LTA 
method has tackled the basic issues of reliability involved in the coding of large amounts of 
data, validity issues have proven harder to settle. Is the hypothesis rejected because 
conceptual complexity and in-group bias cannot proxy for convergence bias? If they are a 
proxy, is the LTA method not sensitive enough to reveal variation in levels among and 
between leaders? Does the role of Irish leaders make a comparison with other Western 
leaders unsuitable?  What constitutes significant change, or difference, when comparing one 
leader over time, or one leader to another/group of leaders? The trait/state debate is important 
for the LTA method. If LTA truly measures a leader’s traits a researcher may draw upon 
sources at any time available. If LTA actually measures a leader’s state at a given moment, a 
researcher must be more selective and only gather sources for analysis that is of right period, 
and understand, assess and take into account a leader’s circumstances and any significant 
impact it has on results and conclusions. Previous research has suggested a variety of 
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conditions under which traits may change such as learning and time in office and different 
political contexts, and it is plausible to assume that major events and crises, and different 
institutional or political roles, could impact on a leader so as to impact on assessment.   
The next issue to be addressed is which sources are suitable to use when constructing 
a leadership trait profile. The issue of ‘strategic’ use of speech-acts (often called impression 
management), and whether leaders display different personal dispositions in private versus in 
public is an important issue that speaks to the validity of all measuring at a distance 
techniques. Impression management refers to the behavioural strategies people use to create 
desired social images or identities (Tetlock and Manstead, 1985: 59.) As Tetlock and 
Manstead argue, establishing the precise extent to which impression management 
complicates or even invalidates research findings in this area is challenging. Researchers 
must be aware of, acknowledge and report the fact that impression management is a factor, 
and where practical, take mitigating steps.  
Before the hypothesis can be rejected on the basis that irrational groupthink was not 
an impacting factor on decision-making in Ireland, these validity issues must be explored, 
and this is the subject of the next Chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Exploring the Methodological Challenges of Leadership Trait Analysis
3
 
6.1 Leadership Trait Analysis: Methodological Challenges 
Given the scale and widespread impact of the global financial crisis since 2008, it is 
understandable that questions are asked of those who took important relevant decisions. It has 
been claimed that political scientists have not adequately explained why policy-makers in 
liberal democracies acted the way they did in the years before the economic crisis (Bernhagen 
and Chari, 2011: 456), and that analysis of the economic crash in Ireland concluded that - up 
to that point - discussion of economic governance had been largely missing in the Irish 
debate, and that this needed to rectified (Kirby, 2010: 55). This research aims to address this 
gap on the basis that economic governance, personality traits, and the decisions made by 
political leaders, actually matter. In addition, once a crisis emerges the issue of political 
leadership becomes more salient. Decision-making is delegated to a small group of leaders ('t 
Hart et al., 1993; Hermann et al., 2001) and the uncertainty associated with large-scale 
upheaval increases public demand for leadership, vision, and decisive action.  
The public and scholars alike wonder how their leaders’ personality traits and 
leadership style influence their crisis response (Thies, 2004; 2009; Basham and Roland, 2014; 
Van Esch, 2015; Van Esch, and Swinkels 2015; Boin, ‘t Hart, and Van Esch, 2012).  To 
provide this answer, a valid and reliable method is needed to establish leaders’ personal 
characteristics across cases. In other words, preceding the larger theoretical and empirical 
question of how the personalities and leadership styles of political leaders matter, lies the 
basic but complex methodological question of how to establish political leaders’ personality 
in a consistent and reliable fashion. While this issue may seem somewhat more mundane than 
the big theoretical question, answering it constitutes a vital step in advancing our 
understanding of the role of leadership in politics. The preceding Chapters illustrate the 
importance of this issue: if policy-responses are to be devised to help avert or mitigate crisis 
events, valid and reliable assessment methods must be available to ensure that causes are 
isolated and addressed. The application of one leadership analysis technique in this research 
has failed to do so.  
Important methodological ground-work has been done and several techniques to study 
the personal characteristics of political leaders exist. One of these techniques and the one 
chosen for this research, Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA, see Chapter 4), focuses explicitly 
                                                          
3
 This chapter is based on collaborative research undertaken by the author and Dr. Femke van Esch, Associate 
Professor, Utrecht University School of Governance. Consent for use of this research here has been granted.   
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on measuring the personality traits of political leaders, and this has given rise to a vibrant and 
flourishing research program. LTA has several advantages over other techniques: it 
encompasses a broad range of traits, and the automation of the coding process makes it time-
efficient and reliable.
 
Moreover, while the quantitative nature of the technique has the definite 
drawback of losing some of the depth and intuitive validity that comes with small-n case-
study research (Post, 2014), it does enable researchers to systematically study trends in 
occurrence and variability of traits as well as establish correlations between leaders’ traits, its 
causes, and consequences (Dyson 2008; Schafer 2000; Thies 2004; Van Esch and Swinkels 
2015).  
Over the years, an active research program has emerged exploring whether leaders’ 
personality traits as measured by LTA matter for political processes and outcomes. The 
questions examined include leaders’ use of advisory systems, foreign policy behaviour, 
negotiation, sense-making and belief-change, and policy outcomes (Dyson 2006; Hermann 
1980a; Hermann and Dayton 2009; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Keller and Foster 2012; 
Mahdasian 2002; Schafer and Walker 2006; Van Esch 2015; Van Esch and Swinkels 2015). 
This research is focused on decision-making. Nevertheless, there are disadvantages to 
employing automated methods and they must be applied with care and with close 
consideration of research-specific validation. 
 Grimmer and Stewart (2013) surveyed a number of automated methods to provide 
advice on how to validate the outputs, and clarify “misconceptions and errors in the 
literature”, arguing that “for automated text methods to become a standard tool for political 
scientists, methodologists must contribute new methods and new methods of validation” 
(Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 267). LTA falls into the category of ‘dictionary methods’ they 
reviewed, as it uses the rate at which key words appear in a text to classify it into particular 
categories (traits). The authors offer this advice: 
“When applying dictionaries, scholars should directly establish that word lists created 
in other contexts are applicable to a particular domain, or create a problem-specific 
dictionary. In either instance, scholars must validate their results. But measures from 
dictionaries are rarely validated. Rather, standard practice in using dictionaries is to 
assume the measures created from a dictionary are correct and then apply them to the 
problem” - Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 275 
 
The authors discourage the use of many commercial tools for quantitative text analysis as 
these programmes simply provide the researcher with output, but it is “often difficult, and 
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sometimes impossible, to validate the output” (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 271). This issue 
arose and was discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
6.2 LTA Validity and Trait Stability 
The automation of the LTA method has tackled the basic issues of (intercoder) reliability 
involved in the coding of large amounts of data. However, the above-mentioned validity 
issues have proven harder to settle. While most authors that have applied the LTA framework 
have used it to answer substantive questions, several authors have also addressed its validity 
issues. A review of these methodological studies shows that tentative agreement exists on 
certain core questions.  
 Firstly, several studies have explored the construct validity of LTA traits by 
comparing whether the scores correspond with existing scholarly accounts of the 
leaders’ disposition and behaviour (Dyson, 2008; Kesgin, 2012; 2013; cf. Hermann, 
2002). These studies conclude unanimously that the outcome of leadership trait 
analysis shows significant correspondence to qualitative assessments of leaders 
personal characteristics and behaviour.  
 Secondly, a range of studies find that the LTA is able to differentiate meaningfully 
between the personalities of different leaders (leader-effect, Dille, 2000; Dille and 
Young, 2000; Dyson, 2008; Kesgin, 2013; Mahdasian, 2002).
4
   
 Finally, Mahdasian (2002) finds that the topic of the speech-acts on which the LTA is 
based may give rise to significantly different scores, but no significant differences are 
revealed between original or translated version of particular speech-acts (cf. Herman, 
2002). 
However, important issues remain. An overarching question is whether LTA measures trait - 
psychological dispositions that remain relatively stable throughout leaders’ lives - or state – 
characteristics that may evolve over time and in response to external circumstances. Authors 
that have addressed this question have come up with ambiguous results with some leaders 
being more stable over time than others, and on some traits more than others (Dille and 
Young, 2000; Dyson, 2008; Mahdasian, 2002). As a result, different authors hold different 
positions on the trait/state issue (Schafer, 2014).  
 
                                                          
4
 Mahdasian (2002) finds that LTA does not differentiate significantly between leaders for In-group Bias. 
95 
 
Over time, Hermann has come to believe that traits are variable rather than stable. Dyson 
(2008) notes the considerable variation in trait scores for individual leaders, but refrains from 
drawing any theoretical conclusions from his findings, while Thies (2004) takes an explicitly 
ambiguous position. However, finding a more cohesive and settled position is important. For 
example, if LTA measures stable personality traits a researcher may draw upon any statement 
made by a leader at any time. If LTA measures leaders’ personal disposition at a specific 
moment in time, researchers are well-advised to be more selective and only use statements 
made during the same period in which the behaviour was displayed (or decision was made) 
that they are seeking to explain. 
 Moreover, some studies have suggested that there may be an underlying pattern to the 
stability and change found in empirical studies, and propose a variety of conditions that may 
induce changes in leaders’ personal trait scores and that therefore should be taken into 
account by researchers using the LTA.  There is, however, no consensus as to what factors 
may significantly affect leaders’ LTA scores. Mahdasian (2002) has suggested that time in 
office may affect leaders’ personal dispositions, while Dille (2000) has studied whether 
cooperative international relations may be relevant, but neither finds evidence for these 
propositions in their studies of US presidents. 
In the literature, several other factors are identified that may affect leaders’ 
personality trait scores, in particular the leaders’ different institutional or political positions 
(role), the decision-making context the leader finds themselves such that these generate 
stimuli, such as stress, which may alter behaviour (state), and finally, the content-material 
analysed to generate the trait scores using LTA and Profiler Plus (source).   The following 
section will set out why these three factors could impact on the scores for seven LTA traits. 
To recap, these traits are: 
 
Leadership 
Trait 
Description LTA 
Trait 
Code 
Conceptual 
complexity 
The intricacy of the cognitive structure of a leader’s belief 
system. Cognitively complex individuals have a desire to seek 
multiple sources of information concerning issues and policy 
options, are able to see varying reasons for a particular position, 
and are willing to entertain the possibility that there is 
ambiguity in the environment  
CC 
Belief in one’s 
ability to 
control events 
The amount of control leaders feel they have over the situations 
they encounter 
BACE 
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Need for power 
or influence 
The  concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring one’s 
power of influence /  have an impact on other people 
PWR 
Self-confidence The leaders’ sense of self-importance and sense of one’s self SC 
Task orientation The extent leaders are focussed on completing their task and 
solving problems or on building and nurturing human 
relationships by maintaining group spirit and morale 
 
Distrust of 
others 
The level of trust a leader has in other actors and whether they 
see them as trustworthy 
DIS 
In-group bias The degree to which a leader praises his own political, 
economic, social, cultural group and how patriotic and 
protective they are of their in-group 
IGB 
   
 Table 6.1: Leadership Trait Analysis: Traits, Meanings, and Code 
 
Table 6.2 shows the mean scores for a norming group of 53 Western leaders for the period 
1998 to 2008 analysed using the same methods that will be applied in this chapter (Hermann, 
1999; Derksen, 2012). 
 
Western Leaders BACE PWR CC SC TASK DIS IGB 
High (equal to or greater than) 0.40 0.31 0.63 0.45 0.73 0.15 0.22 
Norming Group Mean (53 
Western Leaders) 
0.33 0.26 0.57 0.32 0.64 0.09 0.17 
Low (equal to or lower than) 0.26 0.21 0.51 0.19 0.55 0.03 0.12 
Standard Deviation 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.05 
 
Table 6.2: Norming Group Mean Scores and Designation Scheme for Western Leaders  
 
6.3 Expectations of the Impact of Role, State, and Source 
With regard to institutional role, the difference between the heads of government – in the 
Irish and British case the Prime Minister – and their ministers, stands out. For even if Prime 
Ministers are the ‘first among equals’, the position brings both different demands as well as 
different personal and institutional power resources (Heffernan, 2003). In the case of the UK 
and in Ireland, Prime Ministers typically emerge from fierce leadership competitions in their 
parties, and general elections, successes which will understandably boost their self-
confidence.  Moreover, their predominance can be expected to somewhat sate a previously 
held need for power, while simultaneously boosting their belief that they can control events. 
Whether the power of the role is exercised by exploiting resources within policy networks, 
97 
 
through agenda-setting, or by structuring the choices of cabinet and parliament via the 
selective releasing and withholding of information, the Prime Ministerial role can be 
expected to increase self-belief and decrease the craving for power (O’Malley, 2007; Toye, 
2011).  
 Certainly, these impacts can be expected in relation to both of the leaders assessed in 
this Chapter (Gordon Brown and Brian Cowen) following their long waits for the opportunity 
to become Prime Minister, ten and eleven years respectively. As Tony Blair’s likely heir 
apparent, Brown’s wait in particular can been characterised as frustrated and impatient 
(Heffernan, 2005: 614; Peston, 2005; Bower, 2004; Rawnsley, 2001). Altogether, this leads 
to expectation that: Leaders’ belief that they can control events and their level of self-
confidence will be lower as Minister than as Prime Minister, while a leader’s need for power 
will be higher as Minister than as Prime Minister. 
 Crisis and leadership are closely intertwined phenomena as crises are episodes of 
threat and uncertainty likely to harm leaders’ confidence and reduce a sense of control. 
Moreover, today’s crises will increasingly test the conceptual complexity of leaders as, they 
are often the product of processes like globalisation, deregulation, technological advances 
which “promote a close-knit world that is nonetheless susceptible to infestation by a single 
crisis. Comparatively slight mishaps within these massive and intricate infrastructures can 
rapidly escalate in unforeseen ways” (Boin and ‘t Hart, 2003: 545).  
 These forces were certainly at play in the global economic crises faced by Cowen and 
Brown in 2008, and in the case of Cowen in particular, are viewed as sapping him of self-
confidence (Irish Times, January 17
th
, 2011). Crisis events drive up a leader’s need for power 
as policy responses emerge via multi-actor coordination where consultation, negotiation, and 
outright confrontation is necessary ('t Hart, Rosenthal, and Kouzmin, 1993; Flin, 1996). 
Commenting after the crisis, Cowen described it as akin to multiple plane crashes, with 
multiple causes, all occurring at the same time (Cowen, 2012).   
Finally, crises can erode a leader’s trust in others. Crises are accompanied by 
increasingly assertive and tenacious media coverage, and leaders pressured by “streams of 
informal investigations, proactive journalism, insurance claims, and juridical (including 
criminal) proceedings against them” (Boin and ‘t Hart, 2003: 545).  This leads to the 
expectation that leaders’ need for power, conceptual complexity, and distrust of others will be 
higher after the onset of a crisis as opposed to before, while their belief he can control events 
and his self-confidence will be higher before the crisis, than after.  
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In addition to the effect of contextual factors on leaders’ LTA scores, another issue central to 
the methodological discussions surrounding the LTA framework is that of the most 
appropriate source-material. In this regard, the issue of impression management is important. 
Impression management refers to the behavioural strategies people use to create desired 
social images or identities (Tetlock and Manstead, 1985: 59). What people say and do 
frequently represent attempts to create desired impressions on others, and people are “highly 
sensitive to the social significance of their conduct and are motivated to create desired 
identities” (Tetlock and Mansfield, 1985: 60). For political leaders and for those generally 
whose office depends on the votes or support of others, such impression management is 
especially salient. Most studies devoted to this issue and using a variety of methods focus on 
difference between leaders’ public and private speech-acts and find that despite being fraught 
with potential hazards, the studied leaders’ messages were remarkably similar across public 
and the private statements, providing some empirical confirmation of the validity of using 
public speech-acts to assess leaders dispositions (Renshon, 2009: 658; Dyson and Raleigh. 
2014; cf. Marfleet 2000;). 
Researchers only very rarely have access to private sources (cf. Dyson and Raleigh, 
2014 for private source availability). When this is the case, the choice is easy: researchers 
would always prefer to use them over public sources. However, at a distance techniques were 
developed precisely because studies usually do not have direct access to private sources, but 
still want to answer important research questions. Therefore an alternative is needed and the 
most immediate question is therefore what public sources are best used to derive trait scores 
using LTA: prepared speeches, responses to parliamentary questions (used in this research), 
or ad libbed speech-acts.  
Originally, Hermann advises use of ad libbed remarks and responses to questions, 
however (as the research confirms) these are relatively rare and not easily sourced. Having to 
rely on these will limit the total amount of data available and thereby the opportunity to 
control for other factors. This is why research has relied on less spontaneous sources such as 
replies to parliamentary questions (Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Dyson 2008) or even fully 
prepared speeches (Winter et al., 1991; Mahdasian, 2002; Thies, 2004). It is, however, 
unclear whether these more prepared speech-acts return similar results as ad libbed speech. 
Prepared speeches offer a better opportunity to manage created identities than spontaneous, 
ad libbed speech acts, with greater knowledge of topic, audience and greater time to prepare 
conferring advantage. Research shows that “[w]ithout question, people often seek culturally 
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valued identities”, and certain leadership traits are more valued than others (Tetlock and 
Mansfield, 1985: 61). For example, depending on the specific event, utterances can be 
designed in advance to improve leaders’ image by creating or amplifying the impression that 
they believe they can control events, are ambitious, or favour one group over another.  
Evidence of this can be found in Mahdasian’s analysis (2002) where the scores for 
these three associated traits (control of events, need for power, and in-group bias) were 
consistently lower when speech-acts are more spontaneous. Interestingly and contrary to 
intuition perhaps, there is little evidence of leaders managing-up the impression of the 
intricacy or complexity of their belief system, or the variety of their beliefs in prepared 
material. Scores for the conceptual complexity trait were found to be higher rather than lower 
in ad libbed speech acts (Dille and Young, 2000; Mahdasian, 2002; Dyson and Raleigh, 
2014). Similarly, there is some evidence that when speaking spontaneously, leaders can 
portray greater levels of self-confidence and task orientation (Mahdasian, 2002: 79). Though 
this might appear contrary to what one might expect of impression management strategies, it 
is equally possible that a leader would be more confident, assertive and focussed using his 
owns words rather than that of a speech-writer. This leads to the expectation that leaders’ 
scores for the belief in their ability to control events, need for power, and in-group bias will 
be higher in prepared speech content, compared to ad libbed utterances. The empirical 
analysis section of this Chapter will further explore all of these remaining questions.  
Firstly, it will examine whether the seven trait scores vary over time. Then, the 
Chapter will study whether trait scores vary over time due to a change in role (e.g. Minister / 
Prime Minister), or a change in state (e.g. pre-crisis / crisis period). Finally, a comparison is 
provided of trait scores using two different sources (prepared and ad libbed) speech-acts. 
Each of these analyses is unique in including all seven LTA traits (cf. Mahdasian, 2002). 
 
6.4 Testing LTA: Research Design Choices 
To further explore the methodological questions set out above, LTA scores for two European 
leaders, Gordon Brown and Brian Cowen, were generated. Gordon Brown was the British 
Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1997 to 2007, and Prime Minister from 2007 to 2011. 
Brian Cowen was the Irish Minister for Finance from 2004 to 2008 and Taoiseach from 2008 
to 2011. Selecting Brown and Cowen is interesting in that both leaders went directly from 
having the role of Finance Minister to role of Prime Minister. Secondly, after a period of 
economic boom, they were both faced with the 2008 financial crisis. Third, as turbulent times 
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also stimulate leaders to engage with the public and other political actors, there was a high 
probability that both prepared and spontaneously ad libbed content could be located. Overall, 
Brown and Cowen thus offer the variation sought to address our research questions, in terms 
of role, state and source. At the same time, they display similarities that allow us to assign 
any changes or differences we find to these three variables more confidently. They are both 
English-speaking, removing any possibility of translation bias, and while the Irish and UK 
political systems differ somewhat (though within a European Union supranational context) 
their respective executive roles are remarkably similar (O’Malley and Martin, 2010). There is 
also an attraction in keeping the topics of speech-acts as similar as possible as research shows 
this to be important (Mahdasian, 2002), and both leaders had to deal with saving banks and 
responding to the resulting sovereign debt crisis. Finally, both were rather unsuccessful as 
leaders in the end, having presided over a period of growth that proved unsustainable, and 
providing their nations’ initial response to the 2008 market crash in a manner that ended with 
electoral defeat, and a personal exit from politics. 
To establish their LTA scores, both ad libbed speech acts and prepared / semi-ad 
libbed responses to parliamentary question were selected for both leaders from their 
instalment as Chancellor of the Exchequer, throughout their time as Prime Minister, to their 
eventual demise.  For the purposes of this research, July 2008 is chosen as the moment when 
both Brown and Cowen moved into crisis mode.  
At that time, Brown was dealing with what a prominent publication called “Britain’s 
sinking economy” (The Economist, July 3rd, 2008) involving “a punishing slowdown with a 
recession looking likelier by the day, sharp decline in home-building, soaring costs of food 
and fuel, and consumer confidence is at an 18-year low”5. By the end of the month the 
economic circumstances were irrefutably revealed to be having a political impact on Brown. 
On July 24
th
 Brown’s Labour Party lost a by-election in Scotland, with the media stating that 
Gordon Brown's premiership had been dealt a “potentially fatal blow as Labour lost one of its 
safest seats in one of the biggest by-election shocks ever” (The Telegraph).6  
The circumstances and timeline for Cowen were not greatly different. For example, 
on July 8
th
 2008, the Irish government issued a statement on foot of exchequer returns which 
confirmed that the State was facing a shortfall of €3 billion in tax revenue for the year, that 
expenditure was running at 11 per cent ahead of the same period in 2007, and that there were 
                                                          
5
 http://www.economist.com/node/11670314 retrieved November 5
th
 2014. 
6
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/2457021/Glasgow-East-by-election-Humiliation-for-
Gordon-Brown-as-Labour-loses-to-SNP.html retrieved November 5
th
 2014  
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now a number of new spending pressures arising from the spike in unemployment 
(Department of Finance, 2008)
7
.  
The ad libbed speech-acts were sourced via a structured search on the internet and 
major international, Irish and British news-media (via Lexis-Nexis). All fragments that were 
found were included irrespective of their length (cf. Mahdasian, 2002). Given that ad libbed 
speech acts were most difficult to source, this content availability and timeframe was used as 
the benchmark to match the word count and timing of parliamentary sources. 
 
Analysis Groups Sample Size (n) 
Cowen (Analysed by Month) 11 
Cowen (Analysed by Year) 5 
Brown (Analysed by Month) 20 
Brown (Analysed by Year) 8 
Cowen and Brown (Analysed by Month) 31 
Cowen and Brown (Analysed by Year) 13 
 
Table 6.3: How Text is Grouped for Analysis, and Sample Sizes 
Content for Gordon Brown (from 1998, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010) 
totalled over 69,000 words of both ad libbed and more prepared content from parliament. 
This can be broken into ad libbed and prepared content for when he was Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (29,979 and 30,153 words respectively), for when he was Prime Minister (39,462 
and 39,409 words), and for the pre-crisis (47,565 and 47,791) and crisis periods (21,876 and 
21,771).  
For Brian Cowen, 28,000 words of both ad libbed and prepared content (from 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010) were sourced, within which sits ad libbed and prepared content 
for when he was Minister for Finance (4,699 and 4,785 words), for when he served as 
Taoiseach of Ireland (23,845 and 24,136 words), and for the pre-crisis (12,333 and 13,282 
words) and crisis periods (15,667 and14,718 words).  
The review will include all seven LTA traits, and the scores produced by the LTA 
process are subjected to a quantitative analysis to determine whether significant differences 
exist between trait scores on the basis of role, state, and source. Any significant findings will 
further be explored qualitatively. The empirical analysis will start, however, with a review of 
how stable the LTA scores of Cowen and Brown’s actually are. 
                                                          
7
 http://www.finance.gov.ie/news-centre/speeches/former-ministers/statement-brian-lenihan-td-minister-finance-
0 retrieved November 5
th
 2014. 
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6.5 Trait Stability: Do Role, State, and Source Matter?  
As indicated in Figure 6.1, both leaders show a wide variety in trait scores. The dots 
above/between/below the lines indicate a respective high/average/low score relative to the 
comparator norming group. However, like in previous studies, the extent to which scores vary 
differs significantly by leader and by trait (Dyson, 2008). In terms of range, Brown’s scores 
on belief in ability to control events and self-confidence are most volatile. Brown’s belief in 
his ability to control events, for instance, ranges from a high of 0.61 in June 2003, to a low of 
0.18 in March 2009 and the range of scores on self-confidence is even wider.  
Taking into account the lower number of data points, the scores for Brian Cowen fall 
within an even wider range. This is especially the case for self-confidence and distrust in 
others. In terms of their designation (see Table 6.2 above), a considerable amount of Brown’s 
scores on belief in ability to control events, need for power, conceptual complexity, distrust 
of others and in-group bias fall within both the high and the low category. In the case of 
Cowen, several scores on need for power, conceptual complexity, self-confidence and distrust 
of others are located in both the low and high category. These results are based on the 
leaders’ speech acts aggregated per month, which is a relatively limited time-frame. When 
aggregated per year, most scores fall either in the average-high or average-low range, and 
thus show more consistency. Still, the scores of Brown and Cowen seem to provide support 
for the view that the LTA reveals the temporary state of mind of leaders rather than stable 
personality traits. This has important implications for the application of the technique and 
researchers should be careful in selecting their sources as close as possible to the behaviour 
they aim to explain. Moreover, it raises the question whether there is an underlying pattern to 
this volatility. 
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Figure 6.1: Range of Brown and Cowen’s Monthly Leadership Trait Scores 
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6.6 The Impact of Role 
One of the factors potentially causing the variability in score over time is the leader’s 
political role. Research such as Mahdasian’s (2002) or Dyson’s (2008) which compares either 
U.S. Presidents or British Prime Ministers (2002), removes the necessity to take this factor 
into account. However if one intends to compare leaders who hold different roles, perhaps in 
different countries as is the case with the overall research here, then the issue of role emerges 
as a consideration. For is it appropriate to compare the trait scores of a British Prime 
Minister, with those of an Irish Taoiseach or a German Chancellor, or a cabinet Minister to a 
President? Or will their specific roles impact on the leaders’ trait scores by constraining or 
stimulating particular natural leadership traits?  
 To answer this question, an independent samples t-test was performed on the Brown 
and Cowen’s speech-acts (prepared and ad libbed) at the time they were Minister of Finance, 
and while they were Prime Minister. When reviewing both leaders collectively, only distrust 
in others is significantly affected by role, with leaders becoming more distrustful when they 
are Prime Minister.  When assessing the leaders separately, the analysis reveals that role does 
not significantly impact Brown and Cowen’s need for power or influence, conceptual 
complexity, task orientation, or in-group bias. It does, however, affect their belief in their 
ability to control events, self-confidence, and distrust of others (see Table 6.4).  
More specifically, role has a significant and large effect on Cowen’s belief in his own 
ability to control events (measured on a monthly and annual basis), and his belief self-
confidence when measured on a yearly basis. The results show that Cowen had a higher 
belief in his own ability to control events, but lower self-confidence when he was Prime 
Minister compared to when he was Minister for Finance. This is a puzzling combination, 
worthy of future examination. Gordon Brown’s political role only mattered significantly for 
his distrust in others, which increased when serving as Prime Minister compared to when he 
was Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
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Leader 
(Analysis Period) 
Mean 
(Minister) 
Mean  
(Prime Minister) 
Trait t-value P 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.325 0.461 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
-3.307 *0.004 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.208 0.284 Need for Power -1.428 0.169 
Cowen 
(Analysed by Month) 
0.703 0.616 Conceptual Complexity 1.915 0.07 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.408 0.328 Self-Confidence 0.819 0.422 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.795 0.753 Task Orientation 0.721 0.479 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.190 0.145 Distrust of Others 0.744 0.465 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.058 0.091 In-group Bias -0.854 0.403 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.280 0.415 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
-3.333 *0.01 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.220 0.253 Need for Power -0.622 0.551 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.720 0.626 Conceptual Complexity 1.836 0.104 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.565 0.319 Self-Confidence 2.741 *0.025 
Cowen 
(Analysed by Year) 
0.895 0.745 Task Orientation 2.279 0.052 
Cowen 
(Analysed by Year) 
0.155 0.151 Distrust of Others 0.054 0.958 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.040 0.091 In-group Bias -1.844 0.102 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.394 0.391 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
0.096 0.924 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.260 0.282 Need for Power -1.231 0.226 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.601 0.610 Conceptual Complexity -0.357 0.723 
Brown 
(Analysed by Month) 
0.470 0.482 Self-Confidence -0.2 0.842 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.719 0.665 Task Orientation 1.541 0.132 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.078 0.145 Distrust of Others -2.714 *0.01 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.126 0.138 In-group Bias -0.644 0.523 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.393 0.390 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
0.086 0.932 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.273 0.270 Need for Power 0.158 0.876 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.603 0.592 Conceptual Complexity 0.365 0.721 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.479 0.465 Self-Confidence 0.179 0.861 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.696 0.650 Task Orientation 2.123 0.052 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.095 0.150 Distrust of Others -2.117 0.053 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.121 0.120 In-group Bias 0.08 0.938 
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Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.383 0.424 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
-1.683 0.098 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.251 0.283 Need for Power -1.676 0.099 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.618 0.613 Conceptual Complexity 0.218 0.828 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.460 0.409 Self-Confidence 1.039 0.303 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.731 0.706 Task Orientation 0.836 0.406 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.096 0.145 Distrust of Others -2.015 *0.048 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.115 0.115 In-group Bias -0.04 0.968 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.374 0.404 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
-1.143 0.264 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.264 0.260 Need for Power 0.213 0.833 
Cowen and Brown 
(Analysed by Year) 
0.623 0.611 Conceptual Complexity 0.414 0.683 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.493 0.381 Self-Confidence 1.695 0.107 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.729 0.704 Task Orientation 0.736 0.469 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.105 0.151 Distrust of Others -1.767 0.09 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.108 0.104 In-group Bias 0.274 0.787 
 
Table 6.4: Impact of Role on Trait Scores  
(t-test, two tailed p< 0.05) 
However, many studies do not use absolute scores to assess traits, but rather rely on 
Hermann’s method of categorising scores as high, average, or low (see Table 6.2 above). The 
use of the designations reduces dampens the apparent effect of role on the trait score. For 
example, when analysed in terms of low, average or high scores, Cowen’s belief in the ability 
to control events is the only trait that was significantly dependent on political role. 
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Expectations 
 A leaders’ belief that they can control events and their level of self-confidence will be 
lower as Minister than as Prime Minister 
 A leader’s need for power will be higher as Minister than as Prime Minister 
 
Findings 
 Analysing leaders together did reveal an impact of role 
 Both leaders’ scores for distrust of others were higher when serving as Prime Minister 
than when a Minister (no expectation regarding this trait) 
 Cowen had a higher belief in his own ability to control events when he was Prime 
Minister than when he was Minister (matches expectation) 
 Cowen had lower self-confidence when he was Prime Minister than when he was 
Minister (opposite to expectation) 
 Brown had a higher level of distrust in others when serving as Prime Minister than when 
he was Chancellor (no expectation regarding this trait) 
 
Conclusion of t-test analysis 
 Role can have a significant impact on leaders’ trait scores 
 
Table 6.5: Summary of the Impact of Role 
 
Although further work is necessary, overall the results of this study indicate that role may 
have a significant impact on an individual leaders’ belief in their ability to control events, 
self-confidence, and distrust of others. Other traits may not be impacted significantly by the 
role of the leader. These outcomes partly match the expectations. In the case of Cowen, the 
extent to which he believed he could control events was higher when he was Prime Minister 
than when he was a Minister. This lends some credence to theories around Prime Ministerial 
predominance and increased access to information and resources. However, contrary to one 
of the hypotheses, Cowen displayed higher self-confidence when he was Minister as opposed 
to when he led the country.  Brown’s distrust of others was significantly higher when he was 
Prime Minister rather than Chancellor. This is consistent with research which shows that 
backbench dissent in the House of Commons during the government of Brown was “higher 
than that seen in any previous post-war Parliament, along with showing the degree to which 
the government were forced to negotiate with, and concede to, their backbenchers in order to 
prevent rebellion reaching even higher levels” (Cowley and Stuart, 2014: 1).  Finally, the 
results did not provide evidence that either leader’s need for power was significantly higher 
as Minister suggesting perhaps that this trait does not subside on accession to the most senior 
Cabinet position.  
 
108 
 
6.7 The Impact of ‘State’ 
The second factor that may impact on leaders’ personal disposition and trait scores is the 
particular set of circumstances they face (cf. Dille, 2000). The t-test shows that having to deal 
with the crisis does not have a significant effect on any of the leadership traits when the 
scores for Brown and Cowen are aggregated. When the scores of the leaders are separated, 
however, the results indicate that the outbreak of the crisis had a significant impact on 
Cowen’s need for power (measured on a monthly and annual basis). Cowen became 
considerably more power oriented when dealing with the crisis. Cowen’s belief that he could 
control events also increased in the crisis (measured by year). In contrast, the crisis affected 
Gordon Brown’s task-orientation (when measured by month and by year). Interestingly, 
rather than becoming more task oriented, Brown becomes less task-oriented with the 
outbreak of the crisis. None of the other traits showed significant effects. Again, assessing the 
effect of circumstance on leadership traits using Hermann’s designation (high, average or 
low) renders very different results. 
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Leader 
(Analysis Period) 
Mean 
(Pre-Crisis) 
Mean  
(Crisis) 
Trait t-value P 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.395 0.460 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
-1.693 0.106 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.213 0.303 Need for Power -2.246 *0.036 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.664 0.613 Conceptual Complexity 1.342 0.195 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.354 0.336 Self-Confidence 0.22 0.828 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.754 0.764 Task Orientation -0.222 0.827 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.155 0.152 Distrust of Others 0.058 0.954 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.085 0.084 In-group Bias 0.023 0.982 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.340 0.460 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
-4.21 *0.003 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.210 0.300 Need for Power -3.007 *0.017 
Cowen 
(Analysed by Year) 
0.677 0.598 Conceptual Complexity 1.927 0.09 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.390 0.335 Self-Confidence 0.548 0.598 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.778 0.770 Task Orientation 0.148 0.887 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.158 0.143 Distrust of Others 0.279 0.787 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.077 0.088 In-group Bias -0.404 0.697 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.399 0.378 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
0.598 0.553 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.273 0.265 Need for Power 0.396 0.694 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.619 0.574 Conceptual Complexity 1.577 0.123 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.476 0.474 Self-Confidence 0.036 0.971 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.718 0.631 Task Orientation 2.354 *0.024 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.098 0.143 Distrust of Others -1.597 0.119 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.134 0.126 In-group Bias 0.433 0.668 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.395 0.383 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
0.323 0.751 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.278 0.255 Need for Power 1.108 0.287 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.608 0.573 Conceptual Complexity 1.041 0.316 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.485 0.440 Self-Confidence 0.694 0.499 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.693 0.635 Task Orientation 2.528 *0.024 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.106 0.145 Distrust of Others -1.236 0.237 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.119 0.125 In-group Bias -0.418 0.683 
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Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month 
0.398 0.422 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
-0.988 0.327 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month 
0.259 0.285 Need for Power -1.375 0.174 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month 
0.629 0.595 Conceptual Complexity 1.557 0.125 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month 
0.449 0.400 Self-Confidence 1.022 0.311 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month 
0.726 0.703 Task Orientation 0.776 0.441 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month 
0.110 0.148 Distrust of Others -1.563 0.123 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month 
0.123 0.104 In-group Bias 1.197 0.236 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.377 0.421 Belief in Ability to Control 
Events 
-1.606 0.121 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.255 0.278 Need for Power -1.088 0.287 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.631 0.585 Conceptual Complexity 1.658 0.11 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.453 0.388 Self-Confidence 1.16 0.258 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.722 0.703 Task Orientation 0.522 0.606 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.123 0.144 Distrust of Others -0.694 0.494 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.105 0.106 In-group Bias -0.081 0.936 
 
Table 6.6: Impact of State on Trait Scores  
(t-test, two tailed p< 0.05) 
All in all, the analysis does not support the contention that a leader’s conceptual complexity 
or distrust of others would be higher after the onset of a crisis as opposed to before, nor that 
his self-confidence will be higher before the crisis. However in the case of Cowen, there is 
evidence that a crisis situation can make a leader more power-oriented, congruent with crisis 
theories of necessary multi-actor policy responses. Though only appearing in the analysis of 
annual scores, Cowen did display greater belief in his ability to control events in the crisis, 
which is surprising. While there was no a priori expectation that crisis would impact 
significantly on task-orientation, results for Brown did suggest this, albeit not in the direction 
one might assume. Due to the close coincidence of the onset of the crisis state with ascension 
to role as Prime Minister, for both leaders, further research is desirable particularly as the 
traits significantly impacted by the role and state are not identical. The “Belief in Ability to 
Control Events” trait is impacted significantly, and similarly by both variables.  
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Expectations 
 A leader’s need for power, conceptual complexity, and distrust of others will be higher 
after the onset of a crisis as opposed to before 
 A leader’s belief they can control events and his self-confidence, will be higher before the 
crisis, than after 
 
Findings 
 Analysing leaders together revealed no impact of state 
 Cowen had higher need for power when dealing with the crisis (matches expectation) 
 Cowen had greater belief in his ability to control events in the crisis (opposite to 
expectation) 
 Brown had lower task-orientation following the outbreak of the crisis (no expectation 
regarding this trait) 
 
Conclusion of t-test analysis 
 State can have a significant impact on an individual leader’s trait scores 
 
Table 6.7: Summary of the Impact of State 
 
6.8 The Impact of Source 
Finally, there is the question whether one can reliably mix ad libbed interview responses and 
semi-prepared parliamentary responses, or whether ‘impression management’ effects will 
distort the results. To address this question, again a t-test was performed comparing the 
scores for both sources split by month and by year. The analysis shows that for Cowen and 
Brown using ad libbed or parliamentary sources makes a significant difference for belief in 
ability to control events, self-confidence and distrust of others for monthly scores. Annual 
scores for belief in ability to control events and self-confidence only, are impacted by source. 
 For both leaders their scores on belief in ability to control events are generally higher 
when speaking before parliament than in their ad libbed speech, while their distrust of others 
is lower when speaking before parliament. Moreover, as Table 6.8 indicates, source has a 
particular strong effect on Cowen and Brown’s self-confidence which is typically higher 
when they engage in ad libbed speech-acts than when they are addressing parliament. For 
some traits, source impacts in the same way on both leaders. Looking at their individual 
scores, distrust of others is higher for both leaders in ad libbed speech, belief in ability to 
control events is lower in ad libbed speech for both men, and self-confidence is higher using 
ad libbed material to assess the trait for both Brown and Cowen. 
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Leader 
(Analysis Period) 
Mean  
(Parliament) 
Mean 
(Ad Libbed) 
Trait t-value P 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.446 0.427 Belief in Ability to 
Control Events 
0.463 0.648 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.293 0.247 Need for Power 1.079 0.293 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.659 0.604 Conceptual Complexity 1.539 0.139 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.272 0.414 Self-Confidence -2.061 0.053 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.797 0.724 Task Orientation 1.724 0.1 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.098 0.208 Distrust of Others -2.724 *0.013 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.086 0.836 In-group Bias 0.06 0.953 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.392 0.384 Belief in Ability to 
Control Events 
0.16 0.887 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.270 0.222 Need for Power 1.222 0.257 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.688 0.602 Conceptual Complexity 2.26 0.054 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.288 0.448 Self-Confidence -1.938 0.089 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.818 0.732 Task Orientation 1.424 0.192 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.126 0.178 Distrust of Others -0.986 0.353 
Cowen  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.080 0.082 In-group Bias -0.075 0.942 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.430 0.355 Belief in Ability to 
Control Events 
2.614 *0.013 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.277 0.265 Need for Power 0.662 0.512 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.563 0.648 Conceptual Complexity -3.698 *0.001 
Brown 
(Analysed by Month) 
0.353 0.599 Self-Confidence -5.987 *<0.001 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.687 0.696 Task Orientation -0.249 0.804 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.085 0.138 Distrust of Others -2.077 *0.045 
Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.133 0.131 In-group Bias 0.139 0.89 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.436 0.348 Belief in Ability to 
Control Events 
3.728 *0.005 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.281 0.263 Need for Power 1.063 0.306 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.569 0.629 Conceptual Complexity -2.341 *0.035 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.330 0.618 Self-Confidence -6.436 *<0.001 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.670 0.688 Task Orientation -0.74 0.472 
Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.090 0.141 Distrust of Others -2.013 0.064 
Brown  0.124 0.118 In-group Bias 0.518 0.612 
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(Analysed by Year) 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.436 0.381 Belief in Ability to 
Control Events 
2.316 *0.024 
Cowen and Brown 
(Analysed by Month) 
0.282 0.258 Need for Power 1.279 0.206 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.597 0.632 Conceptual Complexity -1.639 0.106 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.324 0.533 Self-Confidence -5.293 *<0.001 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.726 0.706 Task Orientation 0.698 0.488 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.089 0.163 Distrust of Others -3.28 *0.002 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Month) 
0.116 0.114 In-group Bias 0.136 0.892 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.419 0.362 Belief in Ability to 
Control Events 
2.377 *0.026 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.277 0.247 Need for Power 1.616 0.119 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.615 0.619 Conceptual Complexity -0.144 0.887 
Cowen and Brown 
(Analysed by Year) 
0.314 0.552 Self-Confidence -5.093 *<0.001 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.727 0.705 Task Orientation 0.661 0.515 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.104 0.155 Distrust of Others -2.035 0.053 
Cowen and Brown  
(Analysed by Year) 
0.107 0.104 In-group Bias 0.215 0.832 
 
Table 6.8: Impact of Source on Trait Scores  
(t-test, two tailed p< 0.05) 
Different sources do not produce significantly different scores for both leaders’ need for 
power, task orientation or in-group bias. Scores for conceptual complexity reveals a nuanced 
picture. While there is no effect of source-type on Cowen’s conceptual complexity, a pattern 
does seem to emerge for Gordon Brown (see Figure 6.2).  A t-test reveals a significant effect 
of source type on Brown’s conceptual complexity (measured both by month and annually) 
such that his ad libbed speech-acts show higher conceptual complexity than those generated 
by the more prepared speech-acts before parliament. The difference is most prominent in his 
years as Prime Minister. 
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Figure 6.2: Brown’s Conceptual Complexity by Source, per year 
 
Expectations 
 A leader’s scores for the belief in their ability to control events, need for power, and in-
group bias will be higher in prepared speech content, compared to ad libbed utterances 
 
Findings 
 Analysing leaders together did reveal an impact of source 
 Both leaders’ scores for belief in ability to control events were higher when speaking 
before parliament than in their ad libbed speech (matches expectation) 
 Both leaders’ distrust of others was lower when speaking before parliament (no 
expectation regarding this trait) 
 Both leaders’ self-confidence is higher when they engage in ad libbed speech-acts than 
when they have to face parliament (no expectation regarding this trait) 
 Brown’s score for conceptual complexity is higher for ad libbed speech-acts than those 
generated by the more prepared speech-acts before parliament (no expectation regarding 
this trait) 
 
Conclusion of t-test analysis 
 Source can have a significant impact on leaders’ trait scores 
 
Table 6.9: Summary of the Impact of Source 
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The expectation that leaders’ scores for belief in their own ability to control events would be 
higher in prepared material is supported by the results. Set piece situations such as 
parliamentary question time offer an enhanced opportunity for impression management and, 
for this trait at least, that opportunity appears to be availed of. However, further research is 
required to help understand why this is not the case for LTA scores for the need for power 
and in-group bias traits. Perhaps the ability to control events is a consistently valued identity 
trait in a way that need for power or in-group bias are not. 
 The higher traits scores for conceptual complexity (for Brown) and self-confidence in 
ad libbed utterances was not expected a priori, but are consistent with previous research, and 
add weight to the argument that a leader’s confidence, assertiveness and focus can be more 
evident from their own ad libbed words rather than those prepared in advance and/or with 
input from others (Dyson and Raleigh, 2014; Mahdasian, 2002).    
 
6.9 Consequences of findings for the study of Leaders At a Distance 
The first issue that was raised concerned the question whether LTA measures stable traits, or 
the variable state leaders are in. In congruence with previous studies (Dille and Young, 2000; 
Dyson, 2008; Mahdasian, 2002) the analysis of Cowen and Brown finds evidence that LTA 
scores may vary considerably over time although the extent to which may vary between 
leaders and across traits. As LTA has been shown to discriminate between different leaders, 
this may not pose a problem as long as scholars treat the LTA framework as a tool to capture 
leaders’ variable state of mind rather than any fixed personality state and adjust their 
methodological choices accordingly. As is shown in this Chapter, this is especially important 
when working with traits like belief in ability to control events and distrust of others. Only in-
group bias and task orientation appear to be relatively stable over time and under varying 
circumstances. 
When LTA scores are seen as a measure of state rather than trait, the question 
emerges whether there is a logic underlying the variability in scores. For both leaders distrust 
in others is significantly affected by role as they become more distrustful when they become 
Prime Minister. Cowen shows a significantly higher belief in ability to control events (per 
month and annually) and lower self-confidence (per year) during the time he was Prime 
Minister than when he was Minister for Finance. For Gordon Brown the precise political role 
he played only mattered significantly for his distrust in others (per month) whereby he 
showed a higher level of distrust when serving as Prime Minister. These effects, however, 
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largely disappear when the LTA norming group framework is used as advised by Hermann 
and the trait-scores are reported in designations (high, average, low). The only remaining 
effect using this assessment model was on Cowen’s belief in ability to control events, which 
was higher when he served as Prime Minister (per month). Of the hypothesised impacts of 
role on LTA, this was the only one which found support from this analysis, creating questions 
around the extent to which accession to Prime Ministerial role does in fact sate a craving for 
power, or instil a level of confidence which is robust to external challenges.  Since no 
previous study has studied the effect of role, further research is needed to see whether this is a 
more general pattern and whether researchers may confidently use LTA to compare different 
leaders exercising different roles.  
In addition, the effects of the outbreak of the financial crisis were explored. Previous 
studies suggest that salient external events may account for differences in LTA scores over 
time (Mahdasian, 2002), but the only study that has tested this hypothesis to date and which 
focussed solely on conceptual complexity, found no significant context effect (Dille, 2000). 
Again, the results in this Chapter largely confirm this earlier finding with regard to 
conceptual complexity. In terms of the other six traits, the effects are also limited. In absolute 
scores, Cowen is shown to become considerably more power-oriented when dealing with the 
crisis, while Brown became slightly less task oriented. Using Herrmann’s designation scheme 
produces a different outcome, showing only Cowen’s belief in ability to control events to be 
significantly higher after the onset of the crisis (all monthly scores). It may be that a domestic 
versus a global crisis, or a natural versus an economic disaster, would have prompted the 
hypothesised increase in the leader’s conceptual complexity or distrust of others, or the 
expected lowering in his belief he can control events and self-confidence, but further research 
will be necessary in this regard. Overall, even a very salient economic and political event like 
the global financial crisis seems to have only a limited explanatory value for variation in LTA 
scores. 
Further, although researchers are advised to use ad libbed sources, practical 
considerations of availability have forced several of them to use (semi-)prepared sources or 
mixed sources. Like some earlier studies, this analysis of Brown and Cowen suggests that the 
type of source material matters for the outcomes and researchers must be careful to consider 
the consequences of their choices. In fact, source effects are the most robust cause of 
variation in traits. In line with several previous studies, Cowen and Brown’s belief in ability 
to control events, distrust of others, self-confidence and conceptual complexity scores vary 
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significantly whether ad libbed or semi-prepared sources are used. However as the 
impression management thesis suggests, the scores vary in a predictable manner. In 
congruence with earlier studies, Cowen and Brown’s scores on belief in ability to control 
events are significantly lower when their speech-acts are more ad libbed then when they 
engage in semi-prepared speech-acts. Moreover, conceptual complexity and self-confidence 
is higher when engaging in ad libbed speech (cf. Dille and Young, 2000; Dyson and Raleigh, 
2014; Mahdasian, 2002). In contrast to the four US Presidents in Mahdasian’s study however, 
Cowen and Brown’s need for power, task orientation and in-group bias scores do not differ 
significantly over source types. The expectation that impression management would see a 
leader attempt to maximise perceptions of ability to control events were borne out, but this 
was not the case for need for power and in-group bias traits, posing questions around whether 
some traits are more consistently or predictably valued. Similarly, further analysis might help 
reveal the extent to which confidence, assertiveness and focus are revealed to a greater extent 
in ad libbed versus prepared utterances. While these results caution researchers not to mix 
different source-types or compare studies using different sources, the predictable patterns 
may offer opportunities to use semi-prepared sources when ad libbed sources are hard to 
come by when done in an informed fashion. Corrected for their respective tendency to 
increase (belief in ability to control events) or decrease (conceptual complexity, self-
confidence) scores, semi-prepared sources may adequately reflect leaders’ spontaneously 
professed state of mind.  
This analysis has shown that using Herman’s designations of scores as low, average 
and high may be problematic. Firstly, in several instances during the analysis the use of 
designations seem to both obscure meaningful differences in scores while at other instances 
the designations over amplify non-significant differences. This is the direct result of the 
categorisations as an increase of, for instance, 0.10 on a low average score may have no 
effect on the designation while an increase of 0.03 on a high average score may be enough to 
change the designation. Moreover, using one standard deviation, the range denoting high, 
average or low score may vary considerably. In case of belief in ability to control events, for 
instance, a score that sits between 0 and 0.26 is categorised as low while high scores lie 
anywhere between 0.4 and 1, a range more than twice as large. By using such unequal scales, 
significant variance between ‘high’ and ‘super-high’ (or alternatively ‘low’ and ‘super-low’) 
is obscured. This may hide the actual or contextual factors on the scores. More 
fundamentally, the designations are highly dependent on the composition of the norming 
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group of leaders and their average scores. Current norming groups take into account some 
relevant cultural differences but include leaders with very different roles, in different 
contexts/states, and are based on a variety of sources. As this research has revealed some 
evidence that role, state and source-type influence leaders’ scores, these norming groups may 
actually not be suited to categorise leaders’ scores with.  
 
6.10 Consequences of Findings on Study of Irish Leaders Before the Crisis 
Chapter 5 reported results which did not support the hypothesis that leaders in Ireland in the 
lead up to the crisis would have lower trait scores for conceptual complexity, and higher for 
in-group bias, relative to the mean of a norming group of other Western leaders. The question 
was posed as to whether the analysed decision-makers were not victims to irrational forces, 
or whether the LTA method employed is not suitable for detecting these forces. 
 Several previous studies had explored the validity of LTA and found that its results 
showed significant correspondence to qualitative assessments of leaders personal 
characteristics and behaviour, that LTA is able to differentiate meaningfully between the 
personalities of different leaders,  and that the topic of the speech-acts on which the LTA is 
based may give rise to significantly different scores. This Chapter added analysis to reveal 
whether the seven trait scores vary over time, and whether trait scores vary over time due to a 
change in role , state or source.  
 The first finding - that trait scores vary considerably over time - suggests that the 
research design set out in Chapter 4 could be enhanced by reflecting a greater need to see trait 
scores assessed at the precise time-period when a particular decision of consequence is being 
taken. The research looked at a broad time-period and was not concentrated on any one 
particular decision or set of decisions. These issues are dealt with further in Part III. The 
second finding - that role can have a significant impact on leaders’ trait scores – was not 
considered to any great extent in the overall research design, though three roles were 
analysed (Taoiseach, Minister for Finance and Minister for Enterprise). It is possible that role 
did impact on the results but not to such an extent to explain the consistently higher 
conceptual complexity scores returned for Irish leaders. A more likely explanation for the 
results in Chapter 5 were the findings that source can have a significant impact on leaders 
trait scores, coupled with the finding that, as the reference norming groups are based on a 
variety of sources, these norming groups may actually not be suited to categorise leaders’ 
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scores with. Regarding conceptual complexity specifically, while there was no effect of 
source-type on Cowen’s scores, a pattern did seem to emerge for Gordon Brown such that his 
ad libbed speech-acts show higher conceptual complexity than those generated by the more 
prepared speech-acts before parliament. Source can impact significantly on conceptual 
complexity scores, though the pattern seen with Brown would not itself alone explain why 
Irish leaders had a higher score than expected, as it was the material from parliament for 
Gordon Brown which had lower scores. Nevertheless, the research design could be enhanced 
by seeking to correct for the potential of semi-prepared to impact trait scores, particularly 
belief in ability to control events, conceptual complexity, and self-confidence scores. The 
possibility remains that semi-prepared sources can adequately reflect leaders’ spontaneously 
professed state of mind if further research can continually enhance design. In-group bias was 
not significantly impacted by any of the variables. 
Perhaps the most impactful finding from this Chapter in terms of the testing of the 
original hypothesis emerges from the overarching point about use of the norming group. The 
hypothesis rested almost entirely on Irish decision-makers having significantly different trait 
scores than the comparator norming group of Western leaders. However as found in this 
Chapter, though the norming groups take into account some relevant cultural differences, 
they include leaders with very different roles, in different contexts/states, and are based on a 
variety of sources. This Chapter has revealed some evidence that role, state and source-type 
influence leaders’ scores, meaning the norming group employed to test the hypothesis may 
actually not have been suitable. Another issue is that it is possible that norming group scores 
do not represent ideal scores or a benchmark of good performance i.e. it is possible that the 
norming group mean for conceptual complexity is low.   
The original hypothesis-test must be assessed on the basis of these results. It is likely 
that the failure to find evidence of irrational groupthink amongst Irish leaders before the crisis 
is a result of the method employed. Every step possible was taken to eliminate alternative 
explanations for the failure to uncover evidence (role, state, and source) but these could not 
be ruled out. However, making the suggested amendments to the research design may make it 
possible for evidence of active, impactful convergence bias among key decision-makers in 
the period before Ireland’s crash to be detected using this quantitative method. Further 
research is required to provide a method of assessing behavioural biases at a distance, and to 
deliver a reliable proxy for detecting harmful groupthink and herding at the time of important 
decision-making. 
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PART III 
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Chapter 7: Assessing Ideology, Interests, and Institutions in Action 
7.1 Process Tracing a Most-Likely Case   
Chapter 3 set out the theoretical approach to the case study, specifically to explain why 
interests, institutions, and ideology influence decision-making, and how they contribute to 
irrational or rational outcomes. The purpose of this Chapter is to describe the research design 
to determine if and how interests, institutions, and ideology impact on decision-making. 
Among the conclusions reported in Part II of this thesis was that leadership trait scores vary 
considerably over time and that the research design set out in Chapter 4 could be improved by 
reflecting a greater need to analyse the exact time-period when a certain decision of interest is 
being taken. The preceding research examined a broad time-period (1995-2007) and was not 
concentrated on any one particular decision or set of decisions. This suggests that further 
investigation of the forces impacting on decision-making should zoom in on one decision 
taken over a confined time-span.  Case studies employing a process tracing method offer 
maximum opportunity for learning and for generalising beyond a chosen case (Hall, 2003; 
George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett and Elman, 2006).  
In this instance a most-likely case is sought; a subjectively bad decision where it is 
most likely that the theory-derived independent variables set out in Chapter 3 (interests, 
institutions, and ideology) will be present and impactful. The results set out in earlier 
Chapters have shown that the forces of interest to this research in the decision-making 
process can be difficult to locate and measure. In that case, it was the presence and impact of 
irrationality (decision-making biases). The same is true of interests, institutions, and 
ideology. According to Gerring, a central learning from Karl Popper’s work is that it is easier 
to disconfirm an inference than to confirm that same inference (Gerring, 2007: 120). A most-
likely case offers the potential to disconfirm the expectation that interests, institutions, and 
ideology influence the decision outcome. Further, a most-likely case makes it possible to 
evaluate instances in terms of “their degree of crucialness”, and when disconfirming the 
argument that interests, institutions, and ideology are impacting decision-makers, it does not 
matter how other factors impact the decision. This most-likely case may provide evidence 
that the expectation is true, or needs to be reframed and “one may quibble over what it means 
to disconfirm a theory”, but the point is that the most-likely case provides an important 
updating of a theoretical prior (Gerring, 2007: 121). 
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Consequently, a carefully considered, devised and executed framework for the case study 
analysis is crucial. The process tracing analytical approach will follow that set out by Gerring 
(2007). The chosen case study will rely heavily on contextual evidence and deductive logic to 
reconstruct causality due to the absence of temporal (pre/post-test) or spatial variation 
(treatment/control test). Process tracing is the chosen technique because the evidence 
pertaining to the variables of interest (interests, institutions, and ideology) and the bad 
decision outcome on mortgage policy is known in advance to be difficult to understand. The 
technique will see “multiple types of evidence…employed for the verification of a single 
inference – bits and pieces of evidence that embody different units of analysis” (Gerring, 
2007: 173). Individual observations will, as Gerring notes, be non-comparable and the case 
studies will involve long causal chains, and in this sense the case studies will be akin to 
detective work: 
“The maid said this; the butler said that and the suspect was seen at the scene of the crime 
on Tuesday, just prior to the murder. Each of these facts is relevant to the central 
hypothesis – that Jones killed Smith – but they are not directly comparable to one another. 
And just because they cannot be directly compared, they cannot be analysed in a unified 
sample. The maid’s testimony is empirical, and it is certainly relevant, but it cannot be 
reduced to standard dataset observations, and it is not meaningfully understood within a 
formal research design…Process tracing evidence is, almost by definition, difficult to 
verify, for it extends to evidence that is non-experimental and cannot be analysed in a 
sample-based format by virtue of the incommensurability if the individual bits of 
evidence” - Gerring, 2007: 173, 184     
Lunn points to the value of evidence in documentation or personal testimony which can to 
some extent reveal whether particular forces are influencing decision-making, though adding 
an important word of caution about subjectivity (Lunn, 2013: 568). In Chapter 2, Janis’ work 
on groupthink (1982) was summarised as an example of where case studies and fiascoes in 
particular, are employed to reveal the forces shaping decision-making (cf. Baumgartner and 
Jones, 2009: 40). Explaining his rationale for selecting fifteen fiascoes for close examination, 
Nutt states that debacles “offer insights into how a decision can go wrong, why it went 
wrong, and what changes in decision-making practices could improve the chance of success” 
(Nutt, 2002 :8).  This rationale informs the focus on a most-likely, bad-decision case study 
here. Bennett and Elman state “it is appropriate to study a case in which the outcome is 
known if the purpose is to determine whether a purported necessary cause is operating” and 
also to “look within a case for the observable implications of a wide range of alternative 
explanations, to give these explanations a fair shake vis-à-vis the evidence, and to develop 
sufficiently diverse, detailed, and probative evidence to elevate one explanation (which may 
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derive from a single theory or a combination of theories) over all others” (Bennett and Elman, 
2005: 460). The framework employed here achieves these objectives (see section 7.4).  
 This is an empirical enquiry employing within-case observations, and at its centre the 
document evaluation and interview elements of the research will attempt to identify the steps 
in a causal process leading to an outcome, in this case, the bad decision not to intervene to 
prohibit or limit the use of 100 per cent loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages in Ireland in 2005. 
Process tracing is employed because it allows assessment of a theory by identifying the 
causal chain that links the independent variables (interests, institutions, ideology), and the 
dependent variable (rational / irrational decision outcome) and uncover relations between the 
possible causes and outcome (information processing). As described in George and Bennett 
(2005) process tracing is used to investigate and explain the decision process by which initial 
conditions are translated into outcomes so as to uncover what stimuli the actors attended to. It 
is more than a historical narrative and will deliver an analytical causal explanation, though 
“moving up the ladder of abstraction” by constructing an explanation (George and Bennett, 
2005: 211). 
 Employing process tracing (exhaustive examination of sequential data) allows the 
research to establish and evaluate the link between the three factors of interest and the 
decision outcome by using archival documents, interviews and other sources to check 
whether the causal process of the theories can be observed in the sequence, and values of the 
intervening variables (Vennessen, 2008: 232).  The subject of the research, decision-making, 
and the theories of interests, institutions, and ideology operate in “a world marked by 
multiple interaction effects, where it is difficult to explain outcomes in terms of two or three 
dependent variables – precisely the world that more and more political scientists believe we 
confront” – a world that Hall concludes makes process tracing a well-suited methodology for 
theory testing (George and Bennett, 2005: 206). Process tracing is a form of within-case 
analysis where at least parts of the case-study narrative are accompanied with causal 
hypotheses specific to the case.  Process tracing can identify interacting variables, can be 
adapted to the phenomenon under study, help decide whether certain causes can or cannot be 
ruled out, can help uncover equifinality, and most importantly, assess theories (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 212-216).  
In this case, the document analysis and interviews will uncover the foundations of 
individual behaviour that connect interests, institutions, and ideology and decision outcomes. 
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The design reflects the known limitations of the technique (the need for an uninterrupted 
causal chain, employing appropriate levels of analysis absence of a control, assumption of 
stable equilibria, feedback effects, causal versus intervening variables, and small-n sampling) 
by employing systematic process analysis (George and Bennett, 2005: 222; Hall, 2003).  
Documents are examined to see whether the causal processes which the framework outlined 
in Chapter 3 implies is in fact evident in the sequence in this case. Specifically, following 
Hall, the design is based on predictions derived from theories of interests, institutions, and 
ideology about the patterns that should be observed if the analysis framework is valid. Other 
relevant observations, as many and diverse as possible, will be made. Purposive sampling of 
interviewees is employed and given the limited set of actors involved in the case considered 
in this research, sampling of any kind may not be strictly necessary, as it may be possible to 
interview almost the total population of relevant elites (Tansey, 2007); see section7.6. 
 Following Bennett and Elman, the proposed in-depth case study offers separate 
inferential advantages, complementary to the quantitative approach and which are capable of 
producing veriﬁable, and in some instances, generalisable scientiﬁc explanations of decision-
making in Ireland in advance of the economic crash. Further, the case study provides an 
account that runs from a suitably chosen beginning to the end of the story, has few (and 
preferably no) noteworthy breaks in the causal story, will suggest evidence that should be 
found if the account is true (i.e. evidence of erroneous decision-making), and provides 
evidence of observable implications that are inconsistent with alternative explanations. There 
is the openness from the start to find a deviant case in which the outcome is unexpectedly 
wrong: “a powerful, deductive, internally consistent theory can be seriously undermined . . . 
by even one wildly discordant observation” (George and Bennett, 2005: 114).  
Further, Gerring suggests that good (convincing) process tracing analysis involves 
clarifying the argument preferably with the aid or a visual diagram (Gerring, 2007: 184). The 
diagram below depicts a framework (rather than an explanatory theory) with which to analyse 
the role and interaction of the three factors on a decision outcome, which may be rational or 
irrational (see section 3.3 for a full description of the framework). In this most-likely case the 
decision outcome is sub-optimal.  As is often the case, process tracing is used here as an 
adjunct form of analysis, as a complement to the earlier quantitative content analysis work, 
and can be considered a cross-check or a triangulation: it is not intended to bear the entire 
burden of the full empirical study but to offer supporting evidence. The most-likely case 
study may rest upon contextual assumptions about how processes work, but “insofar as there 
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is a comfortable fit between the evidence and assumptions…that account should pass muster” 
(Gerring, 2007: 185). That said, care will be taken to ensure that sufficient documentation is 
included in the account of the case study research such that verification is achievable.  
Having established the factors to be investigated via a case study approach, attention now 
turns to selecting the most-likely case for such an examination.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 7.1: Proposed Framework of Decision-Making (see section 3.3 also) 
7.2 Identifying the Most-Likely Case  
Case selection involves purposive sampling as testing the hypothesis (that interests, 
institutions, and ideology interact to negatively impact on the decision-outcome) requires 
selection based on the dependent variable (see earlier discussion). In other words, a most-
likely, bad decision case.  The case is selected purposively according to criteria specified in 
advance: (i) a case is sought with known outcome i.e. bad decision, and (ii) the choice of case 
is shaped by continuing theory development, to examine if, when and how the three factors 
impact on the outcome.  The rationale for the selection is that the impact of the variables of 
interests, institutions, and ideology, will be observable.  
 The case is not directly representative of diverse populations of decisions and the 
findings of the case studies are applicable to other decisions only in contingent ways.  
Nevertheless, the application of the detailed analysis framework (see below) will maximise 
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the extent to which the case can uncover or refine a theories about interests, institutions, and 
ideology, and ultimately if and how these factors contributed to the recent economic crisis in 
Ireland (and perhaps elsewhere). It is reasonable to assume that the three factors examined 
are factors which are present and impactful in many if not all modern economies.  
 The unit of interest here is a ‘Government decision’, either as a formal decision taken 
by the Government at a formal Cabinet meeting or as a substantial policy decision taken by 
the lead Department in a policy area (See Article 28 of the Irish Constitution). The decision 
should relate to a policy area that can be reasonably assumed to have impacted on Ireland’s 
economic fortunes. The approach is to identify a case, where the Government took a bad 
decision (in terms of protecting the economy) and examine it in depth. Such in depth analysis 
will include examination of contemporary State documents, media reportage, academic work, 
and interviews will relevant persons. As mentioned, this qualitative approach will 
complement and build on a quantitative content analysis already undertaken.  
To identify a most-likely case for the process tracing exercise, a universe of 
government decisions was assessed, bearing in mind the period of interest and the constraints 
of Freedom of Information legislation. All 3,425 decisions taken at formal Cabinet meetings 
for the years 2001-2004 were assessed (see Appendix B). By examining these it was possible 
to identify via two iterations, two policy areas (and over sixty instances) where ostensibly bad 
decisions were taken: national competitiveness policy, and finance policy. However, given 
the broad scope of both policy areas, it was necessary to identify specific elements within 
each that could be subjected to in-depth, process tracing analysis.  
This was done with reference to the four official investigations carried out into the 
crisis in Ireland i.e. Honohan (2010), Regling and Watson (2010), Wright (2010), and Nyberg 
(2011) reports. These documents were analysed to purposely seek out instances of where 
poor decisions with regard to national competitiveness and/or financial policy were likely to 
have been taken in the face of advice suggesting alternative action, which we now know with 
hindsight to have been the correct or more appropriate action. The most-likely case of a 
specific poor decision outcome which emerged from this analysis was the provision of 100 
per cent LTV mortgages in 2005.  
In their discussion of the role that financial policies played in triggering the banking 
crisis in Ireland, Regling and Watson refer to 100 per cent LTV mortgages originally being 
viewed by the authorities overwhelmingly in terms of “a benign shift to a modernised and 
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competitive market – one that was in tune with developments in the UK and US” (Regling 
and Watson, 2010: 29). Of course, hindsight reveals that the introduction of such loans had a 
far from benign impact on the economy. Nyberg describes 100 per cent LTV mortgages as a 
“potentially high-risk retail product” (Nyberg, 2011: ii). The Nyberg Commission concluded 
that availability 100 per cent LTV mortgages “posed new risks” for the Irish economy, 
specifically for both the borrower and the lender (Nyberg, 2011: 21). Nyberg states that 
discouraging high LTV mortgages was one policy decision that could have had “a significant 
impact” with regard to crisis prevention or mitigation (Nyberg, 2011: 64). The Wright 
Review of the Department of Finance points to the introduction of 100 per cent LTV as “an 
opportunity lost”, in terms of policy advice and a subsequent policy decision to avert or 
mitigate economic risk (Wright, 2010: 31). Wright does state that the Department of Finance 
would “have had a hard time” fighting 100 per cent LTV mortgages given the Government’s 
strong concern about home affordability for first-time buyers, but once the Financial 
Regulator, declared himself to be fully satisfied with their introduction, “the Department 
stopped considering the issue” (Wright, 2010: 31). Nyberg’s report references 
communication between the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government and the Department of Finance in 2005, regarding the implication of 100 per 
cent LTV mortgages on house price inflation and household indebtedness. The Department of 
Finance, “after consulting with the Financial Regulator, responded that while borrowers and 
lenders should exercise caution, it did not see any particular need to take action” (Nyberg, 
2011: 71).   
A most-likely case is a subjectively chosen case where the theoretically-derived 
independent variables are most-likely to be operating, and impacting on the dependent 
variable. The case is to disconfirm their impact. The 100 per cent LTV mortgages case is a 
subjectively bad decision where it is most likely that interests, institutions, and ideology will 
be present and impacting on information processing and the decision-outcome. As will be 
shown in later sections, the decision not to intervene to limit or prohibit the product was an 
objectively bad decision based on the official reports, based on the data, and based on the 
hindsight testimony of banks at the Oireachtas Committee inquiry in 2015. The official 
reports describe the decision as being “high-risk”, an “opportunity lost”, and a “new risk”. 
The data below will show, inter alia, that half of all mortgages in arrears in 2011 (70,000) 
extended in 2006 under the 100 per cent regime. The decision not to intervene to limit or 
prohibit 100 per cent LTV was a case where interests, institutions, and ideology are likely to 
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be present and impacting. Official investigations suggest a priori that (i) the interests 
communicated by the Department of the Environment during the case will be important, (ii) 
issues of institutional power (between the Department of Finance and the Financial 
Regulator) will arise, (iii) ideology in the form of a shift to a competitive market feature in 
the case, and (iv) that irrationality in the form of mortgage product developments being an 
extrapolation of what was happening in the United Kingdom and the United States.    
Finally, to get some validation of the decision on high LTV mortgages as a most-
likely case, a now-retired senior Department of Finance official was interviewed. The official 
was given an overview of the research, the findings of the quantitative work to date, and 
approach to case study analysis. The clearly stated purpose of the interview was to ask the 
former official about government decisions that would make suitable case studies of poor 
decisions affecting the economy, contrary to Departmental or other advice, in the period 
before Ireland’s economic crash.  The bad-decision case study (100 per cent LTV 
mortgages), potential alternatives, and the approach to analysis were summarised for the 
official. The former official stated that the 100 per cent LTV mortgages case study appeared 
suitable, and when he reverted a short time after the interview did not suggest additional or 
alternative cases (Former Senior Official, D/Finance: Interview, July 1
st
 2014).  
 As will be described in the next section, the decision not to prevent 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages was a poor one, and presents a most-likely case. The case centres on an ideology-
linked decision to intervene or not in a banking market made up of highly competitive 
interests, and where institutions debated and implemented the outcome. It is also a case 
conducive to process tracing, as it is time-bound and involved a small number of known 
actors. This case also presents an example of the complex decision-making environment 
posited by complexity theory, with non-linear processes and a variety of actors all adapting in 
response to events (see section 3.1). Finally it is an important case. As described below, the 
decision had significant negative direct and demonstration effects on the property market, 
which itself was at the heart of Ireland’s crisis.  
 In light of all of the above, the most-likely case study on mortgage policy was the 
subject of a formal request for official State documents related to the decision under the 
Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 1997.   
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7.3 The Selected Case: 100 Per Cent Loan-To-Value Mortgage Policy 
“The property bubble that ended in 2007 showed the damage to financial stability that 
can be caused by too lax mortgage credit standards. Such an approach can fuel 
housing demand in a way that drives prices up beyond what can be sustained. This 
can result in a wave of defaults and insolvencies that destabilises the whole economy” 
– Central Bank of Ireland, 2014: 2 
 
In October 2014 the Central Bank of Ireland published a consultation paper on macro-
prudential policy for residential mortgage lending in Ireland i.e. the rules for banks on 
mortgage LTV (and loan-to-income) ratios. By opening that paper with the words recounted 
above, the Central Bank was framing the consultation in the context of Ireland’s economic 
crash.  To mitigate the likelihood of an economic crash, the Central Bank proposed (and later 
implemented) mortgage lending rules to ensure a greater degree of safety around the 
mortgage business and greater prudence around lending to households for the purpose of 
purchasing property. Key to such safety and prudence was the rule to be applied to the Loan-
To-Value (LTV) ratio of mortgages. Of course this is some seven years after the crisis 
developed in Ireland.  
 The LTV ratio is important because research suggests a positive relationship between 
the LTV ratio and subsequent mortgage default, with higher ratios associated with higher 
defaults (Central Bank of Ireland, 2014: 8). Higher LTV ratios allow more people to enter the 
housing market because the deposit amount they have to save in advance of securing a 
mortgage is lower. However, higher LTV ratios leave the borrower exposed to a low housing 
equity buffer in the event that the value of the house falls. Research finds that LTV (and debt-
to-income) limits are associated with a decline in house price appreciation and transaction 
activity, and that such the limits alter expectations, which play a key role in bubble dynamics 
(Freidman, 2009: 139; Igan and Kang, 2011: 1). More recent research indicates that rapid 
growth in high-LTV loans can be signs of a build-up in systemic risk and that LTV limits can 
be effective in reducing loan-growth and improving debt-servicing performances of 
borrowers, though not always curbing house price growth (Jácome and Mitra, 2015: 1).  
 Research by the international ratings agency Standard and Poors has found that 40 per 
cent of Irish mortgage borrowers remained in negative equity in 2016, that home loans 
originating in 2007, just before the crash, had the highest degree of negative equity at 59 per 
cent, and that mortgages issued between 2006 and 2008 were deepest in negative equity as 
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they were issued at higher original LTVs and the initial loan was bigger (Irish Times, April 
6
th
 2016). 
In the early 2000s, high LTV mortgage ratios were not a long-standing issue in 
Ireland. An increased prevalence of higher LTV ratios from 2005 on was a consequence of 
Ireland’s membership of the euro, the arrival of foreign banks to the Irish market, access to 
cheap international credit by domestic banks, and excessive competition between those banks 
for the mortgage market. In this context, new entrants and incumbents began competing 
aggressively, stimulating demand with innovations such as 100 per cent LTV mortgages, 
increasingly offered to middle-income borrowers, including first-time buyers. With painful 
hindsight the supervisory authorities in Ireland recognised the danger posed by these 
developments:  
“If there had been an effective LTV cap in place in the early 2000s it is likely that the 
costs of the crisis would have been very greatly reduced. For one thing, binding 
ceilings on LTV ratios would have reduced the effective demand for housing, very 
likely lowering prices. Furthermore, faced with weaker demand and a smaller flow of 
profits, it is likely that developers would have built fewer houses, and would have 
been left with a smaller stock of unsold properties when the crash came” – Central 
Bank of Ireland, 2014: 9 
The failure of decision-makers to intervene in 2005 to prohibit the introduction of widely-
available 100 per cent LTV mortgages to first-time buyers resulted in the distribution of 
mortgages with LTV ratios under 80 per cent falling, the proportion of new loans issued at 
over 90 per cent LTV growing rapidly, and the proportion of outstanding mortgages with 
LTV ratios of over 94 per cent also growing strongly. As was the experience in Ireland, when 
property values decline rapidly, individuals can very quickly find themselves owning 
properties valued at amounts significantly lower than the amount outstanding on the 
associated mortgage, a problem which would have been less severe had the LTV ratio been 
lower. An additional consequence of higher LTV ratios is the reduced options for the bank 
that issued the mortgage to show forbearance should the mortgage-holder fall into arrears 
distress. Research shows that borrowers with high LTV ratios more likely to fall into arrears 
distress, with conjecture in the research that the lack of significant equity in property impacts 
the decision to default by “borrowers with little or no equity being also likely to have been 
the most stretched at the time of the boom, with fewer lifetime resources, such as accrued 
savings, to draw on when harder times hit” (Lydon and McCarthy, 2011: 2 and 15). Imposing 
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lower limits on the LTV ratio can mitigate risk by dampening the property market as they 
tighten the liquidity constraints of targeted borrowers and hence limit demand for housing.  
 As Chapter 9 recounts in detail, the Department of Finance was approached by the 
Department of the Environment in July 2005 who had concerns about an announcement by 
banks in Ireland that they were to make 100 per cent LTV mortgage products widely 
available.  Having considered the matter, in consultation with the Financial Regulator, the 
Department of Finance decided not to intervene to prohibit or limit the products, and that 
decision not to intervene to limit the prevalence of those particular mortgages certainly 
impacted negatively on the country’s economic fortunes.  
 Before looking at the bad decision in depth, it is worth considering what a good 
decision would have looked like. A good decision outcome in 2005 would have been tough 
measures, such as the government banning or disapproving publicly of 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages (Honohan, 2010: 12). The Nyberg investigation concluded the Regulator could 
have attached conditions to the banking licenses of certain institutions or withdrawn those 
licenses altogether.  
 Indeed, even a clear threat to do so if the banks did not change their lending behaviour 
might have had an effect. The measures taken by the Regulator in 2006 to increase capital 
requirements (after much discussion and debate) are widely accepted to have been a move in 
the right direction and had the desired impact on residential mortgage lending growth (though 
it is difficult to separate the impact from other developments such as interest rate increases in 
2006).   
Speaking in 2015, the Chairman of the Regulator from 2003 to 2008 agreed with 
Nyberg when he said that the Regulator “could have imposed additional, even more capital 
requirements than we did, although that would have run into some issues, like the anti-
competitiveness issue and so on. But we could have imposed more stringent capital 
requirements; we could perhaps have gone at it through the consumer code that it was 
inappropriate to be selling these 100 per cent mortgages, to certain classes of people. We 
could have attached conditions to banking licences… which effectively would have banned 
them” (Brian Patterson, Evidence to the Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, June 11th 2015). 
 As the Central Bank of Ireland has stated, it is difficult to accurately estimate to what 
extent risky lending and borrowing behaviour would have altered, had a good decision been 
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taken. Even if prices did not moderate as a result of the government banning or disapproving 
publicly of 100 per cent LTV mortgages, LTV caps would have reduced losses in the crisis. 
For example, the Central Bank’s loan loss forecasting models suggest that an 80 per cent 
LTV cap would have lowered credit losses on residential property of the banks by at least 17 
per cent, even if it is assumed that the same number of loans was made and that housing 
prices were the same as actually prevailed (Central Bank of Ireland, 2014: 9).  
 It might be argued that a good decision in 2005 would have been too late. One expert 
claims though it is impossible to identify when the bubble became irreversible and a collapse 
became inevitable, with the benefit of hindsight, 2006 probably represented the last chance to 
stop the build-up in debts (FitzGerald, 2015: 4). Research shows that the largest number of 
mortgage loans (just over 70,000) was extended in 2006, when house prices were close to 
their peak, and that by 2011 the largest proportion of mortgages in arrears originated in the 
years 2006 and 2007, accounting for over half of all accounts in such distress (Lydon and 
McCarthy, 2011: 3 and 8). In addition, in terms of affordability of mortgages the European 
Central Bank began to “hike interest rates in December 2005, and within eighteen months the 
ECB’s policy rate had doubled” (Ahearne, 2015; 2). Thus a good decision on mortgage LTV 
in 2005 could have helped to halt the build-up of debts, helped to minimise later mortgage 
distress, and minimised the negative impact of the interest rate hikes that were to follow soon 
after. In all, the Wright Review of the Department of Finance points to inaction on 100 per 
cent LTV ratio mortgages in 2005 as “an opportunity lost”, in terms of policy advice and a 
subsequent policy decision to avert or mitigate economic risk (Wright, 2010: 31).  
It is also important to note that some action was ultimately taken in relation to high 
LTV mortgages in 2006. From the beginning of May there was an increase in capital 
requirements for new high LTV mortgages (above 80 per cent LTV). This involved “a sliding 
scale which, by progressively increasing the risk-weighting of mortgages from 50 to 60 per 
cent depending on the LTV rate resulted in a 2.4 per cent Tier 1 capital requirement for 100 
per cent mortgages, compared with 2 per cent before” (Honohan, 2010: 100). It is now known 
that the Regulator consulted with the banks before introducing the measure, and the measure 
is viewed as being a weak response. What is of interest here is why necessary, firmer action 
was not taken in mid-to-late 2005, when similar if not identical information and concerns 
were present and expressed, and the extent to which interests, institutions, and ideology 
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shifted policy-makers away from a good (in this case more timely) decision, and whether 
these is evidence of irrational decision-making.      
7.4 Case Study Framework 
The analysis framework used is a structured and focused comparison whereby general 
questions that reflect the research objective are asked to guide and standardise data collection, 
thereby making systematic comparison and culmination of the findings possible. The method 
deals only with certain aspects of the historical case examined, in other words the three 
factors of interest (interests, institutions, and ideology).  The research objective of the 
application of the framework to the case study is to reveal the extent to which interests, 
institutions, and ideology were present and can explain the decision outcome. Thus the 
dependent variable to be explained is “decision outcome” (bad) and the independent variables 
which comprise the theoretical framework are interests, institutions, and ideology. These 
variables are expected to vary rather than being held constant to provide comparison. The 
material analysed via the framework comprises historical records: government documents, 
parliamentary records, media reportage, interviews, and other documents deemed relevant.  
 A key task of this element of the research is the method employed to assess the 
material. How will the presence and impact of the independent variables of interest be 
detected in the analysed case study text material? It is assumed that actors in the case studies 
especially publically elected politicians will employ the ‘strategic’ use of speech-acts (often 
called impression management), and that decision-makers display different personal 
dispositions in private versus in public. Impression management refers to the behavioural 
strategies people use to create desired social images or identities (Tetlock and Manstead, 
1985, 59.) As Tetlock and Manstead argue, establishing the precise extent to which 
impression management complicates or even invalidates research findings in this area is 
challenging. Researchers must be aware of, acknowledge and report the fact that impression 
management is a factor, and where practical, take mitigating steps. One such mitigating step 
here is to source quasi-private official documents, attainable under Freedom of Information 
legislation and which can be expected to be less impacted by any impression management, 
than the public utterances used in the quantitative element of the research.    
 The general question posed for interests is: to what extent does the material provide 
evidence that strong self-interest or relevant interested party activity was present and 
impactful in the period preceding the decision? Who interests won out in the decision not to 
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limit 100 per cent LTV mortgages? Interest group activity refers to the extent to which a 
group (bank, Government Department, Financial Regulator, others) was lobbying specifically 
on the issue of mortgage policy. Lobbying is the transfer of information between interest 
groups and politicians, their staffs, and agents (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014: 164). 
Information in practice may take many forms: “statistics, facts, arguments, messages, 
forecasts, threats, commitments, signals, or some combination thereof. Interest groups have 
budgets for and spend money on these activities, but that money is not transferred explicitly 
to politicians” (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014: 164).  Pursuing one’s own interests or 
lobbying should not be considered inherently negative as it is an important and valuable 
aspect of policy-making, with interest groups providing vital information, legitimacy, and 
support to the decision-maker (Klűver, 2011). Neither should it be confused with corruption 
whereby decision-makers are offered and accept direct, often financial, rewards for selecting 
a decision outcome because it directly favours the paying interest.  
Notwithstanding the “extraordinarily challenging” question of understanding and 
quantifying how interests are in obtaining policy or other outcomes, it is important to set out 
the structural context and organisational details, and this will be the case (de Figueiredo and 
Richter, 2014: 168, 175). This is provided in Chapter 8. The 100 per cent LTV mortgage case 
study narrative illustrates how the bad-decision outcome aligns with the interests those active 
in the lead-up to the decision being taken. This will help make the counterfactual obvious 
from the beginning. The documentation and testimony is examined to reveal the information 
transferred to the decision-maker, the Department of Finance, (directly or indirectly) by the 
each interested parties. Next, the examination will seek instances of where the decision-
maker employs that information. Such instances may be obvious, sometimes less so.  
It is assumed a priori that there will be instances where the decision-making actor 
(Department of Finance) simultaneously employs the information, attributes it to the interest 
as the source, and it is objectively clear that the information was a central consideration in 
shaping the final decision. However, it is also reasonable to assume that there will be other 
instances where the decision-maker employs the information less overtly meaning extremely 
close examination will be required. For example, where a decision-maker repeats the 
information provided by the interest verbatim, or close to it, but does not attribute it to that 
source. The approach will provide an understanding of variation and the counterfactual, help 
identify and explain how interested parties shape the decision outcome, and place this in the 
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context of the other factors. In short, the material analysed as part of the case will allow 
detection of evidence that self-interest and interest was present and important in the time 
leading up to decisions on mortgage policy in 2005.  The main players in that decision can be 
expected to reveal strong interests and self-interests, whether it is banks seeking to maximise 
market share, the Regulator’s consumer, prudential and industry promotion roles, the 
Department of Finance’s economic and political concerns, or Department of the 
Environment’s housing function and political concerns (see Chapter 8).   
The general question posed for institutions is: to what extent does the material provide 
evidence that institutional arrangements, mandates and expertise were impactful in the period 
preceding the decision? As set out in Chapter 3, institutional arrangements and knowledge 
impact on decision-making. In Ireland’s case both contributed to the crisis via the Social 
Partnership process, and the ‘knowledge interdependence’ of banks, property developers, the 
Central Bank, the Financial Regulator, and policy-makers. Detecting evidence of institutions 
impacting in the case study will mean seeking and revealing in the material admissions or 
evidence of reliance on individuals and bodies external to the Department of Finance for 
information critical to the decision case. It might also present as a demonstrable inability of 
the policy-makers in the Department of Finance to take action which would have been 
beneficial, due to a lack of expertise. While strict quantitative approaches to estimating 
external influence through analysis of large volumes of text have been undertaken in other 
research (see Klűver, 2009), here a qualitative close reading of the material associated with 
each case is employed. The lack of institutional expertise and its most severe consequences 
are evident in Regling and Watson’s analysis of financial regulation in Ireland before the 
crash: 
“Supervisors relied almost entirely on the central bank for economic inputs. By mid-
decade, the financial and property boom in Ireland presented features – both macro- 
and microeconomic – in which financial stability analysis should have sounded alarm 
bells loudly. Domestic financial stability reporting by the central bank failed in this 
regard. It noted worrying features; but it failed to trace their interactions vividly or to 
warn how severe were the emerging risks to bank soundness and, ultimately, to the 
living standards of the ordinary citizen” - Regling and Watson, 2010: 6     
The supervisory approach, information asymmetry, and dependence on external expertise 
which contributed to bad decision outcomes in Ireland reflected to some degree global 
developments and a move to reliance on markets’ own assessments (see the discussion of 
principles-based regulation in Chapter 8). But there may be more local factors at play also. In 
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their 2013 report, the Convention on the Constitution recount a number of phenomena which 
support the idea that institutional expertise is an impactful issue in policy and decision-
making in Ireland: 
“There is little incentive for Irish politicians to have or to develop specialist skills in 
particular policy areas. Ministers are appointed from among elected politicians, and 
typically move between departments in the course of a career, learning as they go. 
This is very unusual in European terms. In most countries, including Britain, ministers 
can be appointed to government from outside parliament because they have 
specialized skills, while still being fully accountable to the legislature… The Irish 
civil service recruits people for their general skills, and people are expected to learn 
on the job. Ireland has fallen behind developments in the British system, on which our 
civil service is based, in areas such as graduate recruitment, specialist training, and 
construction of expert skills services” – Convention on the Constitution, 2013: 17   
That Regling and Watson and others have found evidence of institutions impacting on the 
quality of decision-making via in-depth review of material, interviews etc. lends confidence 
to the approach employed here. Whether the cause is global or domestic is of secondary 
importance for this research. What is central is that the material analysed in the case can 
expose evidence that institutional expertise impacted on decision-making in relation to 
mortgage credit policy.     
 The general question posed for the ideology variable is: to what extent does the 
material provide evidence that ideological considerations were present and impactful in the 
period preceding the decision in November 2005? Ireland has often been cited as an almost 
unique modern society in that it is and has been without the meaningful impact of ideologies 
since the State was formed in 1922: a political system ‘without social bases’, as it were 
(Whyte, 1974). While it can be argued that Ireland’s main political parties do not occupy a 
vast ideological, left/right spectrum, it would not to be correct to state that they are or were 
ideologically identical.  
Benoit and Laver (2005) demonstrated the ability to reveal ideological positions of 
political parties by content analysis, and ordered Irish political parties on a left-right scale as 
follows: Labour, Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil, and the Progressive Democrats, using an expert 
survey; and Labour, Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and the Progressive Democrats using a content 
analysis of party manifestos (Benoit and Laver, 2005: 37). Further, they found that for Ireland 
the left-right scale is more about economic than social policy positions. Components of the 
left category include Market Regulation, Economic Planning, Protectionism: positive, 
Controlled Economy, and Welfare State Expansion. In contrast, the components of the ‘right’ 
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category include Free Enterprise, Incentives, Protectionism: negative, Economic Orthodoxy, 
and Welfare State Limitation (Benoit and Laver, 2005: 35). The Labour Party, Fianna Fáil, 
Fine Gael, and the Progressive Democrats accounted for 82 per cent of the vote in the 2007 
general election, and all but sixteen of the 166 seats in the Dáil.  Nevertheless, it would be 
incorrect to believe that the ideological position of the main political parties was unimportant 
to them in terms of defining what they stood for, or that their ideological position was of no 
relevance when it came to decision-making. Remember, given the focus of this research on 
economic policy, the concept of ideology used here refers to the economic left/right as 
opposed to social liberal/conservative cleavages, with the left referring to an abstract belief in 
State action, intervention in the economy/markets and higher levels of government spending 
and taxation, and the right referring to a contrasting abstract belief in a laissez-faire policy 
approach, non-intervention by the State in economic affairs, and lower levels of government 
expenditure and taxation.  In this context, the case study on possible intervention in the 
mortgage/banking market will be an instructive one.  
 For example, in their 2007 general election manifesto the Labour party employs 
language of the left, focusing on “society” as opposed to “economy”, equality of outcome as 
opposed to equality of opportunity, to socialism, and the interventionist role of the State:  
“Ireland has a successful economy, but a society under strain… We cannot take our 
economic success for granted, but neither can we be content with economic success 
alone. We must measure ourselves too by the quality of our civilisation – by the kind 
of Ireland we create and bequeath to our children. We must seize the opportunity … 
to build an Ireland that [we] call the Fair Society… It is through the development 
of…potential that we individually and collectively flourish… To be a socialist is to 
recognise in each of us, the common humanity that binds all of us… Labour is the 
authentic Irish expression of the great European socialist and social democratic 
movement… We believe in government as a powerful agent for change” - The Labour 
Party, 2007: ii 
The Progressive Democrats - in contrast - in their 2007 general election manifesto employ 
language of the right, making note of the new economic paradigm from the 1990s, personal 
initiative, enterprise, competitiveness, competition, and public finance control, and even 
include a side-swipe at parties of the left: 
“This country is unrecognisable from the failed economic wreck of the mid-1980s… 
The initiative and enterprise that brought about this dramatic change was unleashed 
by the policies of low taxes, competition, and investment in innovation and 
enterprise… The fundamental issues for…Ireland are sound public finances and 
progressive taxation policy [and] pro-enterprise, pro-competition polices and 
reforms… full employment will not be achieved by anti-growth…anti-development 
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policies…[or] by electing to government parties who are either indifferent or openly 
hostile to enterprise, initiative and progress” - The Progressive Democrats, 2007: 4 
From even these few short passages it is possible to detect, despite close proximity on a 
left/right spectrum, the difference in ideas, and apparent importance of ideology to political 
decision-makers at the time in Ireland. Crucially, it is possible to detect the force of ideology 
and variation in ideological position from this text. The material analysed as part of the cases 
study will similarly seek such evidence that ideological considerations were present and 
impactful in the period preceding the decisions on widely available 100 per cent mortgages in 
2005.    
 Based on the above, it is unsurprising that the basic coding frame will consist of the 
three categories arising from the theory and literature outlined above i.e. interests, 
institutions, and ideology. The case study analysis includes examination of primarily extant 
rather than elicited texts- contemporary State documents, media reportage, and academic 
work, supplemented by interviews with relevant persons, and these will be identified under 
these categories.  In this way, the approach is not essentially based on grounded theory, as the 
core categories are not constructed from the data, but rather from logically deduced 
hypotheses (Charmaz, 2006: 6). That said, identification will involve some characteristics of 
grounded theory in that each step of data collection and analysis will allow for the possibility 
(perhaps probability) that the core categories can be elaborated on, their properties better 
defined, and the relationships between categories considered.  
 Interests: does the text indicate that the concerns and/or preferences of self or external 
interests were influencing with negative consequence, the decision process. 
 Institutions: does the text indicate that institutional arrangements and/or expertise were 
impacting with negative consequence on the decision process. 
 Ideology: does the text indicate that ideological considerations were present and 
influencing with negative consequence, the decision process. 
 
Table 7.1: Definitions of the Three Core Categories for Identification 
7.5 Evidence of Irrationality  
The process tracing analysis presents an additional opportunity to qualitatively identify 
whether the bad decision was arrived at as a result of irrational forces, following the 
(unsuccessful) quantitative method employed in Part II. As described in Chapter 3, it is 
possible that a decision-maker chooses a perfectly rational or totally irrational suboptimal 
option. Having identified whether interests, institutions, and ideology are playing a role in 
139 
 
generating the poor decision outcome on 100 per cent LTV mortgages, the texts will be 
analysed to determine whether irrationality was a result. For example, the earlier discussion 
on irrationality included the suggestion (based on Lunn, 2013) that bounded rationality 
amongst decision-makers could take the form of a number of different empirically established 
behavioural biases. Irrationality will be assessed with reference to evidence in the text of 
those empirically established behavioural biases specified by Lunn as likely to have been 
important in pre-crisis Ireland. More specifically, in taking the bad decision on 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages, did the policy-makers display evidence of predicting future outcomes based 
on the past (extrapolation bias), placing greater weight on existing beliefs (confirmation bias), 
predicting outcomes too positively and overestimated the accuracy of those predictions 
(overconfidence bias), being adverse to uncertainty (ambiguity aversion), conforming to 
majority views (behavioural convergence), being drawn toward immediate rewards (time 
inconsistency), or giving inordinate weight to losses or gains (loss/gain asymmetry) – see 
Lunn, 2013: 566.  
 Thus irrationality may be revealed using the second type of evidence outlined by 
Lunn i.e. documentation or personal testimony relating to the 100 per cent LTV mortgages 
case itself, which can to some extent reveal whether behaviour was consistent with the model. 
As Lunn notes this is, of course, partly subjective and “there may be other plausible 
interpretations of what was written, said and done. Illustrative quotations are selective and 
their representativeness dependent on… judgement. Moreover, as this exercise explicitly 
seeks indications that particular biases were involved, there is a danger of over-weighting 
positive instances” (Lunn, 2013: 567).  
This approach has been used previously to detect the presence or absence of irrational 
forces in the period preceding decisions in the case of Australian finance executives in the 
lead-up to the crisis (Coleman and Pinder, 2010) and bankers, authorities, commentators etc. 
(Lunn, 2013) see examples in Table 7.2. As shown, evidence of irrationality in the 
documentation or testimony can come via data or direct quotations.  The historical records, 
government documents, parliamentary records, media reportage, interviews, and other 
relevant documents employed in the case study will be examined specifically to reveal 
variation and report evidence.               
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Irrationality Examples of Evidence / Text 
Extrapolation Bias  Of five economic commentaries, four forecast price increases in the year to come in the range 3–6 per cent; the fifth 
forecast a 7 per cent rise over the following 5 years. All of these professional commentaries made explicit quantitative 
reference to the most recent trends as their primary guide 
 “Between December 2005 and October 2006, new house prices rose by 8.8 per cent. We expect that the impact of 
current and anticipated interest rate increases should contribute to a moderation in inflation relative to recent months. 
We therefore assume that new house prices will increase by a rate of 10 per cent in 2006 and 6 per cent in 2007” – 
Economic Report 
Confirmation Bias  “It’s not rubber stamping . . . If management’s done their job properly then you shouldn’t have situations that the 
board’s knocking you back: if you don’t know you’re going to get it approved then don’t put it up” - CFO of a Mining 
Company 
 “In any assessment of the dangers for financial stability coming from the housing market, the concept of the 
fundamental house price is key” – Economic Report 
 “All institutions confirmed to the inspectors that they have no concerns with the current or future repayment capacity of 
any of the borrowers” – Financial Regulator 
Overconfidence 
Bias 
 “Our view is that we are in a generation of industrialization that is going to go on for at least another couple of 
decades” – CFO of a Mining Company 
 “We take the view that we don’t want to hedge our commodity price exposures at all. The shareholders are paying us 
for our exposure to copper price, or gold price or commodity price . . .We fundamentally have the view that we don’t 
hedge” – CFO of a Mining Company 
 “I was huge into people . . . The difference between Anglo and, say, AIB was not the product – in other words money. 
It was the people and the way they dealt with the customer base. That was the difference. That might have been the big 
mistake we made, but that was the difference” – CEO of a Bank 
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Ambiguity 
Aversion 
 “Funding: we don’t even think about it, don’t worry about it . . . I’m not a big fan of getting too smart or overly 
complicated with big structures. It’s just money at the end of the day” – CFO of a Mining Company 
 “We operate in greater Ireland. London is eastern Ireland, Boston is western Ireland, and then there’s mainland Ireland. 
Culturally, they are very similar regions; it would terrify us to lend money in France, for example.” – Finance Director 
of a Bank 
Behavioural 
Convergence 
 “The Board would normally rely on what management is saying” - Treasurer of a Construction firm 
 Anglo had increased its market share from 3 to 18 per cent over a decade when domestic competition increased and 
foreign-owned banks entered the market. Executives and boards feared that failing to match Anglo’s expansion might 
result in loss of customers, declining bank value, potential takeover and loss of professional respect. Remuneration 
schemes linked to market share or short-term share price may have exaggerated the threat  
 Bankers and those working for the authorities holding private doubts about the riskiness of lending or threats building 
up in the banking system feared sanctions or loss of influence if they followed-up troubling arguments or expressed 
professional concerns 
Time 
Inconsistency 
Various decisions required individuals to weigh up the lure of immediate rewards (or the avoidance of immediate 
aggravation) against longer-term risks. This decision structure applied to:  
 Loan officers or mortgage salespeople whose short-term remuneration and advancement were linked to the number of 
deals they made  
 Executives whose remuneration was linked to market share or share price  
 Board members and supervisors for whom questioning bank strategy or demanding changes entailed immediate costs 
(or risks) to reputation and perhaps prospects, when current profits and incomes were rising strongly 
Loss/Gain 
Asymmetry 
 “. . . foolishly we pursued our money. That was the mistake we made. We should have taken our burning.” – Business 
Leader and Large Bank Shareholder 
 
Table 7.2: Examples of Evidence of Irrationality in Testimony or Historical Documentation  
(Modified from Coleman and Pinder, 2010 and Lunn, 2013) 
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As well as understanding how interests, institutions, and ideology impact the decision, the 
relationships between the factors are also worthy of consideration. Where the issue of 
institutional expertise is one category of interest as set out earlier, “there is some evidence 
that issue expertise may also matter to targeting [by interests]. However, the precise 
magnitude of this fact and the mechanism underlying it, are not well understood” (de 
Figueiredo and Richter, 2014: 169). Thus, the issue of decision-maker expertise may straddle 
two core identification categories, and the examination of the most-likely case might help add 
some understanding to the poorly understood processes underlying this particular targeting.  
It will be clear from Chapter 3 and the above identification summaries that interests, 
institutions, and ideology are less discrete, and interact with each other to a greater extent 
than might first be assumed. Ideology works with institutional arrangements, which are 
impacted by interest group activity, and which in turn target often irrational decision-makers. 
The research fully takes into account that decision-makers will have multiple reasons for 
taking certain actions. It posits that interests, institutions, and ideology, are three factors and 
that they likely act simultaneously.  
7.6 Interviews 
To confirm that the documentary evidence accurately reflected the decision-making process 
and to maximise insight (conscious of hindsight effects), three in-depth interviews were 
undertaken in January and February 2016; one each with senior officials close to the 2005 
decision in the Department of the Environment, in the Department of Finance, and in the 
Financial Regulator. The interviewees were selected on the basis of the official 
documentation from the time, relevant organisation charts, and testimony to the Oireachtas 
Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis. It was not possible to arrange interviews 
with the relevant Ministers or Ministers of State. The interviews were conducted in 
accordance with the guidelines provided by Dublin City University including informed 
consent and plain language statements. They were conducted face-to-face and began with a 
re-statement of the purpose of the interview and an offer to refresh the interviewee of relevant 
events from 2005 (see section 9.1).  
 An interview guide was used, though not verbatim and was supplemented with 
institution-specific questions based on the documentation. The interview material is used in a 
format agreed with the interviewees in advance under confidentiality arrangements i.e. 
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anonymously and with no direct quotations. These three interviews were in addition to the 
one described in section 7.2 undertaken to validate the case selection.  
 The interviews reflected elements of grounded theory as they were carried out using a 
few broad, open-ended questions which invite detailed discussion of topic. Such open-ended, 
non-judgmental questions were designed to encourage unanticipated statements and stories to 
emerge. The combination of the questions and conduct of the interview concentrated on 
achieving a balance between making the interview open-ended whilst focusing on significant 
statements related to the independent variables (interests, institutions, and ideology), and 
probing issues of irrational information processing (Charmaz, 2006: 26).  
 By process tracing this most-likely case, the objective is to look at the existence, 
impact and interaction of all factors within a single case of a bad decision. Taken together, 
this analysis proposes an instructive framework for analysis with these independent variables 
– interests, institutions, and ideology - explaining suboptimal decision-making as the 
dependent variable. The analysis framework offers a sound basis for confidence that such an 
approach can supplement the earlier quantitative content analysis research into government 
decision-making in the run up to Ireland’s recent economic crisis. The 100 per cent LTV 
mortgage case study will further our understanding of why advice on the Irish economy 
offered between 1997 and 2007 did not result in policy action that would have mitigated the 
likelihood or severity of the subsequent crisis and to what extent each interests, institutions, 
and ideology contributed to this. 
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Motivation / interests 
1. When you heard that First Active were issuing 100% mortgages in July 2005, what were 
your initial feelings? 
2. What were the driving interests here? Own? House-buyers? Banks? Political? Wider 
government? 
3. Who’s interests do you think won out in the decision not to limit or prohibit 100 per cent 
LTV products? 
Institutions  
4. What role did your institution see itself as having vis-à-vis the other main players 
(Departments, Regulator, Banks)? 
5. Who had the most power in this set up? 
6. Who held the information? 
7. Do you think there was information available to others to support your view but which 
was not readily available to you? 
8. How would you describe the relationship between institutions? 
9. Do you think a reasonable expectation was put in place regarding ‘proving’ that 100 per 
cent LTVs were bad? 
10. Do you think that the institutional arrangements contributed to the decision not to 
intervene? Who was the decision-maker? Who had the power?  
11. Do you think that the institutional arrangements contributed to groupthink or herding? 
Who had the information? 
12. Was fear of breaking the consensus a factor? 
13. Do you think it mattered that the Dáil was not in session / Minister / Government not 
around?  
Ideology  
14. How did your institution view its or the government’s approach to stepping in to 
intervene in the banking market? 
15. According to one view, it was important to ‘trust the market’. What was your view of that 
approach? 
16. Do you think that intervention (by the Government) would have been popular?  
17. Do you think that thinking was flexible enough at the time to consider all outcomes of 
100 per cent mortgages, or was there a rigidity linked to ideology?   
Irrationality 
18. Do you think that the decision was influenced by: 
a. Predicting future outcomes based on the past? (extrapolation bias)  
b. Placing greater weight on existing beliefs? (confirmation bias)  
c. Predicting outcomes too positively and overestimating the accuracy of those 
predictions? (overconfidence bias)  
d. Being averse to uncertainty? (ambiguity aversion)  
e. Conforming to majority views? (behavioural convergence)  
f. Being drawn toward immediate rewards? (time inconsistency)  
g. Giving inordinate weight to losses or gains? (loss/gain asymmetry)  
 
Table 7.3: Interview Guide  
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Chapter 8: The Decision-Making Environment in Ireland in 2005 
8.1 The Oireachtas, Government, Departments, and Social Partnership 
The decision-making case study in the next Chapter is set in and shaped by a particular 
decision-making environment. The main actors in the case (State/Government, Regulator, 
and banks) interacted with each other, each with their own roles and objectives and within a 
loose hierarchical structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Key Roles 2000 - 2013: State, Regulators, Banks
8
    
 
                                                          
8
 Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Volume 1,  Houses of the Oireachtas, January 
2016, p. 415 
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As illustrated by the official Inquiry into the Banking Crisis (Figure 8.1), the constitutional, 
institutional, regulatory and legislative arrangements suggested – in simple terms - that banks 
operating in Ireland were answerable to the Financial Regulator, who in turn was worked 
within the Central Bank Structure, which was answerable to the Department of Finance and 
the Department of the Taoiseach, which in turn were answerable to the Government, who 
ultimately were answerable to parliament. Before outlining the case of widely-available 100 
per cent Loan-to-Value mortgages in detail, it is worth outlining in a little detail this policy 
environment and how it operated in 2005. 
In common with many modern societies, the practical relationship between the 
parliament and the executive branch of government in Ireland has been a disappointing one in 
terms of delivering the directly elected assembly as the key decision-maker. The main 
chamber of the Oireachtas, the Dáil has been described as supine, woefully inadequate, and 
puny (Ward, 1974; Dinan, 1986; Chubb, 1992). Although dependent on it for support, the 
government of the day trumps the Dáil (and Seanad) in all meaningful ways. The government 
sees “virtually all” of its bills passed, takes on board opposition amendments “only as it sees 
fit”, while “hardly any” of the opposition’s own legislative proposals become law (Gallagher, 
1999: 203). The party and whip system which are the bedrock of the parliamentary system in 
Ireland make the Oireachtas little more than a location for debate and nothing like a locus of 
power.   
One role that the Oireachtas has continued to play however is that as a forum to turn 
issues of public concern into issues of political concern via mechanisms such as Leader’s 
Questions, Order of Business debates, and opposition Private Member’s time.  The 
consequence of the foregoing for this case study research, and arguably in more general 
terms, is that – while it is not irrelevant - one cannot look to the Oireachtas as being the key 
holder of information, central decision-maker, or being primarily responsible for the outcome 
of policy decisions. For that, we must look to the Government, comprised of individual 
Departments and agencies of the State.   
The lower House elects the Taoiseach and approves the Minister he/she chooses. The 
Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats coalition Government of the 29
th
 Dáil, elected following 
the general election in May 2002 was constituted with fifteen Departments. These 
Departments and respective Ministers as of 2005 are set out in Table 8.1. Insofar as there is a 
hierarchy the two most important of these are the Taoiseach’s and Finance Departments. 
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Government Department Office Holder 
Department of the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern (Taoiseach)  
Department of Health and Children Mary Harney (Tánaiste) 
Department of Agriculture and Food Mary Coughlan 
Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism John O’Donoghue 
Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources Noel Ahern 
Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs Éamon Ó Cuív 
Department of Defence Willie O’Dea 
Department of Education and Science Mary Hanafin 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment Micheál Martin 
Department of Finance Brian Cowen 
Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government Dick Roche 
Department of Foreign Affairs Dermot Ahern 
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform Michael McDowell 
Department of Social and Family Affairs Séamus Brennan 
Department of Transport Martin Cullen 
Table 8.1: Government Department Structure in Ireland, 2005 
As set out in Chapter 4, the Taoiseach is considered to be one of the strongest of all heads of 
government, with one of the highest degrees of influence within their system of government, 
and potentially more powerful that any of their European counterparts, save the British Prime 
Minister (Elgie, 2004: 238-239). Connolly and O’Halpin state that “there is a clear ranking in 
the perceived importance of Ministerial portfolios, with Finance generally accepted as the 
most important (after the Taoiseach, of course) because of its responsibility for economic 
management and for public expenditure” (1999: 253). 
 The Taoiseach’s Department is important not just because it is home to the head of 
the government but also - at that time under scrutiny - because of the increasingly important 
role played by the social partnership process which was run out of that Department. 
Governments interact extensively with interest groups, and in Ireland interest groups became 
institutionalised to a large extent through the social partnership process which began in 1987. 
This has been described as a system that aims to keep all the major interest groups reasonably 
happy by giving them a role within the broad economic approach of the State (Murphy, 1999: 
275). Social partnership started out as a process of basic centralised wage bargaining but then 
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expanded in terms of scope, structure and participation to consider issues such as housing 
costs, insurance costs, migration, and childcare policy (Hughes et al., 2007).  Unions, 
employer and farming groups, and the community/voluntary sector (from 1996) agreed a 
series of eight national agreements- for example, the Programme for National Recovery 
(1987), the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (2000), Sustaining Progress (2003) and 
Towards 2016: Ten Year Framework Social Partnership Agreement (2006). By 1999, 78 per 
cent of poll respondents stated that the social partnership model, hosted and chaired in the 
Department of the Taoiseach, was important for Ireland’s economic success (Fitzgerald and 
Girvin, 2000). This broadening of scope and increasing importance had an impact on the 
roles and relative power of the Departments of the Taoiseach and Finance. Social partnership 
has been described as overwhelming the Department of Finance’s budgetary process (Wright, 
2010: 23), and any analysis of policy and decision-making in Ireland in period of interest 
must be mindful of the dominant role played by the Department of the Taoiseach and the 
social partnership process.  
Of all Departments it is the performance of the Department of Finance which has 
come under the greatest scrutiny following the economic collapse. This is unsurprising. 
According to the official Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, the Department had a critically 
important role in relation to economic analysis, interaction with the Central Bank and 
Financial Regulator, and advising the Minister for Finance on inter alia the domestic 
economy, the macroeconomic situation, and financial stability. It also had a role in advising 
the Minister on the views of external, domestic and international economic forecasting 
authorities on the domestic and international economic situation. Most importantly for the 
following case study, in 2005 “the Department had the ability to advise the Minister on policy 
options to counter or offset the conditions that could lead to a crisis” (Houses of the 
Oireachtas, 2016: 148). These strategic roles sat alongside what could be considered to be the 
core functions of such a ministry: the day-to-day management of the State’s finances, and 
public expenditure and revenue raising measures. The Department was also responsible for 
public service management and development. These core functions, and role in managing 
public sector performance and numbers, lead to constant interaction with the other fourteen 
line Departments.  
 The Department of Finance’s breadth of activity was not without consequence, with 
the 2010 review of the Department of Finance stating that many other Departments expressed 
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frustration with Finance observing that the Department lacked a critical mass, or interest in a 
strategic interface with line Departments” (Wright, 2010: 36). The nature and importance of 
interaction between the Department of Finance and one such line Department (Environment, 
Heritage and Local Government) will be explored in the next Chapter. In 2005, “Housing” 
was one of the Departments of the Environment’s five main functional areas - alongside 
‘Environment and Natural Heritage’, ‘Built Heritage and Planning’, ‘Local Government’, and 
‘Supporting the Provision of Infrastructure and Local Services’ - and it had a stated objective 
to “oversee and seek to maintain an efficient housing market” (Department of the 
Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2005: 23 and 44). 
8.2 Financial Regulation 
Already one can see the complex decision-making environment which existed in 2005. An 
ineffective Oireachtas looked on at as the Government dictated the policy and legislative 
agenda. Within Government, the Department of the Taoiseach played a dominant role, 
managing the “overwhelming” social partnership process. At the same time, in terms of 
economic policy and decision-making, the Department of Finance was ‘in the driving seat’ in 
theory if not in practice, as concluded by the Wright review. However, this decision-making 
environment was made even more complex following what has been termed “the most 
significant change to the formal institutions of Irish governance” over decade to 2007: the 
establishment of independent regulatory agencies such as the regulator for financial services 
(Westrup, 2007: 1). The root cause of Ireland’s crash was the practices of the banks and the 
failure of the new financial regulator to effectively supervise them (O’Sullivan and Kennedy, 
2010). The institutional arrangements and role of the regulatory authorities were a matter of 
controversy even before being formally established. 
There is a link between the social partnership process and the development of the 
regulatory system in Ireland. According Westrup, up to the 1990s, policy outcomes reflected 
the interests of producers rather than consumers and this was in contradiction with the 
objectives of social partnership.  The establishment of independent regulators like the 
regulator for financial services reflected the absence of an explicit role for the interests of 
consumers within social partnership, and the difficulty social partnership had experienced in 
challenging entrenched interests in firms (Westrup, 2007: 9). This was the broad context, but 
for financial services in Ireland there were additional motivating factors. By 1998 there was a 
“background of public concern over a number of tax evasion and overcharging issues related 
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to banking” (Honohan, 2010: 34). These concerns arose most notably from the findings of an 
official inquiry that banks had encouraged customers to use concealed deposit accounts to 
avoid taxes due, and reports that banks had increased interest rates on overdrafts or loans 
without informing customers. In addition, the UK government had established its financial 
regulator, the Financial Services Authority, in 1997. The following year the Irish Government 
decided in principle to consolidate prudential and consumer protection regulation of almost 
all types of financial firms in a single regulatory authority. One important point to note in 
regard to the regulation of financial services is that unlike other newly regulated sectors (e.g. 
aviation, electricity, telecoms, accounting, pharmaceuticals, taxis etc.), there already existed a 
number of regulatory actors, most importantly, the Central Bank of Ireland.  
“A key milestone for reform arrived with the publication of a report by the Oireachtas 
Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service in July 1998. The report 
recommended establishment of a new Single Regulatory Authority (SRA) to oversee 
financial regulation, enforcement, and consumer protection. This proposal would have 
removed responsibility for banking regulation from the Central Bank with the creation 
of an independent “greenfield” structure. The alternative was to consolidate all 
financial regulation and consumer protection matters within the Central Bank” - 
Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Vol. 1, Houses of the 
Oireachtas, 2016: 112 
A working party - the Implementation Advisory Group on the establishment of a Single 
Regulatory Authority for the Financial Services Sector - chaired by Michael McDowell was 
established to consider and progress this recommendation. That Group concluded that a 
financial regulator that was completely separate from the Central Bank should be established. 
The rationale was that sufficient accountability to the political system could not be 
guaranteed given the Central Bank’s monetary policy independence. A minority of the Group 
preferred to locate the regulator within a restructured Central Bank (McDowell Working 
Group, 1999). However, as Westrup describes, this recommendation “set off a clamour” from 
the banks and other financial services firms arguing for the retention of the Central Bank as 
regulator: 
“What is clear is that neither the key state nor private actors wanted a change in the 
Central Bank’s regulatory role. The close relationship between the Department of 
Finance and the Central Bank was typified by the almost automatic appointment of 
the First Secretary of the Department to be Governor of the Bank. The result was 
reluctance by these key state actors for a regulator to be created that was outside their 
control. The aggressive lobbying by the banks and the financial firms… confirmed 
their resistance to change in the regulatory status quo” – Westrup, 2007: 14 and 15 
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The result was the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act (CBFSAI) 
2003, which reflected the Government’s choice to implement a compromise based on the 
minority recommendation. The compromise established the regulator as a new division 
within a restructured Central Bank. The regulator would have specified statutory functions 
and would report to the Governor of the Central Bank only in respect of organisational issues 
(e.g. staffing, finance) (Honohan, 2010: 37). One argument made for the compromise was 
that it would simultaneously allow for continuity and accountability, and preserve what was 
working well. According to the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, that 
compromise was “crafted by Dermot McCarthy, then Assistant Secretary in the Department 
of the Taoiseach” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 113).  
 Subsequent investigations have found this compromise organisational structure to be a 
contributor the economic crash in Ireland insofar as it did not allow for adequate supervision 
and regulation of banks. The fact that it was a compromise impacted on the new Regulator’s 
credibility from the off, and the structure was seen as placing an emphasis on competition and 
resulting (perceived) consumer benefits, over macroprudential action. Above all, the structure 
created confusion about who had ultimate responsibility for stability of the economy, the 
stability of the banking system, and the stability of individual banks. Summarised by the 
official Inquiry, the chosen institutional arrangements were “unnecessarily complex and led 
to a real or perceived ambiguity in the respective roles of the Central Bank and Financial 
Regulator. Once the new structure, which represented a material change in the delivery of 
financial supervision in Ireland, was in place, the Government should have carried out an 
independent review and assessment of its effectiveness and the delivery of its functions” 
(Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Vol. 1, Houses of the 
Oireachtas, 2016: 158). However, it would not be true to say that these frailties were 
universally known or expected at the time: 
“The twin-headed bank regulatory framework in Ireland from 2003 onwards was a 
hybrid, by global standards. However, this structure was at times viewed as an 
interesting experiment (like the different, but also original, approach in the 
Netherlands). Indeed, the IMF’s assessment of Ireland’s regulatory framework, at its 
inception, was positive: a key question across countries was how to keep non-
supervising central banks linked in to macroprudential issues, and the IMF saw 
Ireland’s framework as offering scope to do this” – Regling and Watson, 2010: 36 
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Figure 8.2: Complexity of Institutional Regulatory Structure, (Honohan, 2010) 
Notwithstanding the new legislative arrangements, the Central Bank Act of 1942 still 
impacted on the day-to-day operation of the regulatory system. For this research, one 
particular section (S33AK) is of particular note. Section 33AK imposes obligations of 
professional secrecy on officers of the Central Bank and the Regulator with regard to 
confidential information they come across in the course of their duties and limits, for 
example, the extent to which Regulator staff could share information or views with the 
Department of Finance.  
Another complicating factor was the potential for tension between the consumer 
protection and regulatory/supervisory roles of the Regulator. As referenced above, the 
Regulator was established against the backdrop of background of public concern over 
overcharging issues in banks and reports that banks had increased interest rates on overdrafts 
or loans without informing customers. The perception, if not the reality, that consumer issues 
trumped prudential issues was there from the start.  
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Speaking of early consideration of the regulatory structure in 1999, Honohan notes that the 
“newly-assigned importance of the consumer protection function was underlined by the 
proposed creation of the statutory position of Consumer Director within the Authority, 
whereas no corresponding position was proposed for prudential regulation (Honohan, 2010: 
35). 
 In July 2005, the Regulator made the decision that the resources for administrative 
sanctions were to be primarily deployed towards consumer protection issues, and in 2006, the 
IMF proposed that the Prudential Director should be appointed to the authority so the position 
would be on a par with the Consumer Director (Con Horan, Evidence to Oireachtas Banking 
Inquiry, May 27
th
 2005). Honohan does state however that it would be wrong to assume that 
the Regulator devoted most of its time to consumer protection issues (Honohan, 2010: 41). 
Overall, it is important to note that the Financial Regulator’s interests included those of the 
consumer issues, as well as having interest in the functioning of the banks from a supervisory 
point of view.   
 The regulatory framework was further complicated by the inclusion of a ‘dual 
mandate’ clause in the 2003 legislation establishing the regulatory system (Figure 8.3).  
Section 5A – (1) (b) of the Act states that the Central Bank (of which the Regulator was part) 
had a function to promote Ireland’s financial services industry though not in such a way so as  
affect its supervisory role. This was in the context of Dublin’s thriving International Financial 
Services Centre (IFSC) which was established in 1987 and was home to variety of 
internationally traded financial services, including banking. Within three years, employment 
at the IFSC had reached 14,000 people. In 2006, total corporation tax paid by firms operating 
in the IFSC amounted to €1.1 billion. Today there are over 38,000 people working at the 
IFSC and an estimated €1 billion goes to the Exchequer in payroll taxes each year (IFSC.ie / 
Revenue Commissioners
9
). Notwithstanding the obvious dual mandate, there was no 
consensus at the Oireachtas Inquiry that it contributed to the harmful, deferential approach 
taken by the regulator in the lead-up to the crash. That said, the 2010 Central Bank Reform 
Act removed the promotion of financial services as one of the Bank’s objectives, as inter alia 
the Governor believed that promotion of financial services was incompatible with financial 
regulation and ensuring financial stability (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 143-144).   
 
                                                          
9
 See http://www.ifsc.ie/page.aspx?idpage=6  
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Figure 8.3: Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act, 2003 
(excerpt) 
One point on which consensus does appear to have been reached is that this structure did 
have the potential to work, had implementation of regulation been approached properly. For 
example, the Oireachtas Inquiry found that it was the execution of the Regulator/Central 
Bank’s mandates and the absence of interventions that directly contributed to the crisis (p. 
158). Regling and Watson also reported that organisational questions should not have stood 
in the way of firm and proactive supervision, and that the issue was implementation (p. 37). 
The error in approach was the choice of a principles-based regime (‘spirit of the law’) over a 
rules-based one (‘letter of the law’).  This approach was consistent with the European 
approach, where the EU had adopted the principles-based approach based on minimum 
harmonisation, and financial stability risks were mainly treated as relating to individual 
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banks, and not the economy as a whole (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 421). One might 
question the why anything other than a rules-based approach to regulation would be adopted 
by any Financial Regulator anywhere, but as Regling and Watson put it:  
“From the early 1990s onwards, there was a debate in academic and policy circles 
about the ways in which regulatory structures and styles of supervision should be 
adjusted in the face of more complex financial institutions, more complicated 
financial products, and highly adaptive markets – markets which tended to find ways 
around any given set of rules. This debate was not conclusive… Some countries 
shifted towards principles-based regulation – which de-emphasized specific rules that 
could be side-stepped. Some countries adopted less intrusive approaches, sometimes 
described as light touch supervision” - Regling and Watson, 2010: 17 
An example of the impact of this choice emerges from the case study in Chapter 9, with 
Honohan finding that “tough measures, such as banning (or disapproving of publicly) 100 per 
cent LTV mortgages, or setting and enforcing sectoral lending limits were not considered 
seriously as they were felt to be out of tune with the principles-based approach and with 
current international regulatory fashion” (Honohan, 2010: 12).  
 Notwithstanding the structural issues it faced since inception and the principles-based 
approach adopted by it, it is important to recall that the Regulator had “sufficient powers to 
deliver their prudential supervision of the banking sector in a more intrusive manner through, 
for example, imposing conditions on banking licences, revoking a licence, suspension of 
banking business and (after late 2005) administrative sanctions for breaches, including 
lending limits”  (Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Vol. 1, 
Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 159). 
Ultimately the decision-making and regulatory structure put in place from 2003 on 
had serious, negative consequences for the link between citizens and the State. Westrup 
argues that there is an assumption that in most cases “citizens must delegate responsibility to 
elected politicians to create and enact policies, and that if citizens do not like them, they can 
choose to vote their elected representatives out of office. The creation of agencies that are, to 
some degree, outside the control of politicians but responsible for important decisions, 
obviously serves to weaken further the direct link of delegation” (Westrup, 2007: 7). Such a 
weakness is now evident, and the decision-making environment in Ireland in 2005 described 
in the section above paints a complex picture.  
 In light of this complexity, clarity of advice on key aspects of economic developments 
is of increased importance.  Thus there is an inherent assumption that Irish decision-makers 
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received advice on property market, mortgage credit availability, and house prices in the 
years before 2005 which would have encouraged them to take mitigating action. Examples of 
such advice are drawn from two sources: international advice offered by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and domestic advice from Ireland’s Economic, Social and Research 
Institute (ESRI). 
Before setting out the detail, it is worth noting that there is now broad agreement that 
international and domestic advice was not delivered as precisely or strongly as the ensuing 
crisis warranted (Regling and Watson, 2010: 41 and 42; Honohan, 2010: 84; Nyberg, 2011: 
70; Wright, 2010: 6 and 23). The testimony of a former IMF official to Ireland’s official 
parliamentary committee enquiry into the banking crisis sums this point up as follows: 
“I think it is widely accepted that the IMF’s surveillance process failed in Ireland. 
Although, as discussed below, some vulnerabilities were noted, the assessments by 
the IMF staff gave no inkling that a major disaster could be in the making. Adjectives 
such as “exceptional”, remarkable”, “highly impressive” were used throughout the 
first seven years of the decade to describe Ireland’s overall economic performance. 
Such overly positive assessments by the IMF were not confined to the case of Ireland 
and there is no doubt that the organization did not see warning Such overly positive 
assessments by the IMF were not confined to the case of Ireland and there is no doubt 
that the organization did not see warning signs in many industrial countries in the 
build up to the global crisis. However, the extent to which a country’s economic and 
financial situation deteriorated so sharply and dramatically - with minimal prior 
anticipation by the IMF - was, to my knowledge, probably unprecedented in the 
history of IMF surveillance” – Donal Donovan, former IMF Official, February 18th, 
2015 
A similarly damning appraisal was offered to the same enquiry by a former ESRI official 
regarding that organisation’s advice where he stated that the ESRI “did not draw the 
connection between the growth of a property market bubble and the risks to the financial 
system” (FitzGerald, 2015: 1).   
8.3 Examples of Economic Advice
10
 
That both the international and domestic advice was not delivered as warranted is not 
disputed here. The purpose is to set out examples of information and advice that decision-
makers can reasonably be expected to have been aware of which would have informed a 
decision that would have had a more positive outcome for the Irish economy than the 
decision which was ultimately taken. This is not an analysis of the quality or nature of advice 
                                                          
10
 See Appendix A for a discussion of advice specifically on national competitiveness.  
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(timeliness is relevant as decision-makers must be allowed some time to assimilate such 
information after it is first made available), rather it is an analysis of the existence of high-
profile advice, or not.  
Warnings and advice from the IMF, specifically dealing with the housing market and 
price inflation, can be found in their annual “Article IV” country report for Ireland published 
in November 2004, the year preceding the bad decision. The consultation discussions for that 
report were held in Dublin in July 2004, when the IMF met with the Irish Minister for 
Finance, the Governor of the Central Bank, other senior officials, the employers’ federation, 
trade unions, and members of the financial and academic communities (IMF, 2004: 1). At the 
conclusion of the previous consultation in August 2003, the IMF had “cautioned there was a 
significant risk that house prices could be overvalued”. One year on, the IMF found that 
house-price inflation was running well above sustainable rates and the longer it took for them 
to moderate the greater the risk of a “disorderly correction”. The IMF noted that, following a 
significant slowing in late 2001, the rate of house price increases rose to around 15 per cent in 
2003 and was running just below that at the time of the consultations in 2004.   
 As a result the IMF recommended that Irish policy-makers should communicate their 
views about potential overheating in the housing market to help achieve a soft landing, and 
look to removing the subsidies to housing over the medium-term and “help moderate house 
price cycles in the future” (IMF, 2004: 3). Following his analysis of IMF surveillance of 
Ireland, Breen (2012) says threats to Ireland’s economy were identified in 2004 and 2005, 
including cautioning that “if the housing boom were suddenly to unwind, it might have a 
substantial impact on employment and private consumption. To address the housing market 
boom, it suggested Ireland strengthen its financial system with better supervision, stress-
testing and higher regulatory standards, the idea being that it was only a matter of time before 
prices adjusted, and that the financial system should be prepared for the adjustment” (Breen, 
2012: 435 and 436). Thus by the end of 2004 Irish decision-makers had, following 
discussions at the highest level, advice from a respected international observer that the 
housing market was overheating and that they should take steps to see house prices moderate.  
One year earlier, decision-makers received cautionary advice from closer to home 
from the ESRI, an institute established in 1960 to provide an independent source of research 
evidence for policy in Ireland, whilst being funded by the State. One of its key publications is 
its Medium Term Review (MTR), published every two to three years. In July 2003, the ERSI 
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published its ninth MTR which argued that “even if Icarus has singed his wings, the prospects 
remain reasonably bright for a soft landing. Provided that the world economy, and especially 
the European economy, finds its way back to its normal growth path by 2005, the factors that 
gave rise to the very rapid growth in the last decade are not yet exhausted, and the Irish 
economy still has the potential to grow at 5 per cent a year for another five years to the end of 
the current decade” (ESRI, 2003: vii).  
However, alongside this optimistic macroeconomic scenario, the MTR contained 
advice on the property market. The Review noted that one of the consequences of booming 
house prices was that it had “increased the Irish economy’s exposure to a house price shock”, 
and identified affordability as a very important factor, as it determined “whether young adults 
set up independent households or remain at home” (ESRI, 2003: 59). As explained earlier, 
higher LTV ratio mortgages play an important role in making houses more affordable. The 
ERSI review pointed to the rise in personal debt finance for investment over the preceding 
decade or so, stating:  
“As is evident the level of debt remained broadly stable until 1993, but over the 
period of strong economic growth there has been a sharp rise in the level of personal 
indebtedness. The strength of the rise suggests that growth in personal debt has 
outpaced income growth over the period. The vast majority of this increase has been 
in borrowings for housing purposes. House mortgage finance and other housing 
finance amounted to just over 29 per cent of personal disposable income in 1990. By 
2002 this had risen to 60 per cent. In contrast, other personal debt (finance for 
investment and other advances) has risen from nearly 13.5 per cent of personal 
disposable income in 1990 to 17.5 per cent in 2002. The rapid rise in the ratio of 
personal debt to income suggests that the exposure of households to an economic 
shock has increased. As much of the increase is the result of borrowing for housing 
purposes this suggests that the Irish economy is exposed to a shock affecting the 
housing market” – ESRI, 2003: 57 
 
In this context, the following advice was offered by the ESRI in the same publication: 
“Fiscal policy has generally not been used actively in Ireland to reduce demand for 
housing. However, fiscal policy could have a significant effect on the domestic 
housing market through changing household disposable income, and especially 
through changing the cost of capital for homeowners. Against the background of a 
deflationary shock from the recent change in exchange rates, if inflation in the 
housing market were to continue, it might be prudent to take fiscal action to halt the 
rise. When the pressures ease, such fiscal action could be unwound, providing support 
to a market where prices might have begun to fall” - ESRI, 2003: 85 
Thus by the end of 2003 Irish decision-makers had advice from the county’s preeminent 
national observer that the economy and households were exposed to an economic shock, that 
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mortgages debt was a key risk factor, and advising that policy action to change the cost of 
capital would be prudent, and could halt the rise in house prices.  
It is worth noting that in addition to external advice, the policy-system itself was 
demonstrating concern. In October 2004, the Irish Central Bank published a technical paper 
which, despite expressing the views of the authors rather than the Bank itself, went beyond 
comment on the housing market, and referred to high LTV ratios specifically. That paper 
found that greater levels of credit meant mortgage-holders have outstanding loans higher than 
what they otherwise would have been if availability had been curtailed, adding that if an 
increasing proportion of banks’ loan were to borrowers with higher loan-to-value ratios, then 
they will have less of a comfort margin in the event of a decline in residential property prices 
(Fitzpatrick and McQuinn, 2004: 18). 
 While Nyberg believes that individuals in a position to make decisions “are and must 
be ultimately responsible for them regardless of what advice or suggestions they have 
received” (Nyberg, 2011: 6, emphasis added), the position here is slightly different in that 
decision-makers are deemed ultimately responsible for bad decisions because of the advice or 
suggestions they received. Successive investigations have shown that individuals in a position 
to make decisions did receive warnings and advice that, if heeded, would have mitigated the 
crisis.    
 On the face of it, a citizen in Ireland in 2005 might have believed that the 
sustainability of the economic, financial and banking system was being closely monitored 
and effectively managed, in a hands-on manner by the Financial Regulator and the Central 
Bank, with a clear line of responsibility and accountability from them through the Minister 
and Department of Finance, to the highest level of government in the Department of the 
Taoiseach, and ultimately on to an overseeing Oireachtas. The reality was different and the 
inadequate relationships between the Oireachtas, Government, Opposition, Ministers, 
Departments, the Central Bank, and the Regulator are summed up well among the findings of 
the Banking Inquiry: 
“The oversight, challenge and effective scrutiny by the Oireachtas of the 
Government and its policy decisions in relation to fiscal policy, financial stability and 
the system of financial regulation was inadequate in the pre-crisis years. 
The Constitution allows significant decision-making powers by Cabinet to make far-
reaching decisions without any prior engagement with the Oireachtas. Members of the 
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Oireachtas, including the Opposition are constrained, with the added issue of limited 
resources, in their ability to influence the decision-making process.  
Government, including individual Ministers, made policy decisions, based on a range 
of considerations, including having regard to, but not always accepting the advice of 
the Department of Finance, Central Bank and International organisations, and 
ultimately accepted overall responsibility for decisions made. 
The Department of Finance relied on the Central Bank Financial Stability Reports as 
the basis for assessing risks or threats arising from the banks. The Department relied 
on the overall assessment in the reports rather than responding to the specific risks 
identified in the reports. 
The Department did not carry out adequate independent analysis of the risks. 
There was poor assessment by the Central Bank of the build up of micro prudential 
systemic risk and they continued to believe and report that the banks and overall 
sector could withstand and manage the building risks in the system 
The Department of Finance was too reliant on external agencies such as the IMF, 
OECD and European Commission (who all in turn relied, to some extent, on 
information sourced from the Department of Finance and Central Bank) for economic 
forecasting and did not do sufficient analysis to successfully challenge or form an 
independent review on some of the key risks identified in these reports. This included, 
in some instances, editing and reducing the risks highlighted in the international 
reports and in speaking notes for the Minister. 
In the years leading up to the crisis, the Financial Regulator did not identify the 
systemic risk that was building up in the banking sector, did not identify the emerging 
risk to the financial stability of the overall system and, therefore, did not escalate 
these issues to the Central Bank” - Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the 
Banking Crisis Vol. 1, Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 194 and 15. Emphasis added.    
It was in this decision-making environment in Ireland that the banks could pursue strategies 
which not only put their own institutions at risk but also put the Irish economy at risk, given 
the scale and concentration of their lending to the property sector. The main players in the 
bad-decision case study had strong interests and self-interests, whether it is banks seeking to 
maximise market share, the Regulator’s consumer, prudential and industry promotion roles, 
the Department of Finance’s economic and political concerns, or the Department of the 
Environment’s housing function and political concerns.   The next Chapter examines an 
illustrative case involving a strategy not without significant risks, and a decision by banks 
and the State institutions discussed above.    
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Chapter 9: Mortgages Policy in Ireland: A Case Study in Decision--Making  
9.1 Summary Chronology of Events 
The purpose of this Chapter is to recount the relevant events in Ireland leading up to the 
decision by the Government in November 2005 not to intervene to prohibit or limit the 
widespread availability of 100 per cent loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages. These are the events 
to which the research design described in Chapter 7 will be applied to reveal the extent to 
which interests, institutions, and ideology impacted on that decision, and the extent to which 
irrationality was a result. The case study covers the period from July to November 2005 and 
involves a number of key events and actors. The following chronology of events serves as 
summary to reference as the detail is developed over the Chapter.    
 April 19th: House price inflation is discussed as subject of a Private Members Motion in 
Dáil Éireann 
 July 12th: The Governor of Central Bank publically warns of the growth of mortgage 
credit and private sector indebtedness 
 July 13th: First Active launch the first widely available 100 per cent loan-to-value (LTV) 
mortgage for first-time buyers on the Irish market 
 July 14th: The Department of the Environment contact First Active and Ulster Bank 
asking for details and criteria attached to 100 per cent mortgages 
 July 25th: The Minister for Housing publically describes banks who offer the products as 
‘reckless’    
 July 27th: The Secretary General of the Department of Finance tells an Oireachtas 
Committee that individuals and financial institutions have a particular responsibility to 
ensure that debt levels are sustainable 
 August 4th: Permanent TSB, Ulster Bank, Bank of Ireland and its subsidiary ICS Building 
Society have all begun offering 100 per cent LTV mortgage products 
 August 5th: The Department of the Environment emails the Department of Finance 
seeking a meeting to consider developments in the mortgage market, noting their concern 
over 100 per cent LTV products, and asking if there are ways to restrict their issuance    
 August 9th: The Minister for Housing writes to banks outlining his concerns at the 
presence of 100 per cent mortgages on the Irish market, and urging caution in relation to 
them 
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 August 10th: A meeting is held  between the Department of the Environment and the 
Department of Finance to discuss a response to 100 per cent LTV mortgages  
 August 12th: The Head of Banking Supervision in the Financial Regulator prepares a 
memo suggesting new measures aimed at limiting high LTV residential mortgages  
 August 12th: The Department of the Environment formally writes to the Department of 
Finance outlining its concerns 
 August 17th: The Department of Finance prepares a series of actions internally to inform a 
response to the Department of the Environment, and contacts the Regulator seeking a 
meeting on the topic     
 August 18th: Banks reply to the Minister for Housing defending the issuing of the 
mortgages 
 September 1st: The Department of Finance complete and communicate internally its 
economic assessment of the impact of 100 per cent LTV products   
 September 2nd: The Department of Finance writes to the Department of the Environment 
outlining the results of their preliminary analysis and inviting them to a meeting of the 
two Departments and the Regulator 
 November 1st: The Central Bank publishes the Financial Stability Review 2005, which 
includes analysis suggesting that economic fundamentals (e.g. disposable incomes, low 
unemployment, interest rates, pent-up demand, demographics) can account for the vast 
bulk of the increase in mortgage indebtedness in Ireland 
 November 1st: A meeting is held between the Department of the Environment, the 
Department of Finance, and the Financial Regulator to discuss 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages  
 November 16th: The Minister for Housing tells Dáil Éireann that financial institutions 
have caused problems by offering 100 per cent mortgages, that he has serious concerns, 
and urging banks to be more measured in their actions  
 November 16th: The Department of Finance consult with the Regulator on a draft, formal 
written response to the Department of the Environment 
 November 25th: The Department of Finance sends a formal written response to the 
Department of the Environment indicating that no intervention to prohibit, limit, or 
discourage the issuing of 100 per cent mortgages will be made  
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Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government  
Minister: Dick Roche 
Minister of State with Responsibility for Housing: Noel Ahern 
Secretary General: Niall Callan 
Assistant Secretary: Des Dowling (Housing Division) 
Principal: Denis Conlon (Housing Division) 
Administrative Officer: Sinead Smyth (Housing Division) 
Banks 
Bank of Ireland: Brian Goggin, Group Chief Executive  
Bank of Ireland: Joe Larkin, Managing Director (Mortgages) 
Permanent TSB: Denis Casey, Chief Executive 
Ulster Bank Group (First Active and Ulster Bank brands): 
Kevin Gallen, Head of Corporate Affairs 
Allied Irish Bank: Dermot Gleeson, Chairman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Relevant Persons in 100 Per Cent LTV Mortgages Decision Case Study, 2005 
Department of Finance 
Minister for Finance: Brian Cowen 
Secretary General: Tom Considine (also a member of the Board of the CBFSAI) 
Assistant Secretary: William Beausang (Banking Finance and International Division) 
Administrative Officer: Brendan O'Leary: (Banking Finance and International Division) 
Assistant Secretary: Derek Moran (Budget and Economic Division) 
Principal: David Hegarty (Budget and Economic Division) 
Assistant Principal: Marie Mackle (Budget and Economic Division) 
Assistant Principal: Gary Tobin (Public Expenditure Division) 
Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland 
Governor: John Hurley (Central Bank) 
Director General: Liam Barron (Central Bank) 
Head of Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: Frank Browne (Central Bank) 
Chairman: Brian Patterson (Financial Regulator) 
Chief Executive: Liam O’Reilly (Financial Regulator) 
Consumer Director: Mary O’Dea (Financial Regulator) 
Head of Consumer Information: Bernard Sheridan (Financial Regulator) 
Prudential Director: Patrick Neary (Financial Regulator) 
Head of Banking Supervision: Con Horan (Financial Regulator) 
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9.2 Housing Affordability Concerns in 2005 
In 2005, Ireland was coming off another year of exceptional economic performance, with the 
second highest GDP per capita for 2004 in the European Union (EU), an employment rate up 
from 55 per cent in 1996 to 67 per cent in 2005, the lowest unemployment rate in the EU (4.2 
per cent), and population growth of 13.9 per cent to over 4.1 million in the period 1996-2005, 
the second highest rate of increase in the EU (CSO, 2005: 14 and 15). The economy was 
already booming, but negative wholesale bank interest rates combined with a growing 
population, growing incomes and lower actual and prospective mortgage interest rates 
together “triggered the housing price surge” (Honohan, 2010: 22). Between 1995 and 2007 
residential property prices rose by more than 180 per cent, and the maximum sustainable 
annual level of house construction (which was based on continued economic growth and 
immigration) estimated in 2005 to be in the region of 70,000 units was exceeded in 2004 for 
the first time (Nyberg, 2010: 18). The banks were fuelling this bubble via loan book 
expansion, which only intensified on foot of the increased competition in the mortgage 
market with the arrival of new entrants such as Bank of Scotland in 1999.   
 The simultaneous growth in employment and implementation of social partnership 
agreements which delivered wage increases and tax cuts saw the willingness and ability to 
pay for housing rise sharply. As Honohan puts it, “property prices developed their own 
momentum and overshot equilibrium levels. In effect, purchasers increasingly built in an 
expected continuation in the increase of the relative price of housing” (Honohan, 2010: 22). 
The increased ability to pay for housing was one consequence of low wholesale interest rates 
and fierce competition in the mortgage market as banks introduced new products, including 
high loan-to-value ratio mortgages. 
 By March 2005, three banks in Ireland – Ulster Bank, First Active, and Bank of 
Ireland – had begun marketing conditional 100 per cent LTV mortgages. The main condition 
was the occupation of the mortgage applicant when seeking the loan i.e. be a lawyer, doctor, 
accountant, dentist, vet, pharmacist, or similar stable profession of the time considered to 
have particularly strong incomes and job security. In addition, the most that could be drawn 
down under these mortgages was €400,000, “enough to buy a small family home in Dublin 
and a more roomy abode in most other places”, while applicants were also expected to be of a 
certain age and to earn a certain minimum (23 years old and earn €32,000 per annum, in the 
case of Ulster Bank) before they could qualify (Irish Times, March 3
rd
 2005: 28).  
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Figure 9.2: Average House Price in Ireland, 1975 – 200711 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.3: Sectoral Lending Volumes (€ billions), 1999 – 201312 
 
                                                          
11
 Challenges Facing the Irish Economy European Commission Conference, Ronan Lyons, Galway, March 24th 
2012. 
12
 Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Volume 1, Houses of the Oireachtas, January 
2016, p. 133. 
Property Sector 
Other Sectors 
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At the same time, the knock-on impact of house price inflation and loosening credit standards 
were becoming a more prominent political issue.  In March 2005 the then Minister for 
Finance, Brian Cowen, was asked by the opposition his views on whether there is cause for 
concern at the figures on consumer debt, which showed a higher ratio of debt to income than 
ever before. The Minister replied that he was aware of the concerns expressed by a number of 
commentators in relation to the continued strong growth in credit, particularly to the 
household sector and the possible effects of increasing indebtedness upon borrowers, making 
three noteworthy points.    
 First, he was quick to distance himself and his Department from a direct role in 
response to those concerns, placing the issue squarely with the Central Bank and the 
Financial Regulator (Minister for Finance, Dáil Éireann, Written Answers – Consumer Debt, 
March 3
rd
 2005). Notably, the Minister uses the word “reckless” in relation to borrowing but 
not in relation to lending or credit extension/growth.  In his reply, Cowen refers to 
“inappropriate” lending being potentially damaging to the economy.   
 Second, the Minister placed concerns over indebtedness in the context of ostensibly 
positive developments, stating that he had been advised by the Financial Regulator that the 
increase in personal indebtedness could be viewed against a background of record house-
building and personal liabilities are backed by real assets.  
Third, Cowen put an emphasis on the obligation on the banks to provide borrowers 
with adequate information so they could make an informed and appropriate decision, as 
opposed to any obligation on the banks to avoid reckless lending. Next, in terms of direction 
to the banks, the Minister reports that mortgage lenders had been (i) requested to review their 
practices in relation to customer income verification and the funding of mortgage balances so 
as to ensure that not only were loans properly secured but also that borrowers would be able 
to fully repay them, and (ii) advised of the need to stress test every would-be borrower’s 
ability to meet their credit obligations, in the event of more challenging times. The focus is on 
income verification and testing the impact of a rise in interest rates, rather than the impact of 
very high or 100 per cent LTV ratios and the removal of the need for a deposit, on house 
prices in the short term, or market sustainability in the medium term.  
 The following month, the Minister of State at the Department of the Environment, 
Heritage and Local Government, Noel Ahern (hereafter “the Minister for Housing”) was 
asked a question specifically on house prices in Dáil Éireann. Again, certain points of 
emphasis are notable in his reply.  
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First, house price growth is explained as a consequence of unprecedented housing demand 
arising from sustained economic growth and demographic change, rather than a rapid 
extension of credit. Second, the Minister states that Government policy was focused on 
achieving an appropriate supply response and using targeted measures to provide access to 
housing and accommodation for lower income groups. There is no reference to measures to 
address demand or the role credit extension plays in this. Indeed there is a singular focus on 
supply with the Minister stating that “[n]o one simple solution to this issue exists without 
increased supply, which is why we have been working on that aspect for some years”. The 
evidence of success for the Government’s policy was, in the words of the Minister, that 
“2004 was the tenth year of record overall house completions with almost 77,000” (Minister 
of State at the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Dáil Éireann,  
Priority Questions – House Prices, April 13th 2005). 
 Although not referenced by name, the notion of very high or 100 per cent mortgages 
surfaces in this exchange in April 2005, with the Minister for Housing stating that the 
problem facing first-time home buyers at that time was “obtaining an initial deposit rather 
than a mortgage”. The main opposition political party claims that finding a deposit is “the 
core problem for those trying to get on the housing ladder” and asks: “Does the Minister of 
State intend to bring firm proposals to Government to help such people whom Deputies 
encounter at every constituency clinic? It would be helpful to take meaningful action in this 
regard.” In hindsight it is remarkable to see very high or 100 per cent mortgages suggested as 
a possible remedy to rapid house price inflation, if indeed that was what was in the mind of 
the opposition. Even if it was not, it is clear that there is an emphasis here on government 
action to help borrowers reach the growing asking prices rather than action to moderate prices 
beyond increasing supply.  
 On the other hand, the government had been encouraging – and in fact providing – 
high LTV loans for particular house purchasers for a number of years. The Affordable 
Housing Scheme was launched in March 1999 to help lower income households to purchase 
homes. According to the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF), under this Scheme 
Local Authorities provided additional new houses on land available to them in or near urban 
centres where house prices have created an affordability gap for lower income buyers. The 
houses were offered to eligible buyers at cost price and, accordingly, at a significant discount 
from the market value of comparable houses in the area. Purchasers were offered mortgage 
finance at favourable interest rates and a significant feature of the Scheme was that a new 
housing unit was constructed in each case (NESF, 2000: 24). Buyers could obtain a loan of 
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up to 97 per cent of the cost of a house. Until 2005, the State provided all loans for affordable 
housing but had then concluded a deal with the Bank of Ireland under which it would offer up 
to 97 per cent of the value of houses available as part of four schemes. The Minister for 
Housing told the Dáil that he believed “other financial institutions will follow the bank’s lead 
and enter the market”. It is possible that one unintended consequence of this deal was an 
implicit signal by government in 2005 that the provision of high LTV loans by banks was 
desirable in the property market at that time, even for buyers with affordability problems.  
 House price inflation and affordability issues, particularly for first-time buyers, were 
moving ever higher on the political agenda and it was doing so on the basis of genuine 
concern among citizens as opposed to being a politically contrived issue or one exaggerated 
by the opposition. As one politician put it, “nothing takes up so much of our time as getting 
people into houses — whether by loans, planning applications, social and council housing or 
whatever — at our constituency clinics”.  In mid-April 2005 the main opposition party tabled 
a Private Members Motion Dáil Éireann (Brian Hayes T.D. Dáil Éireann, Social and 
Affordable Housing: Motion, April 19
th
 2005), which began by noting that, in alia: 
 The average house price in Ireland stood at €255,776, an increase of €18,000 in one 
year 
 The price of an average house had increased from an average of €75,000 in 1996 
 42,500 people aged over 30 lived with their parents according to Census 2002 
 Over 100,000 individuals were on local authority housing waiting lists 
Again, the debate focussed to a large extent on “young people who want to buy their own 
home but who cannot afford to do so because, while their income can sustain the mortgage, 
they cannot provide the large deposit” / “the need to enable people to assemble a deposit is 
the critical measure that needs to be taken to free up people who cannot get into the house 
purchase market”, a problem for which high LTV mortgages can be seen as a solution.  
 The opposition urged government action on this issue stating that the “greatest 
problem facing young people is the complete and utter failure of the Government to get to 
grips with the housing crisis. Its laissez-faire approach to rocketing house prices has made 
Opposition Members sick as we witness the knock-on effects of its right wing policies”.  As 
before, there was an emphasis on chasing rising prices in the first instance, rather than 
tempering them. The opposition’s first element of a three-point proposal was a savings 
scheme under which first-time buyers would receive €1 for every €3 they save provided those 
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savings are used for a deposit on a house
13
. (The other two elements were the proposed 
abolition of stamp duty on second-hand homes valued at up to €400,000 bought by first-time 
buyers, and the front-loading of mortgage interest relief for first-time buyers on the first 
seven years of the life of a mortgage). As is the custom in the Irish parliament, the 
Government’s response was to move a counter motion replacing the wording in the 
opposition’s criticism with more positive, self-congratulatory text which, unsurprisingly 
focussed on the increased supply of housing rather than any mention to tempering demand or 
price growth via restrictions on credit. The emphasising of supply and the consequential 
construction boom was in fact used to goad the opposition (Noel Ahern, T.D., Minister for 
Housing, Dáil Éireann, April 19
th
 2005). 
 In his response to the opposition’s criticism, the Minister for Housing again referred 
to the Government sponsored legislation of 2004, to facilitate lending institutions in 
providing high LTV (97 per cent) mortgages for affordable housing clients. He stated that he 
was pleased to hear that the first product had been announced by Bank of Ireland and would 
be extended through its branch network shortly. The Government expected other financial 
institutions to follow suit. There was no reference to the need to limit such activity, nor the 
dangers of its proliferation. In addition, by again taunting the opposition with recent statistics 
which indicated that house prices were moderating (“Perhaps it was unfortunate from the 
Opposition’s point of view that the statistics which were published today showed there was a 
1 per cent increase in house prices in three months”), the Minister and Government were 
demonstrating that they believed a cooling of house prices to be a good thing, something to 
be encouraged, and this would be crucial to the decision made in subsequent months.   
 A key player in the lending market is the Irish League of Credit Unions. In 2005, of 
the 29 per cent of adults in Ireland who had a loan of any type, 54 per cent of those loans (by 
number, not value) were provided via the approximately 450 credit unions across the country 
(O’Loughlin, 2006: 12, 13). In April 2005 the Minister for Finance was asked if he intended 
to request the Financial Regulator to investigate the continuing rise in personal credit along 
the lines proposed by the Irish League of Credit Unions, take action to prevent the debt-
income ratio from continuing to rise, or to bring in further regulations to prevent financial 
institutions from granting excessive personal credit (Minister for Finance, Dáil Éireann, 
Written Answers – Financial Services Regulation, April 26th 2005).  
                                                          
13
 The proposed scheme was similar to the Special Savings Incentive Account (SSIA) scheme already in 
operation in Ireland at that time but which would not see savings and bonuses realised for another two years.  
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Unlike the similar question asked a month earlier of the Minister (see above), in this case a 
link was made to concerns about credit extension emanating from the central player in the 
Irish lending market. The Minister replied by first stating that he was aware of the concerns 
expressed by a number of commentators on the continued increase in credit growth, 
particularly to the household sector, and the possible effects of increasing indebtedness upon 
borrowers.  
As before, the Minister for Finance was then quick to outline the institutional 
arrangements and the consequences for the allocation of policy responsibility, stating that the 
growth of credit and the associated increase in indebtedness was a matter for the Financial 
Regulator. The Minister outlined the steps the Financial Regulator was taking on foot of this 
responsibility i.e. highlighting the need for care amongst borrowers, requesting lenders to 
stress-test loans, and promoting greater information and awareness “to assist borrowers in 
making the most appropriate credit decisions given their circumstances”. At this point, there 
is no evidence of concern or move toward action on the part of government to stem the 
rapidly rising levels of credit extension or personal indebtedness. It would be another four 
months before that would emerge.  
9.3 The Arrival of Widely-Available 100 per cent LTV mortgages   
It was in the summer of 2005 that the issue narrowed from lending practices and high levels 
of mortgage debt, to high LTV mortgages specifically.  On July 12
th
 the Governor of the 
Central Bank issued a statement on the publication of their 2004 Annual Report, and their 
concern regarding mortgage debt was clear. Driving this was data showing that total private 
sector credit was growing at an annual rate of about 25 per cent, that the private sector was 
highly indebted by international standards, and this level would very soon match the levels 
recorded in Europe’s most indebted economies.  The institution which, as repeatedly stated 
by the Minister for Finance, had responsibility for policy the growth of credit and the 
associated increase in indebtedness, was publicly and unequivocally stating its concern about 
the level of household indebtedness and the future sustainability of mortgage debt.  
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Figure 9.4: Excerpts from Central Bank Annual Report 2004, pages 11 and 34 
 
On July 13
th
 2005, the day following this cautionary note by the Central Bank, a bank in 
Ireland launched the first mortgage that “covers the full price of a property” widely available 
beyond certain stable professions (Irish Times, July 14
th
 2005: 1). The bank in question was 
First Active, part of the Royal Bank of Scotland group. The product was launched because 
the bank’s mortgage market share was coming under  
pressure, and it followed market research, customer feedback, “rigorous risk assessment”, 
and notification to the Financial Regulator of their intention (Cormac McCarthy, former Head 
of Finance and Chief Executive, First Active, Evidence to the Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, 
May 6
th
 2015).  
 Later that month the first indication of the Department of Finance’s position on these 
developments was given at a parliamentary committee.  The Secretary General of the 
Department, Tom Considine, who was also a member of the Central Bank’s board told the 
committee that if a shock were to occur to the system from something happening outside the 
economy, for example, concerns would arise, adding that there was no sign of something like 
this happening at that moment. He went on to say that although 100 per cent LTV mortgages 
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were now being marketed, it was anticipated that the take-up would be low as more stringent 
criteria would be required for the higher ratio, and noted the “onus on the Regulator to 
continue advising people of the risks and highlight the pertinent issues” (Tom Considine, 
Secretary General of the Department of Finance, Joint Committee on Finance and the Public 
Service Debate on Department of Finance Strategy Statement 2005-07, July 27
th
 2005). 
 In August, Ulster Bank, the owner of the first bank in Ireland to start offering 100 per 
cent mortgages to first-time buyers (First Active), reported a 15 per cent increase in total 
income in the first half of the year, buoyed by a strong mortgage and lending market. 
Commenting on the results, the bank’s Chief Executive said that they saw nothing in their 
business that would lead them to have concerns adding that if anything, he expected the 
bank’s mortgage take-up to increase, helped by the introduction of the 100 per cent mortgage 
(Irish Times, August 5
th
 2005: 1).  
 Within one month of First Active offering the first widely available 100 per cent LTV 
ratio mortgage, there were five mortgage lenders providing the product: “Permanent TSB, 
Ulster Bank, Bank of Ireland and its subsidiary ICS Building Society have all followed First 
Active’s move to waive the traditional requirement for a deposit equivalent to 8 or 10 per 
cent of the purchase price of the property” (Irish Times, August 5th 2005: 7). The headline on 
the article read: “Lenders queue up to offer 100 per cent first-time buyers’ mortgages”. 
9.4 The Concerns of the Department of the Environment 
Although the parliament had adjourned for the summer recess, the arrival of 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages was causing concern amongst some policy-makers. According to emails 
secured under Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation, the Department of the Environment 
(hereafter “D/Env”) was in contact with banks from as early as July 14th 2005 regarding 100 
per cent LTV mortgages (Email, Dept. of the Environment, Scan 1, July 14
th
 2005).  On July 
25
th
 the Minister for Housing launched the bulletin of housing statistics for the first quarter of 
2005. Despite the statistics showing that the rate of house price growth had slowed down, 
according to a media report of the launch the Minister feared that the wide availability of 100 
per cent mortgages could reverse that slowdown. Regarding banks offering 100 per cent 
mortgages to first-time buyers, the Minister was quoted as stating: 
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“That is bordering on the irresponsible and I’m very concerned that this trend might 
start where financial institutions are basically being reckless in handing out money” – 
Noel Ahern T.D., Minister for Housing, July 25
th
 2005.
14
 
On July 27
th
 D/Env requested information from Ulster Bank asking about the maximum 
LTV, terms, and conditions (see Figure 9.5). As that correspondence left D/Env, Ulster Bank 
was writing to the Department in response to the Minister’s remarks quoted above.  
Addressing the Minister, Ulster Bank’s Head of Group Corporate Affairs, wrote: 
“In particular I note your concerns about the possibility of financial institutions being 
‘reckless in handing out money’ to first time buyers… As lenders we regularly see the 
frustration of many first time buyers…  I can assure you that both First Active and 
Ulster Bank will continue to act as responsible lenders” – Kevin Gallen, Head of 
Group Corporate Affairs, Ulster Bank, July 28
th
 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 BreakingNews.ie; retrieved November 27
th
 2015. http://www.breakingnews.ie/ireland/cwkfmhcwsncw/    
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Figure 9.5: Email from Dept. of the Environment to Ulster Bank, July 27
th
 2005 
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Figure 9.6: Email to Dept. of the Environment from Ulster Bank, July 27
th
 2005 
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Figure 9.7: Letter to Dept. of the Environment from Ulster Bank, July 28
th
 2005 
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Between August 2
nd
 and August 9
th
 2005 the Minister wrote to Ulster Banks’ Kevin Gallen, 
to Bank of Ireland’s Group Chief Executive Brian Goggin, and to Permanent TSB’s Chief 
Executive Denis Casey. Although the three letters differ slightly, the core messages are the 
same in each (See Figure 9.8 as an example). In short, the Minister for Housing was saying to 
the banks that his concerns were not his alone, and that despite the rationale expressed by the 
intuitions for 100 per cent LTV ratio mortgages, they should change their policy by limiting 
the issuance of high LTV mortgages to helping lower income households purchase homes 
under Government schemes.  He also issues a veiled threat to intervene, having considered 
“what might be done”. 
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Figure 9.8: Letter from Dept. of the Environment to Ulster Bank, August 2
nd
 2005 
In parallel to this direct approach to the banks urging them to change their mortgage lending 
policy, the Minister’s Department approached the Department of Finance (hereafter 
“D/Fin”) to discuss whether intervention was warranted and/or possible.  On August 5th 2005 
an official from D/Env (where the Minister for Housing was based) emailed a colleague in 
the D/Fin (see Figure 9.9) seeking a meeting “to consider the position in light of recent 
developments in the mortgage market”. For the meeting, the D/Env official proposes 
focussing on “the implications for the housing market of the move by a number of lending 
institutions to offer 100% mortgages to first time buyers”.   
 
   181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.9: Email, Dept. of the Environment to Dept. of Finance, August 5
th
 2005 
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The official from D/Env also attached several documents to his email including a copy of the 
aforementioned Minister’s letter to Ulster Bank, information from the banks on the terms and 
conditions associated with the newly available 100 per cent LTV mortgage products, and an 
Irish Times article of the same date, entitled “Building Confidence in the Housing Market”, 
which the official describes as giving “a good flavour of the sort of concerns that have been 
voiced, in quite a measured way, by some commentators”.   That article states that compared 
with the UK, there was less that policy-makers in Ireland could do to stabilise the property 
market, yet “there are mistakes that, provided a spirit of prudence and foresight prevails, can 
be avoided by the private sector”. Specific mention is made of the Central Bank warnings 
about strong growth in personal debt, and the recent introduction of 100 per cent mortgages 
by First Active placing “pressure on other banks to follow suit” (Irish Times, Business 
Section, August 5
th
 2005: 4). In alerting his manager of his correspondence to D/Fin, the 
D/Env official attached a memo noting the difference in D/Fin’s initial and later response.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.10: Internal Memo, Dept. of the Environment, August 5
th
 2005 
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This is a critical point is this case study. The context, some evidence, and potential solutions 
are available to decision-makers to take a good decision, a decision which relates to a policy 
area that can be reasonably assumed to have impacted on Ireland’s economy. It is at this point 
that the three factors of interest (interests, institutions, and ideology) may impact to deliver 
the bad decision outcome which materialises via a formal letter from the Department of 
Finance to the Department of the Environment in November 2005.  
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9.5 The Initial Response of the Department of Finance 
That crucial August 5
th
 email from D/Env to D/Fin which spelled out both the risks 
associated 100 per vent LTV mortgages, and solutions which we now know could have 
mitigated the crisis, had eight bulleted notes written on it by a D/Fin official and they offer an 
indication of D/Fin’s initial response to D/Env’s concerns.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.11: Dept. of Finance copy of email from Dept. of the Environment,  
August 5
th
 2005 (excerpt) 
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As can be best made out, the legible notes in order read as follows: 
 “informal (followed by two illegible words) 
 new innovation 
 is this a rebalancing or a real change 
 how does this come thru on credit growth, mortgage approvals, (illegible word, 
possibly “house”) price 
 do DoE have info that this will cause problem 
 aware of potential destabilising effect 
 regulator is looking at it – is his responsibility 
 any intervention could make this worse” 
 
Figure 9.12: Dept. of Finance Hand-Written Notes on email  
from Dept. of the Environment, August 5
th
 2005 (excerpt) 
On August 7
th
 2005, a national Sunday newspaper ran an article based on a recently 
published survey of first-time buyers for one of the banks (Permanent TSB), by the Economic 
and Social Research Institute (Sunday Tribune, August 7
th
 2005: 2). The article included the 
following:  
 “Four out of five first time buyers say they save for considerable deposits of up to 
€24,000 over four years 
 Hello? Says one recent professional buyer. “All my friends have just bought their first 
house and not one of them saved for four years. You borrow everything you can and then 
go to the credit union and, after approval, borrow to the limit of your credit cards. That’s 
the way you live nowadays.” 
 The arrival of the 100% mortgage, despite the protestations of the financial institutions 
that they will apply only to a small 5% of high earners, will only serve to make more 
money available. 
 Nine years ago, some 96% of all houses cost under €150,000 – a price that’s little more 
than a folk memory to Dubliners now forking out close to €1m for a pretty standard four-
bed semi-d in a decent location. 
  Now, 41% of properties across the country cost between €240,000 and €400,000 with 
one in 10 priced at more than €400,000.” 
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On August 10
th
, five days after D/Env sent their original email outlining concerns regarding 
100 per cent LTV mortgages and potential interventions, three officials each from the D/Fin 
and D/Fin met to discuss the issue. The delegations were led at Assistant Secretary-level. 
From both Departments’ respective notes, they agreed on the purpose of the meeting i.e. to 
discuss the potential impact of 100 per cent LTV mortgages on the housing market and house 
prices. The key issues for D/Env are evident from the lengthy internal briefing document they 
prepared in advance for their use at the meeting (Briefing note, Dept. of Environment, Scan 
8, August 10
th
 2005).  
The document inter alia says a “key concern is that if higher lending has the effect of 
pushing up prices, any short-term benefits to some first time buyers will be negative for 
others going forward who will end up paying higher prices, borrowing more to fund this, 
having to make higher repayments and being more exposed in the event of any deterioration 
in their own circumstances or in the market generally”, a scenario which ultimately came to 
pass. The internal D/Env briefing also states that “100% lending is necessarily predicated on 
expectation of further significant price increases in the near future. This must give rise to 
concern because it is a factor not based on economic fundamentals. It amounts to pumping a 
market bubble”. This unequivocal statement of a belief that further significant increases in 
Irish house prices would not be based on economic fundamentals will be important later in 
the case, as it is at odds with a key plank of the D/Fin’s formal response in November which 
did not recommend intervention.  
D/Env’s note also shows an awareness of, and answers to, likely responses to their 
concerns. First, it says, “a point that some people will make [is] that the move will make little 
difference because many first time buyers are already borrowing 100%... via credit unions, 
parents etc.”, (so-called secondary borrowing). The Department rejects this point stating (i) 
that research showed that such borrowers were a minority with 80 per cent saving an average 
of €23,000 and saving for a four-year period, (ii) that 100 per cent LTV mortgages leave 
people who would have been in a position to borrow with more cash available to them, and 
bring forward purchases, all of which “bids up” house process, and (iii) that secondary 
borrowing would not necessarily stop as a result of the wide availability of 100 per cent LTV 
products. Second, the note recognises that it could be argued that “the numbers getting 100% 
mortgages may be so few that there is minimal cause for concern”. Again, the Department of 
the Environment rebut this position believing that such a view in turn “undermines the 
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rationale for the change while still leaving potential for damage in terms of price expectations 
and the fact that those already in a position to buy may now have more money for this”.       
For D/Env “the bottom line is that there will be significantly more liquidity in the 
housing market”.  Again, this position is in direct contrast with the view that intervention 
could have negative consequences for the market. Rather it implies the precise opposite. 
Intervention is needed and the note expands on this where it adds: “the likelihood that the 
mortgage market is to some extent being driven by addiction to indefinite high growth rates 
increases the need for some sort of intervention to dampen things down”. Although D/Env 
believed that 100 per cent LTV mortgages had already caused damage in the short time they 
had been available they held that the fact that other banks were not offering the product 
“gives ground for hope that damage limitation is achievable”. Tellingly, D/Env’s note on 100 
per cent LTV mortgages states: 
“While the main concern in the short-term is that higher lending without corresponding 
increases in supply will push up prices higher than would otherwise be the case, looking 
further ahead, there may be a risk that this could make the stability of the housing market 
more fragile in the event of any significant change in the factors that have underpinned 
growth such as low interest rates, growth in net incomes, high inward migration and 
strong investment demand (due to factors such as lack of alternatives and robust price 
expectations, as well as low interest rates).  
While comments about over-valuation of Irish property are somewhat tentative and 
difficult to substantiate, it might be foolish to ignore them (e.g. IMF) entirely. It is 
conceivable that any inflationary effect of increased lending levels can be absorbed by 
continuing strong housing output. However, that can also be looked at another way i.e. 
that a scenario might develop whereby unsustainably high output might be artificially 
prolonged by 100% (or higher) lending, increasing the risk of future instability… The 
bottom line seems to be that 100% or higher lending could make achievement of the 
much-desired soft-landing in the housing market more difficult…” - Briefing note, Dept. 
of Environment, Scan 8, August 10
th
 2005          
The respective notes of that August 10
th
 meeting between the Departments have been 
obtained under an FOI request (Note of Meeting with Dept. of Finance, Dept. of 
Environment, Scan 8, August 11
th
 2005; Note of Meeting with Dept. of Environment, Dept. 
of Finance, Scan 9, August 11
th
 2005). The most senior D/Env official at the meeting, an 
Assistant Secretary, opened the meeting outlining their concerns and the points summarised 
in the paragraphs above. He added a number of important points. First he stated that there 
was a “wide political view that this intervention was not helpful”.  He added that while 
D/Env “didn’t see it’s role as interventionist it had previously intervened to discourage the 
uptake of endowment mortgages”.  
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These statements are recorded differently in D/Fin’s note which simply states that D/Env was 
“generally reluctant in the housing market but that they had concerns regarding the possible 
implications of the new 100% mortgage products”. The D/Fin note made no reference to 
political views or the fact that intervention in the mortgage market had been made previously.  
According to their note, D/Env told D/Fin that “there may be a danger of bubble 
activity as lenders who traditionally looked for headroom in loan to value ratio may now be 
relying on anticipated price increases”. The added that “[the] IMF have already warned that 
the Irish property market is overvalued”. There is no mention of this in the D/Fin note, 
though they do record D/Env’s view that 100 per cent LTV mortgages “were not helpful to 
the psychology of the housing market in terms of dampening house price expectations. These 
products – unlike the Government backed Affordable Housing Schemes – were demand side 
measures with no corresponding supply side counterweight”.    
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Figure 9.13: Dept. of Finance note of meeting with Dept. of the Environment,  
August 10
th
 2005 
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D/Fin’s note of the meeting is the first official record of their views on the matter (as opposed 
to surmising from the eight hand-written bullet points on the crucial August 5
th
 email). This 
record is in stark contrast to D/Env’s note of the same meeting which reports that they posed 
only one question (“Will the higher level of demand result in a higher level of output than 
what might sustainable in the long term?”), whereas they state that D/ Fin posed multiple 
questions at the meeting: 
 “Will this initiative de-stabilize the market? 
 Does 100% mortgage pose a threat to strategy? 
 What is our capacity to analyse the impact? 
 Is this initiative just formalising a practice that was already in place? 
 If we believe that 100% mortgages will impact on house prices- it will be necessary to 
show how this happens separated from all other drivers of prices.   
 Are we confident that trying to restrict credit to FTBs is the right way to go and could 
it have significant consequences? 
 Would we take the same view if a lender arrived in the market with very low interest 
rates?” 
According to D/Env’s meeting note, the next steps included bringing the Financial Regulator 
(“IFSRA”) into the deliberative process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.14: Dept. of Environment note of meeting with Dept. of Finance,   
August 10
th
 2005 (excerpt) 
For their part, D/Fin stated that the next steps would be for the Department of the 
Environment to “formally write” to them on the issues and the Department of Finance would 
“bring the matter to the attention of the Regulator for consideration”. At this point in the 
decision process, it was clear that the Regulator was the next key player to be consulted.  
   191 
 
In their meeting note, D/Env report D/Fin as stating that a formal approach to the Financial 
Regulator required “caution [and] clear questions/points on impacts”, though no explanation 
for why caution should be exercised is given. One explanation is that D/Fin held that a formal 
approach by a Government Department to the Financial Regulator on an issue was a 
significant intervention in its own right. In that case, it would be difficult for them or any 
Government Department to argue that they were in some way powerless, inconsequential or 
unimportant actors in this policy area.   
Two days later, D/Env did as agreed and wrote to D/Fin, enclosing the letters from the 
Minister for Housing to the banks, and some background material “in order to assist further 
consideration of the matter”. This letter is the first and perhaps only formal articulation 
communicated from one element of the policy system to another, of the dangers posed by the 
widespread availability of 100 per cent LTV mortgages (see Figure 9.15).  
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Figure 9.15: Dept. of Finance annotated copy of letter to them from Dept. of the 
Environment, August 12
th
 2005  
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Figure 9.16: Appendix to Dept. of the Environment Letter, August 12
th
 2005 
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It is clear that D/Env have noted three of the main points made by D/Fin at the meeting i.e. (i) 
that the availability of 100 per cent mortgages might be regarded as a means of overcoming 
problems of access to home ownership for some people with ability to meet mortgage 
repayments but unable to secure a deposit, (ii) that assessing the nature and extent of the 
likely impact of developments in the housing market might be difficult, and (iii) that it is 
important to avoid any interventions that might either be unwarranted or have unintended 
effects. By opening with an acknowledgement of this points, adding a “however”, and 
continuing to outline their concerns, D/Env were implying that they did not view these three 
arguments to be of such strength as to dissuade them from mentioning possible interventions 
including “direct restraint of lending”, albeit accompanied by a questioning of the feasibility 
of such an intervention.  
 On August 17
th
, the recipient D/Env’s letter reviewed its contents and made hand-
written notes on it. Firstly, the D/Fin official (who was the senior official from that 
Department at the August 10
th
 meeting), highlighted three sections of D/Env’s text and 
labelled them A, B and C (See Figure 9.15 above). The categorised sections of text were as 
follows: 
 “A:  exert upward pressure on house prices 
B: A particular issue that seems to emerge with the provision of 100% mortgages is 
that this would suggest effective abandonment of one of the two traditional core 
lending criteria viz, loan to value ratio. 
C: provide less inflationary ways of addressing the issue of access to deposit 
funding.”    
 
Figure 9.17: Dept. of Finance Hand-Written Notes on Letter from Dept. of the 
Environment, August 12
th
 2005 (excerpt) 
At the top of the letter, the senior D/Fin official wrote the following in respect of A, B and C, 
and forwarded the letter with the notes to three colleagues:  
“Pls see letter + appendix together with letters to credit institutions. Analysis of A by 
BED is central to our overall assessment of this. We will follow-up re B with IFSRA. 
I’m not entirely clear what is envisaged by C. Once you have had a chance to review 
we should meet to discuss response” 
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It is assumed that BED refers to the Budget and Economic Division of D/Fin. Thus, a central 
action at this point was analysis by D/Fin of the potential for 100 per cent mortgages to 
contribute to house price inflation. In addition, D/Fin was to follow up with the Regulator 
regarding the extent to which these mortgages products represented an abandonment of the 
LTV criteria for such lending.  
Finally, D/Fin is not certain what D/Env meant by “less inflationary ways of 
addressing the issue of access to deposit funding”, though D/Env say in their letter it was 
something that may merit further consideration by both Departments. The Secretary General 
of D/Fin was a government nominee on the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), 
and – as discussed earlier – NESC had in in November 2004 recommended that “Government 
should explore possible ways of providing support to those who need assistance in achieving 
a deposit for owner-occupied housing. Such support could take the form of tax relief on 
saving for a deposit or a loan from the state to cover the deposit” (NESC, 2004: 6). D/Env, 
whose Secretary General was also a member of the Council, were aware of and noted that a 
deposit saving scheme had been mentioned in the media “recently”, and in fact believed that 
it was one explanation for D/Fin’s reticence to intervene on the issue of 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages (Internal memo, Dept. of Environment, Scan 5, August 5
th
 2005). In addition, the 
main opposition political party were proposing a deposit scheme and discussion of same 
featured strongly in the parliamentary debate on housing held in April 2005 (see section 9.2).    
As interesting perhaps, are the elements of the text apparently ignored by D/Fin in 
pursuing this response, including the reference to possible interventions included in D/Env’s 
letter i.e. direct restraint of lending and/or directing any additional lending in a non-
inflationary way (e.g. the Minister for Housing’s suggestion to the lending agencies regarding 
funding of affordable housing). There is no highlighting of any the text included on D/ Env’s 
appended additional information, titled “specific issues for consideration in relation to 100% 
mortgages”, despite the strident views contained therein.  
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9.6 Early Consideration by the Financial Regulator 
The primacy of the Financial Regulator’s role in this policy area in the eyes of the D/Fin is 
evident from the foregoing, but understanding their internal activity and decisions is difficult. 
In his 2010 report on the crisis, Honohan stated that the Regulator “was not passive in 
responding to the renewed system-wide expansion of property-related credit”, and refers to 
an internal memo within the Regulator’s office of August 12th 2005, two days after the 
meeting between the D/Env and D/Fin (Honohan, 2010: 100)
15
.  
 The memo proposed an increase in capital requirements for new high LTV mortgages, 
rather than prohibiting their availability or discouraging their use, based on the idea of a 
capital surcharge on the “riskier property-related loans”. According to Honohan, internal 
Regulator documentation pointed to a recognition of: (i) the unprecedented demand for 
housing credit, (ii) the IMF opinion that Irish property prices were overvalued by more than 
in other countries, (iii) high household debt/income ratios by international standards, (iv) 
increasing competition between lenders resulting in lowering of credit standards, notably the 
spread of 100 per cent mortgages, (v) the move to IFRS provisioning standards which 
reduced the general provisioning available in the banking sector to protect against increased 
defaults, and (vi) the prospect of slower property price growth (Honohan, 2010: 100).  
Accordingly, the internal memo proposed what, according to Honohan, “now seems a 
very modest” increase in capital requirements for new high LTV mortgages (above 80 per 
cent LTV). The memo called for a sliding scale which, by progressively increasing the risk-
weighting of mortgages from 50 to 60 per cent depending on the LTV rate resulted in a 2.4 
per cent Tier 1 capital requirement for 100 per cent mortgages, compared with 2 per cent 
before). Honohan says there was some delay before this proposal was brought to the 
Authority, reflecting hesitation as to its advisability, despite the imposition “as noted in the 
documentation of more stringent national requirements by the regulatory authorities in 
Australia, Canada and Germany” (Honohan, 2010: 100). The proposal was finally approved 
by the Authority at end March 2006 and became effective from May 2006, but Honohan’s 
official report did not state why the proposal was not accepted and implemented in mid-2005.  
 
                                                          
15
 A copy of this memo was requested from the Central Bank but they denied that request, stating that due to the 
confidential nature of the memo they were not in a position to release it. 
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Speaking in 2015, the proposer (Con Horan), who was Head of Banking Supervision at the 
Financial Regulator in 2005, told the Oireachtas Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, of his 
understanding of why the Financial Regulator did not make an intervention in 2005. In short, 
senior management within both the Financial Regulator and the Central Bank had considered 
the matter but did not believe the action was necessary because analysis on mortgage growth 
suggested that developments could be explained by economic fundamentals, there 
was concern that such intervention would jeopardise the stability of the Irish financial system, 
and would be inconsistent with the principles-based approach. The rejection of the proposal 
in August 2005 reflected the “majority view at the time was that the property market was 
going to have a soft landing as interest rates increased” (Con Horan, Evidence to the 
Oireachtas Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, May 27
th
 2015).  
 The Prudential Director at the Regulatory Authority in 2005 (and Con Horan’s 
superior), Pat Neary confirmed Horan’s account of events, in 2015. He indicated that it was 
the then Chief Executive of the Regulator (Liam O’Reilly) and the then Director General of 
the Central Bank (Liam Barron) who rejected the proposal, and that it was not considered by 
the Board of the Regulator (Patrick Neary, Evidence to the Oireachtas Inquiry into the 
Banking Crisis, May 28
th
 2015). 
 This evidence confirms that senior staff within the Regulator were aware of the risks 
posed by the widespread availability of 100 per cent LTV mortgages, and that intervention 
was possible and advisable. Instead of increasing the risk-weighting for 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages in 2005 as a disincentive to their provision, or effectively banning them by 
attaching conditions to banking licences, the Regulator relied upon moral suasion which 
Liam O’Reilly later admitted “was a mistake” (Liam O’Reilly, Evidence to the Inquiry into 
the Banking Crisis, June 11
th
 2015). Brian Patterson, the Chairman of Financial Regulatory 
Authority in 2005 later said that they feared foreign banks beyond their supervisory reach 
could have gained advantage over competitor Irish banks. Further, he said that the Regulator 
did not want to get involved in individual products, but that they could have tackled 
“inappropriate selling” of 100 per cent LTV mortgages by attaching conditions to banking 
licences which “effectively would have banned them (Brian Patterson, Evidence to the 
Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, June 11
th
 2015). 
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9.7 The View of the Banks 
Around this time, mid-August 2005, responses from banks to the letters from the Minister for 
Housing on 100 per cent LTV mortgage products, were received by the D/Env. First, Bank of 
Ireland replied stating that the bank shared the Minister’s concern over house price inflation. 
The bank added that there was “widespread consensus” that the Irish housing market was 
“entering a period of near equilibrium” (see Figure 9.18). Regarding 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages the letter went on, “[a]gainst this background, we are not of the opinion that our 
product is in itself going to cause a noticeable increase in house price inflation”. Of course 
this view ran contrary to the belief of media, commentators and D/Env, and stating that the 
provision of 100 per cent LTV mortgages was not “in itself” likely to cause a noticeable 
increase in house price inflation was a straw man argument, as the Minister had not claimed 
that they would.  Stating that these mortgages were not suitable for “every” first time buyer is 
another example of straw man argumentation.  
Despite the bank stating that these products were not suitable for them, the content of 
the aforementioned ESRI survey and the views of the mortgage brokerage cited earlier 
demonstrated the expectation amongst first time buyers that the availability of 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages served to make more money available, and that half of all first time buyers 
could get on the property ladder without savings of their own, and expectation in a housing 
market is fundamental to price levels. As Nyberg put it, “readily available liquidity and 
perceived/expected demand for property can artificially inflate its value and create additional 
equity above existing loans. When the perceived demand and liquidity disappear, so does the 
supposed equity” (Nyberg, 2011: 36). 
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Figure 9.18: Letter, Bank of Ireland to Dept. of the Environment, August 18
th
 2005 
The reply from Bank of Ireland also touched on, rather than directly dealing with, the point 
made by the Minister for Housing that making 100 per cent LTV mortgages available saw the 
“effective abandonment” of one of two key, traditional criteria for securing a sustainable 
mortgage.  These two criteria were ability to repay based on a loan-to-income multiplier, and 
a lower LTV ratio. In their letter Bank of Ireland say that “entry criteria has been set to target 
the product selectively and those who are positioned to afford a loan at this Loan to Value 
level” and they are “retaining [their] very strong focus on ability to repay and are… one of 
the lenders in the market who stress test repayments at a rate of 2% above [their] standard 
variable rate”.  Finally, Bank of Ireland set out the motivation for introducing their 100 per 
cent LTV product: despite their view that the mortgage market was already well served, once 
major competitors began selling 100 per cent LTV mortgages they were left with little option 
but to ensure that there was “no product innovation gap” in their portfolio in order to protect 
their franchise.     
 Second, Permanent TSB replied to the letter from the Minister for Housing on August 
19
th. Again, the bank stated that it shared the Minister’s concerns regarding house price 
inflation, adding that the significant media exposure given to 100 per cent LTV mortgages 
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focussed on their availability rather than the “strict criteria” applied to applications. (Letter 
from Permanent TSB, Dept. of the Environment, Scan 12, August 19
th
 2005). Pointing to the 
moderation in house prices at that time, the bank state that they “do not believe that the 
introduction of 100% mortgages should have any impact on this trend of moderation or in 
any way contribute to house price inflation”, and believe “it is important product option to 
have available… and one which can help alleviate the otherwise difficult plight of many 
people trying to make their first step onto the property ladder” (Figure 9.19). Unlike the letter 
from Bank of Ireland, there is no mention of the competitive market forces prompting 
Permanent TSB’s entry into this market or undertaking to monitor their use carefully. There 
is the claim that 100 per cent LTV mortgages should not have “any” impact on house prices, 
contrary to the belief of many observers.  Perhaps even more striking was the omission from 
PTSB’s letter to the Minister that they had contacted the Regulator privately on at least two 
occasions in the previous month, asking the Regulator to intervene (Figure 9.20).  
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Figure 9.19:  Letter, Permanent TSB to Dept. of the Environment, August 19
th
 2005 
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Figure 9.20:  Internal File Note, Permanent TSB, July 27
th
 2005 
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9.8 Analysis by the Department of Finance 
D/Fin’s response to D/Env’s letter, proposed by the senior official on August 17th, was (a) 
analysis by D/Fin of the impact of 100 per cent LTV mortgages on house prices, and (b) a 
follow-up with the Financial Regulator on traditional core lending criteria and LTV ratios. 
There is little documented evidence of extensive activity. The Wright Review of the 
Department of Finance later described this response as an example of D/Fin not organising a 
strategic response to the problem, or identifying a full range of options to moderate activity in 
the sector. It also demonstrated D/Fin’s lack of coherence across its divisions in dealing with 
the issue (Wright, 2010: 31).  
The only record of internal D/Fin analysis of the issue comes in the form of a two 
page document (entitled “Analysis of Possible Effect of 100% Mortgages”) and an 
accompanying media article on plans by the Regulator to introduce a sliding scale of higher 
capital reserves for 100 per cent LTV mortgages, which it did eight months later. The official 
who prepared the analysis sent it to her superior on September 1
st
, and copied more senior 
officials in the Department on the email. When questioned at the Banking inquiry in 2015 
about the Department’s conclusions on 100 per cent mortgages, one of those senior officials 
copied on the analysis testified that he “wasn’t involved in preparing that response” and was 
not able to cast any light on it. The analysis concludes that 100 per cent LTV mortgages 
would be inflationary, though the extent of that inflationary pressure was unclear. There are 
only two bolded sentences in the analysis. The first reads: “econometric studies demonstrate 
that relaxation of liquidity or increases in credit do exert a positive impact on prices”; and the 
second reads “at this stage it is impossible to tell the precise impact” (See Figure 9.21).  
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Figure 9.21: Analysis by Dept. of Finance, September 1
st
 2005 
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The analysis shows that D/Fin had informal contacts with the banks regarding the new 
products. Permanent TSB indicated to them that take-up was, at that stage, low adding that it 
takes around six weeks for approvals to be made. EBS had only introduced the product in the 
previous week, while ICS had received “a lot of enquiries”. The analysis states that “[g]iven 
time constraints other private sector intuitions not contacted yet”, meaning conclusions on 
product take-up were based on just three providers (Permanent TSB, EBS and ICS), none of 
whom had firm data.  
The analysis goes on to say: “While no econometric or other studies of the impact of 
100% mortgages specifically have been carried out in Ireland, econometric study of impact of 
credit on house prices (Kieron McQuinn, Central Bank Technical paper No. 5 2004 
November 2004) indicates an elasticity of about 0.6 with respect to the impact of a change in 
credit to price”.  The reference to the 2004 paper is notable here. While that paper does 
examine the link between credit and house prices in a technical manner, it is the non-
technical conclusions arrived at on foot of that technical work that is perhaps more important 
in the context of the D/Fin’s investigation into the likely impact of 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages: 
“Adopting different time-series econometric approaches, we find fairly 
conclusive evidence of a mutually reinforcing long run-relationship between 
house prices and credit levels. This contrasts with other recent work which generally 
finds that this long run relationship operates in one direction or another.  
We argue that this result is probably due to the coming together of a group of country-
specific factors in Ireland such as the recent economic boom, net migration and 
rigidities in housing supply. Based on the long-run estimation, we augment an 
existing model of the Irish property sector to examine the dynamics within the system.  
In the short-run we find that the contemporaneous value of credit growth has a 
positive and significant effect on house price growth. However, house prices do not 
appear to influence credit contemporaneously in the short run. 
It would appear that the provision of greater levels of credit (in terms of loan to 
income ratio) over the past few years has also contributed to the rate of growth. 
Thus, while fundamental factors continue to experience favourable conditions 
(low interest rates, steady income growth rates etc.), the housing market is likely 
to continue to experience some price growth.  
However, in an equilibrium context, if the market is subject to, say, a significant 
income and/or interest rate shock and credit institutions, consequently, revise 
their credit income ratios downwards this would result in any initial price 
declines being exacerbated.  
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On the basis of this work, what are the implications for the stability of the 
domestic financial sector? A greater level of credit availability means that, 
ceterus paribus, mortgage holders have outstanding loans that are greater than 
what they otherwise would have been if availability had been curtailed.  
At the moment, banks have a ‘haircut’ on the market value of the housing assets 
through the loan to value ratio and the fact that this lending is collateralised. However, 
if an increasing proportion of their loans are to borrowers with higher loan to 
value ratios, then they will have less of a comfort margin in the event of a decline 
in residential property prices” – Fitzpatrick and McQuinn, 2004: 17-18, emphasis 
added 
Parallel to carrying out its analysis, D/Fin contacted the Regulator on August 17
th
 (record not 
available), and on September 2
nd
 the Regulator replied nominating their Consumer Director  
(rather than their Prudential Director) to set up a meeting on the topic of recent developments 
in the mortgage market (see Figure 9.22).  
 On foot of their analysis and this reply from the Regulator, D/Fin replied D/Env (see 
Figure 9.23).  The letter captures well the conclusions of the cursory and (as now seems the 
case) incomplete analysis undertaken within D/Fin, notwithstanding the adequacy or 
otherwise of that analysis. The letter concludes with an invitation to a meeting and it would 
be another two months, in November, before the Departments of Finance, Environment, and 
the Regulator would hold the relevant meeting on the issue.  
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Figure 9.22: Letter from Regulator to Dept. of Finance, September 2
nd
 2005 
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Figure 9.23: Letter from Dept. of Finance to Dept. of Environment, September 2005 
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9.9 The Immediate Media and Political Backdrop 
Over those intervening months, the issue continued to get attention in the media. On August 
29
th
 2005 Davy Stockbrokers (who were part of Bank of Ireland Group and acted as 
stockbroker to Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland and Irish Life and Permanent at the time) 
published a 40-page research note which, inter alia, examined the impact of 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages being more widely available on affordability. The research cannot be 
described as obscure given that it was the subject of an article in The Irish Times headed 
“Testing times for 100% mortgages” (Irish Times, Property Section, September 1st 2005: 
28), and was published on the same day as the alternative article from the Irish Independent 
which the D/Fin official attached to their in-house assessment of the issue (see above). 
Relying on the newspaper article alone it would be clear that a study of the impact of 100 per 
cent LTV mortgages specifically had been carried out in Ireland, and that there was cause for 
concern. Had this summary of the research prompted the reader to consult the full research 
they would have read, amongst other findings, the following: 
 “If we take a look at the mortgage market where we have the most data, loan to value 
ratios (LTVs) have largely remained well behaved, until now that is.  
 With FTB's finding it increasingly difficult to put together a deposit, First Active 
recently broke ranks and is now offering a 100% LTV product aimed at first time 
buyers.  
 The product was described by one mortgage broker as the ‘biggest development in the 
Irish mortgage market in years’ and First Active admit that it will add to house price 
inflation in the short term.  
 Ulster Bank (First Active's sister company), Permanent TSB and Bank of Ireland have 
all followed the move (i.e. over half the market by stock and flow) and even if the rest 
do not with their "off the shelf" offerings, it will up the ante in the market and 
encourage banks to offer 95–100% LTV's more frequently. 
 The initial indications are that the product has been very popular 
 The analyst posed as a first-time buyer couple with a joint income of €60,000 and, 
based on a 100 per cent LTV loan, was offered a mortgage of up to €360,000 over 35 
years. Such an offer, at six-times the borrower’s income, would require and 
repayments of 37 per cent of disposable income which is very high for such earners. 
 Credit growth needs to slow from its current stellar pace. 
 The findings do not surprise us and confirm our suspicion that the bank's willingness 
to lend may be as big a driver of the mortgage market right now as any of the other 
factors we tend to point to i.e. demographics, rising disposal incomes etc. and it is a 
trend we would prefer not to see”. 
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Figure 9.24: Example of Research Urging Caution Pre Decision (excerpt), August 2005 
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On September 8
th
, The Irish Times ran an article with the headline “Prepare your battle lines 
for fight ahead” warning that “if the economy fluttered and house prices fell even a tiny bit, 
consumers holding [100 per cent LTV mortgages] would be sitting in the very precarious 
position known as negative equity” (Irish Times, Property Section, September 8th 2005: 40). 
A week later, the headline was more direct: “Beware before banking on a 100% mortgage”. 
This article reports new research by the Irish Mortgage Corporation, stating” research tells us 
that first-timers are now less likely to save for their house purchases than ever before” (Irish 
Times, Property Section, September 15
th
 2005: 46). On October 8
th
, the Sunday newspapers 
ran stories by economist Alan Ahearne headed, “We are on our own if the bubble bursts” 
(Sunday Business Post, October 8
th
 2005) and “What goes up often comes down- with a big 
bang” (Sunday Independent, October 8th 2005).  
 Perhaps the most remarkable media story published in the run up to the meeting 
between the D/Fin, D/Env, and the Financial Regulator was published on October 14
th
 2005. 
Headed “Watchdog sanguine on property boom”, the opinion piece authored by Michael 
Casey is notable for a number reasons. Firstly, it was written by someone who had held a 
senior position within the Central Bank, where Casey had been Assistant Director General. In 
addition, the piece was openly critical of the Financial Regulator stating that despite the 
Regulatory authority expressing concerns about property prices, it seemed to be “more 
concerned about the prudential implications of property price increases rather than any 
inflationary consequences” (Irish Times, Finance Section, October 14th  2005: 5). Finally, the 
piece was remarkable in its direction towards policy-makers (as opposed to banks or 
borrowers), with the subhead reading: “policy-makers must put national interest before that 
of financial institutions”. The article stated that banking is an unusual industry in the sense 
that competition based on mortgage products could become "a race to the bottom". Casey 
argues that there was a role for the Regulator to act “as a ringmaster”  
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Figure 9.25: Excerpt from “Watchdog Sanguine on Property Boom”,  
by Michael Casey, The Irish Times, Finance Section, October 14
th
 2005 
On the political front, it must be noted that these deliberations were taking place whilst the 
Oireachtas (parliament) was on summer recess which has begun on July 1
st
 2005. Although 
the Dáil and Seanad had returned on September 28
th
, there was no discussion on 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages until November 9
th
, and even then it was brief. During a session of 
parliamentary questions to the Minister for Finance, an opposition member had warned of the 
impact of future interest rate increases “for example, in the case of couples with 100% 
mortgages costing €600,000” (Dáil Éireann, Other Questions – Official Engagements, 
November 9
th
 2005).  Rather than deal with the availability of high LTV products. Minister 
Cowen focussed on interest rate policy stating that it was “exclusively a matter for the 
Governor of the European Central Bank. I do not speculate on such issues, for obvious 
reasons”. This reply is similar in approach to those offered in response to questions on credit 
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extension and personal indebtedness, where the Minister highlighted the Central Bank and/or 
Regulator’s role, as opposed to his or his Department’s. Nevertheless, as will be shown later, 
it is important to have a reliable record of the issue of 100 per cent LTV mortgages being 
raised directly with the Minister for Finance in advance of the decision not to intervene, 
which would follow later in that month. 
 The ongoing nature and level of concerns regarding house prices is evidenced by the 
Government setting aside time on November 16
th
 2005 in the Dáil to discuss housing policy 
(Dáil Éireann, Housing Policy – Statements, November 16th 2005).  The session opened with 
a statement from the senior Minister at D/Env, Dick Roche, and contributions were made 
from all sides of the House. Minister Roche used his statement to focus policy measures to 
address supply and quality. In terms of affordability, the Minister’s emphasis was on State 
schemes for low-income households such as the shared ownership scheme, the 1999 
affordable housing scheme, and the Part V housing initiative, and the forecasted 12,000 units 
of output to be delivered from all the affordable schemes between 2005 and 2007. The word 
“mortgage” did not feature in the Minister’s statement. In contrast, the main opposition 
speaker raised the issue of mortgage debt early in his contribution: 
“People are now obtaining mortgages they will never be able to pay back. They are 
borrowing in a climate in which interest rates are about to increase. One might believe an 
increase of 1% is not very much, but one should remember it is not so long ago since 
mortgage interest rates were 15% or 16%. The Minister and I remember this. The reality is 
that there are unacceptable developments in the economy. The Minister’s policy is not 
working and the pricing of houses has gone out of control” – Fergus O’Dowd T.D., Dáil 
Éireann, November 16
th
 2005 
Another opposition member was more specific, and prescient, in his contribution: 
“It has reached the point where 110% mortgages for houses are available in some 
circumstances and while the current Celtic Tiger economy might allow for that, the fact is 
that economic downturns do and will happen. The Celtic Tiger economy is no more the 
product of the efforts of this Government or those of any other Government except on a 
macroeconomic scale, but I will concede that when the downturn occurs, it will not 
necessarily be the fault of Fianna Fáil. It is a cycle, however. It will happen and unless we 
prepare for it, and this is where the Government is responsible, many couples will face 
interest rate hikes and a situation will arise similar to that in London in the 1980s. We do 
not want that to happen” - Paul Gogarty T.D., Dáil Éireann, November 16th 2005 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, given his engagement and public utterances on the topic in the 
preceding months, the Minister for Housing did use his statement to highlight his 
dissatisfaction with the banks:    
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“I will not defend developers and some of them have been extremely greedy. Of late, 
however, financial institutions have caused problems. At present, they can be seen 
offering 100% mortgages and interest-only mortgages. They have so much money 
that they compete for market share and appear to be lending money to people who 
may not realise what they are getting into. I have serious concerns in that regard and I 
wish the financial institutions were somewhat more measured in their actions” - Noel 
Ahern, Minister with Responsibility for Housing, Dáil Éireann, November 16
th
 2005 
Here the Minister points to the pursuit of market share by the banks, rather than a clamour 
amongst borrowers for the product, as the impetus behind the arrival of 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages on to the market, a view which echoes the response to him by Bank of Ireland. 
Nevertheless, the overall message from the Minister’s contribution was that the Government 
was doing a good job because it was succeeding in its main objective of “delivering” record 
levels of housing output alongside investment in social and affordable housing.  
 The beginning of November saw another important development, with the publication 
by the Central Bank of its annual Financial Stability Report (Central Bank of Ireland, 2005), 
known as the FSR. The FSR is important, firstly as it “monitored and provided analysis of the 
key risks to the financial system and financial stability” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 10). 
Secondly, FSR 2005 contained a dedicated Chapter entitled “The Growth in Mortgage 
Indebtedness in Ireland”, which employed econometric analysis to explain the increasing 
household mortgage indebtedness in Ireland at that time. Thirdly, it would subsequently be 
concluded that D/Fin relied on the FSRs as the basis for assessing risks or threats arising from 
the banks, and D/Fin “relied on the overall assessment in the reports rather than responding to 
the specific risks identified in the reports. The Department did not carry out adequate 
independent analysis of the risks” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 11). The Oireachtas 
Inquiry also heard that the Financial Regulator had never disputed the findings of the FSRs 
either. The FSR played a role in shaping thinking right at the top of D/Fin, with the Minister 
in 2005, Brian Cowen speaking in 2015 saying he met with the Central Bank when FSRs 
were produced, adding that briefings he received “from the Governor of the Central Bank and 
through the Financial Stability Reports were overall conclusively positive” (Houses of the 
Oireachtas, 2016: 188).  
 In this regard, the FSRs have been identified as one of the primary contributors to 
consensus that a so-called soft landing was the most likely outcome for the property market. 
The Director General of the Central Bank in 2005, Liam Barron speaking a decade later in 
2015 said that the FSRs were “by far the most important means employed by the [Central] 
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Bank to convey its views on matters relating to financial stability”, and linked them to the 
consensus: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.26: Written Statement by former Director General of the Central Bank to the 
Oireachtas Banking Inquiry, September 2015 (excerpt) 
 
In addition to influencing the top echelons of D/Fin, the FSRs were referenced by officials 
when considering individual economic issues. Specific reference is made to FSR 2005 in 
D/Fin’s letter to D/Env later that month communication their decision not to intervene on 100 
per cent mortgages.  
 
   
 
  
     
Figure 9.27: Dept. of Finance letter to Dept. of Environment, November 2005 (excerpt) 
 
This final statement is a reference to the aforementioned Chapter of FSR 2005 presenting the 
results of an apparently in-depth econometric analysis of increasing mortgage indebtedness in 
Ireland.  That research has subsequently been the subject of some controversy at the 2015 
Oireachtas inquiry into the crisis.  
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On the one hand, the Head of Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in the Central Bank in 
2005, and author of the Chapter on mortgage indebtedness - Frank Browne - has made strong 
comments on that work. Browne gave evidence to the Oireachtas Inquiry in 2015 that the 
research reflected the position of the Central Bank as opposed to his personal contribution, 
that it was prepared under severe time constraints over the summer of 2005, that he was 
asked to avoid any implication that LTV data would signal that banks were behaving 
irresponsibly, that the research exercise overall was not conducive to a technical measure or 
empirical benchmarking, and that a lack of data or appropriate benchmarks hindered 
conclusions (Browne, 2015: 29-30).  This is important for this research into the bad decision 
taken on 100 per cent LTV mortgages not least because that FSR Chapter - which was 
released in the weeks just before, and is referred to in that decision, includes the following 
passage: 
 
    
 
  
 
     
 
 
 
Figure 9.28: Central Bank of Ireland’s Financial Stability Report, November 2005, 
(excerpt, p.66) 
 
On the other hand, the former Director General of the Central Bank provided the following 
evidence to the 2015 Oireachtas inquiry into the crisis: 
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Figure 9.29: Section 24 Statement by former Director General of the Central Bank to 
the Oireachtas Banking Inquiry, November 2015 (excerpt) 
The publication of FRS 2005 is central to this case study because:  
 it monitored and provided analysis of the key risks to the financial system and 
financial stability  
 FSRs were relied upon by the Finance Minister and his Department  
 FSR 2005 contained a Chapter outlining the results of research into residential 
mortgage indebtedness which concluded that rapid growth could be explained by 
economic fundaments  
 the Director General of the Central Bank believed that Chapter to be the most 
important study of the pre-crisis period, and he along with the then Chief Executive of 
the Regulator were the officials which rejected the internal Regulator proposal to 
intervene on 100 per cent LTV mortgages 
 D/Fin would name FSR 2005 as informing its bad decision not to intervene to prohibit 
or limit 100 per cent LTV mortgages  
On the same day as FSR 2005 was published, the most important meeting of this case study 
was held.   
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9.10 The Meeting Between Departments and the Regulator  
On November 1
st
 2005, D/Fin and D/Env met with representatives from the Financial 
Regulator. It is notable that one of the representatives from the Regulators’ office was the 
official (Con Horan) who had, three months earlier, prepared background data in a memo and 
proposal in response to his concerns over the impact of 100 LTV mortgages to senior 
colleagues. Horan had proposed an intervention by the Regulator, a proposal which was 
rejected internally. Four records related to this meeting have been sourced under Freedom of 
Information legislation: 
1. A briefing note prepared in advance of the meeting by the Department of the 
Environment, for use at the meeting (Figures 9.30 and 9.31), 
2. A note taken by a Department of Finance official at the meeting (Figure 9.32), 
3. A note of the meeting composed by a Department of Environment official after the 
meeting, and 
4. A memo on the meeting prepared by a Department of Environment official for the 
Minister for Housing. 
Taking the four documents in order, it is clear that the objective for D/Env (for whom the 
meeting has been arranged) was to convey to the others that the Minister for Housing was 
“very concerned at the continuing level of house price increases and price expectations… and 
the likelihood that lending is a significant factor in this” (Note for Meeting with D/Finance 
and Regulator, Department of the Environment, November 2005, Scan 13)
16
. They noted 
recent articles by commentators not “attached to banks” raising concern, and wanted to hear 
the views of both D/Fin and the Regulator. D/Env wished to use the meeting as an 
opportunity to raise four critical points, each of which was subsequently found to be a real 
and valid concern: 
  
                                                          
16
 It is assumed that the Department of the Environment communicated the points set out in this note. They state 
in their note subsequent to the interaction, that the meeting “provided a valuable exchange of information and 
views on various issues and developments relating to the housing market and an opportunity to ensure that 
Finance and the Regulator are fully briefed on a range of relevant issues such as house prices, affordability and 
lending including various points in the attached personal briefing note”. 
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Figure 9.30: Dept. of the Environment Note for Meeting with Dept. of Finance,  
November 1
st
 2005 (excerpt 1) 
D/Env brought their specific concerns regarding a move away from traditional LTV criteria 
to the meeting: 
“Doesn’t its abandonment mean higher loans available to all who qualify on income 
criterion (as well as those who might have previously qualified on income but lacked 
deposit)? Isn’t this bound to have an inflationary effect?  
Doesn’t 100% mortgage build in expectation of price increase? Since lenders 
traditionally required headroom between loan and value – unless this is no longer 
needed they must now be regarding it as likely to be provided through price increase. 
There is concern that 100% lending will add to the psychology of house price 
inflation especially given the latter point. Price expectations are seen by many 
commentators as a significant factor influencing the market” – Note for Meeting with 
D/Finance and Regulator, Department of the Environment, November 2005, Scan 13 
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At their meeting in August, D/Env had been told by D/Fin that if D/Env believes that 100 per 
cent mortgages would impact on house prices it would be “necessary to show how this 
happens separated from all other drivers of prices”. Notwithstanding the challenging nature 
of that task, the Department of the Environment did bring a response to the meeting. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 9.31: Dept. of the Environment Note for Meeting with Dept. of Finance,  
November 1
st
 2005 (excerpt 2) 
Also included in D/Env’s briefing note for use at the meeting are lengthy extracts from 
Michael Casey’s opinion piece in the Irish Times (see section 9.9), indicating that they gave 
some credence to the points he made including: the need to put national interest before that of 
banks, that banking is an unusual market in terms of the need for intervention, asking why the 
regulator does not rule out 100 per cent LTV mortgages, and the inference that the Regulator 
does not view the property boom as a significant threat to the banks and the wider economy.  
D/Env’s briefing note also refers to media reports some weeks previous that the 
Regulator was proposing to impose higher capital reserve ratios for higher loan to value 
mortgages and asking whether there had been any further developments in this regard. (It is 
possible, if not likely, that they are referring to the same Irish Independent article of 
September 1
st
 circulated by D/Fin official along with their in-house assessment).    
 While a similar pre-meeting note is not available for D/Fin, a copy of their hand-
written notes from the meeting is available.  These eleven pages can be broken into two 
sections: four pages of meeting notes and seven pages of a draft letter setting conclusions 
arrived at, a letter which was sent by D/Fin to D/Env three weeks later.  
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Figure 9.32: Dept. of Finance Note of Meeting with Dept. of Environment and  
Financial Regulator, November 1
st
 2005 (excerpt) 
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Given the sparse nature of the note it is not possible to draw too many conclusions regarding 
D/Fin’s interpretation of the discussion. At most, it can be said that this record did not reflect 
the same seriousness or concern evident from the briefing note D/Env, and presumably 
communicated, to the meeting. From the note it appears that the D/Fin’s view of the best 
response was to keep a watching brief and meet again before the end of the year. It is 
interesting that the note states that there is an absence of “compelling evidence that 100% 
mortgage has driven prices” (emphasis added) as opposed to evidence that 100% mortgage 
will drive prices, in light of the compelling case that they indeed would do so included in 
D/Env’s note, and views elsewhere. For example, D/Fin’s own in-house assessment from two 
months earlier concluded that “it appears that these products will be inflationary”, a 
conclusion they communicated to D/Env in writing in September.  The 2004 technical paper 
by the Central Bank (cited by D/Fin) and the research by Davy’s outlined above, also 
provided important evidence. 
 In contrast to D/Fin, D/Env drafted an extensive formal note of the meeting (Note of 
meeting with Department Finance and Central Bank / Regulator, Department of the 
Environment, November 2005, Scan 15). The key issue from their point of view was that 
“while the Department of Finance and the Regulator acknowledge that increased lending 
levels have potential to contribute to house price increases and the Regulator has concerns 
about 100% mortgages (which seem to involve the effective dropping of the loan to value 
criterion) there does not seem to be evidence currently available that would justify action by 
the Regulator to prohibit or restrict 100% mortgages but the position will be kept under close 
review”. In other words, D/Env had failed to convince those with responsibility that 
intervention was warranted, with the evidence they had access to. According to D/Env’s note, 
this was a result of:  
(i) A determination by D/Fin and the Regulator that intervention “would 
appear likely to be a disproportionately severe response… which could 
provoke doubts about the sector, and the fact that it is not possible to isolate 
the effects of 100% mortgages, although it was agreed that more relaxed 
lending has potential to promote price increase” and,   
(ii) D/Fin being “very conscious of the significant implications for the overall 
economy of a possible downturn in the construction sector and the fact that 
housing demand is now partly underpinned by immigrants many of whom 
are, in turn, employed in the construction sector”.  
   232 
 
In addition, D/Fin’s note captures the difference between the privately expressed concerns of 
the Regulator (call in the banks, collect data, role of auditors, watch default rates) versus the 
formal, public response (difficult to see if 100 per cent LTVs driving price rises).  Finally, 
there is a marked difference between the D/Env’s record of the Regulator’s response and 
D/Fin’s, the former noting “concern”, the latter not so.   
9.11 Communicating the Decision 
A fortnight after this meeting of the two Departments and the Regulator, D/Fin sent a draft of 
a reply to the Regulator to review and asking for any observations they may have in advance 
of it being sent to D/Env (see Figure 9.33). A hand-written and typed version of this draft 
were made available under FOI legislation but given the poor quality of the reproduction of 
the hand-written version, only the typed version is analysed here.  The typed draft was 
reviewed by two officials in the Regulators office and although the final reply transmitted to 
D/Env differs to a significant extent, the correspondence received under FOI only allows one 
edit to be assigned to the Regulator, and it was a minor one.  
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Figure 9.33: Dept. of Finance draft letter to Dept. of Environment; version sent for 
proofing by Financial Regulator, November 2005  
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One of the officials from the Regulator’s office asked that a paragraph be altered very 
slightly. The original paragraph reads: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.34: Dept. of Finance draft letter to Dept. of Environment; version sent for 
proofing by Financial Regulator, November 2005 (excerpt) 
 
Having reviewed the letter, the Regulator replied to D/Fin (see Figure 9.35). Although the 
Regulator only suggested a change which cannot be described as altering greatly the import 
of the message, it is evidence of the institutional relationship between the D/Fin and the 
Regulator. In the final version, all of the text in the paragraph, following the words 
“residential mortgage lending”, was removed.  
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Figure 9.35: Emails between Dept. of Finance and Financial Regulator, November 2005  
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Figure 9.36: Dept. of Finance letter to Dept. of Environment, November 2005  
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Once the letter was agreed by the Regulator, it was reviewed by (at least) two officials within 
the Department of Finance and then transmitted to the Department of the Environment on 
November 25
th
, and copied to the Regulator (see Figure 9.36). This formal letter from D/Fin 
to D/Env, having been cleared with the Regulator, is the manifestation of what Wright called 
D/Fin’s failure to organise a strategic response to the problems in the property sector, or 
identify a full range of options to moderate activity:  “the Department’s response to concerns 
elsewhere in Government, and in some areas of the banking sector, about the introduction of 
100 percent mortgages…was an opportunity lost” (Wright, 2010, 31). The model proposed 
here identifies interests, institutions, and ideology contributing to rational / irrational 
outcomes as an explanation for this lost opportunity.   
 Overall, the purpose of this Chapter was to recount the relevant events in Ireland 
leading up to the decision by the Government in September 2005 not to intervene to prohibit 
or limit the widespread availability of 100 per cent LTV mortgages. It has provided a walk-
through of the story from the economic backdrop to the conclusion, identifying milestones 
such as the arrival of the first 100 per cent LTV mortgage, D/Env’s flagging of concerns with 
the banks and D/Fin, the views of the banks, the consideration (internally) by the Regulator, 
and the tri-party meeting. The account has run from the suitably chosen beginning in early 
2005, through to the end of the story. It has no noteworthy breaks in the causal story and 
suggests evidence of erroneous decision-making. This process tracing allows the research to, 
as Bennett and Elman posit, determine whether the purported factors are operating and also to 
look within the case for the observable implications of alternative explanations. Further, the 
case has been set out such that the evidence can elevate one explanation, derived from the 
theory specified in Chapter 6, over all others (Bennett and Elman, 2005: 460).  
 Having set out the chain of events leading up to the November decision, the research 
design described in Chapter 3 can now be applied to outline the extent to which interests, 
institutions, and ideology impacted on that decision, and to reveal evidence of irrationality.  
The results of the analysis of the most-likely, bad decision case will be reported in the next 
Chapter. 
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Chapter 10: Case Study Evidence of Influences on Decision-Making   
10.1 Recap on Approach 
The purpose of this Chapter is to report the outcome of applying the process tracing research 
design set out in Chapter 7, to the detailed case study recounted in the preceding Chapter. By 
process tracing that most-likely case, the existence, impact and interaction of interests, 
institutions, and ideology can help explain the suboptimal decision-making outcome on 100 
per cent loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages. This will supplement the quantitative content 
analysis research into government decision-making in the run up to Ireland’s recent economic 
crisis reported in Part II of this thesis. The previous Chapter provided the detailed story from 
the economic backdrop in 2005 to the decision by Government in November 2005 not to 
intervene to prohibit or limit the widespread availability of 100 per cent LTV products. This 
Chapter will set out if and how interests, institutions, and ideology influenced the suboptimal 
decision on high LTV mortgages, and report evidence of irrational decision-making. 
10.2 Evidence of Interests Impacting the Decision  
The case-study shows that banks were against the widespread introduction of 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages, and sought intervention to prevent it. Evidence did emerge of the banks 
seeking to maximise market share, of the Central Bank and Regulator pursuing consumer, 
prudential and industry promotion interests, and of D/Fin giving primacy to economic and 
political concerns. There is also evidence of D/Env prioritising its housing function and 
political concerns including its stated interest to oversee and seek to maintain an efficient 
housing market. The interests of property developers are also discussed below.  
 The available documentary evidence from 2005 of the interests of the banks consists 
of Permanent TSB’s internal file note (Figure 9.20), the letters from Joe Larkin of Bank of 
Ireland to the Minister for Housing on August 18
th
, and a letter from Denis Casey of 
Permanent TSB (PTSB) on August 19
th
 (see Figures 9.18 and 9.19). Bank of Ireland only 
introduced the high LTV mortgage because a competitor had done so, and the motivation was 
to protect their franchise, not because there was a gap in the market or because it was an 
inherently ‘good’ product. By Bank of Ireland stating that the high LTV mortgages would be 
kept under close review by the bank, there is an implication that it had some concern with 
regard to the suitability and appropriateness of 100 per cent LTV mortgages. Despite the 
Minister for Housing issuing something of veiled threat when he stated in his letter that it 
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would be necessary for him “to consider what might be done to minimise the risk of adverse 
impact on the housing market, as well as pointing out the dangers involved”, Bank of 
Ireland’s overall response was that the Bank itself would monitor the use of the product, in a 
context where it had admitted that the rationale for introducing the product was protecting its 
business. For their part, PTSB’s letter differs from Bank of Ireland’s, in that there is no 
reference to competitive market forces inciting PTSB’s decision to issue 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages. There is a stated belief that the mortgages should not have “any” impact on house 
prices, contrary to the views of many observers and D/Env. PTSB’s internal file note from 
July also suggests that they were not supportive of the products and had spoken to the 
Regulator on two occasions to make the case for intervention.  From this evidence, it could be 
argued that the bad decision was not taken in the interests of the banks, at least Bank of 
Ireland (or AIB who were not marketing 100 per cent LTV products), as prohibiting or 
limiting their use would not have hindered their competitive position, assuming the 
intervention applied to all banks operating in the market.   
 The Oireachtas Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis
 
in 2015 shed further 
light on the views of the banks in 2005 with regard to 100 per cent LTV mortgages, though 
they were at this stage views framed with the benefit of hindsight. The evidence of the former 
CEO of Bank of Ireland aligns with the 2005 letter: 
“Bank of Ireland came into the 100% home owner market after the practice had been 
established and we were losing market share.  The pioneers of 100% mortgages were 
Ulster Bank through First Active.  And when the concept of providing 100% 
mortgages was first raised at a group  risk policy committee, my recollection is it was 
declined and by the time we came to providing  100% mortgages, we were very much 
as a reluctant follower. It was to protect our franchise and, initially, the offering was 
to professionals. It was then broadened out to first-time buyers and, by definition, as 
things transpired; it was going to be a higher risk segment. That’s why we didn’t want 
to be in 100% mortgages” – Brian Goggin, Evidence to the Inquiry into the Banking 
Crisis, April 30
th
 2015 
When asked whether, in hindsight, Bank of Ireland should have entered the 100 per cent LTV 
mortgage market, the former CEO replied, “no”.    
 PTSB’s evidence to the Inquiry in 2015 differed greatly from that set out in the 
aforementioned letter to the Minister. PTSB advised the Minister for Housing in 2005 that 
100 per cent LTV would have no impact on the market or house price inflation, yet speaking 
in 2015 said that they privately told the Regulator that they “thought this was a bad product, a 
bad idea” and that in their view the Regulator “should seek to forbid the product” (see Figure 
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9.20 and David Went, PTSB, Evidence to the Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, September 3
rd
 
2015).  Despite this difference, there is some evidence that at least three banks (Bank of 
Ireland, AIB, and PTSB) were against the move to widely available 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages. Allied Irish Banks (AIB) did not enter this market in a significant way. Speaking 
in 2015, the AIB Chairman in 2005 (Dermot Gleeson) said that the introduction of 100 per 
cent LTVs was part of the RBS Group’s Irish operations (First Active/Ulster Bank) aim “to 
become the largest bank in Ireland”, adding that “AIB would sometimes grant 100%  
mortgage in the face perhaps of a threat to take a range of business  elsewhere, but it never 
advertised 100% mortgages and never made them  part of its marketing” (Allied Irish Bank, 
Evidence to the Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, March 26
th
 2015).  
 That leaves just one bank group, First Active / Ulster Bank, whose interests could be 
seen to have been served by the bad decision.  First Active, along with Ulster Bank, was part 
of the RBS group and the bank that launched the first widely available 100 per cent LTV 
mortgage in Ireland, as recounted in the previous Chapter.  Speaking in 2015, the former head 
of finance and chief executive at the First Active in 2005 explained the background to the 
launch of the product: 
“In 2004 the First Active mortgage market share was coming under  
pressure in the first-time buyer segment, where mortgage brokers in particular were 
gaining increased traction.  
Following market research and customer feedback, two things became clear  
to us. Firstly, whilst dated market maximum loans to value were already at 92%, some 
of our competitors were increasingly prepared to stretch LTVs to 100% or more to 
secure first-time buyers’ business.  
Secondly, our customers were increasingly having to rely on expensive short-term  
debt, through credit cards and personal loans, to fund the excess between the 
maximum LTV and the house purchase price.  
We already had a 100% mortgage product in existence for some years for 
professionals on which our experience had been very good. Given this 
experience, together with factors to which I already referred and the positive 
economic and demographic backdrop, we decided to recognise the market reality 
through publicly introducing 100% mortgages in what we judged to be a controlled 
and restricted way – no exceptions policy, reduction in maximum term. Before 
launching it, we put the mortgage through a rigorous risk assessment program in RBS 
and we notified the regulator of our intention” – Cormac McCarthy, former Head of 
Finance and Chief Executive, First Active, Evidence to the Inquiry into the Banking 
Crisis, May 6
th
 2015 
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Taking this evidence together, it can be argued that that the primacy of interests of the banks 
can be ruled out as the main factor motivating the bad decision. It appears that Bank of 
Ireland, AIB, and PTSB were not seeking to introduce these products, save for in response to 
the actions of First Active/Ulster Bank. On the other hand, First Active itself admitted that 
falling market share was its motivation, and the interests of First Active/Ulster Bank were 
served by the decision not to intervene to prohibit or limit 100 per cent LTV mortgages. This 
evidence must be weighed against the interests of the other parties involved, such as the 
Department of Finance, as well as the relative importance of institutional and ideological 
forces.   
There is evidence within the documentation that D/Fin placed significant weight on 
the economic (if not political) concerns, which were among its interests. This was in the 
context of what Honohan called the Government‘s pro-cyclical fiscal policy stance and 
“relaxed approach to the growing reliance on construction-related and other insecure sources 
of tax revenue” (Honohan, 2010: 6). After all, the revenue being generated by the property 
market to a large extent allowed Government spending to double in real terms between 1995 
and 2007. It is clear from the Department of Finance’s note of their August meeting that they 
saw the housing market as a domestic risk factor for the Irish economy, that the market was 
delicately poised, and that “any Government intervention could make matters worse” (Note 
of Meeting with Dept. of Environment, Dept. of Finance, Scan 9, August 11
th
 2005). The 
main economic Ministry or Department of any country would have an acute interest in 
maintaining the stability of their economy, and by arguing for a response (non-intervention) 
which in their mind kept the delicately poised economy going, they could serve their own 
short-term self-interest. It has been estimated that for every 10,000 houses built during the 
boom, one billion euro was generated for the Exchequer, 30,000 jobs were sustained and 
economic growth was boosted by one percentage point: “… it was a massive cash cow, 
everyone thought it was brilliant, but clearly, it wasn’t” (Tom Parlon, Director General, 
Construction Industry Federation, Evidence to the Oireachtas Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, 
May 13
th
 2015).  
That is not to say that D/Fin was unclear on the risks to the Exchequer of a downturn 
in the property market, or did not provide clear advice on the dangers of relying on associated 
tax revenues. However, D/Fin did not undertake “analysis or advice on the broader risk to the 
tax system from a more general downturn in economic activity from levels created in part by 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy…and this lack of policy initiative is …disappointing” (Wright, 
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2010: 32) . The Wright review of D/Fin concluded that there was no market for departmental 
advice on the suitability of policy commitments, but such analysis should have been provided 
and “communicated forcefully to the Minister for Finance and the Government”. Taking the 
example of the in-house analysis undertaken on 100 per cent LTV mortgages at the end of 
August 2005, it is difficult to understand at this remove why it was prepared as it was (See 
Figure 9.21).   
 Firstly, the Central Bank’s technical analysis published in 2004, known to D/Fin and 
examined (and cited) by them when trying to assess the impact of 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages, found that:  
 Credit growth had a significant effect on house price growth  
 Higher loan ratios have contributed to house price growth  
 The housing market is likely to experience continued price inflation   
 A significant shock will result in exacerbated price declines  
 Greater credit availability means mortgage holders have outstanding loans that are 
greater than if lending had been curtailed   
 If an increasing proportion of bank loans are to borrowers with higher LTVs then they 
will have less of a comfort margin in the event of a decline in property prices. 
D/Fin deemed the most pertinent conclusion of this technical work by Central Bank staff to 
be the elasticity co-efficient of a change in credit to price, rather than the points above. There 
is no reference in D/Fin’s analysis paper to any of these conclusions, which were based on 
“fairly conclusive evidence” (Fitzpatrick and McQuinn, 2004: 17). Instead D/Fin’s analysis 
goes on to cite “informal consultations with non-private sector economists”, which indicated 
that it was impossible to tell the precise impact of the widespread availability of 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages, and that up to one year’s worth of data may be needed to objectively 
establish price effects. This was despite the Central Bank paper concluding that credit growth 
had a significant effect on house price growth, higher ratios contributed to house price 
growth, and higher LTVs presenting a real risk in the event of a fall in property prices, all 
based on historic data, and not relying on new/future data. As a consequence, D/Fin’s 
analysis concludes that “only speculation is possible” regarding the consequences of not 
intervening as suggested by the Department of the Environment. After references to practice 
in the UK, investor opportunity abroad, and interest forecasts, the analysis concludes with the 
following summary: 
“Despite the uncertainties, the most common view received so far is that this 
development is inflationary, though the extent and duration is unclear, as is the overall 
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impact on house price growth” – Internal email and attachment, Department of 
Finance, September 1
st
 2005, Scan 12 
Secondly, there is the issue of the data which prompted an official within the Regulator to 
consider intervention on 100 per cent LTV mortgages earlier that month (August 12
th
), and 
outlined in the previous Chapter. The proposer of that intervention told the Banking Inquiry 
that his concerns were supported by research of international banking crises and, in 
particular, what had happened in Scandinavia in the 1990s. Specifically, the concern and 
proposal emerged from research which suggested that credit growth rates in excess of 20 per 
cent were indicative of a bubble, when levels in Ireland in 2005 “were growing higher than 
20 per cent, 25 per cent, and 30 per cent” (Con Horan, Evidence to the Inquiry into the 
Banking Crisis, May 27
th
 2015). An important question here is whether the data which 
prompted the concern and proposal within the Regulator was available to D/Fin when 
undertaking their analysis in August, or was it available only to or within the Regulator? 
Interviewed as part of this research in 2016, a senior Regulator official close to this decision 
in 2005 provided some insight on this. Data which prompted the concern and proposal within 
the Regulator in August 2005 was publicly available, and from well-known sources. An 
example is the OECD’s Economic Outlook (No. 78) which was published in 2005 and which 
contained a chapter investigating what was underlying house price growth (including in 
Ireland), and whether or not prices are in line with fundamentals. That OECD analysis 
reported, inter alia, that house prices had grown for 50 consecutive quarters in Ireland 
between Q3 1992 and Q1 2005, and had grown by 243 per cent over that time, by far the 
greatest upturn of all of the benchmarked countries (OECD, 2005: 146). Such data was 
enough to prompt some within the Regulator to suggest intervention on 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages, and lends weight to suggestions that D/Fin could have known what a good 
decision would have been (Senior Official, Financial Regulator in 2005: Interview, February 
13
th
 2016).    
 That said, it is difficult to assess the adequacy of D/Fin’s in-house analysis without 
falling victim to hindsight bias, and there are a number of explanations for why the analysis 
was carried out the way it was and reached the conclusions it did. For example, the Wright 
review has already found that there were “major shortcomings in the Department’s capacity 
[and] the Department had neither the time nor the resources to conduct in-depth investigation 
of issues. This reflected shortages of skills in the requisite disciplines…” (Wright, 2010: 33). 
That said, this analysis was requested by the Banking Finance and International Division of 
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its colleagues in the Budget and Economic Division in pre-crisis times (2005), before the 
crash and the “extraordinary pace of activity [which] exposed some major shortcomings” 
(Wright, 2010: 33). Thus, resources or time-constraints are not a likely explanation.  
 Alternatively D/Fin may have placed significant weight on the economic concerns 
which were among its interests, as discussed above. Interviewed as part of this research in 
2016, a senior D/Fin official close to this decision in 2005 provided some insight on this. The 
fact that the concerns of D/Env were being handled by the Banking Finance and International 
Division as opposed to the Budget and Economic Division was significant. The Banking 
Finance and International Division was not required to make a call on any wider 
macroeconomic issues when working through the 100 per cent LTV mortgages case, despite 
these issues making up a key element of D/Env’s concerns. The equivocal findings of the in-
house analysis suited the Banking Finance and International Division who were co-ordinating 
the response within D/Fin, and that analysis provided reasons as to why D/Fin could 
rationalise 100 per cent LTV mortgages to be a relatively benign issue. Had that analysis 
produced empirical evidence or validated the concerns expressed by D/Env, D/Fin would 
have had a problem (Senior Official, D/Finance in 2005: Interview, January 11
th
 2016).   
 The inference here is that the interests or self-interest of D/Fin were served by an 
analysis that did not support D/Env’s concerns and which rationalised developments in the 
property market. This suggests that the bad decision not to intervene on 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages might have served the interests of D/Fin, or elements of it. It can be confidently 
assumed that the alternative, an analysis which backed D/Env’s concerns and which 
suggested that developments in the property market were a cause of concern, would have 
posed a real challenge for D/Fin, and the Banking Finance and International Division in 
particular, in terms of formulating a response that would not undermine wider policy. This 
fear of evidence which would have made an intervention necessary, re-emerges in the 
discussion on institutional factors.       
 There is further evidence of D/Fin’s interests influencing the decision-making process 
later in the case. A comparison of the draft reply to D/Env in November 2005 (Figure 9.34) 
and the final version (Figure 9.36) in the previous Chapter, suggests a playing down of 
information which gave weight to D/Env’s concerns and which suggested that developments 
in the property should prompt concern and intervention. Officials within D/Fin deleted the 
words underlined below from the draft reply to D/Env. 
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“The recent Competition Authority report on the banking Sector pointed to a high 
degree of competition in residential mortgage lending and highlights the benefits of 
cheaper finance. The Financial Regulator also pointed to the potential impact of Basel 
II bank capital regulations which will change banks capital requirements and increase 
the availability of funding for future lending purposes”. 
Other notable deletions by the D/Fin from the original draft of the letter include: 
 “Credit growth and debt levels are identified [in the Central Bank’s Financial Stability 
Review (FSR)] as the main vulnerabilities to financial stability in Ireland. 
 [The FSR] also highlights a moderation in house price growth which suggests that 
while the risk identified in last year’s FSR of a sharp fall in prices cannot be 
dismissed, this risk may have receded somewhat. However, the FSR goes on to say 
that evaluative evidence suggests this moderation may not have persisted to the extent 
that was anticipated some months ago. This is also evidenced by your own 
Department’s house price statistics as discussed at the meeting. As highlighted by the 
Central Bank, if house price growth were to re-accelerate, this would have important 
implications for the expectations of gradual moderation in house process to an 
equilibrium rate. 
 Clearly [an easing in credit constraints] will need to be monitored by the Financial 
Regulator on an ongoing basis. It is obviously difficult to identify with precision, a 
single contributing cause to house price inflation, owing to the difficulty of 
distinguishing between a number of contributing factors.” 
Thus D/Fin removed text which brought to the attention of D/Env impending changes which 
would increase the availability of credit, highlighted credit growth and indebtedness as key 
vulnerabilities, stated that price moderation may not have persisted to the extent previously 
anticipated, noted that accelerated house price would have important implications for the 
expectations of a soft-landing, stated that banks’ lending criteria must be watched carefully, 
and a recognition that the complexity of property price inflation made identification of key 
contributing factors difficult. This may have been done to help draw a line under the issue, as 
opposed to eliciting a future response from an already-concerned D/Env regarding even-
further credit extension, market vulnerability, threats to the soft-landing thesis, and the 
possibility that high LTV mortgages were in fact a single contributing cause of house price 
inflation. As was the case with the in-house analysis, the alternative would have created a 
problem for D/Fin, and the Banking Finance and International Division specifically, with 
regard to formulating a response that would not undermine wider policy.   
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Interviewed as part of this research in 2016, a senior D/Fin official close to this decision in 
2005 provided some insight on this. While there was a desire within D/Fin to ensure that the 
length of the reply was comparable to the length of the original correspondence from D/Env, 
text was removed from the original draft. For example, the text that Basel II bank capital 
regulations would increase the availability of funding for future lending purposes – though 
accurate – was removed because it was inconsistent with the message D/Fin wished to send 
D/Env, and was text that could galvanise D/Env’s concerns (Senior Official, D/Finance in 
2005: Interview, January 11
th
 2016).    
 Ultimately, the letter was drafted to present a collection of points, none of them 
entirely compelling or persuasive even in D/Fin view, to send a message from D/Fin that 
nothing was going to happen in response to D/Env’s stated concerns, bar keeping the door 
open for further meetings and continuing the monitoring of the situation.  
 The interests of the Central Bank and the Regulator are a function of complex 
institutional arrangements described in detail in Chapter 8. In so far as their interests can be 
summarised, the Oireachtas Banking Inquiry describes the Central Bank (via the Governor) 
as being concerned with European System of Central Bank (ESCB) tasks, including financial 
stability, the Regulator’s interests were the prudential and consumer regulation of financial 
service providers and, finally, the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland 
(CBFSAI) Board, chaired by the Governor of the Central Bank was to the decision-making 
body for all remaining tasks, including the efficient co-ordination of the organisation as a 
whole (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 133). There was also the ‘dual mandate’ clause in the 
2003 legislation establishing the regulatory system which stated that the Central Bank and 
Regulator had an interest in promoting Ireland’s financial services industry. Finally, as to 
whether the Regulator pursued its interests prudential and consumer regulation equally was 
also subject to debate as discussed in the earlier Chapter. While the Central Bank and 
Regulator became subject to Freedom of Information rules from April 2015, the rules only 
apply to records created from April 2008, meaning no documentation from them relating to 
the bad decision in 2005 can form part of this process tracing research.  
 To help overcome this, interviews were conducted as part of this research in 2016 
with senior Regulator, D/Fin and D/Env officials close to this decision in 2005. According to 
them (and noting the dangers of hindsight), it was the short-term interests of consumers of 
banking services and house-buyers that primarily were being served by the decision in 2005 
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not to prohibit or limit 100 per cent LTV mortgages. This issue went beyond the availability 
of high LTV mortgages, and was as much to do with choice and competition in the banking 
market generally. These mortgage products would facilitate more first-time buyers 
purchasing homes, which was viewed at the time as being good from both a social and 
economic perspective, but the issue was as much about having many players active in the 
banking market Senior Official, D/Env. in 2005: Interview, January 8
th
  2016; Senior Official, 
D/Finance in 2005: Interview, January 11
th
 2016). In 2005, the Competition Authority 
pointed to the personal current account market in Ireland being highly concentrated, with AIB 
and Bank of Ireland sharing in excess of 70 per cent of the market, and this was as indicator 
of a lack of competition (Competition Authority, 2005: vii). The Authority concluded that 
banks in Ireland “do not compete aggressively for customers”.  
 The focus on consumer interests was aligned with the interests of the Regulator at that 
time, and along with the view by those close to the decision that the consumer was the 
‘winner’ in their discussions, suggests that the interests of the Regulator were a strong 
influence on the bad decision. As detailed in previous Chapters, the importance of the 
consumer interest function was evident in the Regulator with the presence of the Consumer 
Director on the Authority, though no corresponding position for the Prudential Director. 
Further, when D/Fin contacted the Regulator on August 17
th
 2005 regarding D/Env’s 
concerns, the Chief Executive of the Regulator nominated the Consumer Director to respond 
to and meet D/Fin (see Figure 9.22). The interview conducted as part of this research in 2016 
with a senior Regulator official close to this decision in 2005, shed light on another aspect. 
 The decision not to intervene was also aligned with the Central Bank and Regulator’s 
interests with regard to their function under legislation to promote Ireland’s financial services 
industry. It was believed by senior management within both the Regulator and the Central 
Bank that intervention on 100 per cent LTV mortgages, no matter how narrow the issue or 
targeted the measure, would draw unwanted attention to the Irish market and the nature of 
regulation here (Senior Official, Financial Regulator in 2005: Interview, February 13
th
 2016). 
This view is consistent with evidence heard at the Oireachtas Banking Inquiry when senior 
management considered intervention in August 2005 there was concern that such action 
would jeopardise the stability of the Irish financial system, and would be inconsistent with 
the principles-based approach (Con Horan, Evidence to the Oireachtas Inquiry into the 
Banking Crisis, May 27
th
 2015).  All of this indicates that the Regulator’s interests in the 
consumer-focused regulation of financial service providers, and the combined regulatory 
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systems interests in promoting the financial services industry in Ireland, were an important 
factor in this decision-making process. 
 Discerning the interests of D/Env in this case is more straightforward given the 
number of documents accessible from the time and the extent to which D/Env stated their 
interests internally and to external bodies in those documents. Overall, it is clear that D/Env 
pursued the objective outlined in their Statement of Strategy, to “oversee and seek to 
maintain an efficient housing market” (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government, 2005: 23 and 44). The Minister for Housing’s letters to the banks, D/Env’s 
initial email to D/Fin, their interventions at the two meetings on the topic, their formal letter 
to D/Fin, and their internal notes, all illustrate that D/Env’s interests were in maintaining a 
stable housing market, avoiding inflationary policies, and protecting against wider, negative 
economic impacts (see previous Chapter for documents). Even D/Fin’s note of the August 
10
th
 meeting records D/Env linking 100 per cent LTV mortgages to “the soft-landing scenario 
for the housing market” (see Figure 9.13). While D/Env’s interests were a factor in the 
decision, they did not win out as no intervention was made to prohibit or limit the high LTV 
mortgages in 2005. It was the interests of others (D/Fin, Regulator, consumers) which 
trumped those of D/Env and when these were combined with institutional and ideological 
factors (see below).  
Finally, one group closely associated with activities which helped precipitate the crisis 
in Ireland were the property developers, and they were not dis-interested parties in this 
decision, while inactive parties in it. A feature of the bubble was the concentration of lending 
to a limited number of property developers (Regling and Watson, 2010: 31), and as that 
lending to property developers soared, much of it “turned out to be unrecoverable thus 
proving to be the major weakness of the banks” (Honohan, 2010: 26). The demand for 
lending by developers was spurred on by the supply of credit to mortgage borrowers, and that 
mortgage credit was the developers’ income. In this regard property developers would have 
had something to gain from a relaxation in lending standards and you might expect them to 
have been supportive of their introduction, or silent in response to criticism of their arrival on 
the Irish market. There is no evidence in the documents examined in this research of 
developers seeking to influence the decision in November 2005. Although speaking with 
hindsight, a decade after the event, the evidence of the developers’ representative 
organisation of the Oireachtas Banking Inquiry offers one explanation as to why this is so: 
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“[H]aving thought about it long and hard, and the Construction Industry Federation, 
whatever the impression might have been, they’re a very impressive, serious 
organisation with people that have been there for 20 and 30 years, a lot of experience, 
and a lot of integrity involved in the people. We look at that in terms ourselves and 
say, “What could we have done?” 
It would have been bloody difficult to stop it, at that time, but clearly, you know, a 
company that’s reliant on your customers having 100% mortgages, and we not 
knowing where the financing was coming, and a banking system that was reliant on a 
massive lot of short-term credit and giving long-term loans was a recipe for disaster, 
but I didn’t have the scope to see that, I’m sorry to say, at the time” – Tom Parlon, 
Director General, Construction Industry Federation, Evidence to the Inquiry into the 
Banking Crisis, May 13
th
 2015 
In short, the developers do not appear to have been concerned enough, if at all, about where 
home-buyers sourced the credit to purchase the homes they were building or the terms of that 
credit, to intervene one way or another to pursue their interests on the issue of 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages.  
 Finally, this decision-making case progressed in a particular social and political 
context. As described in the previous Chapter, the knock-on impact of house price inflation 
and loosening credit standards were becoming an increasingly prominent political issue. 
Therefore any decision which could determine whether first-time buyers would have to save 
a deposit before purchasing a house was bound to have some social and political 
ramifications. Interviewed as part of this research in 2016, a senior D/Env official close to the 
decision in 2005 provided some insight on this. There was no sense in the summer of 2005 
that intervening to limit 100 per cent mortgages would pay any political or electoral dividend. 
On the contrary, the products were viewed as socially and politically popular, suggesting that 
the decision not to intervene could have also served political interests Senior Official, D/Env. 
in 2005: Interview, January 8
th
 2016). There was no evidence of this from either the 
documentation of the time or from information gathered subsequently.      
10.3 Evidence of Institutions Impacting the Decision 
As set out in the research design in Chapter 7, evidence was sought of institutional 
arrangements and/or expertise impacting with negative consequence on the decision process. 
The extant documentary evidence does reveal institutions, and the relationships within and 
between D/Fin, the Central Bank, the Regulator, the D/Env, and the banks to be a telling 
factor which shaped the bad-decision outcome in November 2005. Institutions prompted the 
type of decision taken, prioritised certain interests, and promoted some information over 
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alternatives. As the communicator of the decision, D/Fin will be placed at the centre of these 
relationships for the purposes of describing what the evidence reveals. This will be followed 
with some discussion of internal relationships within the Central Bank, between the banks 
and the Regulator, and the role played by Ministers.  
The Department of Finance and the Department of the Environment 
As two government Departments, led by Ministers from the same political party, subject to 
many of the same external economic, political, media and civic pressures, operating under the 
same civil service rules, the difference in D/Fin and D/Env’s approach to this case is 
remarkable. The impact of interests detailed above explains some of this difference. The 
institutional arrangements and relationship are also important. On the face of it, D/Fin 
adopted to a large extent the views of the Regulator whereas D/Env appears to have displayed 
more independence when considering the evidence and arriving at conclusions. There was a 
marked difference in the weight given by D/Fin to input into the decision made by D/Env, 
and that made by the Regulator. That was a function of the relationship D/Fin had with both 
organisations. 
In their formal approach to D/Fin on August 12
th
2005, D/Env states that it makes its 
points without prejudice to consideration of the issue by D/Fin and the views of the 
Regulator. Despite the Minister for - and Department of - Finance giving primacy to the role 
of the Regulator in a myriad of parliamentary questions, D/Env clearly still hold that D/Fin 
has the central role in dealing with their concerns about 100 per vent LTV mortgages. 
Interviewed as part of this research in 2016, senior D/Fin and D/Env officials close to this 
decision in 2005 provided some insight on this. There was recognition within D/Env that its 
activity and influence in housing policy had waned over preceding years. Whereas D/Env had 
been central to national housing policy via their steering of the three so-called ‘Bacon 
Reports’ in 1998, 1999, and 2000, this was not the case in 2005. The Minister and 
Department of the Environment were central to the preparation, publication, and 
implementation of these reports which assessed the housing market, evaluated the trends and 
prospects, and shaped housing policy in the early 2000s. D/Env also had a key role in 
mortgage policy up to 1989 from which point building societies (who were major players in 
the mortgage market) could legally demutualise, become public companies and operate as 
banks. Once they had done so, building societies were supervised by the Regulator in 
common with other financial institutions and D/Env ceased to have policy responsibility for 
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them. All of this was despite the Minister for Housing, a ‘Minister of State’ / junior 
ministerial position, residing within D/Env. The consequence of developments was that 
D/Env’s role in 2005 was essentially limited to social and affordable housing policy, urban 
renewal, and publishing housing statistics. Thus D/Env viewed D/Fin as the key institutional 
actor for them in responding to what they saw as a negative development in the mortgage 
market (Senior Official, D/Env. in 2005: Interview, January 8
th
 2016).  
 In 2005 D/Env still had a stated objective to oversee and seek to maintain an efficient 
housing market and this contributed to D/Fin perceiving D/Env’s contacting them in July as a 
case of ‘shifting responsibility’ to D/Fin. There was a general sense in D/Fin that D/Env had 
abdicated its responsibilities around housing policy. For D/Fin, the 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages issue was one of housing policy, while for D/Env the issue was one of banking 
policy. When D/Fin and its Banking Finance and International Division took on the 
responsibility for D/Env’s concerns as a banking policy issue this appears to have had a 
profound impact on the decision-making process. For reasons which will be discussed below, 
D/Fin treated the views of various institutions on banking policy differently, meaning that the 
concerns expressed by D/Env on banking policy issues were not given the same weight by 
D/Fin as, say, concerns expressed by banks or the Regulator. In short, the concerns expressed 
by D/Env did not constitute a red-flag for D/Fin, but the same concerns expressed by the 
banks or the Regulator to D/Fin would have been dealt with as a red-flag and may have been 
handled with a different level of seriousness and urgency by D/Fin. This was compounded by 
uncertainty within D/Fin as to whether the concerns about 100 per cent LTV mortgages 
reflected the organisational view of D/Env or were the concerns of the Minister for Housing, 
who was seen to be particularly active on this topic (Senior Official, D/Finance in 2005: 
Interview, January 11
th
 2016).  
 In the discussion on the impact of interests (above), there was evidence of a fear 
within D/Fin of data which would have made an intervention necessary, and this hierarchical 
approach to how concerns were treated further complicates the decision-making process. 
Analysis which suggested that developments in the property market were a cause of concern, 
would have created a significant challenge for D/Fin, and the Banking Finance and 
International Division in particular, in terms of formulating a response that would not 
undermine wider policy. This is particularly true if such analysis came from the banks or the 
Regulator. As it was, in July 2005, the institutional relationship between D/Fin and D/Env 
impacted on the decision not to intervene on 100 per cent LTV mortgages and militated 
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against a good outcome: D/Fin did not rank D/Env’s concerns are highly as those of the 
Regulator or banks, and felt D/Env were abdicating their responsibility on what was a 
housing, rather than a banking issue. That is not to say that this issue ‘fell between two 
stools’, as D/Fin and the Regulator were well connected and debated the issue.   
The Department of Finance and the Regulator 
On the face of it, the institutional relationship between D/Fin and the Regulator insofar as it 
impacts on this decision case, is straightforward and is well set out in the following evidence 
given to the Oireachtas Banking Inquiry: 
“In terms of the role of the Department of Finance on the banking regulation side, we 
had no role in raising issues/concerns around the stability of the banks with the 
Central Bank because that was their job and they were an independent Central Bank. 
Once you get into a space where the Department is encroaching on the independence 
of a Central Bank, or the independence of the supervisor, you’re getting into, sort of, 
potentially quite difficult territory so, I mean, the responsibilities are defined in 
legislation… 
The Department’s involvement then, on my area of the Department, in looking at the 
banks specifically, is actually very specific and looking at the regulatory structures 
itself, the responsibility for the legislation that we have, but it’s also then the planning 
for a difficulty but we don’t have a role and we didn’t have the information and we 
would have been precluded from getting the information that would have allowed us 
to make any independent assessment…  
[The] Central Bank would certainly have given the Department short shrift, if it had 
arrived at its door asking or requesting to get involved in financial stability analysis” – 
William Beausang, Evidence to the Oireachtas Banking Inquiry, June 24
th
 2015.    
There is consistent evidence throughout the contemporary documents of the primacy given to 
the Regulator by D/Fin in dealing with the 100 per cent LTV mortgages issue.  Despite 
believing that this was a matter of housing policy, once D/Fin had accepted that they had to 
respond to D/Env, they deferred to the Regulator from start to finish, though they performed 
some in-house analysis. On receipt of D/Env first communication on this (see Figure 9.11) 
D/Fin highlighted the role of the Regulator, writing “regulator is looking at it – is his 
responsibility” on the correspondence. In their note of the meeting on August 10th, D/Env 
report D/Fin as stating that a formal approach to the Regulator required “caution [and] clear 
questions/points on impacts”, though no explanation for why caution should be exercised is 
given.  
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D/Fin’s official response to D/Env’s concerns in November clearly reveals the institutional 
influence on the decision-making process. There are seven paragraphs in the letter, and the 
deferring of D/Fin to the Regulator/Central bank is evident in each (see Figure 9.36). First, 
D/Fin reminds the D/Env that there were representatives from the Regulator and Central 
Bank at their key meeting on November 1
st
. Second, D/Fin point to the data and findings on 
mortgages and indebtedness reported by the Central Bank in the controversial chapter in FSR 
2005 (see Chapter 9). Third, D/Fin notes the Regulator’s view of the health of the banking 
system and the extent to which fundamental economic factors can explain mortgage growth 
and debt levels. Next, D/Fin recounts the Regulator’s view on the take up of 100 per event 
mortgage products. Fifth, they cite the Regulator’s overview of the competitive nature of the 
banking market. Then D/Fin remind D/Env of the role and actions of the Regulator in regard 
to raising awareness among consumers of the need to borrow prudently, and for banks to lend 
responsibly. In the final paragraph, D/Fin reports the Regulator’s view that higher LTV 
products are becoming more prevalent, and that borrowers and lenders must take into account 
the potential impact of higher interest rates. The cumulative effect of this presentation of the 
arguments by D/Fin is that there is very little of their voice in the communication.  
 The concerns raised by D/Env were communicated to D/Fin and there is no record of 
D/Env contacting the Regulator directly. In their letter to D/Fin (August 12
th
), they stated that 
if it was concluded that the potential impact of 100 per cent LTV mortgages give rise to 
concern, this would raise the question of what action may be appropriate for “the 
Government” to contemplate, not the Regulator (see Figure 9.15, paragraph six). What is 
apparent is that, despite the Regulator and D/Fin being formally independent de jure under 
legislation, the views held by D/Fin were de facto the views of the Regulator. This 
synchronisation in decision-making is most evident in the drafting of the formal reply to the 
D/Env (see Figure 9.33).  
The formal separation of D/Fin and the Regulator, perhaps ironically, resulted in 
identical decision-making processes and conclusions. 
“The concept of supervisory independence was also central to the design of the EU 
framework for financial regulation. The authoritative expert consensus at the time was 
that banking supervisors should benefit from the same high degree of independence as 
central bankers. It was therefore integral to my area of the Department’s relationship 
with the Financial Regulator that we should not take any significant action or step 
which could interfere or encroach on that strict supervisory independence.  
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This was essential to rule out any scope for any perception of political interference in 
financial regulation and supervision, given the major conflicts of interest that might 
potentially arise. Any perceived breach of that principle would certainly have given 
rise to major concerns at regulatory authority level, given the authority’s statutory 
mandate” – William Beausang, Senior Department of Finance official, Evidence to 
the Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, June 11
th
 2015  
Far from ensuring that one institution was not influenced by another, the institutional 
arrangement resulted in one of them accepting entirely the views of the other. When asked a 
decade later specifically about D/Fin’s response to the introduction by Irish banks of 100 per 
cent LTV mortgages, the responsible official in 2005 in the Department replied: 
“Well, I mean, there’s, I think, papers in the public domain reflecting ... and a 
freedom of information request, which deal with that issue at some length. I mean, the 
issue was raised by the Minister of Housing at the time with the Minister for Finance. 
We examined the issue on the banking side in consultation with our colleagues on the 
... on the economic side. We consulted with the Financial Regulator and we ... we 
responded and we met with the Department of the Environment and we ultimately 
responded to the Department of Environment on the basis of the analysis that the 
Financial Regulator communicated to us at that time around that issue. So, I mean, 
that’s ... you know, that’s an issue that we were involved in, yes, certainly, and it was 
an issue that we ... we assessed on the basis of the advice that we got from the 
Financial Regulator. I mean, you’ll recall that the Financial Regulator, that ... we 
wrote out in November 2005 back to the Department of the Environment but I think 
in March 2006, the Financial Regulator introduced a higher risk weighting on 
mortgage lending with LTVs of 100%” – William Beausang, Senior Department of 
Finance official, Evidence to the Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, June 11
th
 2015 
Speaking at the same inquiry, the Minister for Finance in 2005 also conveyed the dependence 
of D/Fin on the Regulator when it came to reacting to 100 per cent LTV mortgage products: 
“[T]he other point is on the regulatory side, I agree, you know, looking back now, 
there was certainly reason for the regulator to ... to intervene rather than simply adopt 
statements saying we’d be better ... you know, “Watch yourself getting a 100% 
mortgage” and all this stuff. We needed a more interventionist approach and we didn’t 
get it. Now, that’s where that ended up, and obviously it ... it contributed to some of 
the problem as well. So I ... I ... I mean these are the ... these are what we know now. I 
... I just felt supply ... increased supply is the best way of dealing with moderating 
house prices” - Brian Cowen, former Minister for Finance, Evidence to the Inquiry 
into the Banking Crisis, July 2
nd
 2015 
 
In the case of 100 per cent LTV mortgages at least, there is no evidence of some alternative 
view in D/Fin, and they did have access to D/Env’s alternative view and access to identical 
data that had prompted a leading official in the Regulator to propose intervention in August 
2005. However, D/Fin’s own analysis did not produce strong arguments for an alternative 
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course of action.  Interviewed as part of this research in 2016, senior D/Fin and Regulator 
officials close to this decision in 2005 provided some insight on this.  
 First, D/Fin and the Regulator appear to have differing views, in hindsight, as to who 
was the key decision-maker on the 100 per cent LTV mortgage issue in 2005. Contrary to the 
belief in D/Fin, the Regulator believed that, while the meeting between them, D/Fin and 
D/Env did not constitute a decision-making forum, the Regulator was the lesser of D/Fin in 
decision-making terms, and the Regulator answered to them. Though the Regulator was 
independent of D/Fin and was responsible for regulation, D/Fin (in the Regulator’s view) set 
the policy, and the discussion in 2005 on 100 per cent LTV mortgages was a matter of policy 
(Senior Official, Financial Regulator in 2005: Interview, February 13
th
 2016). The relevant 
legislation (Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act, 2003) does state 
that the Minister for Finance may, from time to time, request the Governor, the Board or the 
Regulatory Authority to consult with the Minister, in relation to their respective functions, as 
regards the performance by the Bank of any function of the Bank (other than one imposed on 
it by European obligations). The legislation also states that if the Minister for Finance has in 
writing notified the Regulator of any requirements with respect to the form in which its 
strategic plan is to be prepared, the plan must comply with those requirements. Legislative 
expertise would be required to decide whether these provisions did in reality mean that D/Fin 
set the policy on the mortgage market, but this point may be moot if it is what the 
representative from the Regulator at the meeting perceived to be the case.  
 Second, the institutional arrangement, and Central Bank/Regulator secrecy in 
particular, impacted on the decision-making process at this time. As discussed above, 
relevant legislation imposed obligations of professional secrecy on officers of the Central 
Bank and the Regulator and limited the extent to which Regulator staff could share 
information or views with D/Fin. An earlier section also recounted how the concerns 
expressed by D/Env did not equate to a red-flag for D/Fin, but the same concerns expressed 
by the Regulator to D/Fin would have been dealt with as a red-flag and might have been 
handled with a different level of seriousness by them. Though it emerged subsequently that 
there were those within the Regulator who felt strongly enough in 2005 to propose 
intervention on 100 per cent LTV mortgages, D/Fin had no sense of this during their 
engagement in 2005. The Oireachtas Banking Inquiry was told that both the Regulator’s 
Head of Banking Supervision (Con Horan, who made the proposal), and the Prudential 
Director (Pat Neary) supported intervention in 2005 (Evidence to the Oireachtas Inquiry, 
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May 27
th
 and 28
th
 2015). Mr. Horan was the Regulator’s representative at the meeting 
between them, D/Fin and D/Env on November 1
st
 2005. Had D/Fin known that the Prudential 
Director believed the situation on 100 per cent LTV mortgages to be such that intervention 
was warranted, that would be a major issue and would constitute a ‘red flag’ for D/Fin. The 
explanation emerging from the interviews undertaken for this research in 2016 with senior 
D/Fin and Regulator officials is that this crucial non-exchange of this information was a 
result of a combination of factors: a strong organisational line within the public service and 
the Regulator, the institutional secrecy within the Regulator (S33AK), a ‘wanting to believe’ / 
confirmation bias within D/Fin who were seeking re-assurance, an awareness of the political 
reality of the pressure on home-buyers, and the impact of recent analysis- specifically the 
Chapter on mortgage indebtedness in FSR 2005 (see Chapter 9). The impact of institutional 
factors on this particular decision were summed up in hindsight by a feeling within D/Fin that 
not only were confidential matters within the Regulator secret, everything was secret (Senior 
Official, D/Finance in 2005: Interview, January 11
th
 2016); and a belief within the Regulator 
that D/Fin were not seeking the views of the representatives of the Regulator (whom we 
know now held concerns) but were seeking the views of the institution of the Regulator as an 
entity in its own right (Senior Official, Financial Regulator in 2005: Interview, February 13
th
 
2016).  
 Third, D/Fin’s institutional standing within the policy system had been damaged by 
successive years of inaccurate forecasting on the economy and fiscal projections. In many 
instances growth often exceeded what D/Fin had expected, hurting their credibility and 
reducing their confidence in terms of recommending strong policy interventions. The 
simultaneous rise in influence of the Department of the Taoiseach and the Social Partnership 
process also denuded D/Fin of some of its traditional institutional power. The establishment 
of the Financial Services Clearing House in the Department of the Taoiseach, where D/Fin 
would have to report monthly to them and to the industry on the job they were doing, was 
further evidence of a loss of institutional power.      
 Overall, it is clear that the institutional relationship between the Regulator and D/Fin 
contributed to the poor decision outcome on 100 per cent LTV mortgages in 2005. Had D/Fin 
and the Regulator agreed with each other, and with D/Env about who was the ultimate 
decision-maker that could have impacted on the outcome, as could better information 
exchange around the level of concern within the Regulator about the products.  
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The Banks, and the Regulator / Government Departments  
There is no record of communication between any banks and D/Fin on the 100 per cent LTV 
issue in 2005. This suggests that the banks, at least one of whom was in active engagement 
with the Regulator, did not believe it necessary and/or appropriate to contact D/Fin. This is 
telling given the view by D/Fin that a statement of concern from a bank to them on 100 per 
cent LTV mortgages would have constituted a ‘red flag’ (in a way D/Env’s concerns did not), 
and begs the question as to whether the decision outcome would have been any different if, 
for example, D/Fin had received the messages contained in PTSB’s file note from July (see 
Figure 9.20). In a sense, on this issue there was too little lobbying of D/Fin by the banks.    
 The banks were in contact with D/Env in the summer of 2005 (see Figures 9.6, 9.7, 
9.18 and 9.19). First Active/Ulster Bank’s letter was in response to the Minister for 
Housing’s comments that banks were pursuing reckless lending policies, and the reply did not 
reflect any sense that these banks were overly concerned with D/Env’s reservations about 100 
per cent mortgages. For example, there is no offer to meet with the Minister or his officials to 
provide further re-assurance, nor any commitment to provide further updates or data.  Bank 
of Ireland replied to the Minister for Housing’s letter in which he clearly expressed concern. 
As discussed earlier, that bank expressed their shared concern and belief that they had no 
choice but to launch the product once a competitor had. They offer to work with D/Env on 
the affordable housing mortgage scheme, but again there is no sense that the bank sees D/Env 
as an important actor in, for example, working with them to get the Regulator to intervene. 
Permanent TSB also replied to the Minister for Housing’s letter and it is noticeable they do 
not even inform the Minister that they had contacted the Regulator to say that 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages were “a bad product” and that “the Regulator should seek to forbid the 
product”, assuming that this contact had already taken place (see Figure 9.20 and David 
Went, PTSB, Evidence to the Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, September 3
rd
 2015). In none 
of the correspondence between the banks and D/Env is there a sense that they view that 
Department as an important actor on the issue of mortgage policy. This is consistent with the 
discussion earlier about institutional power and the extent to which D/Env influence on 
housing policy had waned.  
 There is also evidence of the response politicians in general would have received from 
banks if they raised concerns about mortgage lending in 2005/2006, including a plea to trust 
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the market. Speaking to the Oireachtas Inquiry in 2015, the former Green Party leader said 
the following: 
“On the question of banking, the Green Party was to the fore in directly criticising the 
lending practices of the banks. Our then Finance spokesperson, Dan Boyle, recalls in 
a book he published on our time in government, a meeting with the Irish Banking 
Federation in 2006. He attended this meeting, along with the current leader of the 
party, Eamon Ryan and I’d like to quote directly: 
‘We brought up the question of the efficacy and economic sanity of issuing 110%  
mortgages, and the general lack of sustainability that seemed to exist in the property 
market; a market the banks seemed intent on inflating further. The response to our 
concerns was both arrogant and condescending. We didn’t understand banking, we 
were told, besides which the market would correct itself in a relatively painless 
manner’” - John Gormley, Evidence to the Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, July 29th 
2015 
This reveals something about institutional power, as representatives of the banks dismissed 
elected representatives of the citizens with (perceived) arrogance and condescension.  
 As was the case with interests, disentangling the banks’ relationship with the 
Regulator is complicated by the fact that there does not appear to have been a singular view 
from ‘banks’ as to whether 100 per cent LTV mortgages were a bad idea.   In one sense, the 
media coverage of the launch of the products exposed the nature of the relationship between 
the Regulator and the banks, stating that the “launch of the 100 per cent mortgage comes in a 
week in which the Central Bank welcomed the slowdown in house price inflation and 
signalled concern about high and growing levels of household debt” (Irish Times, July 14th 
2005: 1).  First Active bank either did not believe or did not care about the view of the 
regulatory institutions, and the Central Bank and/or the Regulator were not willing to take 
corrective action despite its own concerns and those further afield. As more banks entered the 
100 per cent mortgage product market, they too were openly ignoring the Central Bank.  
 At the Oireachtas Banking Inquiry, the Chief Executive at the Regulator in 2005 was 
asked if the banks simply ignored warnings, to which he replied: “I think it goes back to the 
euphoria. We failed, I suppose, to convince the banks that there was an issue” (Liam 
O’Reilly, June 11th 2015). This is puzzling and perhaps self-serving. The correspondence 
from Bank of Ireland and the testimony by PTSB to the same Inquiry suggests that it was the 
banks who failed to convince the Regulator that there was an issue with 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages. From the evidence available, the best explanation for any failure here lies in the 
principles-based approach taken by the Regulator to the banks (see Chapter 8). This in turn 
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reflects the influence of the third and remaining factor of interest in this research, ideology 
(see below).    
 One final institutional issue which may have negatively influenced this decision is the 
phenomenon of institutional memory. Institutions’ memories of the past are thought to be 
particularly acute when tackling economic and financial policy problems (Haldane, 2013: 8). 
“Central banks have institutional memory, embedding past knowledge of the costs of 
inflationary excess. For example, the Bundesbank’s inflation-aversion is deeply 
rooted in Germany’s hyperinflationary past. This memory of the past is crucial for 
preserving the value of money in the future” - Haldane, 2013 :9 
Senior management within both the Regulator and the Central Bank had held senior positions 
in these (or similar institutions) for a number of years. For example, Liam O’Reilly was Chief 
Executive of the Regulator at the time of the bad decision in 2005. He was assistant director 
general of the Central Bank of Ireland from 1998, had been responsible for all of the Central 
Bank’s financial supervision functions, and was appointed interim Chief Executive of the 
Regulator in November 2002, and Chief Executive in May 2003. This form of continuity of 
service is not without consequence.    
The Honohan report described the presence of what he called the “crying wolf” 
problem in the Central Bank in the years before the crisis. The Central Bank had “warned in 
the preceding decade of a possible housing market collapse which had not, in fact, occurred” 
(Honohan, 2010: 95). Interviewed as part of this research in 2016, a senior Regulator official 
close to this decision in 2005 provided some insight on this. When the Regulator, upon whom 
D/Fin were relying for guidance, was giving consideration to intervention on 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages in 2005, it was likely that senior management were influenced by 
institutional memory and feared “crying wolf” once more about the mortgage and property 
market, and this may have impacted negatively on the decision outcome (Senior Official, 
Financial Regulator in 2005: Interview, February 13
th
 2016). Concerns about the mortgage 
market within the Regulator’s office and a recommendation to intervene would have been 
adjudicated on by individuals who were susceptible to Honohan’s “crying wolf” problem. An 
example of the consequences is evident in this case: in January 2006 the Chief Executive of 
the Regulator retired (Liam O’Reilly), the Prudential Director became Chief Executive (Pat 
Neary), and the Head of Banking Supervision became Prudential Director (Con Horan). 
Almost immediately there was intervention on 100 per cent LTV mortgages. This suggests 
that the removal of the institutional memory of crying wolf helped a good decision to be 
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made.  Institutional memory can impact at very micro, individual levels as well as shaping 
the general institutional relationship between a relatively new Regulator and a longer-
established Central Bank. 
The Ministers 
The detailed case set out in Chapter 9 demonstrates clearly the activity and involvement of a 
number of key actors including the Minister of State with Responsibility for Housing Noel 
Ahern, senior officials in D/Fin and D/Env, and senior people within the Regulator. There is 
no evidence of the involvement of the two senior Ministers: Brian Cowen at D/Fin and Dick 
Roche in D/Env. All three of Cowen, Roche and Ahern were members of the Fianna Fáil 
party so Ahern’s activity cannot be deemed to have been a ‘crusade’ on behalf of a junior 
coalition political party. Interviewed as part of this research in 2016, senior D/Fin and D/Env 
officials close to this decision in 2005 provided some insight on this.     
In the case of D/Env the explanation appears straightforward: the senior Minister, 
Dick Roche, typically left matters of housing policy to the Minister of State with 
Responsibility for Housing, Noel Ahern (Senior Official, D/Env. in 2005: Interview, January 
8
th
 2016). The process in D/Fin is less clear, though the view in D/Fin on the issue of 100 per 
cent LTV mortgages in 2005 was that the concerns of D/Env expressed at official level 
(Assistant Secretary-to-Assistant Secretary) were treated no less seriously than had there been 
direct Minister/Minister of State-to-Minister correspondence. There is an issue of signalling 
here as there is a view that the correspondence was more comprehensive and the level of 
engagement was higher because the concerns of D/Env were expressed at official level. 
Ministers do not tend to exchange letters as lengthy, comprehensive and questioning as those 
exchanged between the two Assistant Secretaries in this case. Had the Minister for Housing 
Ahern written to Minister for Finance Cowen, it is possible there would not have been as 
much activity as it would have been treated as a standard political representation. In that case, 
the co-ordinating Division with D/Fin would have sought views from within the Department 
and from the Regulator, collated these into one response and returned a response. Whatever 
about the efficacy of the decision-making process that unfolded between July and November 
2005, it is clear that the level of engagement, including two meetings on the topic, was 
greater than a typical political representation would generate.  Also, had Ahern written to 
Cowen, a likely first question asked by the Minister for Finance would be ‘do I have a role 
here’ to which his officials would have replied ‘no, this is a matter for the Regulator’ (Senior 
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Official, D/Finance in 2005: Interview, January 11
th
 2016). There is no evidence of D/Fin 
officials bringing D/Env’s detailed concerns to the attention of Minister Cowen. 
The Minister for Finance would have been aware of the broad issues, if not the 100 
per cent mortgage item specifically. For example, the Economic and Social Research 
Institute’s Quarterly Economic Commentaries and Medium-Term Reviews regularly 
examined the interaction between the construction sector and the real economy and “briefings 
were provided to the Minister [for Finance] based on their findings. In briefing for the 
Minister on the 2005-2010 MTR, the Minister was informed that the continued rise in house 
prices posed a serious threat (Nyberg, 2011: 71). It is possible that the Minister for Finance 
was made aware of the issue by the Minister for Housing at another forum. For example, an 
earlier section recounted the warning of an opposition TD to Minister Cowen in the Dáil on 
November 9
th
. Further, speaking on national radio in 2015, a leading political journalist stated 
the following: 
“The [Minister with responsibility for Housing] railed against the 100 per cent 
mortgages and the property bubble…. He’s never been given full credit for this… he 
bitterly opposed the hundred per cent mortgages. I know he was at a meeting of the 
Fianna Fáil parliamentary party one night and he raised it with the Fianna Fáil 
parliamentary party and he says “this is going to end in tears”, and somebody who 
was there said [the Taoiseach] looked into the middle distance” – Michael O’Regan, 
Parliamentary Correspondent of The Irish Times, speaking on The Marian Finucane 
Show, RTE Radio 1, June 14
th
 2015    
The Minister for Finance was a senior member of Fianna Fáil’s parliamentary party at the 
time and may have been present to hear the Minister of State’s concerns. Regarding the 
reported response of the Taoiseach, the Minister for Housing has contradicted the report 
above, saying that he “never raised his concerns about the property bubble with… the then 
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern”. In a media interview in 2015, Noel Ahern is quoted as saying he 
did raise concerns with other agencies, such as the Central Bank and the Department of 
Finance, but when he met the Taoiseach they tended to “talk about other things" (Sunday 
Independent, August 23
rd
 2015).  According to the newspaper, the Minister for Housing had 
“serious concerns over the proliferation of 100 per cent mortgages and the impact they had on 
the market”. He is reported to have said:  
“[T]here was some official concern over 100pc mortgages. Many did not want to 
know… There was concern, we certainly had concerns about 100pc mortgages and 
we fought a battle on that with the banks and with the Central Bank, the Regulator 
and the Department of Finance alright…  
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There was a bit of an attitude from them that 'it was only a promotional thing from a 
building society' and 'it will go away, it's only an advertising thing' and 'where's your 
evidence?' that sort of thing… Six months after they were accepting that, all of the 
other banks moved to follow First Active… It defied logic, but we were very much 
concerned about the 100pc mortgages, because they were dodgy… They assumed the 
market would continue to increase and people would be protected by those 
increases…   
We did want that and my own mantra was 'supply, supply, supply', which was prudent 
in the early years. The thinking was that if you increased supply, you meet the 
demand and you take the sting out of the thing… For the five years I was there, that 
was the policy. That was a success and we were hitting completion numbers not seen 
before. And then it took off again, which defied logic [after the 100pc mortgages were 
introduced”] – Noel Ahern, former Minister for Housing, Sunday Independent, August 
23
rd
 2015 
By describing his “battle” as being against “the banks and with the Central Bank, the 
Regulator and the Department of Finance”, he hints at an institutional coherence or policy 
unity amongst those four actors. The contemporary evidence detailed earlier suggests that this 
was not entirely the case, as most banks were not enthusiastic about the products.    
10.4 Evidence of Ideology Impacting the Decision 
The recollection of the Minister for Housing also suggests some ideological influence on 
certain decision-makers, as they “assumed the market would continue to increase and people 
would be protected by those increases” i.e. trust in the market to protect consumers. The 
detailed case recounted in the previous Chapter provides similar evidence. To recap, given 
the focus of this research on economic policy, the concept of ideology employed refers to the 
economic left/right as opposed to social liberal/conservative cleavages, with the left referring 
to an abstract belief in State action, intervention in the economy and higher levels of 
government spending and taxation, and the right referring to a contrasting abstract belief in a 
laissez-faire policy approach, non-intervention by the State in economic affairs, and lower 
levels of government expenditure and taxation.   
 From the first documentary evidence of D/Fin’s response to D/Env’s concerns, their 
hand-written notes on the initial email (see Figure 9.11), there is some hint of an ideological 
influence. D/Fin make the point that any intervention by the State could make matters worse. 
While this is ambiguous in terms of ideology, the statement to D/Env at their meeting on 
August 10
th
 2005 that it was important to “trust the market” is less so. This is followed up 
with the point that “a watching brief must be kept on developments”. The phrases indicate 
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that ideological considerations were present and influencing with consequence, the decision-
making process. In their note of the same meeting, D/Env state that the first point made by 
D/Fin in response to their concerns was that the Government “needs a strong basis to 
intervene in the market” (Note of Meeting with Dept. of Finance, Dept. of Environment, Scan 
8, August 11th 2005).  
There are also sections of D/Env’s note of the meeting on November 1st that point to 
the both the influence of a free market competition ideology on the Regulator’s thinking: 
“Although not proposing action at this time the Regulator is keeping the option of 
increase in mortgage lending capital requirements under review as a possible option. 
This would be considered a severe measure. The fact that a relaxation of capital 
requirements (from coverage of 50% of loan amounts to 35%) internationally under 
the Basel Capital Accord is due to come into effect on 1 January 2007 would put 
Ireland in an unusual position if we were to increase capital requirements. While there 
is some national discretion under the Basel Accord, there would probably need to be 
substantial evidence that the Irish market was some unusual in some significant 
respect to warrant departure… 
The Regulator is also conscious of a risk that any intervention in the mortgage market 
could affect competition, which has been largely beneficial for consumers. However, 
it was acknowledged that there is probably a degree of discomfort even within the 
sector about being compelled to provide 100% mortgages by competitive pressures” -  
Note of meeting with Department Finance and Central Bank / Regulator, Department 
of the Environment, November 2005, Scan 15 
The statement by D/Env that the Regulator considered an increase in mortgage lending 
capital requirements to be a “severe measure” is at odds with the Honohan investigation 
findings in 2010. According to Honohan, there appears to have been a consensus among 
Regulator and Central Bank staff that “the capital requirements measures – which in addition 
to being very modest in size only came into effect close to the tail end of the boom – were 
viewed as a shot across the bows of the credit institutions, rather than an attempt to try to 
make high LTV transactions prohibitively costly” (Honohan, 2010: 103). Honohan also 
found evidence of this consensus in the minutes of the Regulators’ board meeting for 
February 2006 when, in discussing the risk weighting of residential mortgages, reference is 
made to the fact that “the proposed change is not designed to interfere in the operation of the 
market or to reduce the level of mortgage lending, but to signal the determination of the 
Financial Regulator to ensure that there is appropriate capital provision. The Department of 
the Environment’s description of the response by the Regulator to concerns over 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages in the note also points to this deference and diffidence (as identified by 
Honohan, 2010) which resulted from a free market competition ideology:  
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“[A]ction taken by the Regulator includes: calling in chief executives of the lending 
institutions to discuss issues and concerns in relation to the market; close monitoring 
of data; ensuring rigorous examination of lending by internal auditors” - Note of 
meeting with Department Finance and Central Bank / Regulator, Department of the 
Environment, November 2005, Scan 15 
 
Such weak intervention fits with Honohan’s view that there was an unresolved anxiety in the 
Regulator’s office that the necessary, aggressive intervention would lead to a loss of market 
share by Irish banks and/or trigger a collapse in confidence in the property market. 
 In the November letter (Figure 9.36), D/Fin reminds D/Env of the “operational and 
policy context” in which the banks and the Regulator operate, the “impact of competition in 
the banking sector”, and “the high degree of competition in residential mortgage lending”. 
They then reference a Competition Authority report on the Banking Sector. The first line of 
that Report states “Banks in Ireland do not compete aggressively” (The Competition 
Authority, 2005: vii), and the objective if the recommendations therein are to “make the 
banking industry more competitive”, thereby extolling the virtues of free-market ideology. 
On mortgage lending specifically, the Report states:  
“Competition works well in banking when rival banks vigorously seek and win one 
another’s customers with innovative products, lower prices, and better service. This is 
more likely to be the case when other banks and financial institutions can enter 
financial markets exhibiting above normal profits. Evidence of the benefits of 
competition can be seen in sectors of the financial services industry where 
competition has taken hold, in particular, residential mortgages. The entry of Bank of 
Scotland (Ireland) into the residential mortgage market in 1999, for example, led to an 
increase in competition, effectively leading to a fall of one percentage point in 
mortgage rates for customers” – The Competition Authority, 2005 
D/Fin is telling D/Env - in the context of a letter on 100 per cent LTV mortgages - that 
competition in the residential mortgage market is a good thing because it provides customers 
with innovative products, lower prices, and better service. This echoes D/Fin’s suggestion to 
the D/Env at their meeting in August, that they should “trust the market”. This portion of the 
letter provides evidence of ideological concerns impacting on the decision-making process, 
with D/Fin evoking a free-market rationale to D/Env to justify non-intervention on high LTV 
residential mortgages.   
 Overall, an ideological position reflecting a laissez-faire policy approach, and non-
intervention by the State is detectable from phrases such as “trust the market”, “any 
Government intervention could make matters worse”, and a “watching brief needs to be kept 
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on developments”. However it has been shown that D/Fin were to a significant extent 
reflecting the view of the regulator rather than their own views so caution must be if 
suggesting this ideological influence applied to all of the decision-makers to an equal extent. 
Interviews undertaken as part of this research in 2016 with senior D/Fin, D/Env and 
Regulator officials illustrate the nuanced way in which ideology influenced the case. 
 For D/Env, market intervention was to be approached with caution and policy should 
be focussed on stability rather than change, which may have unintended consequences. This 
was especially true in the housing market due to the long-lead time for the full effects of 
policy change to emerge. That said D/Env believed a threshold had been reached on 100 per 
cent LTV mortgages - in terms of the data available and the likelihood of risk – such that 
intervention was needed. House-price escalation was continuing at such a pace and for such a 
long period, driven to a significant extent by excessive lending, that D/Env believed that 
action should be taken. They also looked to what the Central Bank would have done in the 
circumstances had they still had control over interest rate policy, and concluded that they 
would have intervened and increased rates. They could not prescribe what should be done but 
D/Env felt it incumbent on them to put the questions to those who could decide and could act 
(Senior Official, D/Env. in 2005: Interview, January 8
th
 2016). 
 D/Fin believed that the Government’s broad policy-approach was non-interventionist. 
This was especially true for the housing market where, interestingly, they looked at D/Env’s 
three ‘Bacon Report’ processes (discussed above) as an example of interference, perhaps 
politically driven. There was some recognition of the change in political thinking nationally 
with the electoral success of the right-leaning Progressive Democrats, and the appointment of 
Charlie McCreevy as Minister for Finance (1997-2004) who was seen as pro-market, which 
played to D/Fin’s own instincts. D/Fin also saw something of an osmosis of what was 
happening internationally influencing policy in Ireland. For example, the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the presumed victory of capitalism, and institutions such as the EU Commission 
emphasising the creation of a ‘brave new world’ of market-driven integration with deep and 
liquid capital markets. D/Fin was aware of international research of the time which linked 
financial market development with productivity gains and how this was well received in 
Ireland in light of declining national competitiveness. The impact was hubris about the 
market model from 2000, and a belief that it was not a civil servant’s role to second-guess the 
market. In the sense that an efficient market was a conduit for information to flow in a way 
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that it would not otherwise, this belief made sense from an economic ministry’s perspective 
(Senior Official, D/Finance in 2005: Interview, January 11
th
 2016).  
As mentioned earlier, this was at a time when D/Fin’s institutional credibility and 
confidence had been damaged due to inaccurate economic and fiscal forecasts. The creation 
of the Financial Services Clearing House in the Department of the Taoiseach, where D/Fin 
would have to report monthly to the financial services industry, was also evidence of 
deference to the markets.  The overall consequence is that D/Fin placed great significance on 
the markets and the banks having confidence in product-development. While a Department 
would not be strongly ideological, the dominance of the market ideology generally raised the 
threshold of what information or signals were necessary before intervention was to be 
recommended. This is significant in light of the earlier discussion whereby the concerns of 
D/Env did not constitute a red-flag to D/Fin, whereas similar concerns from a bank or the 
Regulator may have reached the necessary threshold for D/Fin to consider a more 
interventionist response contrary to the dominant ideology.      
 For the final key decision-maker in this case – the Regulator – ideology was an 
overtly influential factor. Interviews undertaken as part of this research in 2016 with senior 
D/Fin, D/Env and Regulator officials confirm this. Chapter 8 discussed some of the 
contributing factors: the choice of regulatory structure in 2003 placing an emphasis on 
competition and the resulting (perceived) consumer benefits, over macro-prudential action; 
the creation of the statutory position of Consumer Director on the Board of the Regulator; the 
legislative ‘dual mandate’ stating that the Central Bank / Regulator had a function to promote 
Ireland’s financial services industry; and the choice of a principles-based regulatory regime 
(‘spirit of the law’) over a rules-based one (‘letter of the law’). This last point was in the 
context of developments referenced above (the fall of the Berlin Wall, the victory of 
capitalism, the success of the Progressive Democrats, the appointment of Charlie McCreevy 
as Minister for Finance) and an international emphasis on market-driven integration and 
innovation (Senior Official, Financial Regulator in 2005: Interview, February 13
th
 2016). 
Additional evidence that market ideology raised the threshold of what signals were necessary 
before intervention was to be recommended was found in how Ireland’s breaching of levels 
credit growth which signalled a bubble in Scandinavia, was treated by senior management in 
the Regulator and Central Bank.    
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The faith in markets was most clearly manifested in 2004 with the Basel II accord. Basel II is 
important in the 100 per cent LTV mortgages case because the accord saw responsibility for 
risk shift from the regulatory authorities to the banks (see Friedman, 2009). Basel II was a 
“continuation the deregulation of the industry which had been happening for more than a 
decade” following the period known as the great moderation-  a decade or more of stable 
interest rates, stable inflation, and stable banking (Con Horan, Evidence to the Oireachtas 
Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, May 27
th
 2015).   As the Regulator was responsible for 
making the accord a reality in Ireland and for generating (if not communicating) the 
substance of the response to D/Env’s concerns about 100 per cent LTV mortgages, it was 
understandable that it influenced the decision. Notwithstanding the privately communicated 
concerns by banks to the Regulator, as far as those representing D/Fin and the Regulator 
during discussions were concerned, once the banks had decided that 100 per cent LTV 
mortgages were appropriate, that was it.  
“The system of regulation that was put in place by the [Regulator] failed. There is no 
denying that, it’s a fact. In its defence, I would say it was the same system that was 
used throughout Europe and it is clear now that that whole system, throughout 
Europe, also failed. Now, you have to put it in the context as well of… the Basel II 
structure. I mean, the way in which that was evolving was to, if you like, rubber stamp 
the whole approach, principles-led regulatory approach going forward in Europe, 
whereby further responsibility was being transferred away from regulators to the 
boards and management of banks” - Patrick Neary, Financial Regulator, Evidence to 
the Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, May 28
th
 2015 
“Basel II accord provided what proved to be entirely unwarranted reassurance to the 
Department [of Finance] that the supervisory, prudential and financial stability 
systems in the [Central Bank and Regulator] were operating effectively” – William 
Beausang, Senior Department of Finance official, Evidence to the Inquiry into the 
Banking Crisis, June 11
th
 2015 
The discussion on the impact of interests on the bad decision illustrated the importance of 
market forces to the banks and this section on ideology shows that none of the key players in 
the decision (D/Fin, Regulator, or D/Env) provided an ideological counterweight.  D/Env, 
while cautious on intervention, did believe action was warranted in the summer of 2005. For 
D/Fin, ideology created a higher threshold for intervention in the market that they did not 
believe had been met. For the Regulator, the entire regulatory approach which was based on 
the market ideology argued against intervention on 100 per cent LTV mortgages in 2005.    
 Chapter 3 described inter alia McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal’s succinct approach 
which argues that it is the impact of the “three I’s” – interests, institutions, and ideology - that 
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sees successive governments facilitate dangerous policy and market bubbles. The process 
tracing of the bad-decision case study in Chapter 9, followed by the analysis in the sections 
above lends support to that framework. The decision on 100 per cent LTV mortgages in 2005 
provides evidence that interests, institutions, and ideology all influenced the outcome 
negatively. The task remains to examine whether these three factors impact information 
processing to shapes a rational or irrational decision outcome. Before undertaking that task it 
is worth summarising the findings thus far on how interests, institutions, and ideology 
influenced the case in question.  
 
Interests 
Process tracing the most-likely case has revealed evidence that: 
 The interests of D/Fin (Banking Finance and International Division) were served as, 
despite seeing the property sector as a risk-factor, the bad decision left the economic 
model untouched, and meant they had no difficult choice to make on a financial services 
market intervention. 
 The interests (as opposed to the ideology) of the Central Bank and Regulator were served 
by the bad decision as it did not complicate their legislative duty to promote the financial 
services industry in Ireland.  
 The interests of the banks were served only in so far as the bad decision allowed them to 
compete for market share once the first institution had entered the market.   
 The interests of D/Env were not served by the bad decision as it did not contribute to 
maintaining an efficient housing market. 
 The interests of elected politicians or property developers were not actively or overtly 
pursued in the case but the bad-decision would likely have served their short-run interests.    
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Institutions 
Process tracing the most-likely case has revealed evidence that: 
 The lower relative institutional standing of D/Env vis-à-vis the banks and Regulator in the 
eyes of D/Fin contributed to the bad decision. 
 The dependence of D/Fin on the Regulator for information was a negative influence on 
the decision process. 
 The lack of clarity about which institution (D/Fin or Regulator) was the de facto decision-
maker in the case influenced the decision-making process negatively. 
 The institutional secrecy of the Central Bank / Regulator in its dealings with D/Fin, and to 
a lesser extent D/Env, contributed to the bad decision.  
 The decline in D/Fin’s institutional confidence and credibility was a negative influence on 
the outcome. 
 The lower relative institutional standing of government Departments vis-à-vis the 
Regulator in the eyes of the banks contributed to the bad decision. 
 The institutional memory of the Central Bank was a negative influence on the decision 
process. 
     
 
Ideology 
Process tracing the most-likely case has revealed evidence that: 
 The dominant market ideology of the time (combined with the relative institutional 
standing of D/Env) contributed to the poor decision outcome by raising the threshold to 
be reached for intervention to be seriously considered. 
 The ideological instincts of D/Fin and probably the wider government-system at the time 
were served by the bad decision, and this hindered the process. 
 The available evidence was sufficient for D/Env to conclude that intervention was 
necessary, and thus it trumped any ideological instinct, but this did not lead to a good 
decision overall. 
 The ideologically-driven approach to regulation impacted negatively on the decision.       
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Of course these three factors interact, and this will be discussed below. Following the 
framework in Chapter 7, the next step is establishing a better understanding of the role of 
irrationality on the outcome. It is possible that a decision-maker chooses a perfectly rational 
or totally irrational suboptimal option, as information processing is impacted by one, two, or 
all three factors. Having now identified that interests, institutions, and ideology were playing 
a role in shaping how information was processed and the poor decision outcome on 100 per 
cent LTV mortgages, the evidence is analysed to identify the extent to which rationality or 
irrationality was the result. 
10.5 Information Processing: Rationality and Irrationality  
A bad decision can arise as a result of rational self-interest or the presence and actions of one 
or more powerful groups for whom it yields a greater return than an alternative. In this case, 
D/Fin and the Banking Finance and International Division acted out of rational self-interest 
as the bad decision meant they avoided the possibility of having to devise a significant and, in 
their eyes, risky financial services market intervention. It suited them that the in-house 
analysis (or other available data) did not conclude that D/Env were correct to be as concerned 
as they were, 100 per cent LTV mortgages were risky, or inflationary, or would contribute to 
an already overheating, property market bubble. D/Fin also acted out of rational self-interest 
when tailoring the communication of the outcome of deliberations such that no further 
oxygen was given to D/Env’s concerns. The decision also suited the Central Bank and 
Regulator from a rational self-interest perspective as it was perfectly aligned with their 
pursuit of increased consumer choice, and an aggressive, competitive banking market. 
Though there was no evidence of activity by them in the decision case, it would have been 
perfectly rational for elected politicians or property developers to support the suboptimal 
outcome to serve their short-term interests in the form of votes, continued property related 
revenues for the Exchequer, or sustained housing demand.     
 The proposed framework for analysis allows for institutions to prompt a rational, poor 
choice by creating an information processing context which is resistant to alternatives, or 
which distributes power and knowledge in such a way as to militate against alternatives. The 
in-built independence of D/Fin and the Regulator was rational in terms of preventing 
inappropriate influence, but it also created the dependence of D/Fin on the Regulator for 
information. D/Fin’s role in economic policy was much broader than the Regulator’s but the 
case demonstrates that there was little or no independent, rigorous analysis of the impact of 
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100 per cent LTV mortgages on those broader policy spheres. The institutional framework 
also made it possible for two actors (D/Fin and the Regulator) to rationally conclude the other 
as being the de facto decision-maker in the case. In addition, the perfectly rational 
institutional secrecy provisions of the Central Bank / Regulator in its dealings with D/Fin, 
and to a lesser extent D/Env, limited information flow with disastrous consequences. D/Fin 
believes in hindsight, that had they been aware of the detail of the Regulator’s internal data, 
concerns, and proposal in August 2005 that an alternative and positive decision-outcome was 
possible if not likely. Further, according to D/Env, D/Fin stated at their first meeting that if 
D/Env believed that 100 per cent mortgages would impact on house prices it would be 
necessary to show how this happens separated from all other drivers of prices. This is 
institutional bargaining power impacting on the decision, and D/Fin was making an 
unreasonable demand, one they could not meet themselves.  Finally, while it was rational for 
actors to respond as they did to D/Fin’s declining institutional confidence and credibility, it 
did mean crucial information (e.g. the content Permanent TSB’s file note) did not flow in 
such a way as to increase the likelihood of a positive outcome. Even D/Fin’s rational 
response to its own declining institutional confidence and credibility was a negative influence 
on the decision-making process, limiting their likelihood to take necessary action.  
 Finally, the proposed framework suggests that an ultimately poor choice might be 
preferred as a result of rigid abstract beliefs held by the decision-maker, their party, or which 
dominate political thinking, and which constrain alternative policy preferences. This is most 
evident in this case from the D/Fin’s rational view that their ideological instincts and 
preferences of the wider government-system at the time were aligned with the ultimate 
decision outcome. It was not that case that the dominant abstract ideological beliefs resisted 
new information flows (see below), rather they helped rationalise the decision outcome.   
Irrationality can emerge as a result an external groups’ control of information and 
messaging activating one or more empirically-established behavioural biases. In this case, 
banks who believed 100 per cent LTV products to be appropriate (First Active) and those 
who believed them to be dangerous (Bank of Ireland, PTSB), issued the products in order to 
compete for market share. In doing so, the banks contributed to the activation of wider 
irrationality. This is similar to Lunn’s findings that property market assessments by banks and 
others contributed to extrapolation and confirmation bias, expectations of continued house 
price increases, and the prospect of a soft-landing for the property market (Lunn, 2013: 576). 
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The first mention of 100 per cent LTV mortgage products in the Oireachtas is evidence of 
this effect.  
“We must consider the current confidence in the economy. One leading institution 
pointed out in recent days that 100% mortgages are available for house developments. 
I might not agree with 100% mortgages, but when a lending organisation gives out 
that kind of money it shows confidence in the economy” – Ned O’Keeffe T.D., July 
20
th
 2005 
Once the Regulator, Central Bank and D/Fin did not intervene soon after the introduction of 
the product, and banks marketed aggressively, the process cascades and the benign approach 
to the product reflected in Deputy O’Keeffe’s comments stimulates irrationality in the form 
of behavioural convergence, herding and groupthink (Sunstein, 2015: 63-73). This may be 
the clearest example from this case of the evidence of elevated irrationality in Ireland 
suggested by Nyberg (2011), but which was not revealed by the quantitative analysis in Part 
II of this thesis.  
 A similar mechanism may have been at play when the decision not to intervene on 
100 per cent LTV products aligned with the interests of the Central Bank and Regulator who 
were promoting Ireland’s financial services industry under their dual mandate. For example, 
the evidence of the case shows that Pat Neary (then Prudential Director) supported Con 
Horan’s proposal to intervene on 100 per cent mortgages in August 2005, but he did not get 
senior management to agree. The crash did not arrive for another two years and in that time 
the Central Bank and Regulator were able to assess their regulatory approach in the belief 
that it was working (placing greater weight on existing beliefs i.e. confirmation bias), and 
predicting a positive outcomes while overestimating the accuracy of those predictions 
(overconfidence bias). This irrational dissonance helped the Regulator to pursue its dual 
mandate. For example, Patrick Neary accompanied Taoiseach Bertie Ahern on a visit to New 
York in March 2007, where Ahern made a speech at a breakfast meeting with the US 
financial services industry. During the event Ahern sought increased investment in Ireland 
and said that Ireland was very lightly regulated compared to most of its European colleagues 
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016: 144).   
The case recalled how First Active put its interests first and either did not believe or 
did not care about the view of the Central Bank and/or the Regulator. The Regulator later 
explained the ignoring of them by the banks as a consequence of irrational “euphoria”. 
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Explaining these events with reference to “euphoria” points to the irrationality posited in the 
literature to explain how poor decision-making can arise (Lunn, 2013: 583). 
 The framework proposed in this research suggests that a poor decision can be arrived 
at due to the institutional framework similarly activating empirically-established behavioural 
biases such as groupthink or herding. The framework expects that the case can reveal 
organisational structures which facilitated a lack of critical discussion and groupthink, 
institutions and supervisors acting in a herding manner, and conformism to be present. In 
short, the political system would take a supportive rather than a challenging role (Nyberg, 
2011: iv and 9). Before process tracing the case, there was some expectation the D/Fin would 
be dependent on the Central Bank and the Regulator for information, increasing the 
likelihood of groupthink or herding. The analysis starkly revealed the dependence of D/Fin 
on the Regulator for information on the appropriateness of 100 per cent LTV mortgages and 
that this was a negative influence on the decision process. Though parts of the political 
system (D/Env) took a challenging role in respect of the bank/Regulator’s stance, others 
adopted a more supportive role (D/Fin). The irrational institutional memory of the Central 
Bank also prompted both confirmation bias, and loss aversion with regard to reputation, and 
was another negative influence on the decision process.  
 Finally, the proposed framework suggests that a poor, irrational outcome choice can 
emerge due to the policy-maker’s rigid, abstract beliefs resisting new information flow, 
activating empirically-established behavioural biases. Nyberg concluded that the widespread 
ideological belief in the efficiency of markets became widely trusted among Irish financial 
professionals in private and public institutions, and prompted assumptions across institutions 
and within institutions, strengthened through groupthink (Nyberg, 2011: 94). In the case 
investigated here it is clear that the dominant market ideology of the time raised the threshold 
to be reached for intervention to be seriously considered by D/Fin. The information 
underpinning D/Env’s concerns did not reach the threshold demanded by the ideology, for 
market intervention. Further, the ideologically-driven approach to regulation faced a 
challenge in this case as evidenced by the fear about the message that intervention would 
communicate in terms of financial markets in Ireland. 
The challenge of linking an influencing factor (interests, institutions, ideology) 
exclusively to either rational or irrational information processing is clear from this analysis. 
This can be explained by the proposed framework’s expectation that the three factors will be 
   276 
 
operating simultaneously and interacting with each other. The case showed how D/Fin’s 
interests (seeking to avoid intervention) interacted with the institutional factors (D/Env’s 
concerns were not given the same weight as those of others) and the ideological context (a 
high threshold for intervention). The case demonstrated how the interests of the Central Bank 
and Regulator were served by the bad decision as (i) it did not complicate their duty to 
promote the financial services industry in Ireland, and (ii) because the decision was seen as 
pro-consumer choice. Remember, the Central Bank and the Regulator were worried that even 
the smallest intervention could threaten a delicately poised market.  It could be argued that 
promoting an industry model which they privately feared would collapse, is irrational. But if 
they believed that the alternative to a collapse was likely and in sight (e.g. precipitated by 
rising interest rates which would arrive), promoting the industry was entirely rational. 
10.6 Conclusion 
Overall, information processing was impacted by the interacting influences of interests, 
institutions, and ideology, and a poor decision-outcome was the result. However, it would not 
be accurate to say that the decision-making process was entirely irrational. Many errors were 
made for rational reasons, often in an actor’s self-interests. Between institutions there was 
information sharing and debate, and the information necessary for a good decision was 
available to the Regulator, in particular. The Department of Finance may have been too 
deferential to the Regulator and not deferential enough to the Department of the 
Environment. As noted earlier, for D/Fin the 100 per cent LTV mortgages issue was one of 
housing policy, while for D/Env the issue was one of banking policy. Although the 
Department of Finance communicated the decision, it appears that the Regulator was the 
institution with the power to intervene to prohibit or limit the product. In that sense, the 
wrong institution made the formal decision. It is clear that the banks, on the whole, were not 
pressing for these products, ruling out their interests as a primary factor. Once one bank 
issued the 100 per cent mortgages, it was in other financial institutions’ interests to allow 
competition but banks’ interests were not the driving force. Ideology, framed as manifesting 
itself as principles-based regulation, is a ready defence, explanation or excuse for the bad 
decision but the process was more complex. It was the combination of ideological and 
institutional factors that had the greatest negative impact. The dominant market ideology of 
the time, combined with the relative institutional standing of decision-makers, contributed 
most to the poor decision outcome. That free market ideology raised the threshold to be met 
before intervention by the State was seriously considered, and coupled with the relatively low 
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standing of the primary proponent of such intervention, meant a sub-optimal outcome was 
reached.   
 Finally, the process tracing evidence suggests irrationality cannot be described as the 
primary cause of the poor outcome. The detailed information considered and discussed by 
decision-makers in the case, over a period of months, argues against impactful behavioural 
convergence or groupthink. Many of the symptoms of such irrationality were present 
(selective bias in processing information at hand, poor information search, incomplete survey 
of alternatives) within institutional actors, however between them there was detailed 
information exchange and deliberation. Interests, institutions, and ideology interacted to 
prompt the poor rational and irrational information processing, which led to the bad result. 
Policy-makers arrived at these decisions for rational and irrational reasons; out of rational 
self-interest to avoid difficult action, as a result of rational institutional separation, or as a 
consequence of a rational assessment that the decision aligns with ideological instincts. But 
also as result of irrationality prompted by the actions of interests, as a consequence of 
groupthink and herding which was supported by institutional arrangements, and because a 
dominant ideology limited information flow. 
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Chapter 11: Discussion and Lessons   
11.1 Introduction 
Looking back at the original motivation for the research, what has been learned about why 
decision-makers acted the way they did?  Despite possessing evidence-based advice that if 
implemented would have helped protect competitiveness and bolster the economy, the policy 
system did not respond adequately. At a general level the reasons for this are self-evident: 
decision-makers benefitting from the economic bubble bought into a soft-landing consensus 
which resisted suggestions of significantly altering policy. Underlying this, interests, 
institutions, and ideology interacted, and were a negative influence in the decision-making 
process, and contributed to a consensus. Not all of the mis-steps were irrational, and rational 
self-interest was an important element. At the same time, empirically established behavioural 
biases were active to an extent in Ireland and contributed to an ensuing bubble of a scale that 
it’s bursting destroyed the economy. The social consequences were extensive and included 
significant unemployment, emigration, cuts to public services, tax rises, and political turmoil.  
 The behavioural economics literature created some optimism that decision-makers 
need not wait for painful hindsight to confirm that irrationality is present and impacting to an 
extent that it is damaging economic policy.  Further, political theory suggested interests, 
institutions, and ideology as contributing factors to the poor decision-making that lead to the 
economic bubble. A worthy broader objective must be devising responses to counteract any 
negative link detected between these factors, irrational information processing, and bad 
decision outcomes. Thus, this research sought to answer two important questions: 
1. Is evidence of active, impactful irrationality among key decision-makers in the period 
before Ireland’s crash detectable using a quantitative method? 
2. What role did interests, institutions, and ideology play in poor decision-making? 
The preceding Chapters have endeavoured to answer these questions, and taken together can 
help add to our understanding of why policy-makers in Ireland before the crash acted the way 
they did, and did not respond adequately to advice.    
11.2 What we learned in Part I 
Part I developed the linkage between leaders’ personal characteristics and decision-making. 
Policy-makers perceive and interpret what is happening around them, and it is their 
aggregated preferences that shape what governments and institutions do. In Ireland’s case 
those preferences are believed to have been negatively influenced by irrational forces; 
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systematic errors in judgements and choices which were influenced by emotions. This 
phenomenon is the focus of the field of behavioural economics which, since the 1970s in 
particular, has been challenging the neo-classical notion of rational actors taking rational 
decisions to deliver the perceived optimal outcome for them. It is based on Simon’s concept 
of bounded rationality, which recognises the small capacity of the human mind for 
formulating and solving complex problems, relative to the scale of the problems faced. 
Behavioural economics revealed the impact of heuristics, loss/gain asymmetry, and framing 
effects on our choices. These help explain why, in economic bubbles, decision-makers find it 
difficult to conceive of the possibility of a crisis scenario, why they pursue increasingly risky 
financial practices to stave off or delay losses, and why they have erroneous expectations and 
perceptions of ‘normality’, risk and opportunity.  
Away from economics, the application of this behavioural approach has enhanced 
studies of international relations, most notably with the emergence the concept of groupthink. 
Research has demonstrated situations where people engage in consensus-seeking within a 
cohesive group to such an extent that it overwhelms assessment of what the optimal decision 
or action is. This behavioural convergence is thought to have been active during Ireland’s 
boom, where decision-makers displayed behaviour exhibiting bandwagon effects both 
between institutions (herding) and within them (groupthink). Post-crisis research has 
identified behavioural biases impacting in media coverage of the boom and at the highest 
levels in banks. However, evidence of the presence of behavioural biases specifically among 
key political decision-makers in Ireland, and examining whether biases were more prevalent 
in Ireland versus elsewhere, was absent. 
Part I also discussed the challenges to be overcome when attempting to detect 
impactful irrationality in real-time, especially as those who hold/held positions of significant 
authority and esteem, and are unlikely to participate in typical experiments to assess 
behavioural convergence bias.  Helpfully, a ‘methodological arsenal’ is available to 
researchers attempting to assess decision-makers at a distance, including conceptual 
complexity and in-group bias trait analysis, the preferred approach for this research. The 
theory suggested that less conceptually complex leaders, highly committed to their own 
group, could be expected to establish suboptimal and less open information processing during 
decision-making, to undertake incomplete analysis of alternatives and objectives, perform 
poor information search, fail to examine risks of preferred choice, fail to reappraise initially 
rejected alternatives, to demonstrate selective bias in processing information at hand, and fail 
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to work out contingency plans. Thus, conceptual complexity and in-group bias provided a 
potential proxy for behavioural convergence bias, to allow detection in a covert manner. This 
underpinned the statement of the hypothesis, that decision-makers in Ireland would have:  
 lower relative levels of conceptual complexity compared to decision-makers in 
comparable economies, in the years preceding the economic crash, and 
 higher relative levels of in-group bias compared to decision-makers in 
comparable economies, in the years preceding the economic crash. 
Away from the concept of irrationality, a review of the literature further explained how 
economic and political bubbles emerge, and we learned that given that long-established 
academic perspectives of decision-making and public administration have been described as 
out of touch, new approaches to analysis of decision-making in the public service have 
emerged. These approaches (e.g. multiple streams framework; complex adaptive systems; 
punctuated equilibrium) have noted the rise in the number of actors with heterogeneous 
interests interacting in policy and decision-making, leading to highly variable results. They 
highlight the role of institutions which, when in place for extended periods, structure 
participation and give the illusion of policy stability. Interests and institutions are closely 
linked in these new approaches, as institutions create policy-monopolies and a political 
system which appears to convey benefits to the same interests.  Turning to ideology, this 
factor has been singled out in previous research as the common factor in a range of economic 
booms and busts. This is because ideology results in decision-makers clinging to one ‘key 
idea’ as their only guide to economic policy. Official investigations into Ireland’s crash have 
pointed to interests, institutions, and ideology as contributing factors in one way or another, 
describing them in a variety of ways; “deference and diffidence” or the “paradigm of efficient 
financial markets”. 
Part I detailed McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal’s analysis of decision-making, which 
informed the development of the proposed framework of decision-making analysis employed 
in the thesis. This section set out how interests influence decision-makers by mobilising 
constituencies, direct expenditure on electoral campaigns, and the production and provision 
of information. This problem is compounded by decision-makers having to operate within 
institutions resistant to policy change, and an institutional framework which have a 
significant impact on information flows and levels of expertise. Suboptimal decision 
outcomes are further encouraged when ideology justifies erroneous action or inaction despite 
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events and information suggesting a particular course of action. The thesis recounted the case 
of Ireland’s taxation regime from 1987 to the crash twenty years later as an example of the 
link between policy bubbles and economic bubbles. The decision to adopt a new fiscal 
strategy, which changed the structure of the tax system in Ireland through the boom, provided 
an illustrative case of dynamic policy-making, where a bubble forms, grows in response to 
positive feedback, and bursts years after it moved from being strength to being a weakness.  
This policy overreaction in pursuit of short-run benefits delivered massive societal costs, 
despite warnings to the contrary. This example demonstrated how the causes of a bubble go 
beyond irrational forces, behavioural convergence and groupthink, and include interests, 
institutions, and ideology as important drivers of harmful policy and economic bubbles. 
The proposed framework for analysis considers the impact of interests, institutions, 
and ideology on information processing, and the consequences for rational or irrational 
outcomes. We learned that one (probably unintended) consequence of previous analysis of 
Ireland’s crisis is that, by identifying the causes to be a combination of a naïve belief in 
efficient markets and irrational forces, research has downplayed rational decisions that 
nonetheless had poor outcomes. Not all rational decisions are ‘good’ or irrational ones ‘bad’. 
The literature suggested that decision-makers value or weight preferences depending on the 
context in which they are evoked, and efforts to pin-point whether a suboptimal outcome was 
arrived at as a result of a rational or irrational decision are not straightforward.   
11.3 What we learned in Part II 
Part II began by outlining a method to test the hypothesis that decision-makers in Ireland in 
the years preceding the economic crash had lower relative levels of conceptual complexity, 
and higher levels of in-group bias, compared to decision-makers in similar countries.  The 
selection of leaders for analysis and period of interest were also set out.  The Leadership Trait 
Analysis (LTA) technique is one of the most prominent techniques for studying personality 
traits of leaders and with this technique, seven different personality traits including 
conceptual complexity and in-group bias, can be assessed. Additional benefits of LTA 
include the availability of automated content analysis software and that, once the leaders’ 
content has been analysed and individual scores calculated for each of the traits, it is possible 
to put the scores into perspective by determining how they compare with those of other 
leaders. In the course of Part II we also learned that it is possible to efficiently extract specific 
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content (responses to oral parliamentary questions) for specific Irish leaders from the online 
record of parliament.  
Part II then tested the hypothesis that Irish leaders in the run up to the crisis would 
have a lower trait score for conceptual complexity, and higher scores for in-group bias, 
relative to the mean of other western leaders in a comparator ‘norming’ group. The results of 
analysis on all of the content for the eight leaders refuted the hypothesis. Each and every 
leader had a level of conceptual complexity above the mean of comparable Western leaders, 
and lower levels of in-group bias. Part II then reported preliminary tests to determine whether 
the hypothesis should be rejected on the grounds that irrationality was not an important 
impacting force in Ireland’s bubble, or whether there were methodological grounds. This 
analysis suggested that the analysis of single blocks with large word-counts was not 
responsible for a rejection of the hypothesis, and that there is some variation in the trait 
scores for a leader depending on the topic he or she is discussing. Next, LTA analysis of 
additional content from a leading daily newspaper placed further doubts on the methodology 
as the results did not produce the expected signals. 
Part II thus reported that evidence to support claims of irrational forces impacting on 
decisions in Ireland before the crash was not unearthed in this stage of the research. The 
possibility remained that there could be issues with the method, with role, the state/context of 
the leader, and/or with the content used. Given the incredibly negative economic and social 
fallout from the economic crisis, real-time detection of impactful and harmful decision-
making biases is worth seeking, and this lead to the research reported in the final Chapter of 
Part II. 
That element of the research offered a review of the LTA technique and the ongoing 
discussions concerning its validity and reliability. In an effort to contribute answers to some 
of the remaining questions in this matter, the thesis conducted an empirical analysis of all 
seven leadership traits of a British Prime Minister and Irish Taoiseach. The research 
explained why it is that the role and contextual state of leaders, along with the content used to 
analyse them, might impact on LTA trait scores. We learned that leaders show a wide 
variation in trait scores, and that the extent to which scores vary differs significantly by 
leader, and by trait. The statistical tests then revealed that role can have a significant impact 
on leaders’ trait scores, their state (crisis/non-crisis) can have a significant impact on an 
individual leader’s trait scores, and finally that of all of the factors that may explain the 
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variance in LTA scores that this thesis has explored, source type impacts to the greatest 
extent on LTA results. 
In general terms we learned that when attempting to detect irrationality using an at a 
distance technique, the research design must be mindful of (i) the need to analyse content 
from a period close to or at the time the decision of interest was taken, (ii) the impact that the 
role the leader holds on results, especially if comparing leaders across countries, (iii) the 
consequences for their results of the environment in which the decision was taken, and (iv) 
the need to carefully select which content (ad libbed / prepared) will be analysed and the 
impact of that choice on results. 
In terms of the original question of active irrationality, behavioural convergence bias, 
and resulting conceptual complexity and in-group bias among Irish leaders before the crash, 
the methodological research provided some answers. First, we learned that the research could 
be enhanced by assessing their personality traits at the precise time-period when a particular 
decision of consequence is being taken.  
Second, we learned that comparing the scores for Irish leaders with leaders from 
abroad, whose roles may be very different, is likely to have impacted the results. Third, we 
learned that source can impact significantly on conceptual complexity scores, though the 
pattern seen would not itself alone explain why Irish leaders had a higher score than 
expected, as it was the material from parliament which had lower scores. Nevertheless, the 
research design’s ability to detect irrationality among Irish leaders could be enhanced by 
seeking to correct for the potential of semi-prepared content to impact trait scores, 
particularly the traits ‘belief in ability to control events’, ‘conceptual complexity’, and ‘self-
confidence’.  
Fourth and finally, perhaps the most impactful learning in terms of the testing of the 
original hypothesis emerges from the overarching point about use of the norming group. The 
hypothesis rested almost entirely on Irish decision-makers having lower conceptual 
complexity / higher in-group bias scores than the comparator norming group of Western 
leaders. However as found in this thesis, though the norming groups take into account some 
relevant cultural differences, they include leaders with very different roles, in different 
contexts/states, and are based on a variety of sources.  
Therefore, it is likely that the failure to uncover evidence of irrational groupthink 
amongst Irish leaders before the crash is a consequence of the method employed. Every step 
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possible was taken to eliminate alternative explanations for the failure to uncover evidence 
(role, state, and source) but these could not be ruled out.  
Nevertheless the research findings do make a significant contribution to this area of 
study in terms of theory and methods, and the results of the application of the LTA analysis 
and the subsequent probing of validity issues are important. By connecting empirically 
established cognitive biases, leadership traits, and decision-making in public-policy, the 
thesis develops an avenue of theory worthy of further exposition. The analysis focussed on 
just one manifestation of irrationality (behavioural convergence bias / groupthink / herding) 
but many others have been suggested as contributing to poor decision-making in the years 
preceding the crash. Future research could consider and develop proxies to aid real-time 
assessment of loss/gain asymmetry or extrapolation bias, for example.    
While an unequivocal statement on the relative levels of irrationality in the form of 
behavioural convergence bias among decision-makers in Ireland in the Celtic Tiger era was 
not possible, this arose from questions over the impact of specific factors (role, state and 
source), the norming group used for comparison, and the black-box nature of the software 
employed. Yet, the thesis does provide an empirical analysis of irrationality among decision-
makers in Ireland, something absent from previous analyses including the official 
investigations. By linking cognitive biases to leadership traits, and setting out a content 
analysis approach to assessment, using automated software, this research had contributed to 
methodological considerations. Further, the thesis provides key considerations for researchers 
and software developers when testing the validity of quantitative trait analysis techniques.       
 
11.4 What we learned in Part III 
Part III of the thesis was designed to contribute to a broader objective to devise responses to 
counteract any negative link detected these between interests, institutions, and ideology, and 
irrationality, and bad decision outcomes. Specifically, these Chapters investigated the extent 
to which these three factors impact on information processing by decision-makers, and the 
rationality or otherwise of the outcome.  
 Part III went on to test the proposed analysis framework by process tracing a most-
likely case (a subjectively bad decision where it is most-likely that three factors will be 
present and impactful) which was identified following an extensive case-selection process. 
The case study supplements the quantitative content analysis research in Part II. The case 
   285 
 
study helped us further understand why economic advice offered between 1997 and 2007 did 
not translate into policy action that would have mitigated the likelihood or severity of the 
economic crisis in Ireland from 2008, and to what extent and how each of the three factors 
contributed to this. The thesis explained that the chosen most-likely case study concentrates 
on the three variables within the causal process for bad decision-making, in the knowledge of 
the limitations of such an approach.  Even though the case was chosen on the dependent 
variable, it served the purpose of identifying the potential causal paths and variables leading 
to the outcomes.  
 In the course of setting out the case-selection approach, we learned about the 
challenge facing researchers when it comes to isolating specific bad (or good) decisions when 
presented with the universe of formal decisions taken by a Government. We learned that 
despite applying a logical, two-stage iterative case identification process, the full universe of 
3,425 formal decisions taken by the Irish Government from 2001 to 2004 could not reveal a 
suitable single most-likely case to be analysed. Four official investigations in to Ireland’s 
crash – Honohan (2010), Regling and Watson (2010), Wright (2010), and Nyberg (2011) 
reports – and consultation with a former senior government official, led to identification of a 
suitable case: the decision by the Government in 2005 not to intervene to prohibit or limit the 
use of 100 per cent loan-to-value (LTV) residential mortgages.   
 The thesis then explained how the selected case met the necessary criteria for the 
process tracing approach, as well as setting out what a ‘good’ decision would have looked 
like in this case. We then learned how documentary and interview data can be analysed to 
reveal the influence of interests, institutions, and ideology on the decision outcome. The 
detailed definitions of the three core categories for identification were provided and taken 
together, the thesis proposed an instructive framework with these variables – interests, 
institutions, and ideology – linked to information processing and suboptimal decision-
outcomes.  
   We then learned about the decision-making environment that existed in Ireland in 
2005, with specific attention paid to the institutional relationships within and between the 
Oireachtas, Government Departments, and Social Partnership, and a detailed description of 
the structures for (and constraints on) the regulation of financial services, which are all 
critical to the case study.  We learned how the nature of the structure of the Financial 
Services Regulator (‘Regulator’) within the Central Bank, their specific secrecy protocols, 
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and dual-mandate to promote the industry, all impacted on the decision-making environment. 
The thesis also summarised the advice to Government about the overheating of Ireland’s 
property market, and the short-comings of that advice, which provided the backdrop to the 
bad-decision case. Overall, in this element of the thesis we learned that citizens in Ireland in 
2005 were wrong to have believed that the sustainability of the economic, financial and 
banking system was being closely monitored and effectively managed, in a hands-on manner 
by the Financial Regulator and the Central Bank, with a clear line of responsibility and 
accountability from them through the Minister and Department of Finance, to the highest 
level of government in the Department of the Taoiseach, and ultimately on to an overseeing 
Oireachtas. The thesis set out the reality where relationships between the Oireachtas, 
Government, Opposition, Ministers, Departments, the Central Bank, and the Regulator were 
inadequate.  
Next, Part III set out in minute detail the events leading up to the bad decision on 100 
per cent LTV mortgages, beginning in early 2005 and ending with communication of the 
decision in November that year. This extensive section of the thesis detailed the economic 
and political backdrop to the case, and circumstances surrounding the arrival of widely-
available 100 per cent LTV mortgages. We then learned about the concerns expressed by one 
arm of Government (the Department of the Environment), the response of another (the 
Department of Finance), and early consideration of the issue by the Regulator. The 
documentation secured under Freedom of Information legislation and from other sources 
allowed us to learn about the views of the banks and the nature of the in-house analysis by the 
Department of Finance of concerns about 100 per cent LTV mortgages. Next, the thesis 
described the important media and political backdrop immediately preceding the decision 
and, using primary sources, recounted the details of the key meeting between Government 
Departments and the Regulator. Overall, we learned of the detail and nature of the interaction 
between Government Departments, Agencies and banks at a critical time before the crash, 
and this provided the evidence on which to undertake the detailed analysis which followed. 
 At this point the thesis could report that the process tracing method had revealed 
evidence which confirmed that interests, institutions, and ideology were interacting to 
influence information processing and the decision outcome. We learned that the interests of 
part of the Department of Finance were served by the poor decision as despite seeing the 
property sector as a risk-factor, the decision left the economic model untouched, and meant 
they had no difficult choice to make on a financial services market intervention. The interests 
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of the Central Bank and the Regulator were served by the poor outcome as it did not 
complicate their legislative duty to promote the financial services industry in Ireland. 
Interestingly, the interests of the banks were served only in so far as the outcome allowed 
them to compete for market share once the first institution had entered the market.  The 
interests of the Department of the Environment were not served as the decision did not 
contribute to maintaining an efficient housing market. Finally, we learned that the interests of 
elected politicians or property developers were not actively or overtly pursued in the case but 
that the bad decision would likely have served their short-run interests.    
With regard to the influence of institutions on the most-likely bad decision case, the 
thesis confirmed that the lower relative institutional standing of the Department of the 
Environment vis-à-vis the banks and Regulator in the eyes of the Department of Finance 
contributed to the bad decision. The dependence of the Department of Finance on the 
Regulator for information was also a negative influence on the decision process. In addition, 
the lack of clarity about which institution (the Department of Finance or Regulator) was the 
de facto decision-maker in the case influenced the decision-making process negatively. We 
learned that the institutional secrecy of the Central Bank / Regulator in its dealings with the 
Department of Finance, and to a lesser extent the Department of the Environment, 
contributed to the bad decision. The thesis revealed that the decline in the Department of 
Finance’s institutional confidence and credibility was a negative influence on the outcome. 
Further, the lower relative institutional standing of government Departments vis-à-vis the 
Regulator in the eyes of the banks contributed to the bad decision. Finally, we learned that the 
institutional memory of the Central Bank was a negative influence on the process.  
Turning to the influence of ideology on decision-making, the thesis found that the 
ideological instincts of the Department of Finance and likely the wider government-system at 
the time were served by the bad decision, and that this hindered the process. The available 
evidence was sufficient for the Department of the Environment to conclude that intervention 
was necessary, and thus it trumped any ideological instinct, but this did not lead to a good 
decision overall. We learned that the dominant market ideology of the time (combined with 
the relative institutional standing of the Department of the Environment) contributed to the 
poor decision outcome by raising the threshold to be reached for intervention to be seriously 
considered.  
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Also in Part III, we learned that interests, institutions, and ideology interact and can be linked 
to irrationality. For example, the interests of the banks who issued 100 per cent LTV products 
activated wider irrationality, precipitated extrapolation and confirmation bias, built 
expectations of continued house price increases, and contributed to consensus view that the 
property market would experience a soft-landing.  Also, we learned how the institutional 
arrangements activated groupthink and herding in decision-making in Ireland before the 
crash. The Department of Finance was entirely dependent on the Regulator for a position, 
while the Department of the Environment who had no such dependence, arrived at an 
alternative (and ultimately correct) position. We learned how ideology activated irrationality 
by raising the information-threshold which had to be breached before market intervention 
was considered seriously by the Department of Finance.  
What could be described as an ‘absence of politics’ is also noticeable in the case. 
Though the Minister for Housing (who was a Minister for State) was active in seeking a 
policy response to the introduction of 100 per cent LTV mortgages, senior Ministers were 
not. There is no evidence of similar activity by the Minister for the Environment, Dick 
Roche, or consideration of the matter by the Minister for Finance, Brian Cowen. The case 
shows civil servants acting to represent their Ministers and Departments in the decision-
making process, and officials from the Regulator representing the institutional view. This 
presents the possibility that the propensity to act impacted on the decision, with elected 
politicians being more inclined to be seen to act on issues than civil servants.  
As described in Chapter 8, a citizen may have had an expectation that Ministers 
would manage key economic decisions in a hands-on manner. The case-selection process 
outlined in Chapter 7 shows that while there are many formal decisions taken by Government 
at meetings of the Cabinet, many decisions with significant consequences for the economy 
and society are taken elsewhere. In this case, the crucial decision to not intervene was not 
taken by Government or by elected politicians, and was taken via an informal process which 
is shaped as much by institutional relationships as it is by the formal institutional framework, 
making it a process more difficult to structure or reform. The public policy environment was 
shown to be complex and decision-makers engage in give-and-take with other actors in a 
continuous process of adaptation as the situation develops.  The case study is a detailed 
account of this complex scenario, focusing on three factors which theory posits to be 
important influencers of decision-making.   
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Finally, the process tracing evidence suggests that irrationality cannot be described as the 
primary cause of the poor outcome. The detailed information considered and discussed by 
decision-makers in the case, over a period of months, argues against impactful behavioural 
convergence or groupthink. In fact, there may have been an overabundance of information 
(see Friedman, 2009: 169).  Many of the symptoms of such irrational groupthink were present 
(selective bias in processing information at hand, poor information search, incomplete survey 
of alternatives) within institutional actors, but between them there was detailed information 
exchange and deliberation. 
11.5 Scope for further research arising out of this thesis 
Despite the valuable lessons provided by this research there remains scope for further 
research to help provide definitive answers to the two overarching research questions.  
 Firstly, there is the question of detecting active, impactful irrationality using a 
quantitative method, before a crisis emerges. In section 4.4 a new process was developed 
whereby text from leaders could be efficiently and reliably retrieved from online sources. 
Section 4.3 described how a software package, Profiler Plus, has been developed which can 
automatically subject text to Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) to detect the levels of seven 
personality traits. In sections 6.8 to 6.10 there was a discussion on how different sources (ad 
libbed / semi-prepared) can impact on LTA trait scores and the possibility of correcting for 
this. Section 6.10 revealed the importance of performing LTA at a moment close to when a 
decision of consequence – and which may be impacted by personality – is being made.  
 These particular conclusions from this thesis offer the basis for interesting, rich, and 
important future research. Such research would involve computing as well as leadership 
studies expertise, and would have the objective of delivering a system for detecting active, 
impactful irrationality using a quantitative method, in real-time. The computing expertise 
would be necessary to link the automated retrieval of semi-prepared utterances by leaders 
from online sources, such as the Dáil record, with the automated LTA Profile Plus software. 
Given the increasing levels of computing power and the declining cost of data storage, a 
unified system would have the potential to allow utterances of leaders to be analysed on a 
near-constant basis. The system would allow any of the members of the Dáil (or indeed the 
Seanad), or those appearing at Oireachtas Committees (these transcripts are online also) to be 
analysed. Researchers could analyse political parties or groupings in aggregates, determine 
the extent to which traits vary by topic, by time of day, by day of week, by chamber of the 
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Oireachtas, by how far into a government’s term the debate took place, or by Left-Right 
grouping. For example, and linked to Part II of this thesis, new research reports that 
assessments of conceptual complexity call into question the typical interpretation that 
conservatives are less complex than liberals (Conway et. al, forthcoming). The impact on an 
individual of moving between opposition and government could also be assessed.  
 The impact of significant national or international events on personality traits could 
also be more easily investigated. This would include the impact of historic events on the trait 
scores of leaders who are no longer in office, or even who are deceased. For example, 
research has shown that exposure to dramatic news stories significantly decreases 
individuals’ recall of information in the stories and reduced the complexity with which 
individuals thought about the events reported (Milburn and McGrail, 2013).  Of course, use 
of the system would not be limited to Ireland and it could be employed in any jurisdiction 
where parliamentary utterances are recorded, XML-tagged and accessible.  
 The leadership studies expertise is required to examine other forms of irrationality 
(beyond behavioural convergence bias / groupthink / herding). As noted earlier, many other 
biases have been suggested as contributing to suboptimal decision-making in the decade 
before the crisis. Additional research could seek proxies to assist assessment of loss/gain 
asymmetry or extrapolation bias, for example. Leadership studies expertise would also help 
overcome the methodological issues revealed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. Most significant of 
these would be the adjustments required to correct for the semi-prepared nature of the content 
from the Oireachtas. Depending on the resources available, researchers could view the 
delivery of the particular content and use only that judged to have been ‘off-script’. Short of 
that, the thesis showed that employing ad libbed or parliamentary sources makes a significant 
difference for certain trait scores (belief in ability to control events, self-confidence, and 
distrust of others). Further research is needed to ensure the validity of the system is 
maximised.  
 In all of this it would be important to be conscious of the role of the speaker and to 
perhaps limit such assessments of speakers to comparing TDs to TDs, and Ministers to 
Ministers. If the research is interested in the trait behaviour of an individual over time, role is 
not an issue unless they change portfolio.  Finally, given the findings regarding the value of 
the pre-prepared norming groups, it is advisable at this stage to limit the research such that 
there is no necessity to reference these.  If a fully automated system were developed, 
researchers could investigate the possibility of generating new, bespoke norming groups. For 
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example, a norming group of all the leaders of a particular party going back to the beginning 
of Dáil records (January 1919) would make for interesting analysis of present-day leaders.  
Most importantly, such an automated system has the potential to deliver a real-time detection 
of active irrationality, which has been identified as a significant contributory factor in the 
precipitation of the economic crisis. Given the economic, social and political fall-out of the 
crisis, future research along the lines set out above, are worthy of consideration.  
 Secondly, there is the question of interests, institutions, and ideology negatively 
impacting information processing and contributing to active irrationality among decision-
makers, and strategies to mitigate their negative influence. This thesis and its proposed 
framework of decision-making analysis has reinforced the notion of the complex 
environment facing policy-makers (section 3.3), and also highlighted importance of the 
lessons from behavioural economics for policy-making (section 2.1). Complex policy 
environments increase the need for efficient information flow, and much of the negative 
influence of interests, institutions, and ideology revealed in the thesis arises from their impact 
on such flows. The thesis also demonstrated the link between irrational groupthink and the 
conceptual complexity / in-group bias of decision-makers (section 2.2).  Chapters 9 and 10 
presented a number of critical instances in the case-study where information did not flow 
correctly, and how this impacted negatively on the decision outcome.  In this way the thesis 
has informed future research into mitigation strategies, and how the can be targeted.  
 For example, the data that prompted a senior official in the Regulator to propose 
intervention in 2005 included growth rates of bank loans households for house purchase. In 
this instance, the official noted that mortgage credit growth rates in excess of 20 per cent 
were indicative of a previous bubble in Scandinavia.  Similar to later events in Ireland and 
elsewhere, Scandinavia suffered a bubble and bust in the early 1990s following inter alia 
financial market deregulation and the rapid increase of new lending from financial 
institutions. For example in Sweden, bank lending growth of 11 per cent per year in the early 
1980s jumped to 20 per cent in 1986 (Englund, 1999: 84).  The crash came in 1989 with an 
asset price collapse (property and stocks) and a sharp rise in interest rates, and in the 
following years with credit markets drying up, investment collapsing, GDP contracting 
sharply, and bank liabilities being guaranteed by the State. Similar events occurred in Ireland. 
 The fact that mortgage credit growth rates in excess of 20 per cent triggered concern 
within the Regulator in Ireland about a bubble in Irish property market is interesting. At the 
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beginning of 2005 year-on-year mortgage credit growth rates in Ireland had hit 30 per cent, 
and stood at 28 per cent when the proposal for intervention was made in August 2005 
(Central Bank of Ireland, 2016: 1). The eventual implementation of the proposal from May 
2006 – coupled with interest rate rises – saw the level of growth decline, falling below 25 per 
cent within nine months. In hindsight, a notional limit of 20 per cent mortgage credit growth 
would have been a useful heuristic to mandate further investigation.  In his famous speech in 
2012, the then Executive Director of Financial Stability at the Bank of England, Andrew 
Haldane, argued that the type of complex financial regulation developed before the crash 
might not just be costly and cumbersome but sub-optimal for crisis control, and that in 
financial regulation, “less may be more” (Haldane, 2012: 1).  
 Haldane draws on lessons from behavioural economics (Simon, Kahneman and 
Tversky) as this thesis has, and similarly focusses in on the ability of decision-makers to 
manage complexity. In contrast to the discussion of heuristics in Chapter 2, Haldane 
combines the research of Gigerenzer (2007, 2010), with the financial regulators’ experience 
of regulation post Basel II (see Chapter 8) to demonstrate that heuristics may in fact be an 
optimal response to the complex regulatory environment.  In summary, the research found 
that heuristics or simple rules can be suitable decision-making techniques in the face of 
complexity because:  
 Collecting and processing the information necessary for complex decision-making is 
costly 
 Disregarding information can make not only for cheaper but also for better decisions 
 In an uncertain environment, where probabilities are unknown, statistical weighting 
approaches to decision-making may no longer be suitable 
 Other things equal, the smaller the sample, the greater the model uncertainty and the 
better the performance of simple, heuristic strategies 
 Complex rules may cause people to manage to the rules, for fear of falling foul of 
them. (Haldane, 2012: 3-5) 
Gigerenzer argues for the use of “fast and frugal” heuristics whose underlying reasons we are 
not fully aware of, yet which are strong enough to act upon, and which hit at the most 
important information while ignoring the rest (Gigerenzer, 2007: 16, 18).  As mentioned, 
Haldane coupled this research with the experience of regulator’s before the crash. Where the 
Basel I regulatory regime of 1988 was only thirty pages in length, Basel II was 347 pages 
long, and the exponential increase in length and complexity made it more difficult, rather 
than easier, for regulators to assess financial institutions.  Haldane concludes: 
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“Modern finance is complex, perhaps too complex. Regulation of modern finance is 
complex, almost certainly too complex. That configuration spells trouble. As you do 
not fight fire with fire, you do not fight complexity with complexity. Because 
complexity generates uncertainty, not risk, it requires a regulatory response grounded 
in simplicity, not complexity” – Haldane, 2012: 19 
Returning to the need for strategies to improve information flow in complex environments, 
where interests, institutions, and ideology are influencing negatively, the work of Gigerenzer, 
Hertwig, and Pachur (2011) suggests an approach worthy of further research.  Haldane’s 
suggestion that fast and frugal heuristics are suitable for certain aspects of decision-making 
within financial regulation follows Gigerenzer, Hertwig, and Pachur’s ecological rationality 
guidance principle: there should be a match between the mind and the environment, such that 
a heuristic function wells. By ‘functioning well’ the authors mean that the heuristic predicts 
faster, with less information, or more accurately than a competing strategy (Gigerenzer, 
Hertwig, and Pachur, 2011: xix). This is important; in process tracing the case of 100 per cent 
LTV mortgages, D/Fin referred to a short-list of indicators suggested by international 
observers as signalling a bubble which included less suitable metrics, such as those which 
would only have been impacted after the bubble had burst (e.g. unemployment, economic 
growth). The ecological rationality and the match between a heuristic and the policy-
environment can be tested using computer simulation and mathematical analysis.  
 Future research employing these principles and techniques should investigate whether 
fast and frugal heuristics are suitable for certain aspects of decision-making within economic 
governance and policy on national competitiveness. This thesis has demonstrated how 
interests, institutions, and ideology negatively impacted information flow, including when 
data and related proposals from within the Regulator in 2005, which would have been 
positive, were rejected. For example, that decision process – in hindsight – would have 
unquestionably benefitted from a notional limit of X per cent mortgage credit growth as a 
useful heuristic to mandate further investigation by policy-makers.  This thesis suggests there 
may be scope for future research to investigate if and how a suite of heuristics can be devised 
that will aid policy-makers with bounded rationality, subject to the impacts of interests, 
institutions, and ideology, can make better decisions in the face of complexity. These 
heuristics could apply across a range of policy areas from economics to competitiveness, to 
environmental and regulatory policy. The Irish Government has made a start in this area with 
the decision in 2015, based on the work of this author, to investigate the use of heuristics to 
provide early-warning signals for further action with regard to the sustainability of 
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employment across sectors of the economy (Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, 
2015: 243-246). In addition to the benefits of such heuristics spelled out by Gigerenzer, 
Hertwig, and Pachur, and by Haldane, they carry the potential advantage of being more 
resistant to the impacts of interests, institutions, and ideology, if carefully designed, agreed in 
advance and with some independent input.  
Finally, future research on the impact of gender on macroeconomic decision-making 
may also be worth pursuing. Figure 9.1 listed the main actors in the case study on mortgage 
policy. Of the 29 people mentioned, only three are female. It is reasonable to assume that the 
same group of actors or at least a group with the same gender imbalance, decided upon a 
wide variety of economic and regulatory polices impacting on Ireland’s fortunes. The gender 
imbalance is important because of the link made in behavioural economics between the 
gender of the decision-maker, and the assessment of risk (and risk/loss aversion). Empirical 
research shows that across a variety of scenarios, males engage in more risky behaviours than 
do females (see Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer, 1999 for meta-analysis; cf. Fehr-Duda, de 
Gennaro, and Schubert, 2006). In gambling, health, recreation, and social activity, females 
demonstrate a lower propensity toward risky choices as a result of the greater perceived 
likelihood of negative outcomes and lesser expectation of enjoyment (Harris, Jenkins, and 
Glaser; 2006).  Research also suggests that level of stress in the decision-making setting 
amplifies gender differences in strategies used during risky decisions, as males take more risk 
and females take less risk under stress (Mather and Lighthall, 2012). Turning to financial 
decisions specifically, Dowling and Aribi (2013) show that the presence, and proportion, of 
female directors are strongly related to the propensity of a firm to engage in the risky activity 
(make large acquisitions), drawing on the psychological and decision-making research which 
shows females to be less overconfident in their decision-making. In the case study in this 
thesis, the decision-makers could be described as demonstrating risky behaviour by not 
responding to the concerns of the Department of the Environment and elsewhere, and not to 
intervening in the market. Of course, those decision-makers may describe the proposed 
intervention as a higher risk. In any event, the impact of gender (and gender imbalance) on 
macroeconomic decision-making by elected leaders and senior civil servants specifically, 
appears to hold potential for fruitful investigation.      
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11.6 Policy Implications 
The learnings from this thesis are new and important but to what extent do they deliver a 
solution to the original puzzle? First, must policy-makers or advisory bodies still wait for 
painful hindsight to confirm that irrationality is present and impacting to an extent that it is 
harming economic policy?  For now, yes. However, the method developed in this thesis 
which links irrationality, behavioural bias, leadership traits, conceptual complexity, and in-
group bias represents good progress. It has opened up the possibility of assessment at a 
distance, and crucially, assessment in real-time. There is cause for continued optimism that 
the real-time detection of active irrationality among key decision-makers is possible. The new 
automated text retrieval process devised for this thesis, when coupled with the automated 
LTA/Profiler Plus system, opens great potential for researchers interested in leadership and 
decision-making. Further, though the hypothesis was not supported by the results, the 
subsequent in-depth investigation of the LTA methodology has produced important lessons 
for those designing approaches to assessment at a distance.  
 Second, the puzzle presented the challenge of devising responses to counteract any 
negative link detected between interests, institutions, and ideology, and poor outcomes. The 
development and testing of a new framework for analysis in this thesis which revealed the 
linkages with rational/irrational decision-making is valuable progress. Before this research 
was undertaken there were ‘islands of knowledge’: international research pointing to the role 
of interests, institutions, and ideology; research into Ireland’s crisis highlighting the impact of 
interests and institutions, or ideology and irrationality. There were some linkages made of 
course, but the model developed for this thesis makes these linkages explicit and suggests 
processes which can explain variation in ‘levels’ of irrationality. This represents important 
progress as mitigation strategies can now be far more targeted as they are informed by a 
better of understanding of how of interests, institutions, and ideology can negatively impact 
on decision-making (in rational and irrational ways). For example, information which 
prompts concerns and suggests intervention should be assessed on its merits, unimpeded by 
the dominant ideology (or irrationality) of the day. It should not be the case that ideology 
raises the threshold for signal levels necessary before intervention is to be recommended, and 
strategies, including the targeted use of heuristics, can assist here. 
 Overall then, the thesis has succeeded in improving our understanding of why policy-
makers in Ireland before the crash acted the way they did, and did not respond adequately to 
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advice. Despite the results, the notion that irrationality was an important factor stands. The 
failure to detect the expected signal (lower relative conceptual complexity; higher in-group 
bias) was a function of the methodology. Further, the thesis provides an improved 
understanding of how interests, institutions, and ideology influenced policy-makers in Ireland 
to act the way they did, and ignore advice the way they did. They did so for rational and 
irrational reasons; out of rational self-interest to avoid difficult action, as a result of rational 
institutional separation, or as a consequence of a rational assessment that the decision aligns 
with ideological instincts. But also as result of irrationality prompted by the actions of 
interests, as a consequence of groupthink and herding which was supported by institutional 
arrangements, or because a dominant ideology limited information flow.   
At a thematic level, the thesis has reinforced the sense of the complexity of the 
decision-making environment and a recognition of how important the learnings from 
behavioural economics are for policy-making.  A recurring point has been how information 
flow is influenced by external factors and is processed by individual decision-makers, or 
decision-makers in groups. Although dealing with the impact of groupthink specifically, 
Sunstein and Hasties’s prescription (2015) for better decision-making seems broadly 
applicable here. After all, a central challenge to be addressed is decision-makers failing to get 
important information, whether as a direct result of interests or institutions or ideology on 
actors acting rationally, or via linked irrationality. The remedy proposed by Sunstein and 
Hastie looks like it would have had a reasonable chance of improving the decision-making 
outcome in the case detailed here. That is (i) ensuring that options are not closed down too 
early, by preparing a comprehensive list of solutions ahead of selecting a solution, (ii) 
challenging any notion of the inherent ‘wisdom of the crowd’, by actively seeking dissent and 
ensuring diversity of opinion within the group of decision-makers, and guarding against 
‘happy-talk’ dominating the discussions, (iii) avoiding ‘chasing an expert’, by consulting a 
number of experts as opposed to the one who appears best placed to inform a decision, and 
(iv) broadening information search by exploiting technology and web-based information 
sources, and employing creative idea-generation techniques. These immediate policy-lessons 
have, on the face of it, a good chance of improving decision-making on a case-by-case basis 
and, in the aggregate, guarding against broad policy failure. The longer term lessons with 
regard to developing efficient real-time detection of active and harmful irrationality, and 
devising suitable heuristics to help policy-makers overcome bounded rationality and 
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complexity, can also contribute to strategies to mitigate against disasters such as the 
economic crisis in Ireland from 2008.    
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Advice from the National Competitiveness Council, 1997 – 2006 
The National Competitiveness Council (NCC) was established in 1997 by the Government to 
report to the Taoiseach on key competitiveness issues facing the Irish economy and offer 
recommendations on actions necessary to improve Ireland’s competitive position. The fact 
that the NCC was established in the first place should provide some encouragement that 
decision-makers viewed national competitiveness as important to the well-being of the 
economy (and the State as a whole), and that its advice on how to ensure a competitive 
economy would be acted upon. In fact, decision-makers presided over a steady decline in 
Ireland’s competitiveness which made the economic crash more severe and recovery more 
difficult (NCC, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Ireland’s International Competitiveness Rankings, 1997 – 201117 
                                                          
17
 IMD ranking is taken from the International Institute for Management Development’s World Competitiveness 
Yearbook; WEF ranking is sourced from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. Note 
that there were adjustments in the WEF methodology between 2002 and 2005 which may account for shifts.  
      
 
Within a year of establishment, the NCC was warning that Ireland’s competitive position - 
while outstandingly strong in recent years - was “not yet based on solid foundations and 
needs to be kept under constant review if recent danger signs such as skills shortages, 
infrastructural bottlenecks, lack of investment in telecommunications and the growing gap 
between multinationals and indigenous companies are not to undermine it” (NCC, 1998: 1). 
This warning was accompanied by policy advice on how to remedy the situation, in this case 
dealing with social insurance, personal tax rates corporation tax for small firms and the skill 
requirements of the economy.  
 The annual cycle of ‘diagnosis and prescription’ on Ireland’s faltering national 
competitiveness continued over the period of the boom. Looking at their annual reports
18
 
shows, for example, in 2001, the NCC was highlighting the need for regulatory reform to 
increase competition in locally traded sectors.  In 2003, they warned that the rapid growth in 
costs was not accompanied by higher efficiency and productivity. When these inefficiencies 
are passed onto the rest of the economy, the NCC warned that Ireland’s international 
competitiveness would deteriorate and jobs in the exposed internationally trading sectors of 
the economy would be lost.  
 In 2004, they warned government to broaden its revenue base. In 2005, they warned 
of the need to strike the right balance between competitive taxes and the adequate provision 
of public goods. In 2006, the NCC highlighted the need to ensure the sustainability of the tax 
regime. They said government should continue to shift tax incentives away from investments 
in property and broaden the revenue base that finances public spending. The proposed next 
round of benchmarking the pay of public service employees vis-à-vis the private sector 
should be fully evidence-based and transparent in its analysis, and should continue to 
incentivise public sector efficiency they said, while urging government to gain better control 
over current expenditure.  
 These warnings were accompanied by recommended policy actions, directed at 
government to guard against downside risk. In some cases the government took on board 
recommendations related to improving Ireland competitiveness, took decisions and 
implemented policy changes (e.g. maintaining a competitive tax wedge, prioritisation of 
education and R&D investment, more integrated approach to planning and delivery of capital 
                                                          
18
 NCC publications can be found at www.competitiveness.ie/publication/nccSearch.jsp 
      
 
projects). In others cases, recommendations were not acted upon (e.g. tackling the high cost 
base, competition in the domestic economy, advanced broadband infrastructure and services). 
 This was despite NCC recommendations often being included in political party 
manifestoes and even Programmes for Government. The 2007 government programme 
commits inter alia to ensuring that competition thrives and that costs are kept to a minimum, 
driving down the cost of waste management charges to business, upgrading national 
infrastructure with positive consequences for business costs and productivity, and taking 
action where people contend that their legal bill is excessive and includes wasted costs 
(Department of the Taoiseach, 2007). In short, warnings were communicated to decision-
makers to inform them of negative developments in Ireland’s national competitiveness, 
accompanied by policy advice on how to remedy the situation but as shown by the data from 
international bodies (IMD and WEF), Ireland’s competitive position continued to deteriorate 
despite the annual diagnoses and prescriptions. The consequences of the failure to respond to 
advice on national competitiveness should not be underestimated, and its impact on the crisis 
is best summarised by Regling and Watson, who reference the competitiveness factors on 
which the NCC advised: 
“While global and domestic factors...interacted in mutually reinforcing ways, it is 
feasible to disentangle the main ‘home-made’ elements in the debacle.  
Fiscal policy heightened the vulnerability of the economy. At the macroeconomic 
level, [government] should have done more to dampen the powerful monetary and 
liquidity impulses that were stimulating the economy. Budgets that were strongly 
counter-cyclical could have helped to moderate the boom, and would also have 
created fiscal space to cushion the recession when it came.  
But budgetary policy veered more toward spending money while revenues came in. In 
addition, the pattern of tax cuts left revenues increasingly fragile, since they were 
dependent on taxes driven by the property sector and by high consumer spending. 
Ireland was also unusual in having tax deductibility for mortgages, and significant and 
distortive subsidies for commercial real estate development, yet no property tax... 
Wage settlements accelerated markedly from the late 90s, in absolute and in relative 
terms... Ireland had also the highest price level in the euro area according to Eurostat 
statistics.  
Competitiveness deteriorated significantly. From 1999 to 2008, Ireland's real effective 
exchange rate increased more than that of any other country in the euro area. Of 
course, some loss of competitiveness is the natural mechanism through which growth 
is slowed in a euro area economy that is overheating. In Ireland, however, an 
imprudent expansion of bank lending, accompanied by an unwise policy on tax 
exemptions, resulted in this natural economic cycle becoming much more extreme 
than should have ever have been the case” - Regling and Watson, 2010: 21 
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Case Study Selection from the Universe of Government Decisions 
To identify a case for the process tracing exercise, first a universe of relevant government 
decisions was assessed, bearing in mind the period of interest and the constraints of 
legislation. The period of interest is from 2001 on, when the Irish economy moved from its 
sustainable growth phase to its unsustainable boom phase. Under the relevant legislation in 
force at the time of the research, access to papers was subject to a ten-year rule meaning that 
the final year which could be assessed was 2004.  
 A list of all Government decisions taken at formal Cabinet meetings for the four 
years, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 was provided by the Department of the Taoiseach. The 
universe of formal decisions taken in these four years was 3,425 (868, 870, 852 and 835 in 
each year respectively). Selecting decisions which relate to a policy area that can be 
reasonably assumed to have impacted on the Ireland’s economy is a subjective exercise. In 
addition, such a selection must be made based on how each decision is described in the list 
provided.  
The list of 3,425 government decisions contains the title of the decision, not the detail 
of the decision itself. In some cases, the title of the decision strongly indicated that its 
substance impacted on the economy e.g. Budget 2002, Economic and Budgetary Outlook 
2003-2005, or Five Year Multi-Annual Framework for Capital Expenditure 2004-2008. In 
other cases, the title strongly indicates the opposite e.g. Chester Beatty Library: Report of the 
Board of Trustees, 2001, or Judge of The High Court: Appointment of One Ordinary Judge. 
Unsurprisingly, a large number of the decision titles required a subjective judgement call 
when selecting them as being impactful on the national economy or otherwise: knowing what 
we know now, was this a decision that was likely to have contributed to the onset or 
mitigation of the economic crisis? Again, as Bennett and Elman note, although the dependent 
variable is known (bad decision), selection bias is to be avoided; “it is appropriate to study a 
case in which the outcome is known if the purpose is to determine whether a purported 
necessary cause is operating” (Bennett and Elman, 2006: 462).  
Taking this together, and accepting that further informative documentation on each 
decision would be requested, 343 (10 per cent) of the universe 3,425 decisions taken in the 
four years from 2001 to 2004 could be described as on the face of it impacting on the national 
economy as understood in this research. Of the 868 formal decisions taken by Government at 
Cabinet in 2001, 86 (ten per cent) can be described as impacting the economy.  For 2002, of 
      
 
the 870 formal decisions taken by Government at Cabinet in 2002, the number is 81 (nine per 
cent); in 2003 of the 852 formal decisions, 94 (eleven per cent) can be described as being of 
particular interest; finally in 2004, of the 835 formal decisions, 82 (10 per cent) can be 
described as being of real interest when considering the fortunes of Ireland’s economy in the 
following years.   
 In selecting cases, it is important to be mindful of resource constraints. For example, 
examination of additional information provided by the Department of the Taoiseach revealed 
that there are 57 Cabinet documents associated with the Budget 2003 decision alone. 
Therefore, having reduced a universe of 3,425 possible decisions to 343 economy-related 
formal Government decisions as understood for this research, the case study selection process 
required a second run, to settle on a smaller and more practical number of potential cases.   
To reduce the first decision-subset from 343 to, say, about five bad decisions for 
which official records would be sought, it was important to consider again the original 
purpose of the inquiry. It is widely accepted that lost national competitiveness over the period 
of the boom was a key element of how the crisis developed into a bust, and this aspect of 
economic policy is a central aspect of this research. Decisions which in hindsight were self-
evidently incorrect are likely to be revealed in relation to the consideration of and response to 
the NCC’s Competitiveness Challenge reports between 2001 and 2004 and the consideration 
of and response to the reports on expenditure trends and plans, and subsequent Budgets.  
By examining the full universe of formal decision taken by Government at Cabinet 
during government meetings in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004, it was possible to identify via 
two iterations, two policy areas and over sixty instances where ostensibly bad decisions were 
taken, namely national competitiveness reports and public finance stability. 
 
  Cabinet 
Meeting Date 
Decision Topic 
1 04/12/2001 'The Competitiveness Challenge 2001': Publication 
2 19/11/2002 The Competitiveness Challenge 2002: Publication 
3 25/11/2003 Competitiveness Challenge 2003 And The Annual Competitiveness 
Report 2003: Publication 
4 05/10/2004 Competitiveness Challenge 2004 And The Annual Competitiveness 
Report 2004: Publication 
Decisions on Competitiveness Reports 2001-2004 
      
 
 
  Cabinet 
Meeting Date 
Decision Topic 
1 30/01/2001 Budget 2001: Update 
2 06/02/2001 Ireland's Budgetary Policy: Commission Recommendation 
3 20/02/2001 Government Policy On Public Expenditure In 2001 
4 06/03/2001 Estimates 2001: Savings To Eliminate Overrun On Budget Spending 
Levels 
5 27/03/2001 "No-Policy Change" Expenditure Projections For 2002-2003: 
Approval 
6 15/05/2001 Expenditure Position In 2001 
7 12/06/2001 2002-2004 No Policy Change Expenditure Projections 
8 26/06/2001 Expenditure Review Process 
9 27/07/2001 Economic And Budgetary Strategy 2002-2004 
10 12/09/2001 Public Expenditure In 2001 And 2002 
11 02/10/2001 Estimates 2002 
12 23/10/2001 Estimates 2002 
13 31/10/2001 Estimates 2002 
14 06/11/2001 Estimates 2002 
15 27/11/2001 "No Policy Change" Expenditure Projections For 2003 And 2004 
16 27/11/2001 Estimates Of Receipts And Expenditure For The Year Ending 31 
December, 2002 (White Paper) 
17 05/12/2001 Budget 2002 
18 30/01/2002 Budget 2002: EU Commission Assessment 
19 12/02/2002 Revised Estimates For Public Services 2002 And Public Capital 
Programme 2002 
20 26/02/2002 Estimates 
21 26/03/2002 2003 Estimates/Budget Process 
22 17/04/2002 Estimates 
23 08/05/2002 Expenditure Review Process 
24 02/07/2002 End June Exchequer Position And Approach To Expenditure 
Adjustments Agreed By Government 
      
 
25 02/07/2002 Economic And Budgetary Strategy 2003-2005 
26 26/07/2002 Estimates 2003: Expenditure Review Mechanism 
27 22/10/2002 Economic And Budgetary Outlook 2003-2005 
28 30/10/2002 Estimates 2003 
29 05/11/2002 Estimates 2003 
30 12/11/2002 Estimates 2003 
31 20/11/2002 Estimates 2003 
32 26/11/2002 Estimates Of Receipts And Expenditure For Year Ending 31 
December 2003 (White Paper) 
33 03/12/2002 NESC Report No. 109: Achieving Quality Outcomes - Management 
Of Public Expenditure 
34 04/12/2002 Budget 2003 
35 11/02/2003 Revised Estimates For Public Services 2003 And Public Capital 
Programme 2003 
36 04/03/2003 2003 Service Plans And Expenditure Level 
37 04/03/2003 2004 Estimates/Budget Process 
38 23/07/2003 Expenditure Trends In 2003: Position At End May 2003 
39 23/07/2003 Economic And Budgetary Strategy 2004-2006 
40 16/09/2003 Expenditure Estimates 2004 
41 22/10/2003 Expenditure Estimates 2004 
42 04/11/2003 Estimates 2004 
43 18/11/2003 Five Year Multi-Annual Framework For Capital Expenditure 2004-
2008 
44 22/11/2003 Five Year Multi-Annual Framework For Capital Expenditure 2004-
2008 
45 25/11/2003 Estimates Of Receipts And Expenditure For Year Ending 31 
December 2004 (White Paper) 
46 02/12/2003 Budget 2004 
47 03/12/2003 Budget 2004 
48 08/06/2004 Report On Expenditure Trends In 2004 
49 14/07/2004 Expenditure Trends In 2004: Report 
50 14/07/2004 Control And Management Of Expenditure: Report To End June 2004 
51 14/07/2004 Economic And Budgetary Strategy 2005-2007 
      
 
52 21/09/2004 Appraisal And Management Of Capital Expenditure 
53 16/11/2004 Report On Expenditure Trends In 2004 
54 23/11/2004 Estimates Of Receipts And Expenditure For Year Ending 31 
December 2005 
55 03/02/2004 Revised Estimates 2004 And Public Capital Programme 2004 
56 27/10/2004 Estimates 2005 
57 09/11/2004 Estimates 2005 
58 23/11/2004 Estimates Of Receipts And Expenditure For Year Ending 31 
December 2005 
59 30/11/2004 Budget 2005 
60 14/12/2004 E.U. Future Financial Perspectives: Policy Changes And Budgetary 
Means Of The Enlarged Union, 2007-2013 
Decisions on Public Finances 2001-2004 
However, given the broad scope of both policy areas, it was necessary to identify specific 
decision within each that could be subjected to in-depth, process tracing analysis. This was 
done with reference to the four official investigations carried out into the crisis in Ireland i.e. 
Honohan (2010), Regling and Watson (2010), Wright (2010), and Nyberg (2011) reports. 
That process is described in Chapter 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
